RESPONSES TO SURVEY OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS

Markets Group, Federal Reserve Bank of New York



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The **Survey of Market Participants** is formulated by the Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to enhance policymakers' understanding of market expectations on a variety of topics related to the economy, monetary policy and financial markets. The questions involve only topics that are widely discussed in the public domain and never presume any particular policy action. FOMC participants are not involved in the survey's design.

For most questions, median responses across participants, along with the 25th and 75th percentiles, are reported. For questions that ask respondents to give a probability distribution, the average response across participants for each potential outcome is reported. Brief summaries of the comments received in free response form are also provided.

Responses were received from 28 market participants. Except where noted, all 28 participants responded to each question. In some cases, participants may not have provided complete responses (e.g. may not have provided forecasts extending to the same time horizon as requested in the survey). In these instances, the number of respondents who answered all parts of the question is indicated.

List of Market Participants:

¹ Answers may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.

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1a) Provide below your expectations for <u>changes</u>, if any, to the language referencing each of the following topics in the November FOMC statement. Please write N/A if you do not expect any changes.

Current economic conditions:

Many respondents indicated they expected little or no change. Several respondents indicated they expected a mention of some moderation in job growth. Several respondents indicated they expected continued reference to elevated inflation.

Economic outlook and communication on the expected path of the target federal funds rate: (27 responses)

Many respondents indicated they expected little or no change. Several respondents indicated they expected some reference to a slowing in the pace of tightening.

Communication on tools other than the target federal funds rate:

(27 responses)

Most respondents indicated they expected little or no change.

Other:

(23 responses)

Respondents did not provide significant commentary in this section.

1b) What are your expectations for the Chair's press conference? (27 responses)

Many respondents indicated they expected the Chair to note that the pace of tightening is expected to slow or to discuss conditions for slowing. Several expected the Chair to suggest that the FOMC will be attentive to the cumulative impact of tightening on the real economy over time. Several indicated they expected the Chair to note that the peak level of the target range for the federal funds rate during this tightening cycle will likely be maintained for a period of time.

Many respondents indicated they expected the Chair to reiterate the FOMC's commitment to returning inflation to target. Several expected the Chair to continue to reference the tight labor market.

2) How would you grade the Federal Reserve System's communication with the markets and with the public since the last policy survey? Please provide a rating between 1 and 5, with 1 indicating ineffectiveness and 5 indicating effectiveness.

	Number of Respondents
1 - Ineffective	2
2	4
3	9
4	12
5 - Effective	1
# of Respondents	28

Please explain:

Many respondents viewed Fed communications as being clear, consistent, or effective. Several respondents referenced the FOMC's consistent resolve to fight inflation. For respondents that indicated communications were less effective, several cited the role of press articles in influencing the perceived policy outlook. Several respondents noted a lack of detail or consistent messaging on conditions for slowing or stopping policy rate increases.

Provide your estimate of the most likely outcome (i.e., the mode) for the target federal funds rate or range, as applicable, immediately following the FOMC meetings and at the end of each of the following quarters and years below. For the time periods at which you expect a target range, please indicate the midpoint of that range in providing your response.

	Nov. 1-2	Dec. 13-14	Jan. 31 - Feb. 1	Mar. 21-22	May 2-3	Jun. 13-14
25th Percentile	3.875%	4.375%	4.625%	4.625%	4.625%	4.625%
Median	3.875%	4.375%	4.625%	4.625%	4.625%	4.625%
75th Percentile	3.875%	4.375%	4.688%	4.875%	4.875%	4.875%
# of Respondents	28	28	28	28	28	28

	2023 Q3	2023 Q4	2024 Q1	2024 Q2	2024 Q3	2024 Q4
25th Percentile	4.375%	4.125%	3.875%	3.250%	2.625%	2.500%
Median	4.625%	4.625%	4.125%	3.875%	3.625%	3.125%
75th Percentile	4.875%	4.875%	4.625%	4.375%	4.125%	3.875%
# of Respondents	28	28	27	27	27	27

	2025 Q1	2025 Q2	2025 Q3	2025 Q4	2026	2027	2028	2029
25th Percentile	2.250%	2.125%	2.125%	2.125%	2.125%	2.125%	2.125%	2.125%
Median	2.875%	2.625%	2.625%	2.500%	2.375%	2.375%	2.375%	2.375%
75th Percentile	3.563%	3.375%	3.125%	3.063%	2.625%	2.625%	2.625%	2.625%
# of Respondents	26	26	26	26	25	25	25	25

3b) In addition, provide your estimate of the longer run target federal funds rate and your expectation for the average federal funds rate over the next 10 years.

	10-yr Average FF Rate	Longer Run
25th Percentile	2.34%	2.13%
Median	2.63%	2.38%
75th Percentile	2.89%	2.50%
# of Respondents	27	27

Please indicate the percent chance that you attach to the target federal funds rate or range falling in each of the following ranges immediately following the November FOMC meeting and at the end of 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025. If you expect a target range, please use the midpoint of that range in providing your response. (26 responses)

	Feder	al Funds	Rate or	Range af	ter the N	ovember	2022 FO	MC Meet	ing	
					3.26 - 3.50%					>= 4.51%
Average	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	16%	74%	6%	0%	0%

	Federal Funds Rate or Range at the End of 2022												
	<= 3.25%	3.26 - 3.50%		3.76 - 4.00%				4.76 - 5.00%	5.01 - 5.25%	>= 5.26%			
Average	1%	1%	2%	6%	18%	41%	28%	3%	1%	0%			

	Federal Funds Rate or Range at the End of 2023												
	<= 3.50%				4.26 - 4.50%				5.26 - 5.50%	>= 5.51%			
Average	17%	7%	9%	8%	10%	16%	15%	8%	4%	5%			

	Federal Funds Rate or Range at the End of 2024											
	<= 1.00%	1.01 - 1.50%	1.51 - 2.00%	2.01 - 2.50%	2.51 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.50%	3.51 - 4.00%	4.01 - 4.50%	4.51 - 5.00%	>= 5.01%		
Average	9%	5%	8%	12%	13%	18%	17%	9%	5%	4%		

	Federal Funds Rate or Range at the End of 2025												
	<= 1.00%				2.51 - 3.00%				4.51 - 5.00%	>= 5.01%			
Average	13%	6%	12%	22%	16%	12%	9%	5%	3%	3%			

Please indicate the percent chance that you attach to the <u>highest level of the target range for the federal funds rate before the target range is next decreased</u> falling in each of the following ranges.

			3.76 - 4.00%								
А	verage	2%	4%	5%	13%	20%	23%	14%	11%	5%	3%

3e) For parts a-d, please explain the factors behind any change to your expectations, where applicable, since the last policy survey.

(26 responses)

Many respondents indicated they increased their modal expectations for the target range for the federal funds rate compared with their prior survey response due to higher-than-expected realized inflation prints. Several respondents attributed changes in their policy expectations to communications from FOMC officials.

The following matrix lays out hypothetical scenarios in which the realized levels of the 2023 unemployment rate (Q4 average level) and 2023 core PCE inflation (Q4/Q4 growth) are either 50 basis points above, below, or equal to the medians of FOMC participants' projections for these indicators in the current (September 2022) Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). For example, the upper left box represents a scenario in which the unemployment rate and core PCE inflation are both 50 basis points below the current SEP medians.

For each of the following scenarios, please indicate the level of the target federal funds rate or range that you expect would prevail at the end of Q1 2024. If you expect a target range, please indicate the midpoint of that range in providing your response.

(23 responses)

25th Percentile Responses		2023 Unemployment Rate (Q4 average level)			
		- 50 bps	Current SEP median 4.4%	+ 50 bps	
	- 50 bps	4.19%	3.81%	3.25%	
2023 Core PCE Inflation (Q4/Q4 growth)	Current SEP median 3.1%	4.63%	4.38%	3.88%	
	+ 50 bps	5.13%	4.88%	4.63%	

Median Responses		2023 Unemployment Rate (Q4 average level)			
		- 50 bps	Current SEP median 4.4%	+ 50 bps	
	- 50 bps	4.38%	4.13%	3.63%	
2023 Core PCE Inflation (Q4/Q4 growth)	Current SEP median 3.1%	4.63%	4.63%	4.13%	
	+ 50 bps	5.38%	5.13%	4.88%	

75th Percentile Responses		2023 Unemployment Rate (Q4 average level)				
		- 50 bps	Current SEP median 4.4%	+ 50 bps		
	- 50 bps	4.38%	4.38%	4.25%		
2023 Core PCE Inflation (Q4/Q4 growth)	Current SEP median 3.1%	5.00%	4.63%	4.63%		
	+ 50 bps	5.63%	5.19%	4.94%		

Please explain any assumptions underlying your responses.

(20 responses)

Some respondents noted that they perceived the FOMC as being more responsive to inflation than to unemployment.

5a) Please provide your modal expectation for the <u>total net change in SOMA holdings</u> of U.S. Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) over each of the periods below.

If you expect SOMA holdings to increase on net in a given period, for example through net asset purchases, please enter a positive number. If you expect SOMA holdings to be unchanged on net in a given period, for example through reinvestments that result in no net change in holdings, please enter 0. If you expect SOMA holdings to decline on net in a given period, for example through maturities or paydowns that exceed any reinvestments or through sales, please enter a negative number.

		Net Ch	ange in U.S. T	reasury Secui	rities (\$ billion	ıs)		
	Nov. 2022	Dec. 2022	Jan. 2023	Feb. 2023	Mar. 2023	Apr. 2023	May. 2023	Jun. 2023
25th Percentile	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60
Median	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60
75th Percentile	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60	-60
# of Respondents	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21

	Net Change in U.S. Treasury Securities (\$ billions)									
	2023 Q3	2023 Q4	2024 Q1	2024 Q2	2024 Q3	2024 Q4	2025 Q1	2025 Q2	2025 Q3	2025 Q4
25th Percentile	-180	-180	-180	-180	-180	-180	-180	-180	-180	-21
Median	-180	-180	-180	-180	-180	-90	0	0	0	0
75th Percentile	-180	-180	-180	-180	0	0	0	0	0	35
# of Respondents	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21

	Net Change in Agency MBS (\$ billions)									
	Nov. 2022	Dec. 2022	Jan. 2023	Feb. 2023	Mar. 2023	Apr. 2023	May. 2023	Jun. 2023		
25th Percentile	-25	-25	-25	-25	-25	-25	-25	-25		
Median	-20	-20	-20	-20	-20	-20	-20	-20		
75th Percentile	-19	-18	-18	-18	-18	-18	-18	-19		
# of Respondents	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21		

	Net Change in Agency MBS (\$ billions)									
	2023 Q3	2023 Q4	2024 Q1	2024 Q2	2024 Q3	2024 Q4	2025 Q1	2025 Q2	2025 Q3	2025 Q4
25th Percentile	-80	-80	-100	-100	-75	-75	-75	-75	-75	-75
Median	-60	-60	-60	-60	-50	-45	-45	-45	-36	-15
75th Percentile	-55	-53	-45	-45	0	0	0	0	0	0
# of Respondents	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21

Please indicate the period in which you expect the SOMA portfolio will cease to decline as well as the size of the SOMA portfolio when it ceases to decline. Please also indicate the size of specified liabilities, reserves and take-up at the overnight reverse repurchase facility, when the SOMA portfolio ceases to decline.

	Period in which SOMA portfolio ceases to decline*	Size of SOMA portfolio when it ceases to decline**	Size of reserves***	Take-up at the overnight reverse repurchase facility****
25th Percentile	2024 Q2	5,750	1,875	375
Median	2024 Q4	6,250	2,375	875
75th Percentile	2025 Q4	6,750	2,375	1,500
# of Respondents	22	22	19	19

*Dropdown selections: Q4 2022, Q1 2023, Q2 2023, Q3 2023, Q42023, Q12024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024, Q1 2025, Q2 2025, Q3 2025, Q4 2025, Q1 2026, Q2 2026, Q3 2026, Q4 2026, Q1 2027, Q2 2027, Q3 2027, Q4 2027, Q1 2028, Q2 2028, Q3 2028, Q4 2028, Q1 2029 or later.

**Dropdown selections: \$0-500bn, \$501-1000bn, \$1001-1500bn, \$1501-2000bn, \$2001-2500bn, \$2501-3000bn, \$3001-3500bn, \$3501-4000bn, \$4001-4500bn, \$4501-5000bn, \$5001-5500bn, \$5501-6000bn, \$6001-6500bn, \$6501-7000bn, \$7001-7500bn, \$7501-8000bn, \$8001bn or larger

***Dropdown selections: \$1000bn or smaller, \$1001-1250bn, \$1251-1500bn, \$1501-1750bn, \$1751-2000bn, \$2001-2250bn, \$2251-2500bn, \$2501-2750bn, \$2751-3000bn, \$3001-3250bn, \$3251-3500bn, \$3501-3750bn, \$3751-4000bn, \$4001bn or larger.

****Dropdown selections: \$0-250bn, \$251-500bn, \$501-750bn, \$751-1000bn, \$1001-1250bn, \$1251-1500bn, \$1501-1750bn, \$1751-2000bn, \$2001-2250bn, \$2251-2500bn, \$2501bn or larger.

Please indicate the percent chance that you attach to the size of the SOMA portfolio falling in each of the following ranges when it ceases to decline. For reference, Securities Held Outright in the SOMA portfolio on October 12, 2022 was \$8,330 billion according to the most recent H.4.1 release.

(22 responses)

	\$4000bn	\$4001-	\$4501-	\$5001-	\$5501-	\$6001-	\$6501-	\$7001-	\$7501bn
	or smaller	4500bn	5000bn	5500bn	6000bn	6500bn	7000bn	7500bn	or larger
Average	6%	5%	8%	10%	16%	21%	16%	11%	8%

Please provide any additional information on your expectations for balance sheet reduction, including the period in which you expect the SOMA portfolio will cease to decline and the factors behind your expectations. Please include any factors that influenced the probability that you assigned to the distribution of outcomes in part c above.

(16 responses)

Many respondents indicated they expected little or no change versus the prior survey or did not provide significant commentary. Several respondents indicated they expected an earlier end to balance sheet reduction or saw risks of an earlier end due to expectations for a slowdown in growth or due to policy rate cuts.

The table below lists the average spreads of selected money market rates* over the past week. Please provide your expectation for each of these rate spreads for the day after each of the FOMC meetings. <u>Please ensure your signs are correct.</u>

Тор	of target rar	nge** minus l	ORB (in bps)	
	Nov.	Dec.	Jan. 31 -	Mar.
_	1-2	13-14	Feb. 1	21-22
25th Percentile	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
Median	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
75th Percentile	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
# of Respondents	15	15	15	15

EFFR minus IORB (in bps)								
	Nov.	Dec.	Jan. 31 -	Mar.				
_	1-2	13-14	Feb. 1	21-22				
25th Percentile	-7.0	-7.0	-7.0	-7.0				
Median	-7.0	-7.0	-7.0	-7.0				
75th Percentile	-7.0	-7.0	-7.0	-7.0				
# of Respondents	14	14	14	14				

SOFR minus IORB (in bps)									
	Nov.	Dec.	Jan. 31 -	Mar.					
	1-2	13-14	Feb. 1	21-22					
25th Percentile	-12.5	-12.5	-11.0	-11.0					
Median	-11.0	-11.0	-11.0	-11.0					
75th Percentile	-11.0	-11.0	-10.0	-9.6					
# of Respondents	14	14	14	14					

Bottom o	f target rang	je** minus ON	RRP rate (in	bps)
	Nov. 1-2	Dec. 13-14	Jan. 31 - Feb. 1	Mar. 21-22
25th Percentile	-5.0	-5.0	-5.0	-5.0
Median	-5.0	-5.0	-5.0	-5.0
75th Percentile	-5.0	-5.0	-5.0	-5.0
# of Respondents	15	15	15	15

^{*}Listed rates include the interest on reserve balances (IORB) rate, effective federal funds rate (EFFR), Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR), and overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) rate.
**Target range for the federal funds rate

7) Please provide the percent chance you attach to the following outcomes for U.S. real GDP growth in 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 (Q4/Q4).

(25 responses)

Probability Distribution of U.S. Real GDP Growth in 2022 (Q4/Q4)										
		-1.00 - -0.51%					1.51 - 2.00%		2.51 - 3.00%	>= 3.01%
Average	5%	6%	14%	26%	17%	13%	10%	4%	2%	2%

	Probability Distribution of U.S. Real GDP Growth in 2023 (Q4/Q4)										
		-1.00 - -0.51%					1.51 - 2.00%			>= 3.01%	
Average	7%	7%	14%	23%	17%	12%	8%	5%	3%	3%	

	Pro	obability	Distributi	on of U.S	S. Real G	DP Grow	th in 202	4 (Q4/Q4))	
		-1.00 - -0.51%								>= 3.01%
Average	6%	3%	4%	7%	14%	20%	22%	14%	6%	4%

Probability Distribution of U.S. Real GDP Growth in 2025 (Q4/Q4)										
		-1.00 - -0.51%					1.51 - 2.00%			>= 3.01%
Average	4%	3%	3%	6%	9%	19%	26%	16%	8%	5%

Please also provide your point estimate for the most likely outcome.

U.S. F	U.S. Real GDP Modal Point Estimates (Q4/Q4)										
	2022	2023	2024	2025							
25th Percentile	0.02%	0.26%	1.25%	1.60%							
Median	0.45%	0.50%	1.70%	1.80%							
75th Percentile	0.79%	1.08%	1.80%	2.00%							
# of Respondents	26	26	25	25							

Please provide the percent chance you attach to the following outcomes for <u>headline PCE inflation</u> in 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 (Q4/Q4).

(25 responses)

	Probability Distribution of Headline PCE Inflation in 2022 (Q4/Q4)											
	<= 3.00%	3.01 - 3.50%		4.01 - 4.50%		5.01 - 5.50%			6.51 - 7.00%	>= 7.01%		
Average	1%	2%	3%	8%	15%	23%	21%	21%	5%	2%		

Probability Distribution of Headline PCE Inflation in 2023 (Q4/Q4)										
	<= 1.50%				2.26 - 2.50%				3.26 - 3.50%	>= 3.51%
Average	3%	3%	5%	9%	11%	14%	15%	12%	16%	11%

Probability Distribution of Headline PCE Inflation in 2024 (Q4/Q4)										
						2.51 - 2.75%				>= 3.51%
Average	7%	6%	10%	20%	22%	13%	8%	5%	4%	4%

	Probability Distribution of Headline PCE Inflation in 2025 (Q4/Q4)										
	<= 1.50%	1.51 - 1.75%			2.26 - 2.50%				3.26 - 3.50%	>= 3.51%	
Average	7%	8%	19%	18%	16%	13%	7%	4%	3%	4%	

Please also provide your point estimate for the most likely outcome.

Headline	PCE Inflation	Modal Point	Estimates (Q	4/Q4)
	2022	2023	2024	2025
25th Percentile	5.26%	2.53%	2.20%	2.00%
Median	5.65%	2.78%	2.30%	2.10%
75th Percentile	5.90%	3.25%	2.50%	2.38%
# of Respondents	26	26	25	25

8b) For the outcomes below, provide the percent chance you attach to the annual average <u>CPI inflation</u> rate from November 1, 2022 - October 31, 2027 falling in each of the following ranges. Please also provide your point estimate for the most likely outcome.

(26 responses)

	<= 0.50%	0.51 - 1.00%	1.01 - 1.50%	1.51 - 2.00%	2.01 - 2.50%	2.51 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.50%	>= 3.51%
Average	0%	1%	5%	15%	24%	28%	18%	8%

	Most Likely Outcome
25th Percentile	2.50%
Median	2.50%
75th Percentile	3.00%
# of Respondents	25

8c) For the outcomes below, provide the percent chance you attach to the annual average <u>CPI inflation</u> rate from November 1, 2027 - October 31, 2032 falling in each of the following ranges. Please also provide your point estimate for the most likely outcome.

(26 responses)

	<= 0.50%	0.51 - 1.00%	1.01 - 1.50%	1.51 - 2.00%	2.01 - 2.50%	2.51 - 3.00%	3.01 - 3.50%	>= 3.51%
Average	1%	3%	10%	26%	33%	20%	6%	2%

	Most Likely Outcome
25th Percentile	2.20%
Median	2.30%
75th Percentile	2.40%
# of Respondents	25

9a) What percent chance do you attach to:

the U.S. economy currently being in a recession*? the U.S. economy being in a recession* in 6 months? the global economy being in a recession** in 6 months?

	Currently in U.S. Recession	U.S. Recession in 6 Months	Global Recession in 6 Months
25th Percentile	5%	25%	30%
Median	5%	35%	45%
75th Percentile	15%	50%	53%
# of Respondents	27	27	27

^{*}NBER-defined recession

9b) What percent chance do you attach to the U.S. economy first entering a recession* in each of the following periods?

(26 responses)

	2022**	H1 2023	H2 2023	H1 2024	H2 2024	No recession by end 2024
Average	20%	31%	23%	10%	5%	11%

^{*}NBER-defined recession

9c) Please explain the factors behind any change to your expectations in parts a and b since the last policy survey.

(24 responses)

In explaining changes to their recession probabilities, among respondents citing reasons for a higher probability of recession, some cited the tightening of monetary policy or financial conditions. Several respondents noted the risk of a global recession due to a deteriorating global outlook.

^{**}Previous IMF staff work has suggested that a "global recession" can be characterized as a period during which there is a decline in annual per-capita real global GDP, backed up by a decline or worsening in one or more of the following global macroeconomic indicators: industrial production, trade, capital flows, oil consumption and unemployment.

^{**}Includes the possibility that the economy may currently be in an NBER-defined recession.