### The case for abundant reserves

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#### Excess reserves: scarcity vs. abundance

- Debate is sometimes framed as a corridor vs. a floor
- In my experience this terminology has confused general listeners
  - Old system wasn't a corridor, nor is the new system a floor

### Going from abundance to scarcity

- Is it feasible? That is, would it work as smoothly as it did prior to 2007?
- Is it optimal? If we can get scarcity to work smoothly, would that be the best system?

### Preview of conclusions

- Returning to scarcity would be feasible, but would require coordination with other official bodies
- Harder to argue scarcity is optimal
  - Historical precedent seems less compelling, as historically the Fed didn't have an IOR facility
  - Abundance protects the Fed balance sheet, improves payment system functioning, and may have other benefits as well

# Feasibility: what is different from 2006?

- Payment volumes haven't increased much
- Autonomous factor volatility has increased, particularly Treasury's general account

Factors Absorbing Reserve funds: Treasury deposits with F.R. Banks

weekly change, million USD (eop)



# Feasibility: what is different from 2006?

- Regulatory regime shift
  - LCR: replacing reserves with other (mostly) HQLA
  - CLAR: Comprehensive Liquidity Assessment and Review
    - Public documents indicate tests of liquidity stress scenarios
    - Not all HQLA created equally. Reserves have settlement immediacy that even Treasuries lack
  - Banks internal liquidity standards may have changed, particularly with respect to intraday liquidity

# Optimality: if we can go back, should we?

- Arguments for abundant reserves:
  - Operational simplicity
  - Reduced credit risk to the Fed
  - Reduced settlement risk in the banking system
  - Less inter-day interest rate volatility
  - Public provision of safe, short-term assets

## Reducing Fed credit risk: with abundancy, reserves are bought, not borrowed



## Improved payments liquidity (borrowing from Bech, Martin, and McAndrews)

Deciles of Fedwire Value Settled throughout Day Deciles of Fedwire Value Time Distribution January 18, 2000: January 22, 2001: CHIPS intraday CHIPS closing May 17, 2004: July 1, 2006: March 24, 2011: at 17:00 finality Time open at 21:00 GSE policy risk policy change December 8, 1997: September 10, 2002: open at 00:30 CLS opens 100% 18:30 18:00 90% 17:00 16:00 15:00 50% 14:00 40% 13:00 30% 12:00 20% 11:00 10:00 10% 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors' calculations.

Notes: A twenty-one-day centered moving average is used. Values exclude payments related to CHIPS, CLS, DTC, and principal and interest payment funding.

#### Lower inter-day interest rate volatility

Federal funds rate



### Conclusions

- Staying with the current system would be operationally simpler, particularly in the transition period
- Abundant reserve balances minimize the Fed's credit risk
- They would also support better functioning of the payments system, with associated benefits
- Interest rate volatility can be expected to be lower with abundant reserves
- Public provision of safe, short-term assets: this may get too close to mission creep