## **SURVEY OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS JULY 2022**

This survey is formulated by the Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to enhance policymakers' understanding of market expectations on a variety of topics related to the economy, monetary policy and financial markets. The questions involve only topics that are widely discussed in the public domain and never presume any particular policy action. FOMC participants are not involved in the survey's design.



Please respond by Monday, July 18th at 2:00pm Eastern Time to the questions below. Your time and input are greatly appreciated. Type of Respondent: **Market Participant** Respondent Name: 1a) Provide below your expectations for <u>changes</u>, if any, to the language referencing each of the following topics in the July FOMC statement. <u>Please write N/A if you do not expect any changes.</u> Current economic conditions: Economic outlook and communication on the expected path of the target federal funds rate: Communication on tools other than the target federal funds rate: Other: **1b)** What are your expectations for the Chair's press conference?

		Rating:							
Please explain:				I					
								]	
								J	
<b>3a)</b> Provide your estimate of the applicable, immediately for below. For the time period providing your response.									
		2022 FOMO	meetings			2023 FOMO	meetings		
	Jul 26-27	Sep 20-21	Nov 1-2	Dec 13-14	Jan 31-Feb 1	Mar 21-22	May 2-3	Jun 13-14	
Target rate / midpoint of target range:		·							
			Qua	rters					
Target rate / midpoint of	2023 Q3	2023 Q4	2024 Q1	2024 Q2	2024 Q3	2024 Q4			
target range:									
		Yea	ars						
Target rate / midpoint of	2025	2026	2027	2028					
target range:									
<b>3b)</b> In addition, provide your enterth	estimate of the	ne longer run	target feder	al funds rate	and your exp	pectation for t	he average		
rederal fullus fate over th	e next to ye	ais.							
Ī						erage federal ext 10 years:			
Longer run:				IUIIO	late over in			-	
Longer run:		l		Turido	rate over in			1	
Longer run:				Turide	Tate over no				
Longer run:				Turido	Tate Over III				

2) How would you grade the Federal Reserve System's communication with the markets and with the public since the last policy survey? Please provide a rating between 1 and 5, with 1 indicating ineffectiveness and 5 indicating

effectiveness.

Please indicate the percent chance\* that you attach to the target federal funds rate or range falling in each of the following ranges immediately following the July and September FOMC meetings and at the end of 2022, 2023, and 2024. If you expect a target range, please use the midpoint of that range in providing your response.

_	≤ 1.00%	1.01 - 1.25%	1.26 - 1.50%	1.51 - 1.75%	1.76 - 2.00%	2.01 - 2.25%	2.26 - 2.50%	2.51 - 2.75%	2.76 - 3.00%	≥ 3.01%	
July 26-27:											0.00%
	≤ 1.50%	1.51 - 1.75%	1.76 - 2.00%	2.01 - 2.25%	2.26 - 2.50%	2.51 - 2.75%	2.76 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.25%	3.26 - 3.50%	≥ 3.51%	
September 20- 21**:											0.00%
	≤ 2.00%	2.01 - 2.25%	2.26 - 2.50%	2.51 - 2.75%	2.76 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.25%	3.26 - 3.50%	3.51 - 3.75%	3.76 - 4.00%	≥ 4.01%	
Year-end 2022**:											0.00%
Year-end 2023**:											0.00%
•	≤ 1.75%	1.76 - 2.00%	2.01 - 2.25%	2.26 - 2.50%	2.51 - 2.75%	2.76 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.25%	3.26 - 3.50%	3.51 - 3.75%	≥ 3.76%	
Year-end 2024**:			w should add i								0.00%

<sup>\*</sup>Responses across each row should add up to 100 percent.

3d) What is your estimate of the target federal funds rate or range a	t the effective lower bound?
Level of the target federal funds rate or range at the effective lower bound (in percent):	

3e)	For parts a-d, please explain the factors behind any change to your expectations, where applicable, since the last policy survey.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Bins were chosen with consideration to responses to question 2a in the June SPD and SMP as well as market pricing.


**3f)** Please indicate the percent chance\* that you attach to the <u>highest level of the target range for the federal funds</u> rate before the target range is next decreased falling in each of the following ranges.

≤ 2.25%	2.26 - 2.50%	2.51 - 2.75%	2.76 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.25%	3.26 - 3.50%	3.51 - 3.75%	3.76 - 4.00%	4.01 - 4.25%	≥ 4.26%	Sum
										0.00%

<sup>\*</sup>Responses should add up to 100 percent. Bins were chosen with consideration to responses to question 2a in the June SPD and SMP.

The following matrix lays out hypothetical scenarios in which the realized levels of the 2022 unemployment rate (Q4 average level) and 2022 core PCE inflation (Q4/Q4 growth) are either 50 basis points above, below, or equal to the medians of FOMC participants' projections for these indicators in the current (June 2022) Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). For example, the upper left box represents a scenario in which the unemployment rate and core PCE inflation are both 50 basis points below the current SEP medians.

For each of the following scenarios, please indicate the level of the target federal funds rate or range that you expect would prevail at the end of Q1 2023. If you expect a target range, please indicate the midpoint of that range in providing your response.\*



Please explain any assumptions underlying your responses.

<sup>\*</sup>For reference, a similar question was last asked in the May 2022 survey.

**5a)** Please provide your modal expectation for the <u>total net change in SOMA holdings</u> of U.S. Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) over each of the periods below.

If you expect SOMA holdings to increase on net in a given period, for example through net asset purchases, please enter a positive number. If you expect SOMA holdings to be unchanged on net in a given period, for example through reinvestments that result in no net change in holdings, please enter 0. If you expect SOMA holdings to decline on net in a given period, for example through maturities or paydowns that exceed any reinvestments or through sales, please enter a negative number.

Net change amounts referenced below are in \$ billions.

Not change in SOMA		Total net ch	ange over	each period	
Net change in SOMA holdings:	August 2022	September 2022	October 2022	November 2022	December 2022
U.S. Treasuries (\$ billions):					
Agency MBS (\$ billions):					

Net change in SOMA holdings:	Total net change over each quarter						
riolalings.	2023 Q1	2023 Q2	2023 Q3	2023 Q4			
U.S. Treasuries (\$ billions):							
Agency MBS (\$ billions):							

Net change in SOMA holdings:	Total net change over each quarter							
noidings.	2024 Q1	2024 Q2	2024 Q3	2024 Q4	2025 Q1	2025 Q2	2025 Q3	2025 Q4
U.S. Treasuries (\$ billions):								
Agency MBS (\$ billions):								

Please indicate the period in which you expect the SOMA portfolio will cease to decline as well as the size of the SOMA portfolio when it ceases to decline. For reference, Securities Held Outright in the SOMA portfolio on July 6, 2022 was \$8,456 billion according to the most recent H.4.1 release.

Period in which SOMA portfolio ceases to decline*:	
*Dropdown selections: Q3 20	022. Q4 2022. Q1 2023. Q2

\*Dropdown selections: Q3 2022, Q4 2022, Q1 2023, Q2 2023, Q3 2023, Q4 2023, Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024, Q1 2025, Q2 2025, Q3 2025, Q4 2025, Q1 2026, Q2 2026, Q3 2026, Q4 2026, Q1 2027, Q2 2027, Q3 2027, Q4 2027, Q1 2028 or later.

Size of SOMA portfolio when it	
ceases to decline**:	

\*\*Dropdown selections: \$0-500bn, \$501-1000bn,\$1001-1500bn, \$1501-2000bn, \$2001-2500bn, \$2501-3000bn, \$3001-3500bn, \$3501-4000bn, \$4001-4500bn, \$4501-5000bn, \$5001-5500bn, \$5501-6000bn, \$6001-6500bn, \$6501-7000bn, \$7001-7500bn, \$7501-8000bn, \$8001bn or larger.

56)	Please indicate the percent chance* that you attach to the size of the SOMA portfolio falling in each of the
<i>30</i>	Please indicate the percent chance* that you attach to the size of the SOMA portfolio falling in each of the following ranges when it ceases to decline. For reference, Securities Held Outright in the SOMA portfolio on July
	6, 2022 was \$8,456 billion according to the most recent H.4.1 release.

\$4000bn or smaller	\$4001- 4500bn	\$4501- 5000bn	\$5001- 5500bn	\$5501- 6000bn	\$6001- 6500bn	\$6501- 7000bn	\$7001- 7500bn	\$7501bn or larger	Sum
									0.00%

<sup>\*</sup>Responses should add up to 100 percent.

5d)	Please provide any additional information on your expectations for balance sheet reduction, including any factors
ouj	Please provide any additional information on your expectations for balance sheet reduction, including any factors that influenced the probability that you assigned to the distribution of outcomes in part c above.

**6)** Please provide the percent chance\* you attach to the following outcomes for U.S. real GDP growth in 2022, 2023, and 2024 (Q4/Q4).

	< 0.00%	0.00 <b>-</b> 0.50%	0.51 - 1.00%	1.01 - 1.50%	1.51 - 2.00%	2.01 - 2.50%	2.51 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.50%	3.51 - 4.00%	≥ 4.01%	Sum
2022 (Q4/Q4):											0.00%
2023 (Q4/Q4):											0.00%
2024 (Q4/Q4):											0.00%

<sup>\*</sup>Responses across each row should add up to 100 percent.

Please also provide your point estimate for the most likely outcome.


2022 (Q4/Q4):	
2023 (Q4/Q4):	
2024 (Q4/Q4):	

7a\	Please provide the percent chance* you attach to the following outcomes for <u>headline PCE inflation</u> in 2022, 2023, and 2024 (Q4/Q4).
. u,	2023, and 2024 (Q4/Q4).

	≤ 3.00%	3.01 - 3.50%	3.51 - 4.00%	4.01 - 4.50%	4.51 - 5.00%	5.01 - 5.50%	5.51 - 6.00%	6.01 - 6.50%	6.51 - 7.00%	≥ 7.01%	Sum
2022 (Q4/Q4)**:											0.00%
	≤ 1.50%	1.51 - 1.75%	1.76 - 2.00%	2.01 - 2.25%	2.26 - 2.50%	2.51 - 2.75%	2.76 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.25%	3.26 - 3.50%	≥ 3.51%	Sum
2023 (Q4/Q4)**:											0.00%
2024 (Q4/Q4)**:											0.00%

<sup>\*</sup>Responses across each row should add up to 100 percent.

Please also provide your point estimate for the most likely outcome.



**7b)** For the outcomes below, provide the percent chance\* you attach to the annual average <u>CPI inflation</u> rate from July 1, 2022 - June 30, 2027 falling in each of the following ranges. Please also provide your point estimate for the most likely outcome.

≤ 0.50%	0.51 <b>-</b> 1.00%	1.01 <b>-</b> 1.50%	1.51 - 2.00%	2.01 <b>-</b> 2.50%	2.51 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.50%	≥ 3.51%	Sum	_	
								0.00%	Point estimate:	

<sup>\*</sup>Responses should add up to 100 percent.

**7c)** For the outcomes below, provide the percent chance\* you attach to the annual average <u>CPI inflation</u> rate from July 1, 2027 - June 30, 2032 falling in each of the following ranges. Please also provide your point estimate for the most likely outcome.

_	≤ 0.50%	0.51 - 1.00%	1.01 - 1.50%	1.51 - 2.00%	2.01 - 2.50%	2.51 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.50%	≥ 3.51%	Sum	_	
									0.00%	Point estimate:	

<sup>\*</sup>Responses should add up to 100 percent.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Bins were chosen with consideration to responses to question 6a in the June SPD and SMP.

the U.S. economy being in a recession*?  the global economy being in a recession* in 6 months?  the global economy being in a recession* in 6 months?  **NBER-defined recession  **Previous IMF-steff work has suggested that a "global recession" can be characterized as a period during which there is a decline in annual per-optic real global GDP, backed up by a decline or worsening in one or more of the following global macroeconomic indicators: industrial production, trade, capital flows, oil consumption and unemployment.  **Bip**  **What percent chance* do you attach to the U.S. economy first entering a recession** in each of the following periods?  **No recession by end 2022*** H1 2023 H2 2023 H1 2024 H2 2024 2024 Sum  ***Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  ***Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Thank you for your time and input. Please send survey responses to ny.mktpolicysurvey@ny.frb.org						ı				
***ThBER-defined recession**  ***Theyous IMF staff work has suggested that a "global recession" can be characterized as a period during which there is a decline in annual per-capita real global GDP, backed up by a decline or worsening in one or more of the following global macroeconomic indicators: industrial production, trade, capital flows, oil consumption and unemployment.  **Bb**  **Bb**  **What percent chance* do you attach to the U.S. economy first entering a recession** in each of the following periods?  **No recession by end  **Pesponses should add up to 100 percent.  **NBER-defined recession.  ***Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  ***Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  ***Please explain the factors behind any change to your expectations in parts a and b since the last policy survey.			the U.S. ecor	nomy curren	tly being in a	recession*?				
**NBER-defined recession  **Previous IMF staff work has suggested that a "global recession" can be characterized as a period during which there is a decline in annual per-capita real global GDP, backed up by a decline or worsening in one or more of the following global macroeconomic indicators: industrial production, trade, capital flows, oil consumption and unemployment.  **Bb**  **No recession by end 2022*** H1 2023 H2 2023 H1 2024 H2 2024 2024 Sum 2009%  **Responses should add up to 100 percent.**  **NBER-defined recession.**  **Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.**  **Includes the possibility that the factors behind any change to your expectations in parts a and b since the last policy survey.		the	e U.S. econon	ny being in a	recession* i	n 6 months?				
**Previous IMF staff work has suggested that a "global recession" can be characterized as a period during which there is a decline in annual per-capita real global GDP, backed up by a decline or worsening in one or more of the following global macroeconomic indicators: industrial production, trade, capital flows, oil consumption and unemployment.  **Bb**  What percent chance* do you attach to the U.S. economy first entering a recession** in each of the following periods?  No recession by end yellow a sum of the following periods are periods:  **Responses should add up to 100 percent.**  **NBER-defined recession.**  ***Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  ***Includes the factors behind any change to your expectations in parts a and b since the last policy survey.		the g	Jlobal econom	y being in a	recession** <u>i</u>	n 6 months?				
No recession by end 2022*** H1 2023 H2 2023 H1 2024 H2 2024 2024 Sum  *Responses should add up to 100 percent.  **NBER-defined recession.  ***Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  ***Includes the possibility that the factors behind any change to your expectations in parts a and b since the last policy survey.	**Previous per-capita	s IMF staff work ha a real global GDP,	backed up by a	a decline or wo	orsening in one			_		
No recession by end 2022*** H1 2023 H2 2023 H1 2024 H2 2024 Sum  *Responses should add up to 100 percent.  **NBER-defined recession.  ****Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  ****Includes the possibility that the factors behind any change to your expectations in parts a and b since the last policy survey.	<b>Ob)</b> What no			o 4b o 11 C o o	an a may finat d		i-n** in		all avvisa a	
2022*** H1 2023 H2 2023 H1 2024 H2 2024 Sum			o you attach to	o the U.S. ed	conomy first 6	entering a red	cession^^ in (	each of the 1	ollowing	
2022*** H1 2023 H2 2023 H1 2024 H2 2024 Sum  *Responses should add up to 100 percent.  ***NBER-defined recession.  ***Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  ***Bease explain the factors behind any change to your expectations in parts a and b since the last policy survey.						_				
*Responses should add up to 100 percent.  ***NBER-defined recession.  ****Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  ***Please explain the factors behind any change to your expectations in parts a and b since the last policy survey.	2022**	·* H1 2023	H2 2023	H1 2024	H2 2024	by end	Sum			
***NBER-defined recession.  ****Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  ***Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  ***Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **Operation of the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.  **					112 2024	ZUZ				
8c) Please explain the factors behind any change to your expectations in parts a and b since the last policy survey.	-	-	-							
	**NBER-d			v mav currentl	v ha in an NBE	-D / 6' /				
		es the possibility th	nat the economy	y may carrent	y De III all NDL	:R-aetinea rec	ession.			
Thank you for your time and input. Please send survey responses to ny.mktpolicysurvey@ny.frb.org		es the possibility th	nat the economy	y may carrent	y be iii aii NbL	:R-aetinea rec	ession.			
Thank you for your time and input. Please send survey responses to ny.mktpolicysurvey@ny.frb.org	***Include							the last pol	icy survey.	
Thank you for your time and input. Please send survey responses to ny.mktpolicysurvey@ny.frb.org	***Include							the last pol	icy survey.	
	***Include							the last pol	icy survey.	
	***Include	explain the factor	rs behind any	change to yo	our expectation	ons in parts a	and b since			
	***Include	explain the factor	rs behind any	change to yo	our expectation	ons in parts a	and b since			

**8a)** What percent chance do you attach to: