Agency Problems and Conflicts of Interest in Financial Intermediaries

December 3-4, 2004
A conference jointly sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), and the Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics of Ohio State University.

Overview
In financial markets, financial intermediaries act as agents of issuers and investors, and “gatekeepers.” This multiplicity of functions can lead to conflicts of interest. By performing its gatekeeping role well, for instance, a financial intermediary may have to forgo profitable investment banking assignments.

This conference aims to promote a better understanding of the economic relevance of conflicts of interest in financial intermediaries by examining: whether the conflicts were particularly worse at the end of the 1990s; how conflicts are managed within financial institutions; how contracting, legal, and reputation mechanisms affect conflicts; and the role of regulatory authorities and regulations in overseeing conflicts.

Conference Agenda PDF OFFSITE

Conference Location
Fisher College of Business
Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio

Conference Organizers
Hamid Mehran, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
René Stulz, Ohio State University

Contact
Please address any questions, to:

Hamid Mehran
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Research
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
hamid.mehran@ny.frb.org