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


Two Papers About the MPC! (Sort Of)

Chris Carroll
These are my views and not those of anybody else at CFPB

May 20, 2015





Nobody trying to make a forecast in 2009–2010 would ask:

Big negative shocks to income

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 - □ If $\kappa = 0.05$ then multiplier is only ≈ 0.05
 - 2007-vintage DSGE models mostly implied κ ∈ (0.00, 0.05)



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$0 < \hat{\alpha} < 1$: Not Exactly a Triumph

Problem:

Friedman's PIH is not really about r

Standard Theory About Response to r ...

If $u(\mathbf{c}) = (1 - \gamma)^{-1} \mathbf{c}^{1-\gamma}$, and r is believed to be constant forever, then perfect foresight infinite horizon model PerfForesightCRRA says

$$c = \underbrace{\left(b_t + p\left(\frac{1+r}{r}\right)\right)}_{o} \underbrace{\left(r - \gamma^{-1}(r-9)\right)}_{c}$$

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$$= o\kappa$$

where o is 'overall wealth' (human plus nonhuman), and $o\kappa$ is the amount that the model says is OK to spend (!)

Unanticipated Permanent Change In r

$$\boldsymbol{c}_t = \left(r - \gamma^{-1}(r - \vartheta)\right)\left(\boldsymbol{b}_t + \boldsymbol{p}\left(\frac{1+r}{r}\right)\right)$$

Three effects:

• Income Effect (assume $\gamma^{-1} = 0$ and $\boldsymbol{p} = 0$):

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• Human Wealth Effect ($p \neq 0$, r_t and r_{t+1} small)

$$\Delta \boldsymbol{c}_{t+1} \approx (1/r_{t+1} - 1/r_t) \boldsymbol{p} \kappa_t = (r_t/r_{t+1} - 1) (\kappa_t/r_t) \boldsymbol{p}$$

Sizes? Depends ...

Simple calibration: $\boldsymbol{b}_t = \boldsymbol{p} = 1$, $r_t = 0.06$, $r_{t+1} = 9 = 0.03$

	Effect Size		
γ	Income-And-Subst	Human Wealth	$\Delta oldsymbol{c}_{t+1}/\Delta oldsymbol{y}_{t+1}$
∞	0.03	1.0	1.03/0.03 ≈ 30
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Definitely not rejected!

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Any of these differences could make *huge* difference for behavior

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- ∃ people for whom extra income from ARM resets in 2009-2010 will lead to some c and some deleveraging
- Little progress has been made on 'What will the MPC be out of stimulus payments?'



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- Me: No! Use data and results to calibrate a theory
 - IF data line up reasonably with theory, maybe we learned something



Three kinds of 'heterogeneity':

• Within person over time:



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 - Shift in state variable



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 - Dummies maybe control for levels but not patterns of behavior



Example Of Puzzle That Isn't

At a couple of places, some confusion about apparent contradiction:

Low wealth borrowers have a higher MPC




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- Low wealth borrowers deleverage more



A Wealth Shock





Another Puzzle That Isn't


Sometimes low wealth borrowers deleverage more

Another Puzzle That Isn't

- Sometimes low wealth borrowers deleverage more
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Differences Across Households In Time Preference





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This DOES reject a theory: RBC at local level



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- ⇒ Use for calibrating theories



Milton A. Friedman. *A Theory of the Consumption Function*. Princeton University Press, 1957.