Shadow Maturity Transformation and Systemic Risk

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Overview of discussion

- What is shadow bank maturity transformation and why do we care about this?
- What role did this play leading up to and during the recent financial crisis?
- How will financial reform affect the shadow banking system?
- What more needs to be done?
What is credit intermediation?

Maturity transformation: fund long-term assets with short-term liabilities

Credit transformation: enhancement through use of priority or guarantees

Liquidity transformation: illiquid assets funded by liquid liabilities
Topology of Credit Intermediation

explicit and direct

Credit put

Liquidity put

Official sector
Topology of Credit Intermediation

- **Implicit and Indirect**
  - Credit put
  - Liquidity put

- **Explicit and Direct**
  - Credit put
  - Liquidity put

- **Official Sector**

- **Implicit and Direct**
  - Credit put
  - Liquidity put

- **Explicit and Indirect**
  - Credit put
  - Liquidity put

- **Unenhanced**
Shadow Maturity Transformation

Implicit and indirect

- Credit put
- Liquidity put

Explicit and direct

- Bank-sponsored MMMF
- Tri-Party Repo
- Bank-sponsored SIV
- Official sector
- ARS
- GSE
- ABCP
- VRDO
- Independent MMMF
- Independent SIV

Unenhanced
Shadow Banking Sector

- Shadow Maturity Transformation
  - CP, Repo and Securities
  - Lending, Money funds

- Shadow Credit Transformation
  - ABS, GSE debt, Agency
  - MBS

Bank Liabilities
Official Sector Support for Shadow Banking Activities

Credit & Liquidity Programs

- AMLF - Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Fund (ABCP MMMF) Liquidity Facility
- TSLF - Term Securities Lending Facility
- TALF - Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
- CPFF - Commercial Paper Funding Facility
- PDCF - Primary Dealer Credit Facility
- TAF - Term Auction Facility

Source: March 3, 2011 H.4.1 release. Differences in balances compared to other material in this presentation may be due to differences in timing or metrics.

1. AMLF - Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Fund (ABCP MMMF) Liquidity Facility; TSLF - Term Securities Lending Facility; TALF - Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility; CPFF - Commercial Paper Funding Facility; PDCF - Primary Dealer Credit Facility; and TAF - Term Auction Facility.

2. Assets of the portfolio are exhibited and not the loans.
Asset-backed commercial paper market (ABCP)
Money Market Mutual Funds

![Graph 1: Taxable MMMF Assets, by Fund Type](image1)

- Government as % of Total
- Government
- Prime

Source: ICI

![Graph 2: Total MMMF Assets*, by Share Type](image2)

- Institutional as % of Total
- Institutional
- Retail

Source: ICI

*Includes tax-exempt funds
FAS 166/167 and Basel capital rules may significantly increase liquidity and capital requirements for bank backup lines of credit for conduits.

Balance sheet consolidation for loans or securities of the conduit:
- increased risk-based leverage ratio and capital requirements as well higher loan loss reserves.

Proposed liquidity requirements for banks could make backup lines more expensive:
- liquid assets must be sufficient to meet its stress liquidity needs for a 30-day time horizon.
The cumulative impact of these changes will likely include:

- More required capital and liquidity for bank-sponsored conduits, corresponding to higher-cost lines of credit to finance companies
- Likely end of programs which exist solely for off-balance sheet capital arbitrage

Mitigating behavior by the industry might include:

- Shift in conduit sponsorship from US banks to non-banks or foreign banks with balance sheet capacity
- Re-structuring of conduits in order to avoid accounting consolidation (e.g. sale of first-loss tranche to transfer control to third-party)

- The ABCP market will be smaller and more expensive, sponsored by non-banks and largely fund asset-backed loans originated by non-bank finance companies
Industry Tri-Party Task Force has suggested improvements in the following areas:

- Operational Arrangements
- Dealer Liquidity Risk Management
- Margining Practices
- Contingency Planning
- Transparency

“Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform” White Paper by FRBNY:

- Market reliance on intra-day credit from clearing banks
- Aggressive dealer liquidity management
- Cash investor and clearing bank risk management
- Cash contingency plans around large dealer default

Taskforce Website:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/tpr_infr_reform.html
The Future for Tri-Party Repo

- Impact on the market
  - Reduced intra-day credit and daily unwind
  - Higher margins, less cyclical margins, higher-quality collateral
- Future of broker-dealer model
  - Broker-dealer model now has liquidity backstop, but will be subject to leverage requirements and prudential supervision instead of voluntary oversight
  - Need tri-party solution to failure of major borrower to reduce systemic risk
MMMF Buffers

Loss absorption buffers address the risk of “credit” losses but may not adequately reduce the risk of losses associated with sales of assets at fire sale prices.

Access to a source of non-official emergency liquidity could further reduce this risk.
Conclusions

- The motivations for shadow banking have become even stronger with increases in capital and liquidity requirements on traditional institutions;

- The objective is to reduce the risks associated with maturity transformation through more appropriate, properly priced and transparent backstops – credit and liquidity “puts”.

- Regulation has done some good, but more work needs to be done to prevent shadow credit intermediation from being a continued source of systemic concern.