Non-bank financial intermediation and systemic risk. Asset management

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The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
Outline

• The rationale behind the “activity” vs “entity” approach. A brief history

• A financial intermediation angle
  – Liquidity transformation in open ended funds
  – Credit transformation in securities lending

• Advocating what should be obvious: activity and entity approaches are complementary and not substitute
Activity-based vs Entity-based analysis

• Distinction originates with systemic risk focus in asset management (AM) space
• Result of post-crisis impetus toward designation. FSOC in US, FSB globally
• Has led to distortions in positive analysis and to the creation of a less-than-productive dichotomy
• Parallel with banking: deposit taking and loan making are traditional activities with well-recognized systemic implications. Dedicated tomes of regulation and supervisory manuals.
• Yet, no objection to the argument that some banking entities, by virtue of their scale and scope might deserve extra monitoring
Current state of regulatory debate

• Focus on AM activities and identification of potential systemic footprint
  – FSOC Review of AM Activities and Products (2016)
  – FSB Policy Recommendations to Address Structural Vulnerabilities from AM Activities (2017)

• Subsequently, focus on entities
  – FSB NBNII (Non Bank, Non Insurance)-GSIFI assessment methodology

• But little appetite to pursue second leg
AM activities and systemic risk

• Focus on open ended mutual funds
  – High frequency (e.g. daily) redemptions
  – Illiquid asset allocations
  – First mover advantage
  – Potential for large redemptions during stress events
  – Asset sales and potentially large (fire sale) price impact on less liquid assets
  – Also potential credit effect
Increasing fire sale vulnerabilities over time

Drivers of aggregate funds’ spillover losses:
- Overall increasing funds’ asset size
- Increasing flow-return sensitivities
(Cetorelli, Duarte and Eisenbach, 2017)
Asset sale spillover to banks increasing as well

1. Size of transmission spillover increasing since 2009. Probably reflection of increasing size of MFs
2. Peak at 2012 and then decline. Not driven by change in size of MFs. One likely factor a change in asset commonality
Back to entities

- Standard argument against a systemic risk focus on AM entities: The asset manager is an *agent* and not a *principal*
  - Acts on investment mandate
  - The manager does not own the assets
  - Balance sheet of an asset manager firm separate from balance sheet of funds under management
Back to entities

• But ownership of assets *per se* may be irrelevant for systemic considerations

• Asset manager as an aggregator and a coordinating device. Not that different from Diamond’s bank as a “delegated monitoring” or Boyd and Prescott’s bank as a “coalition of agents”
Back to entities

• Even accepting the agency argument, the description for the *average* firm may not fully apply in the cross section

• By virtue of scale and scope, certain asset management firms could operate in violation of the agency-based model and act as a principal instead

• Plenty of instances of “hybrid” firms outside AM:
  – AIG pre-crisis in credit derivatives + securities lending
  – Large BHCs expansion in insurance, investment banking, asset management itself

• Note: entity-based monitoring of asset management already in place for BHCs with asset management arms!
Example of securities lending

• FSB 2017 (but first in FSOC Annual Report 2014) identified role of agent lender in securities lending as an instance where asset management firms can take on principal roles (with their own balance sheet on the line)

• FSB issued a specific policy recommendation that captures asset management firms acting as agent lenders (FSB 2017, Policy Recommendation 14)
Reference charts
Total Net Assets of Investment Companies, By Type

Year


$Bn

0 5000 10000 15000 20000

Mutual funds ETFs Closed-end funds UITs

Note: Total net assets are as of the end of the year.
Source: Investment Company Institute
Note: Total net assets are as of the end of the year

Source: Investment Company Institute
Figure 1.3

Share of Household Financial Assets Held in Investment Companies

Percentage of household financial assets; year-end, 1980-2016

Note: Household financial assets held in registered investment companies include household holdings of ETFs, closed-end funds, UITs, and mutual funds. Mutual funds held in employer-sponsored DC plans, IRAs, and variable annuities are included.

Sources: Investment Company Institute and Federal Reserve Board

FIGURE 1.6
Investment Companies Channel Investment to Stock, Bond, and Money Markets
Percentage of total market securities held by investment companies; year-end, 2013–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutual funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other registered investment</td>
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</tbody>
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- **US corporate equity**
  - 2013: 24% Mutual, 5% Other
  - 2014: 24% Mutual, 5% Other
  - 2015: 25% Mutual, 6% Other
  - 2016: 24% Mutual, 6% Other

- **US and foreign corporate bonds**
  - 2013: 17% Mutual, 2% Other
  - 2014: 16% Mutual, 3% Other
  - 2015: 16% Mutual, 3% Other
  - 2016: 16% Mutual, 3% Other

- **US Treasury and government agency securities**
  - 2013: 10% Mutual, 11% Other
  - 2014: 10% Mutual, 10% Other
  - 2015: 10% Mutual, 11% Other
  - 2016: 12% Mutual, 13% Other

- **US municipal securities**
  - 2013: 21% Mutual, 3% Other
  - 2014: 22% Mutual, 3% Other
  - 2015: 22% Mutual, 3% Other
  - 2016: 20% Mutual, 3% Other

- **Commercial paper**
  - 2013: 46% Mutual, 46% Other
  - 2014: 46% Mutual, 46% Other
  - 2015: 40% Mutual, 40% Other
  - 2016: 19% Mutual, 19% Other

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1. Total US Treasury and government agency securities held by other registered investment companies was less than 0.5 percent in each year.

2. Other registered investment companies held no commercial paper in each year.

Note: Components may not add to the total because of rounding.

Sources: Investment Company Institute, Federal Reserve Board, and World Federation of Exchanges

### FIGURE 1.10
Share of Mutual Fund and ETF Assets at the Largest Fund Complexes

*Percentage of total net assets of mutual funds and ETFs; year-end, selected years*

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<tr>
<td>Largest 5 complexes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Largest 10 complexes</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Largest 25 complexes</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data include only mutual funds and ETFs registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Mutual fund data do not include mutual funds that invest primarily in other mutual funds. ETFs registered as UITs and ETFs that invest primarily in other ETFs are excluded.