# STATE OF THE US LABOR MARKET


Ayşegül Şahin Princeton

September 26, 2025 NY Fed EAP

Based on analysis available at www.LaborMarketUpdate.net

# PAYROLL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH

#### **Nonfarm Payroll Employment**



# SLOW GROWTH OF LABOR SUPPLY TRANSLATES INTO SLOW JOB GROWTH

# Trend payroll job growth is very low without immigration

- ► Latest CBO projection is roughly 1% growth in civilian noninstitutionalized population in 2025
- ▶ Implies about 50K jobs a month in 2025

# Soft landing+declining population growth imply substantial slowdown in job growth

- ▶ Even in the absence of a recession, expect substantial slowdown in job creation
- Slow job creation could co-exist with stable unemployment rate
- Weakness mostly in lagging indicators not leading ones

#### ACCOUNTING IDENTITY THAT LINKS JOBS AND WORKERS

"Missing" jobs (payroll jobs) related to "Missing" workers

$$\underbrace{J_t}_{\substack{\text{Payroll} \\ \text{jobs}}} = \underbrace{\left(\frac{J_t}{J_t^H}\right)}_{\substack{\text{Survey}}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{J_t^H}{E_t}\right)}_{\substack{\text{Scope} \\ \text{olifference}}} \underbrace{\left(1 - u_t\right)}_{\substack{\text{Cun-)employment Participation Population rate}} \underbrace{POP_t}_{\substack{\text{rate}}}$$


 $\rightarrow$   $J_t^H$  is CPS-based proxy of nonfarm payroll employment.

# RULES OF THUMB ABOUT JOB GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND PARTICIPATION


$$\underbrace{\Delta \ln J_t}_{\text{Payroll growth}} \approx \underbrace{\Delta \ln \left(\frac{J_t}{J_t^H}\right)}_{\text{Change in survey}} + \underbrace{\Delta \ln \left(\frac{J_t^H}{E_t}\right)}_{\text{Change in scope}} - \underbrace{\underbrace{\Delta u_t}_{\text{Unemployment}}}_{\text{change}} + \underbrace{\underbrace{\Delta \ln LFPR_t}_{\text{Participation}}}_{\text{change}} + \underbrace{\underbrace{\Delta \ln LFPR_t}_{\text{Population}}}_{\text{growth}}$$

Change in $u_t$ , $LFPR_t$ or $POP_t$	Percent change in Nonfarm payrolls	Change in nonfarm payroll jobs	
0.1 pct point decrease in the <i>unemployment rate</i>	0.1 pct increase in nonfarm payrolls	150K more nonfarm payroll jobs	
0.1 pct point increase in the <i>participation rate</i>	0.16 pct increase in nonfarm payrolls	250K more nonfarm payroll jobs	
1% increase in <i>population</i>	1% increase in nonfarm payrolls	1.6 million more nonfarm payroll jobs	

# CBO'S NEW IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION GROWTH ESTIMATES



Population Growth projections




Reference: https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61390

# LABOR MARKET IN 2025: SOME (UN)-PLEASANT ARITHMETIC


Change in $u_t$ or $LFPR_t$	Percent change in Nonfarm payrolls	Change in nonfarm payroll jobs
0.2 pct point increase in the <i>unemployment rate</i>	0.2 pct decrease in nonfarm payrolls	300K less nonfarm payroll jobs
0.3 pct point decrease in the <i>participation rate</i>	0.48 pct decrease in nonfarm payrolls	750K less nonfarm payroll jobs

Need 1.6 million increase in population for employment to remain steady in 2025 The growth rate of civilian noninstitutionalized population estimated to be 1% ( $\approx$  2.6 million) by the CBO

# CASE STUDY: JAPAN



# CASE STUDY: JAPAN




# Which indicators would provide a reliable assessment of recessionary risks?


# A WIDE RANGE OF INDICATORS: SLACK-DASH

Indicator	Source	Procyclical	First mont
Unemployment rate (U3)	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	1960-0
Part-time for economic reasons	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	1960-0
Broad unemployment rate (U6)	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	1994-0
Median duration of unemployment	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	1967-0
Long-term unemployed (27 weeks or more)	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	1960-0
Unemployment Rate - 20+ yrs, Women	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	1960-0
Unemployment Rate - Black or African American	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	1972-0
Unemployment Rate - Hispanic or Latino	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	1973-0
Participation Cycle	BLS / Hobijn and Sahin (2022)	True	1978-1
Expect more jobs, net (CB)	Conference Board	True	1967-0
Expected job availability (U of Michigan)	University of Michigan	True	1978-0
Job Losers as a Percent of Total Unemployed	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	1967-0
Initial claims	Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration	False	1967-0
Announced Job Cuts	Challenger, Gray, and Christmas	False	1989-
Layoffs rate	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	2000-
Job flows: E to U	Bureau of Labor Statistics	False	1990-
Job flows: U to E	Bureau of Labor Statistics	True	1990-0
Hires rate	Bureau of Labor Statistics	True	2000-
Job openings rate	Bureau of Labor Statistics	True	2000-
Manufacturing Employment Index (ISM)	Institute for Supply Management	True	1960-
Services Employment Index (ISM)	Institute for Supply Management	True	1997-
Percent of firms with positions not able to fill right now (NFIB)	National Federation of Independent Businesses	True	1973-
Percent of firms planning to increase employment (NFIB)	National Federation of Independent Businesses	True	1973-
Labor shortage (NFIB)	National Federation of Independent Businesses	True	1993-0
Quits rate	Bureau of Labor Statistics	True	2000-
Job leavers as a percent of the unemployed	Bureau of Labor Statistics	True	1967-
Capacity utilization	Federal Reserve Board of Governors	True	1967-
Private nonfarm payroll employment (Change)	Bureau of Labor Statistics	True	1961-
Aggregate Weekly Hours (pct. Change)	Bureau of Labor Statistics	True	1965-
Temporary help employment (Change)	Bureau of Labor Statistics	True	1991-
EPOP ratio (Change)	Bureau of Labor Statistics	True	1961-0
Labor Force Participation Rate (Change)	Bureau of Labor Statistics	True	1961-0

# SEPTEMBER 2025



### JANUARY 2025



# WHY DO WE THINK THE LABOR MARKET IS NOT DOING WELL?


#### Often cited statistics

- ▶ Payroll growth → influenced by fluctuations in population growth
- ► Unemployment rate → all the rise due to job-finding margin
- ► Labor force participation rate → delayed soft landing effect+downward trend
- ▶ Job openings/hires rates → lower due to declining turnover not employment growth
- ▶ Duration of unemployment/Job-finding rate → lagging indicators

So far, we are seeing lagged effects of soft landing+low population growth


# **DURATION DISTRIBUTION**

#### **Unemployment by Duration**




# **REASON DISTRIBUTION**

#### **Unemployment by Reason**




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors' calculations


# DECEMBER 2000




## JANUARY 2001




# FEBRUARY 2001



# **MARCH 2001**



### **APRIL 2001**



# MAY 2001



<== More slack -- percentile -- Less slack ==>

20


Source: BLS, BEA, NEIB, CB, UMich, CGC, ISM, DOLETA - Authors' calculations

0


100

80

# **JUNE 2001**



# **JULY 2001**



## SUMMARY

# Labor market developments in line with soft landing+lower population growth

- ► Even in the absence of a recession, expect substantial slowdown in job creation
- Slow job creation could co-exist with stable unemployment rate
- Weakness mostly in lagging indicators not leading ones

# **Need to watch leading indicators**

Various measures of job destruction