

Recent Trends in Productivity Growth

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Economic Advisory Panel

Paula Campbell Roberts

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
Key Discussion Points

- What is most interesting about recent improvements in US labor productivity growth are the **factors that are detracting**.
- Debates around the **productivity declines experienced post GFC** persist:
 - Secular stagnation: lack of investment (despite near zero interest rates) or demographics,
 - Zombie firms: Ultra-low rates kept unviable firms alive, misallocating capital and suppressing competitive pressure that drive productivity. Covid and the subsequent rate shocks flushed out some excess paving the way for more healthy business formation, but the proportion of listed firms unable to cover their interest expense remains elevated
 - 'Great innovations are behind us' e.g., electricity, plumbing, or internet
 - Mismeasurement.
- The core drivers of the recent albeit modest improvements in productivity growth are a combination of significant increases in capex and modest increases in total factor productivity.
 - **Capital Input has significantly increased.** Classical industrial policy measures including the CHIPs Act (e.g., subsidies, tax credits) catalyzed ~\$160bn in capital investments over 2 years. Manufacturing construction spending experienced 44% annualized growth with semiconductor and green energy manufacturing as the dominant drivers. The AI wave – a privately funded competitively driven supercycle has dwarfed the CHIPs effect. Estimates for AI spending in 2026 are up to \$527bn. The open question is whether the revenue and productivity improvements materialize fast enough to service the debt.
 - **Labor Quality may represent a drag.** A lack of investment in worker retraining, mass Baby boomer retirements accelerated by Covid, constraints on immigration and labor force growth, as well as health crises have contributed to stagnation in labor quality. **AI impact is in early innings** and may not yet be a major, consistent contributor.
- Private Equity firms are using AI both internally as well as in their portfolio companies:
 - Internal: automating repetitive data heavy tasks across sourcing, due diligence, portfolio operations and risk management.
 - Portfolio companies: Firms are investing in power generation, data centers, supply chains, cybersecurity and are beginning to see EBITDA uplift from using AI to drive automation, digital transformation and efficiency improvements.

Note: We define zombie firms as firms whose interest coverage ratio falls below 1 for 3 or more consecutive years, meaning it cannot cover its interest payments from operating earnings alone, and is effectively dependent on inexpensive credit or asset sales to survive. Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Peterson Institute, Goldman Sachs.

Despite Recent Downward Revisions Estimates for Annual Labor Productivity Growth Remain Modest But Solid



Using output measures of both the BLS and Fernald’s utilization adjusted measure, the data shows some improvement in productivity – from 2.2% to 2.6% from 2024 to 2025 for BLS, and from 2.6% to 2.7% in the Fernald estimates over the same period.



Note: All variables are percent change at an annual rate ($=400 * \text{change in natural log}$). Produced on March 24, 2026 10:07 AM. Source: San Francisco Fed, John G. Fernald, "A Quarterly, Utilization-Adjusted Series on Total Factor Productivity." FRBSF Working Paper 2012-19. . the dataset implements an adjustment for variations in factor utilization—labor effort and the workweek of capital.

The Combination of Improvements to Capital Input and TFP Are Driving Recent Surges in Labor Productivity Growth

Productivity is driven by capital deepening, labor quality and total factor productivity e.g., technology, efficiency, organization – and includes AI. Recent productivity gains must be understood through this decomposition – not in aggregate alone. $\Delta\text{Labor Productivity} = \Delta\text{Capital Deepening} + \Delta\text{Labor Quality} + \Delta\text{TFP}$.



Source: San Francisco Fed, John G. Fernald, "A Quarterly, Utilization-Adjusted Series on Total Factor Productivity;" Note: Fernald adjusts Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for utilization to isolate true technological change from cyclical fluctuations in factor intensity, such as changes in worker effort or capital workweek. This approach removes the downward bias during recessions where unadjusted TFP falls simply because inputs are used less intensely, not because technology decreased. Authors calculations.

Labor Quality Has Been Stagnant

We see evidence of deterioration in the human capital contribution to productivity. Labor quality is no longer a neutral contributor, but a constraint.

Skills Mismatch

- According to McKinsey, 40% of U.S. workers report skills misalignment. Automation is displacing middle-skill jobs.
- Many companies remain in a “low hire-low fire”, now “low-hire-fire” mode of operation.

Health & Opioid Crisis


- The health and opioid crisis is reducing effective labor supply.
- Princeton economists (Case & Deaton) link opioid epidemic to 30% of male LFPR decline. Mental health costs employers \$1T/yr globally (WHO).

Baby Boomer Retirement

- We are losing experienced workers via early retirement.
- Pre-covid, the US averaged 1MM retirees per year. In 2020, 3.5 million retired.

Declining Firm-Sponsored Training


- According to NBER firm-sponsored training fell sharply as labor turnover rose. Gig economy expansion may have exacerbated under-investment in worker development.



Sources: McKinsey Global Institute, Acemoglu & Restrepo (2018), Case & Deaton (2020), NAEP 2022, NBER, Federal Reserve, Pew Research Center, San Francisco Fed, John G. Fernald, "A Quarterly, Utilization-Adjusted Series on Total Factor Productivity." FRBSF Working Paper 2012-19.

Capital Investment Has Reaccelerated Sharply

Intangible and tech investment now represent ~45% of capex vs 25% pre-GFC.



KEY STRUCTURAL SHIFTS

Post-GFC Retrenchment

- CapEx fell as credit tightened
- Sluggish recovery despite near-zero rates.
- Secular stagnation debate intensified.

Tax Reform (2017)

- The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act cut the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% and introduced 100% bonus depreciation.

Covid (2020)

- Firms hoarded cash as consumer and business demand cratered and supply chains collapsed and oil price declines

Fiscal Stimulus (2022 -)

- Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act trigger capex in manufacturing, construction, clean energy and semiconductor production.


AI Investment (2023 -)

- 2023-2026 Massive increase in AI data center buildout. Intangible & tech-related investment now represents ~45% of total capex vs ~25% pre-GFC.


Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Haver Analytics.

AI Investment Is High, But Broad-Based Deployment Outside of Large Cap Firms Is Low

According to Wells Fargo analysis, AI has significantly widened the productivity gap between large-cap companies and small-cap companies with productivity for the S&P500 soaring by 5.5% while it has declined by 12.3% for the Russell 2000.



KKR's US Macro Team Highlights the Divergence Between Worker Efficiency in the S&P500 versus the S&P600




Left hand chart: Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Total Factor Productivity 2025.

Right hand chart: Data as of September 30, 2025. Source: Wells Fargo Securities, Factset.

AI and the TFP J-Curve: History Suggests We Have A Few More Years Before We Witness True AI-Driven Transformation

Historical General Purpose Technology Diffusion Pattern



Technology	Invention	Broad TFP Impact	Lag (yrs)	Mechanism
• Steam Engine	1769	1820–1850	~50–80	Factory system, transport
• Electricity	1880s	1910–1940	~25–50	Motor system, factory layout
• ICT / Internet	1970s–80s	1995–2005	~15–25	Process reengineering, e-comm
• Generative AI	2017–22	2028–35 (projected)	~7–15?	Knowledge work automation

Sources: Bresnahan & Trajtenberg (1995) RAND JE | David (1990) AER 'Dynamo & Computer' | Brynjolfsson, Rock & Syverson (2021) 'The Productivity J-Curve'

Measurement and Misinterpretation: Are We Underestimating Productivity?

A recent study posits that healthcare productivity gains are closer to 7.5% for a broad set of conditions, given declines in quality adjusted cost and improvements in post-treatment quality of life and longevity. AI outputs (intangibles, time savings) are poorly captured in GDP. While we may have always mismeasured productivity, it is worth noting that true TFP may be higher than measured – especially in services.

Figure 5. Quality-Adjusted Cost Index Adjusted With Change in Lifetime QALY (\$VQALY 100,000), 2002–2015 (ICD-9) and 2016–2021 (ICD-10)





Figure 6. Quality-Adjusted Productivity Index Adjusted With Change in Lifetime QALY (\$VQALY 100,000), 2002–2015 (ICD-9) and 2016–2021 (ICD-10)



Notes: This figure shows chained index applying the risk-adjusted cost index. The figure shows the pre-2015 indexes (left

Additional Discussion Points/ Outstanding Questions


- Recent productivity improvements appear to be led by capital and modest gains in efficiency
- Labor is a constraint. Weak labor quality and weak demographics limit upside.
- AI is a future TFP story. We are investing significantly today, but broad productivity gains are likely delayed.
- What conditions are required for AI to transition from capital deepening to sustained TFP growth?
 - Diffusion across firms?
 - Labor reallocation and reskilling?
 - Organizational redesign?
 - Measurement improvements?
- How do we incentivize market participants to reinvest in labor? What is the backup plan?

APPENDIX

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Decomposition of Labor Productivity



Source: San Francisco Fed, John G. Fernald, "A Quarterly, Utilization-Adjusted Series on Total Factor Productivity." FRBSF Working Paper 2012-19.