Regime Switches, Agents' Beliefs, and Post-World War II U.S. Macroeconomic Dynamics^{*}

Francesco Bianchi Princeton University

November 3, 2008

Abstract

This paper is focused on the evolution of inflation and output dynamics over the last 50 years, the changes in the behavior of the Federal Reserve, and the role of agents' beliefs. I consider a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Markov-switching structural parameters and heteroskedastic shocks. Agents are aware of the possibility of regime changes and they form expectations accordingly. The results support the view that there were regime switches in the conduct of monetary policy. However, the idea that US monetary policy can be described in terms of preand post-Volcker proves to be misleading. The behavior of the Federal Reserve has instead repeatedly fluctuated between a Hawk- and a Dove- regime. Counterfactual simulations show that if agents had anticipated the appointment of Volcker, inflation would not have reached the peaks of the late '70s and the inflation-output trade-off would have been less severe. This result suggests that in the '70s the Federal Reserve was facing a serious problem of credibility and that there are potentially important gains from committing to a regime of inflation targeting. Finally, I show that in the last year the Fed has systematically deviated from standard monetary practice. As a technical contribution, the paper provides a Bayesian algorithm to estimate a Markovswitching DSGE model.

^{*}I am grateful to Chris Sims, Mark Watson, Efrem Castelnuovo, Stefania D'Amico, Jean-Philippe Laforte, Andrew Levin, David Lucca and all seminar participants at Princeton University and at the Board of Governors of the FRS for useful suggestions and comments. Correspondence: 001 Fisher Hall, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544, USA. E-mail: fbianchi@princeton.edu.

1 Introduction

This paper aims to explain the evolution of inflation and output dynamics over the last 50 years taking into account not only the possibility of regime switches in the behavior of the Federal Reserve, but also agents' beliefs around these changes. To this end, I make use of a Markov-Switching Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (MS-DSGE) model in which the behavior of the Federal Reserve is allowed to change across regimes. In such a model, regime changes are regarded as stochastic and reversible, and agents' beliefs matter for the law of motion governing the evolution of the economy.

In order to contextualize the results, I shall start with a brief description of the events that this paper intends to interrelate. Figure 1 shows the series for output gap, annualized quarterly inflation, and the Federal Funds rate for the period 1954:IV-2008:I. The shaded areas represent the NBER recessions and the vertical lines mark the appointment dates of the Federal Reserve chairmen. Some stylized facts stand out. Over the early years of the sample inflation was relatively low and stable. Then, inflation started rising during the late '60s and spun out of control in the late '70s. At the same time the economy experienced a deep and long recession following the oil crisis of 1974. During the first half of the '80s the economy went through a painful disinflation. Inflation went back to the levels that were prevailing before the '70s at the cost of two severe recessions. From the mid-80s, until the recent financial crisis the economy has been characterized by remarkable economic stability. Economists like to refer to this last period with the term "Great Moderation", while the name "Great Inflation" is often used to label the turmoil of the '70s. The sharp contrast between the two periods is evident. Understanding the causes of these remarkable changes in the reduced form properties of the macroeconomy is crucial, particularly now that policy makers are facing a potentially devastating crisis, along with rising inflation. If these changes are the result of exogenous shocks, events similar to those of the Great Inflation could occur again. If, on the other hand, policy makers currently posses a better understanding of the economy, then we could be somewhat optimistic about the long run consequences of the current economic crisis.

With regard to this, it can hardly go unnoticed that the sharp decline in inflation started shortly after Paul Volcker was appointed chairman of the Federal Reserve in August 1979. It is definitely tempting to draw a line between the two events and conclude that a substantial change in the conduct of monetary policy must have occurred in those years. Even if several economists would agree that this was in fact the case, there is much less consensus around the notion that this event represented an unprecedented and once-and-for-all regime change.

Economists that tend to establish a clear link between the behavior of the Fed and the performance of the economy would argue that the changes described above are the result of a substantial switch in the anti-inflationary stance of the Federal Reserve ("Good Policy"). The two most prominent examples of this school of thought are Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). These authors point out that the policy rule followed in the '70s was one that, when embedded in a stochastic general equilibrium model, would imply nonuniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to self-fulfilling inflationary shocks. Their estimated policy rule for the later period, on the other hand, implied no such indeterminacy. Therefore, the Fed would be blamed for the high and volatile inflation of the '70s and to praise for the stability that has characterized the recent years. On the other hand, Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Leeper and Zha (2003), and Stock and Watson (2003) perform several econometric tests and do not find strong evidence against stability of coefficients. Moreover, Canova and Gambetti (2004), Kim and Nelson (2004), Cogley and Sargent (2006) and Primiceri (2005) show little evidence in favor of the view that the monetary policy rule has changed drastically. Similarly, Sims and Zha (2006), using a Markov-switching VAR, identify changes in the volatilities of the structural disturbances as the key driver behind the stabilization of the U.S. economy. Thus, at least to some extent, the Great Moderation would be due to "Good Luck", i.e. to a reduction in the magnitude of the shocks hitting the economy.

The first contribution of this paper is to shed new light on this controversy. I consider a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model in which the Taylor rule parameters characterizing the behavior of the Federal Reserve are allowed to change across regimes. In the model agents are aware of the possibility of regime changes and they take this into account when forming expectations. Therefore the law of motion of the variables of interest depends not only on the traditional microfounded parameters, but also on the beliefs around alternative regimes.

Two main results emerge from the estimates. First, the model supports the idea that US monetary policy was indeed subject to regime changes. The best performing model is one in which the Taylor rule is allowed to move between a *Hawk*- and a *Dove*- regime. The former implies a strong response to inflation and little concern for the output gap, whereas the latter comes with a weak response to inflation. In particular, while the *Hawk* regime, if taken in *isolation*, would satisfy the Taylor principle, the *Dove* regime would not.¹ Following

¹The Taylor principle asserts that central banks can stabilize the macroeconomy by moving their interest




Figure 1: Output gap, inflation, and policy interes rate for the US. Output gap is obtained HP filtering the series of real per capita GDP. The shaded areas represent NBER recessions, while the vertical lines mark the appointment dates of the Chairmen.

an adverse technology shock, the Fed is willing to cause a deep recession to fight inflation only under the *Hawk* regime. Under the *Dove* regime, the Fed tries to minimize output fluctuations.

Second, the idea that US economic history can be divided into pre- and post- Volcker turns out to be misleading. Surely the results corroborate the widespread belief that the appointment of Volcker marked a change in the stance of the Fed toward inflation. In fact, around 1980, right after his appointment, the Fed moved from the *Dove* to the *Hawk* regime. However, the behavior of the Federal Reserve has repeatedly fluctuated between the two alternative Taylor rules and regime changes have been relatively frequent. Specifically, the *Dove* regime was certainly in place during the second half of the '70s, but also during the first half of the '60s, again around 1991, and with high probability toward the end of the sample.

The second contribution of the paper relates to the role of agents' beliefs in explaining

rate instrument more than one-for-one in response to a change in inflation.

the Great Inflation. Were agents aware of the possibility of the appointment of an extremely conservative chairman like Volcker? Were they expecting to go back to the *Hawk* regime any time soon? Or were they making decisions assuming that the Burns/Miller regime would have lasted forever?

Counterfactual simulations suggest that this last hypothesis is more likely to explain what was occurring in the '70s. It seems that in those years the Fed was facing a severe credibility problem and beliefs about alternative monetary policy regimes were indeed playing a crucial role. To address this hypothesis, I introduce a third regime, the *Eagle* regime, that is even more hawkish than the *Hawk* regime. This regime is meant to describe the behavior of an extremely conservative chairman like Volcker. It turns out that if agents had assigned a relatively large probability to this hypothetical regime, inflation would not have reached the peaks of the mid- and late- '70s, independent of whether or not the *Eagle* regime occurred. Furthermore, the costs in terms of lower output would have not been extremely large. Quite interestingly, simply imposing the *Hawk* regime throughout the entire sample would have implied modest gains in terms of inflation and a substantial output loss.

These last results point toward two important conclusions. First, beliefs about alternative regimes can go a long way in modifying equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, in the present model, the effective sacrifice ratio faced by the Federal Reserve depends on the alternative scenarios that agents have in mind. If agents had anticipated the appointment of a very conservative chairman, the cost of keeping inflation down would have been lower. Second, monetary policy does not need to be hawkish all the time in order to achieve the desired goal of low and stable inflation. What is truly necessary is a strong commitment to bring the economy back to equilibrium as soon as adverse shocks disappear. It seems that in the '70s the main problem was not simply that the Fed was accommodating a series of adverse technology shocks, but rather that there was a lack of commitment to restoring equilibrium once the economy had gone through the peak of the crisis.

The last contribution of this paper is methodological. I propose a Bayesian algorithm to estimate a Markov Switching DSGE model *via* Gibbs sampling. The algorithm allows for different assumptions regarding the transition matrix used by agents in the model. Specifically, this matrix may or may not coincide with the one that is observed ex-post by the econometrician. To the best of my knowledge this paper represents the first attempt to estimate a fully specified DSGE model in which the behavior of the Federal Reserve can switch across regimes.²

²Schorfheide (2005), Ireland (2007), and Liu et al. (2007) consider models in which the target for inflation

I believe that a MS-DSGE model represents a promising tool to better understand the Great Moderation as well as the rise and fall of inflation because it combines the advantages of the previous approaches, as well as mitigating the drawbacks. Consider the Good Luck-Good Policy literature. It is quite striking that researchers tend to find opposite results moving from different starting points. The two most representative papers of the "Good Policy" view are based on a subsample analysis: Clarida *et al.* (2000) draw their conclusions according to instrumental variable estimators based on single equations. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) obtain similar results using Bayesian methods to construct probability weights for the determinacy and indeterminacy regions in the context of a New Keynesian business-cycle model. However, in both cases, estimates are conducted breaking the period of interest into subsamples: pre- and post-Volcker. Instead, authors supporting the "Good Luck" hypothesis draw their conclusions according to models in which parameter switches are modeled as stochastic and reversible. In other words, they do not impose a one-time-only regime change but they let the data decide *if* there was a break and *if* this break can be regarded as a permanent change.

At the same time, both approaches have some important limitations when taking into account the role of expectations. The Good Policy literature, based on subsample analysis, falls short in recognizing that if a regime change occurred once, it might occur again, and that agents should take this into account when forming expectations. At the same time, reduced form models do not allow for the presence of forward-looking variables that play a key role in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. This has important implications when interpreting those counterfactual exercises which show that little would have changed if more aggressive regimes had been in place during the '70s.

In a MS-DSGE, regime changes are not regarded as once-and-for-all and expectations are formed accordingly. Thus, the law of motion of the variables included in the model can change in response to changes in beliefs. These could deal with the nature of the alternative regimes or simply with the probabilities assigned to them. Consequently, counterfactual simulations are more meaningful and more robust to the Lucas critique, because the model is re-solved not only incorporating eventual changes in the parameters of the model, but also taking into account the assumptions about what agents know or believe. This is particularly relevant, for example, when imposing that a single regime be in place throughout the sample.

Furthermore, given that the model is microfounded, all parameters have a clear economic

can change. Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and Laforte (2005) allow for heteroskedasticity. See section 2 for more details.

interpretation. This implies that a given hypothesis around the source(s) of the Great Moderation can explicitly be tested against the others. The benchmark specification considered in this paper accommodates both explanations of the Great Moderation given that it allows for a Markov-switching Taylor rule and heteroskedastic volatilities. As emphasized by Sims and Zha (2006) and Cogley and Sargent (2006), it is essential to account for the stochastic volatility of exogenous shocks when trying to identify shifts in monetary policy. In fact, it turns out that a change in the volatilities of the structural shocks contributes to the broad picture. A high volatility regime has been in place for a large part of the period that goes from the early '70s to the mid-80s. Interestingly, 1984 is regarded as the year in which the Fed was finally able to gain control of inflation.

Finally, I also consider a variety of alternative specifications that are meant to capture the competing explanations of the Great Moderation. Specifically, I use a model in which only the volatilities are allowed to change across regimes as a proxy for the 'Just Good Luck' hypothesis, while the 'Just Good Policy' is captured by a model with a once-and-for-all regime change. All the models are estimated with Bayesian methods and model comparison is conducted in order to determine which of them is favored by the data.

The content of this paper can be summarized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief summary of the related literature. Section 3 contains a description of the model and an outline of the solution method proposed by Farmer *et al.* (2006). Section 4 describes the estimation algorithms. Section 5 presents the results for the benchmark model in which the behavior of the Fed can switch between two Taylor rules. Section 6 displays impulse responses and counterfactual exercises for the benchmark model. Section 7 considers alternative specifications that offer competing explanations for the source of the Great Moderation. Section 8 confronts the different models with the data computing the marginal data densities. Section 9 concludes.

2 Related literature

This paper is related to the growing literature that allows for parameter instability in microfounded models. Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) consider a DSGE model allowing for time variation in the volatility of the structural innovations. Laforte (2005) models heteroskedasticity in a DSGE model according to a Markov-switching process. Liu *et al.* (2007) test empirical evidence of regime changes in the Federal Reserve's inflation target. They also allow for heteroskedastic shock disturbances. Along the same lines, Schorfheide (2005) estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which monetary policy follows a nominal interest rate rule that is subject to regime switches in the target inflation rate. Interestingly, he also considers the case in which agents use Bayesian updating to infer the policy regime. Ireland (2007) also estimates a New Keynesian model in which Federal Reserve's unobserved inflation target drifts over time. In a univariate framework, Castelnuovo *et al.* (2008) combine a regime-switching Taylor rule with a time-varying policy target. They find evidence in favor of regime shifts, time-variation of the inflation target, and a drop in the inflation gap persistence when entering the Great Moderation period.

King (2007) proposes a method to estimate dynamic-equilibrium models subject to permanent shocks to the structural parameters. His approach does not require a model solution or linearization. Time-varying structural parameters are treated as state variables that are both exogenous and unobservable, and the model is estimated with particle filtering. Davig and Leeper (2006b) estimate Markov-switching Taylor and Fiscal rules, plugging them into a calibrated DSGE model. The two rules are estimated in isolation (while here I estimate all the parameters of the model jointly). Whereas Davig and Leeper (2006b) use the monotone map method of Coleman (1991), the solution method employed in this paper is based on the work of Farmer *et al.* (2006),. I shall postpone the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches until section 3.5.

Finally, Bikbov (2008) estimates a structural VAR with restrictions imposed according to an underlying New-Keynesian model with Markov-switching parameters. Regime changes are identified extracting information from the yield curve. The yield curve contains information about expectations of future interest rates that in turn reflect the probabilities assigned to different regimes. In this paper there is no attempt to attach an economic interpretation to all parameters nor to conduct a rigorous investigation around the sources of the Great Moderation through model comparison. The author is more interested in the effects of regime changes on the real economy and the nominal yield curve.

3 The Model

I consider a small size microfounded DSGE model resembling the one used by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). Details about the model can be found in appendix B.

3.1 General setting - Fixed parameters

Once log-linearized around the steady state, the model reduces to a system of three equations (1)-(3), that, with equations (4) and (5), describe the evolution of the economy:

$$\widetilde{R}_t = \rho_R \widetilde{R}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_R)(\psi_1 \widetilde{\pi}_t + \psi_2 \widetilde{y}_t) + \epsilon_{R,t}$$
(1)

$$\widetilde{\pi}_t = \beta E_t(\widetilde{\pi}_{t+1}) + \kappa(\widetilde{y}_t - z_t)$$
(2)

$$\widetilde{y}_t = E_t(\widetilde{y}_{t+1}) - \tau^{-1}(\widetilde{R}_t - E_t(\widetilde{\pi}_{t+1})) + g_t$$
(3)

$$z_t = \rho_z z_{t-1} + \epsilon_{z,t} \tag{4}$$

$$g_t = \rho_g g_{t-1} + \epsilon_{g,t} \tag{5}$$

 R_t , \tilde{y}_t , and $\tilde{\pi}_t$ are respectively the monetary policy interest rate, output, and quarterly inflation. The tilde denotes percentage deviations from a steady state or, in the case of output, from a trend path. The process z_t , captures exogenous shifts of the marginal costs of production and can be interpreted as a technology shock. Finally, the process g_t summarizes changes in preferences or a time-varying government spending.

Inflation dynamics are described by the expectational Phillips curve (2) with slope κ . Intuitively a boom, defined as a positive value for \tilde{y}_t , is inflationary only when it is not supported by a (temporary) technology improvement ($z_t > 0$).

The behavior of the monetary authority is described by equation (1). The central bank responds to deviations of inflation and output from their respective target levels adjusting the monetary policy interest rate. Unanticipated deviation from the systematic component of the monetary policy rule are captured by $\epsilon_{R,t}$. Note that the Central Bank tries to stabilize \tilde{y}_t , instead of $\tilde{y}_t - z_t$. Therefore, following a technology shock, a trade-off arises: It is not possible to keep inflation stable and at the same time have output close to the target.

Woodford (2003) (chapter 6) shows that it is fluctuations in $\tilde{y}_t - z_t$ rather than \tilde{y}_t that are relevant for welfare. However, Woodford himself (Woodford (2003), chapter 4) points out that there are reasons to doubt that the measure of output gap used in practice would coincide with $\tilde{y}_t - z_t$. There are several measures of output gap and a Central Bank is likely to look at all of them when making decisions. More importantly, the assumption that the Fed responds to $\tilde{y}_t - z_t$ is at odds with some recent contributions in the macro literature: Both Primiceri (2006) and Orphanides (2002) show that during the '70s there were important misjudgments around the path of potential output. Admittedly, the ideal solution would be to assume that the Fed faces a filtering problem, perhaps along the lines of Boivin and Giannoni (2008) and Svensson and Woodford (2003). However, this approach would add a substantial computational burden. Therefore, at this stage, the Taylor rule as specified (1) must be preferred.

Equation (3) is an intertemporal Euler equation describing the households' optimal choice of consumption and bond holdings. Since the underlying model has no investment, output is proportional to consumption up to the exogenous process g_t . The parameter $0 < \beta < 1$ is the households' discount factor and $\tau^{-1} > 0$ can be interpreted as intertemporal substitution elasticity.

The model can be solved using gensys.³ The system of equations can be rewritten as:

$$\Gamma_0 S_t = \Gamma_1 S_{t-1} + C + \Psi \epsilon_t + \Pi \eta_t$$

where

$$S_{t} = \left[\widetilde{y}_{t}, \widetilde{\pi}_{t}, \widetilde{R}_{t}, g_{t}, z_{t}, E_{t}(\widetilde{y}_{t+1}), E_{t}(\widetilde{\pi}_{t+1})\right]'$$

$$\epsilon_{t} = \left[\epsilon_{R,t}, \epsilon_{g,t}, \epsilon_{z,t}\right]'$$

$$\epsilon_{t} \sim N(0, Q), \ Q = diag\left(\sigma_{R}^{2}, \sigma_{g}^{2}, \sigma_{z}^{2}\right)$$
(6)

Let θ be the vector collecting all the parameters of the model:

$$\boldsymbol{\theta} = \left[\boldsymbol{\tau}, \boldsymbol{\kappa}, \boldsymbol{\psi}_1, \boldsymbol{\psi}_2, \boldsymbol{\rho}_r, \boldsymbol{\rho}_g, \boldsymbol{\rho}_z, \ln r^*, \ln \pi^*, \sigma_R, \sigma_g, \sigma_z\right]'$$

Gensys returns a first order VAR in the state variable:

$$S_t = T(\theta)S_{t-1} + R(\theta)\epsilon_t \tag{7}$$

The law of motion of the DSGE state vector can be combined with an observation equation:

$$y_t = D(\theta) + ZS_t + v_t \tag{8}$$

$$v_t \sim N(0,U), \ U = diag\left(\sigma_x^2, \sigma_\pi^2, \sigma_r^2\right)$$
(9)

³http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/gensys/.

$$Y_t = \begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ \Delta \ln P_t \\ \ln R_t^A \end{bmatrix} \qquad D(\theta) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \ln \pi^* \\ 4(\ln \pi^* + \ln r^*) \end{bmatrix}$$
$$Z = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 4 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

where v_t is a vector of observation errors and x_t , $\Delta \ln P_t$, and $\ln R_t^A$ represent respectively the output gap, quarterly inflation, and the monetary policy interest rate.⁴ Then the Kalman filter is used to evaluate the likelihood $\ell(\theta, M, \sigma_s | Y^T)$.

3.2 Markov-switching Taylor rule

In this section I extend the model to allow for heteroskedasticity and switches in the parameters describing the Taylor rule. This specification is chosen as the benchmark case because it nests the two alternative explanations of the Great Moderation. A change in the behavior of the Fed is often regarded as the keystone to explain the Great Moderation, therefore the model allows for two distinct Taylor rules. At the same time, the Good Luck argument is captured by the Markov-switching volatilities. However, the solution method described below holds true even when *all* structural parameters are allowed to switch.

As a first step partition the vector of parameters θ in three subvectors: θ^{sp} , θ^{ss} and θ^{er} contain respectively the structural parameters, the steady state values and the standard deviations of the shocks:

$$\begin{aligned} \theta^{sp} &= \left[\tau, \kappa, \psi_1, \psi_2, \rho_r, \rho_g, \rho_z\right]' \\ \theta^{ss} &= \left[\ln r^*, \ln \pi^*\right]', \ \theta^{er} = \left[\sigma_r, \sigma_g, \sigma_z\right]' \end{aligned}$$

Now suppose that the coefficients of the Taylor rule describing the behavior of the Federal Reserve can assume m^{sp} different values:

$$\widetilde{R}_{t} = \rho_{R}(\xi_{t}^{sp})\widetilde{R}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_{R}(\xi_{t}^{sp}))(\psi_{1}(\xi_{t}^{sp})\widetilde{\pi}_{t} + \psi_{2}(\xi_{t}^{sp})\widetilde{y}_{t}) + \epsilon_{R,t}$$
(10)

⁴The time series are extracted from the Global Insight database. Output gap is measured as the percentage deviations of real per capita GDP from a trend obtained with the HP filter. Inflation is quarterly percentage change of CPI (Urban, all items). Nominal interest rate is the average Federal Funds Rate in percent.

where ξ_t^{sp} is an unobserved state capturing the monetary policy regime.

Heteroskedasticity is modelled as an independent Markov-switching process. Therefore, (6) becomes:

$$\epsilon_t \sim N\left(0, Q\left(\xi_t^{er}\right)\right), \ Q\left(\xi_t^{er}\right) = diag\left(\theta^{er}\left(\xi_t^{er}\right)\right) \tag{11}$$

where ξ_t^{er} is an unobserved state that describes the evolution of the stochastic volatility regime.

The unobserved states ξ_t^{sp} and ξ_t^{er} can take on a finite number of values, $j^{sp} = 1, \ldots, m^{sp}$ and $j^{er} = 1, \ldots, m^{er}$, and follow two independent Markov chains. Therefore the probability of moving from one state to another is given by:

$$P[\xi_t^{sp} = i | \xi_{t-1}^{sp} = j] = h_{ij}^{sp}$$
(12)

$$P[\xi_t^{er} = i | \xi_{t-1}^{er} = j] = h_{ij}^{er}$$
(13)

The model is now described by (2)-(5), (10), (11), $H^{sp} = [h_{ij}^{sp}]$ and $H^{er} = [h_{ij}^{er}]$.

3.3 Solving the MS-DSGE model

The model with Markov-switching structural parameters is solved using the method proposed by Farmer *et al.* (2006) (FWZ). The idea is to expand the state space of a Markov-switching rational expectations model and to write an equivalent model with fixed parameters in this expanded space. The authors consider the class of minimal state variable solutions (McCallum (1983), MSV) to the expanded model and they prove that any MSV solution is also a solution to the original Markov-switching rational expectations model. The class of solutions considered by FWZ is large, but it is not exhaustive. The authors argue that MSV solution is likely to be the most interesting class to study given that it is often stable under real time learning (Evans and Honkapohja (2001), McCallum (2003)). They provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the MSV solution and show that the MSV solution can be characterized as a vector-autoregression with regime switching, of the kind studied by Hamilton (1989) and Sims and Zha (2006). This property of the solution turns out to be extremely convenient when estimating the model.

In what follows I provide an outline of the solution method that should suffice for those readers interested in using the algorithm for applied work. Please refer to Farmer *et al.* (2006) for further details.

The model described by equations (2)-(5), (10) and (11) can be rewritten as:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \Gamma_0(\xi_t^{sp}) & \Gamma_1(\xi_t^{sp}) \\ \Gamma_{0,1}(\xi_t^{sp}) \\ (n-l) \times n \\ \Gamma_{0,2} \\ l \times n \end{bmatrix} S_t = \begin{bmatrix} \Gamma_{1,1}(\xi_t^{sp}) \\ (n-l) \times n \\ \Gamma_{1,2} \\ l \times n \end{bmatrix} S_{t-1} + \begin{bmatrix} \psi(\xi_t^{sp}) \\ (n-l) \times k \\ 0 \\ l \times k \end{bmatrix} \epsilon_t + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ (n-l) \times n \\ \pi \\ l \times n \end{bmatrix} \eta_t$$
(14)

where ξ_t^{sp} follows an m^{sp} -state Markov chain, $\xi_t^{sp} \in M^{sp} \equiv \{1, ..., m^{sp}\}$, with stationary transition matrix H^{sp} , n is the number of endogenous variables (n = 7 in this case), k is the number of exogenous shocks (k = 3), and l is the number of endogenous shocks (l = 2). The fundamental equations of (14) are allowed to change across regimes but the parameters defining the non-fundemental shocks do not depend on ξ_t^{sp} .

The first step consists in rewriting (14) as a fixed parameters system of equations in the expanded state vector \overline{S}_t :

$$\overline{\Gamma}_0 \overline{S}_t = \overline{\Gamma}_1 \overline{S}_{t-1} + \overline{\Psi} u_t + \overline{\Pi} \eta_t \tag{15}$$

where:

$$\overline{\Gamma}_{0}_{np \times np} = \begin{bmatrix} diag\left(a_{1}\left(1\right), ..., a_{1}\left(m^{sp}\right)\right) \\ a_{2}, ..., a_{2} \\ \Phi \end{bmatrix}$$
(16)

$$\overline{\Gamma}_{1}_{np \times np} = \begin{bmatrix} [diag(b_{1}(1), ..., b_{1}(m^{sp}))](H^{sp} \otimes I_{n}) \\ b_{2}, ..., b_{2} \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$
(17)

$$\Pi_{np\times l} = \begin{bmatrix} 0\\ \pi\\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \Phi_{(m^{sp}-1)l\times np} = \begin{bmatrix} e'_{2} \otimes \phi_{2}\\ \vdots\\ e'_{m^{sp}} \otimes \phi_{m^{sp}} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\overline{\Psi} = \begin{bmatrix} I_{(n-l)m^{sp}} & diag\left(\psi\left(1\right), ..., \psi\left(m^{sp}\right)\right)\\ 0 & 0\\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\overline{S}_{t} = \begin{bmatrix} \iota_{\left(\xi_{t}^{sp}=1\right)}S_{t}\\ \vdots\\ \iota_{\left(\xi_{t}^{sp}=m^{sp}\right)}S_{t} \end{bmatrix}$$
(18)

where Φ will be described later. The vector of shocks u_t is defined as:

$$u_{t} = \left[\begin{array}{c} \Xi_{\xi_{t}^{sp}}\left(e_{\xi_{t-1}^{sp}}\otimes\left(1_{m^{sp}}^{\prime}\otimes I_{n}\right)\overline{S}_{t-1}\right)\\ e_{\xi_{t}^{sp}}\otimes\epsilon_{t}\end{array}\right]$$

with

$$\Xi_{i}_{(n-l)h \times nh} = (diag [b_{1}(1), ..., b_{1}(m^{sp})]) \times [(e_{i} \otimes 1'_{m^{sp}} - H^{sp}) \otimes I_{n}]$$

The error term u_t contains two types of shocks: the *switching* shocks and the *normal* shocks. The normal shocks $(e_{\xi_t^{sp}} \otimes \epsilon_t)$ carry the exogenous shocks that hit the structural equations, while the *switching* shocks turn on or off the appropriate blocks of the model to represent the Markov-switching dynamics. Note that both shocks are zero in expectation.

Definition 1 A stochastic process $\{\overline{S}_t, \eta_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$ is a solution to the model if:

- 1. $\{\overline{S}_t, \eta_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$ jointly satisfy equation (14)
- 2. The endogenous stochastic process $\{\eta_t\}$ satisfies the property $E_{t-1}\{\eta_t\}=0$
- 3. S_t is bounded in expectation in the sense that $\left\|E_t\left\{\overline{S}_{t+s}\right\}\right\| < M_t$ for all s > 0

As mentioned above, FWZ focus on MSV solutions. They prove the equivalence between the MSV solution to the original model and the MSV solution to the expanded fixed coefficient model (15).

The matrix Φ plays a key role. Definition 1 requires boundness of the stochastic process in solving the model. To accomplish this the solution of the expanded system is required to lie in the stable linear subspace. This is accomplished by defining a matrix Z such that

$$Z'\overline{S}_t = 0 \tag{19}$$

To understand how the matrix Z and Φ are related, consider the impact of different regimes. Supposing regime 1 occurs, the third block of (15) imposes a series of zero restrictions on the variables referring to regimes $i = 2...m^{sp}$. These restrictions, combined with the ones arising from the first block of equations, set the correspondent element of \overline{S}_t to zero. If regime $i = 2...m^{sp}$ occurs, we would like a similar block of zero restrictions imposed on regime 1. Here I describe the definition of Φ such that, using (19), it is possible to accomplish the desired result : **Algorithm 2** Start with a set of matrices $\{\phi_i^0\}_{i=2}^{m^{sp}}$ and construct $\overline{\Gamma}_0$. Next compute the QZ decomposition of $\{A^0, B\}$: $Q^0T^0Z^0 = B$ and $Q^0S^0Z^0 = A^0$. Reorder the triangular matrices $S = (s_{i,j})$ and $T = (t_{i,j})$ in such a way that $t_{i,i}/s_{i,i}$ is in are in increasing order. Let $q \in \{1, 2..., m^{sp}\}$ be the integer such that $t_{i,i}/s_{i,i} < 1$ if $i \leq q$ and $t_{i,i}/s_{i,i} > 1$ if i > q. Let Z_u be the last np - q rows of Z. Partition Z_u as $Z_u = [z_1, ..., z_{m^{sp}}]$ and set $\phi_i^1 = z_i^1$. Repeat the procedure until convergence.

If convergence occurs the solution to (15) is also a solution to (14) and it can be written as a VAR with time dependent coefficients:

$$S_t = T\left(\xi_t^{sp}, \theta^{sp}, H^m\right) S_{t-1} + R\left(\xi_t^{sp}, \theta^{sp}, H^m\right) \epsilon_t \tag{20}$$

Note that the law of motion of the DSGE states depends on the structural parameters (θ^{sp}) , the regime in place (ξ_t^{sp}) , and the transition matrix used by agents in the model (H^m) . This does not necessarily coincide with the *objective* transition matrix that is observed expost by the econometrician (H^{sp}) . From now on, a more compact notation will be used:

$$T(\xi_t^{sp}) = T(\xi_t^{sp}, \theta^{sp}, H^m)$$
$$R(\xi_t^{sp}) = R(\xi_t^{sp}, \theta^{sp}, H^m)$$

3.4 Alternative solution methods

The solution method described in the previous section is not the only one available. Davig and Leeper (2006b) and Davig *et al.* (2007) consider models that are more general than the linear-in-variables model that are considered here and, in certain special cases, they can be solved explicitly. Their solution method makes use of the monotone map method, based on Coleman (1991). The algorithm requires a discretized state space and a set of initial decision rules that reduce the model to a set of nonlinear expectational first-order difference equations. A solution consists of a set of functions that map the minimum set of state variables into values for the endogenous variables. This solution method is appealing to the extent that is well suited for a larger class of models, but it suffers from a clear computational burden. This makes the algorithm impractical when the estimation strategy requires solving the model several times, as is the case in this paper. Furthermore, at this stage local uniqueness of a solution must be proved perturbing the equilibrium decision rules.

Another solution algorithm for a large class of linear-in-variables regime-switching mod-

els is provided by Svensson and Williams (2007). This method returns the same solution obtained with the FWZ algorithm when the equilibrium is unique. However, Svensson and Williams (2007) do not provide conditions for uniqueness. Therefore, the algorithm can converge to a unique solution, to one of a set of indeterminate solutions, or even to an unbounded stochastic difference equation that does not satisfy the transversality conditions.

Bikbov (2008) generalizes a method proposed by Moreno and Cho (2005) for fixed coefficient New-Keynesian models, to the case of regime switching dynamics. The method returns a solution in the form of a MS-VAR, as in FWZ. However, this is the only similarity between the two approaches. In Bikbov (2008) there is no need to write an equivalent model in the expanded state space: The solution is achieved by working directly on the original model through an iteration procedure. For the fixed coefficient case, Moreno and Cho (2005) report that, in the case of a unique stationary solution, their method delivers the same solution as obtained with the QZ decomposition method. If the rational expectations solution is not unique the method yields the minimum state variable solution. Unfortunately, it is not clear if a similar argument applies to the case with Markov-switching dynamics and how to check if a unique stationary equilibrium exists. Furthermore, the algorithm imposes a "no-bubble condition" that, to the best of my knowledge, must be verified by simulation.

To summarize, the method of FWZ is preferred to the methods presented above for two reasons. First, it is computationally efficient: Usually the algorithm converges very quickly. Second, it provides the conditions necessary to establish existence and boundness of the minimum state variable solution. Obviously, uniqueness of the MSV solution does not imply uniqueness in a larger class of solutions. However, the problem of indeterminacy/determinacy in a MS-DSGE model is a very complicated one and, as far as I know, it has not yet been solved. Davig and Leeper (2007) make a step in this direction, but, as shown by Farmer *et al.* (2008), the generalization of the Taylor principle that they propose rules out only a subset of indeterminate equilibria.⁵

4 Estimation strategies

The solution method of FWZ returns the VAR with time dependent coefficients (20). This can be combined with the system of observation equations (8). The result is once again a

⁵Davig and Leeper (2007) re-write the original model in an expanded state space and they provide conditions for this model to have a unique solution. However, there are solutions of the original system that do not solve the expanded model. Therefore, determinacy of the expanded model turns out to be only a necessary condition for determinacy of the original system.

model cast in state space form:

$$y_t = D(\theta^{ss}) + ZS_t + v_t \tag{21}$$

$$S_t = T\left(\xi_t^{sp}\right) S_{t-1} + R\left(\xi_t^{sp}\right) \epsilon_t \tag{22}$$

$$\epsilon_t \sim N(0, Q(\xi_t^{er})), \ Q(\xi_t^{er}) = diag(\theta^{er}(\xi_t^{er}))$$
(23)

$$v_t \sim N(0,U), \ U = diag\left(\sigma_x^2, \sigma_\pi^2, \sigma_R^2\right)$$
(24)

$$H^{sp}(\cdot, i) \sim D(a_{ii}^{sp}, a_{ij}^{sp}), \ H^{er}(\cdot, i) \sim D(a_{ii}^{er}, a_{ij}^{er})$$
 (25)

For a DSGE model with fixed parameters the likelihood can be easily evaluated using the Kalman filter and then combined with a prior distribution for the parameters. When dealing with a MS-DSGE model the Kalman filter cannot be applied in its standard form. Given an observation for Y_t , the estimate of the underlying DSGE state vector S_t is not unique. At the same time, the Hamilton filter, that is usually used to evaluate the likelihood of Markov-switching models, cannot be applied because it relies on the assumption that Markov states are history independent. This does not occur here: Given that we do not observe S_t , the probability assigned to a particular Markov state depends on the value of S_{t-1} , whose distribution depends on the realization of $\xi^{sp,t-1}$.⁶

Note that if we could observe $\xi^{sp,T}$ and $\xi^{er,T}$, then it would be straightforward to apply the Kalman filter because given Y_t it would be possible to unequivocally update the distribution of S_t . In the same way, if S^T were observable, then the Hamilton filter could be applied to the MSVAR described by (22), (23) and (25). These considerations suggest that it is possible to sample from the posterior using a Gibbs sampling algorithm. This algorithm is described in section 4.1.

Because the posterior density function is very non-Gaussian and complicated in shape, it is extremely important to find the posterior mode. The estimate at the mode represents the most likely value and also serves as a crucial starting point for initializing different chains of MCMC draws.

The standard method to approximate the posterior is based on Kim's approximate evaluation of the likelihood (Kim and Nelson (1999)) and relies on an approximation of the DSGE state vector distribution. This algorithm is illustrated in section 4.2.1. In section 4.2.2 I propose an alternative method to evaluate the likelihood: Instead of approximating the DSGE state vector distribution, I keep track of a limited number of alternative paths for

⁶Here and later on $\xi^{sp,t-1}$ stands for $\{\xi_s^{sp}\}_{s=1}^{t-1}$.

the Markov-switching states. Each of them is associated with a specific distribution for the DSGE states. Paths that are unlikely are trimmed or approximated with Kim's algorithm. In the latter case, the *trimming approximation* is, by definition, more accurate. This approximation requires a larger computational burden, but might be more appropriate when dealing with switches in the structural parameters of a DSGE model since the laws of motion can vary quite a lot across regimes.

A detailed description of the prior distributions and the sampling method is given in appendix A. Readers that are not interested into the technical details of the estimation strategies might want to skip the following two sections (4.1 and 4.2).

4.1 Gibbs sampling algorithm

Here I summarize the basic algorithm which involves the following steps:

At the beginning of iteration n we have: θ_{n-1}^{sp} , θ_{n-1}^{ss} , θ_{n-1}^{er} , S_{n-1}^{T} , $\xi_{n-1}^{er,T}$, $\xi_{n-1}^{er,T}$, H_{n-1}^{m} , H_{n-1}^{sp} ,

- 1. Given S_{n-1}^T , H_{n-1}^{sp} and H_{n-1}^{er} , (22), (23) and (25) form a MSVAR. Use the Hamilton filter to get a filtered estimate of the MS states and the then use the backward drawing method to get $\xi_n^{sp,T}$ and $\xi_n^{er,T}$.
- 2. Given $\xi_n^{sp,T}$ and $\xi_n^{er,T}$, draw H_n^{sp} and H_n^{er} according to a Dirichlet distribution.
- 3. Conditional on $\xi_n^{sp,T}$ and $\xi_n^{er,T}$, the likelihood of the state space form model (21)-(24) can be evaluated using the Kalman filter. Draw $\tilde{H}^{sp,m}$, ϑ^{sp} , ϑ^{ss} , and ϑ^{er} from the proposal distributions. The proposal parameters are accepted or rejected according to a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The new set of parameters are accepted with probability $\min\{1, r\}$ where

$$r = \frac{\ell\left(\vartheta^{sp}, \vartheta^{er}, \vartheta^{ss}, \widetilde{H}^m | Y^T, \xi_{n-1}^{sp,T}, \xi_{n-1}^{er,T}, ...\right) p\left(\vartheta^{sp}, \vartheta^{er}, \vartheta^{ss}, \widetilde{H}^m\right)}{\ell\left(\theta_{n-1}^{sp}, \theta_{n-1}^{ss}, \theta_{n-1}^{er}, H_{n-1}^m | Y^T, \xi_{n-1}^{sp,T}, \xi_{n-1}^{er,T}, ...\right) p\left(\theta_{n-1}^{sp}, \theta_{n-1}^{er}, \theta_{n-1}^{er}, H_{n-1}^m\right)}$$

This step also returns filtered estimates of the DSGE states: \widetilde{S}_n^T .

4. Draw S_n^T . Start drawing the last DSGE state $S_{T,n}$ from the terminal density $p(S_{T,n}|Y^T,...)$ and then use a backward recursion to draw $p(S_{t,n}|S_{t+1,n}, Y^T,...)$. 5. If $n < n_{sim}$, go back to 1, otherwise stop, where n_{sim} is the desired number of iterations.

In the algorithm described above no approximation of the likelihood is required, given that the DSGE parameters are drawn conditional on the Markov-switching states. If agents in the model know the transition matrix observed ex-post by the econometrician (i.e. $H^{sp} =$ $H^m = H^{sp,m}$), step 4 needs to be modified to take into account that a change in the transition matrix also implies a change in the law of motion of the DSGE states. In this case, I employ a Metropolis-Hastings step in which the DSGE states are regarded as observed variables. Please refer to appendix A for further details.

4.2 Approximation of the Likelihood

This section contains a description of the two algorithms used to approximate the likelihood when maximizing the posterior mode and computing the marginal data density.

4.2.1 Kim's approximation

In this section I describe Kim's approximation of the likelihood (Kim and Nelson (1999)). Consider the model described by (21)-(25). Combine the MS states of the structural parameters and of the heteroskedastic shocks in a unique chain, ξ_t . ξ_t can assume m different values, with $m = m^{sp} * m^{er}$, and evolves according to the transition matrix $H = H^{sp} \otimes H^{er}$. For a given set of parameters, and some assumptions about the initial DSGE state variables and MS latent variables, we can recursively run the following filter:

$$S_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)} = T_j S_{t-1|t-1}^i$$
$$T_j = T (\xi_t = j)$$

$$P_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)} = T_j P_{t-1|t-1}^i T'_j + R_j Q_j R'_j$$
$$Q_j = Q(\xi_t = j), \ R_j = R(\xi_t = j)$$

$$e_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)} = y_t - D - ZS_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)}$$
$$f_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)} = ZP_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)}Z' + U$$

$$S_{t|t}^{(i,j)} = S_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)} + P_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)} Z' \left(f_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)} \right)^{-1} e_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)}$$
$$P_{t|t}^{(i,j)} = P_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)} - P_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)} Z' \left(f_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)} \right)^{-1} Z e_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)}$$

At end of each iteration the $M \times M$ elements of $S_{t|t}^{(i,j)}$ and $P_{t|t}^{(i,j)}$ are collapsed into M elements which are represented by $S_{t|t}^{j}$ and $P_{t|t}^{j}$:

$$S_{t|t}^{j} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{M} \Pr\left[\xi_{t-1} = i, \xi_{t} = j | Y_{t}\right] S_{t|t}^{(i,j)}}{\Pr\left[\xi_{t} = j | Y_{t}\right]}$$
$$P_{t|t}^{j} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{M} \Pr\left[\xi_{t-1} = i, \xi_{t} = j | Y_{t}\right] \left(P_{t|t}^{(i,j)} + \left(S_{t|t}^{j} - S_{t|t}^{(i,j)}\right) \left(S_{t|t}^{j} - S_{t|t}^{(i,j)}\right)'\right)}{\Pr\left[\xi_{t} = j | Y_{t}\right]}$$

Finally, the likelihood density of observation y_t is given by:

$$\ell\left(y_t|Y_{t-1}\right) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} f\left(y_t|\xi_{t-1} = i, \xi_t = j, Y_{t-1}\right) \Pr\left[\xi_{t-1} = i, \xi_t = j|Y_t\right]$$
$$f\left(y_t|\xi_{t-1} = i, \xi_t = j, Y_{t-1}\right) = (2\pi)^{-N/2} |f_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)}|^{-1/2} \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2}e_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)\prime}f_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)}e_{t|t-1}^{(i,j)}\right\}$$

4.2.2 Trimming approximation

This section proposes an alternative algorithm to approximate the likelihood of a MS-DSGE model. This approach is computationally more intensive, but returns a better approximation of the likelihood, especially when dealing with structural breaks. The idea is to keep track of a limited number of alternative paths for the Markov-switching states. Paths that have been assigned a low probability are trimmed or approximated using Kim's algorithm.

Combine ξ_t^{sp} and ξ_t^{er} to obtain ξ_t . ξ_t can assume all values from 1 to m, where $m = m^{sp} * m^{er}$, and it evolves according to the transition matrix $H = H^{sp} \otimes H^{er}$. Suppose the algorithm has reached time t. From previous steps, we have a $((t-1) \times l_{t-1})$ matrix L containing the l_{t-1} retained paths, a vector L_p collecting the probabilities assigned to the different paths, and a $(n \times l_{t-1})$ matrix L_S and a $(n \times n \times l_{t-1})$ matrix L_P containing respectively means and covariance matrices of the DSGE state vector corresponding to each of the l_{t-1} paths.

The goal is to approximate the likelihood for time t, $\ell(y_t|Y^{t-1})$ for a given a set of

parameters:

- 1. $\forall i = 1...l_{t-1}, \forall j = 1...m$, compute a one-step-ahaed Kalman filter with $S_{t-1|t-1}^i = L_s(:,i)$ and $P_{t-1|t-1}^i = L_P(:,:,i)$. This will return $f(y_t|\xi^{t-1} = i, \xi_t = j, Y_{t-1})$, i.e. the probability of observing y_t given history i and $\xi_t = j$. At the end of this step we will have a total of $l_{t-1} * m$ possible histories that are stored in L'. $\forall i$ and $\forall j$ save $\widetilde{S}_{t|t}^{(i,j)}$ and $\widetilde{P}_{t|t}^{(i,j)}$ and store them in L'_S and L'_P .
- 2. Compute the ex-ante probabilities for each of the $l_{t-1} * m$ possible paths using the transition matrix H:

$$p_{t|t-1}(j,i) = p_{t-1|t-1}(i) * H(j,i)$$

$$p_{t-1|t-1}(i) = L_p(i)$$

3. Compute the likelihood density of observation y_t as a weighted average of the conditional likelihoods:

$$f(y_t|Y_{t-1}) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \sum_{i=1}^{l_t} p_{t|t-1}(j,i) f(y_t|\xi^{t-1} = i, \xi_t = j, Y_{t-1})$$

4. Update the probabilities for the different paths:

$$\widetilde{p}_{t|t}(i') = \frac{p_{t|t-1}(j,i) f\left(y_t | \xi^{t-1} = i, \xi_t = j, Y_{t-1}\right)}{f\left(y_t | Y_{t-1}\right)}$$
$$i' = 1...l_{t-1} * m$$

and store them in L'_p .

5. Reorder L'_p in decreasing order and rearrange L'_S , L'_P and L' accordingly. Retain l_t of the possible paths where $l_t = \min \{B, l\}$, where B is an arbitrary integer and l > 0 is such that

$$\sum_{i'=1}^{l} \widetilde{p}_{t|t}\left(i'\right) \ge tr$$

where tr > 0 is an arbitrary threshold (for example: B = 100, tr = 0.99). Update the

matrices L_P , L_S , and L:

$$L_P = L'_P(:,:,1:l_t)$$
$$L_S = L'_S(:,1:l_t)$$
$$L = L'(:,1:l_t)$$

6. Rescale the probabilities of the retained paths and update L_p :

$$L_{p}(i) = p_{t|t}(i) = \frac{\widetilde{p}_{t|t}(i)}{\sum_{j=1}^{l_{t}} \widetilde{p}_{t|t}(j)}, \quad i = 1...l_{t}$$

Note that Kim's approximation can be applied to the trimmed paths. In this case, the algorithm explicitly keeps track of those paths that turn out to have the largest probability, whereas all the others are approximated.

5 The Benchmark Model

The benchmark model allows for both explanations of the Great Moderation: Good Policy and Good Luck. The structural parameters of the Taylor Rule are allowed to change across regimes, while all the other structural parameters are kept constant. The model also allows for heteroskedastic shocks. Taylor rule parameters and heteroskedastic shocks evolve according to two independent chains ξ_t^{sp} and ξ_t^{er} . The transition matrix that enters the model and is used by agents to form expectations, H^m , is assumed to coincide with the one observed by the econometrician, H^{sp} .

5.1 Parameters estimates and regime probabilities

Table 1 reports means and 90% error bands for the DSGE parameters and the transition matrices. Concerning the parameters of the Taylor rule, we find that under regime 1 ($\xi_t^{sp} = 1$) the Federal Funds Rate reacts strongly to deviations of inflation from its target, while output gap does not seem to be a major concern. The opposite occurs under regime 2. The degree of interest rate smoothing turns out to be similar across regimes. For obvious reasons, I shall refer to regime 1 as the *Hawk* regime, while regime 2 will be the *Dove regime*. Interestingly enough, if the two regimes were taken in isolation and embedded in a fixed coefficient DSGE model, only the former would imply determinacy.




Figure 2: MSDSGE model, posterior mode estimates. Top panel, probability of regime 1 for the structural parameters, the *Hawk* regime; lower panel, probability of regime 1 for the stochastic volatilities, high volatility regime.

Parameter	$\xi_t^{sp} = 1$	$\xi_t^{sp} = 2$	_	Parameter	$\xi^{er} = 1$	$\xi^{er} = 2$
ψ_1	2.0651	0.6451		σ_R	$\underset{(0.2494, 0.3872)}{0.3134}$	$0.0763 \\ \scriptstyle (0.0623, 0.0928)$
ψ_2	(1.4054, 2.6225) 0.3212	(0.4258, 0.9189) 0.2795		σ_{g}	0.3569 (0.2841,0.4532)	0.1494 (0.1156,0.1793)
$ ho_R$	(0.1744, 0.5145) 0.7919	(0.1545, 0.4188) 0.7625		σ_z	$\underset{(1.3778,2.7163)}{1.9948}$	0.6292 (0.4563,0.8143)
$\overline{\tau}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.7296, 0.8506) & (0.6659, 0.8375) \\ \hline 2.9227 \\ (0.107, 0.004) \end{array}$		_	σ_y	$0.0723 \\ (0.0316, 0.1526)$	
κ	(2.1497, 3.8294) 0.0288			σ_p	0.2968 (0.2632,0.3322)	
$ ho_g$	(0.0198, 0.0374) 0.8359 (0.7962, 0.8788)		_	σ_r	$\underset{(0.0155,0.0470)}{0.0289}$	
$ ho_z$	0.8804 (0.8456,0.9182)			diag(H^{sp}) dia	$g\left(H^{er} ight)$
r^*	$\underset{(0.3459, 0.5397)}{0.4552}$			0.92	54 0	$\frac{9(11)}{.8958}$ 52,0.9564)
π*	$\pi^* \qquad \begin{array}{c} 0.8117 \\ (0.6874, 0.9374) \end{array}$			(0.8237, 0.91) (0.8322, 0.00)	62 0	.9538 90,0.9802)

Table 1: Means and 90 percent error bands of the DSGE and transition matrix parameters




Figure 3: The top panel reports annualized quaterly inflation (observed and filtered) and the inflation target. The second panel contains the real FFR as implied by the model. The last panel displays the differences between the observed FFR and the ones implied by the two alternative Taylor rules. Note how in the '60s the interest rate was too high compared to the one that would have prevailed if the *Hawk* regime had been in place, while in the '70s the *Hawk* regime would have required a much higher interest rate.

The point estimate of the inflation target is 0.8117, implying a target for annual inflation around 3.25%. The top panel of figure 3 displays the series of quarterly annualized inflation and the corresponding target/steady state value. There are some notable deviations, especially during the '60s and the '70s.

As for the other parameters, I regard the low value of the slope of the Phillips curve ($\kappa = 0.0288$) as particularly relevant, since such a small value implies a very high sacrifice ratio. In other words, in order to bring inflation down the Federal Reserve needs to generate a severe recession.

Figure 2 shows the (smoothed) probabilities assigned to $\xi_t^{sp} = 1$ (top panel) and $\xi_t^{er} = 1$ (lower panel). Confronting these probabilities with narrative accounts of monetary policy

history is a way to understand how reasonable the results are. However, before proceeding, a *caveat* is in order. In interpreting the probabilities assigned to the two regimes the reader should take into account how these are related to the estimate of the inflation target. In other words, a high probability assigned to the *Dove* regime does not automatically imply a loose monetary policy, but only that the Fed is being relatively unresponsive to deviations of inflation from the target. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, the third panel of figure 3 reports the difference between the observed Federal Funds rate and the interest rate that would be implied by the two Taylor rules. A large positive difference between the observed interest rate and its counterfactual value under regime 1 (DReg 1), implies that the Fed is responding very strongly to inflation deviations, even under the assumption that the *Hawk* regime is in place. On the other hand, a large negative value of this same variable suggests that the Fed is not active enough.

Monetary policy turns out to be active during the early years of the sample, from 1955 to 1958, and with high probability during the following three years. Romer and Romer (2002) provide narrative evidence in favor of the idea that the stance of the Fed toward inflation during this period was substantially similar to that of the 90s. They also show that a Taylor rule estimated over the sample 1952:1-1958:4 would imply determinacy. Furthermore, after the presidential election of 1960, Richard Nixon blamed his defeat on excessively tight monetary policy implemented by the Fed. At that time, Fed chairman Martin had clear in mind that the goal of the Fed was "to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going", i.e. to raise interest rates in response to an overheated economy.

Over the period 1961-1965 the *Dove* regime was the rule. This should not be interpreted as evidence of a lack of commitment to low inflation. In fact, the truth is exactly the opposite. The *Dove* regime prevails because, given the target for inflation, the *Hawk* regime would require lowering the FFR. The *Hawk* regime regains the lead over the last five years of Martin's chairmanship.

On February 1970, Arthur F. Burns was appointed chairman by Richard Nixon. Burns is often regarded as responsible for the high and variable inflation that prevailed during the '70s. It is commonly accepted that on several occasions he had to succumb to the requests of the White House. In fact, for almost the entire duration of his mandate, the Fed followed a passive Taylor rule. During these years, the *Hawk* regime would have required a much higher monetary policy interest rate.⁷

⁷Here the use of the words *active* and *passive* follows Leeper (1991). Monetary policy is active when the interest rate is highly responsive to inflation.

This long period of passive monetary policy ended in 1980, shortly after Paul Volcker took office in August 1979. Volcker was appointed with the precise goal of ending the high inflation. The high probability of the *Hawk* regime during these years confirms the widespread belief that he delivered on his commitment.

The middle panel of figure 3 contains the pattern of real interest rates as implied by the model (computed as $R_t - 4 * E_t(\pi_{t+1})$). During Burns' chairmanship real interest rates were negative or very close to zero, whereas, right after the appointment of Volcker, they suddenly increased to unprecedented high values. During the following years, inflation started moving down and the economy experienced a deep recession, while the Fed was still keeping the FFR high. Note that the probability of the *Dove* regime from zero becomes slightly positive, implying that, given the target for inflation, a lower FFR would have been desirable. In other words, there is a non-zero probability, that Volcker set the FFR in a manner *less* responsive to changes in inflation: Regardless of inflation being on a downward sloping path and a severe recession, monetary policy was still remarkably tight.

For the remainder of the sample the *Hawk* regime has been the rule with a couple of important exceptions. The first one occurred during the 1991 recession. In this case there is no uncertainty regarding how the high probability assigned to the *Dove* regime should be interpreted. On the other hand, the relatively high values for the probability of the *Dove* regime during the second half of the 90s and toward the end of sample point toward a FFR too high compared to what would be implied by the *Hawk* regime.

These results strongly support the idea that the appointment of Volcker marked a change in Fed's inflation stance and that the '70s were characterized by a passive monetary policy regime. At the same time, they question the wide spread-belief that US monetary policy history can be described in terms of a permanent and one-time-only regime change: pre- and post-Volcker. While a single regime prevails constantly during the chairmanships of Burns and Volcker, the same cannot be said for the remainder of the sample.

Up to this point nothing has been said about the Good Luck hypothesis. Looking at the second panel of figure 2, it emerges that regime 1, characterized by large volatilities for all shocks, prevails for a long period that goes from the early '70s to 1985, with a break between the two oil crises. This result is quite informative because 1984 is regarded as a turning point in US economic history. There are two alternative ways to interpret this finding. On the one hand, even if a regime change occurred well before 1984, perhaps *the conquest of American inflation* was actually determined by a break in the uncertainty characterizing the macroeconomy. On the other hand, this same break might have occurred in response

to the renewed commitment of the Federal Reserve to a low and stable inflation. Both interpretations require that the uncertainty characterizing the economy and the behavior of the Fed are likely to be interdependent. Just as the Great Inflation was characterized by high volatilities and loose monetary policy, in a similar vein the Great Moderation emerged after a reduction in the volatilities of the structural shocks and a drastic change in the conduct of monetary policy.

Quite interestingly the probability of the high volatility regime rises again at the end of the sample. To interpret this result, it might be useful to take a closer look at the third panel of figure 3. It cannot go unnoticed that in recent times both the *Hawk* and the *Dove* regime would have required higher interest rates, implying that monetary policy has been relatively loose.⁸ This is not surprising, given that the Fed is currently dealing with a deep financial crisis. However, should the Fed continue to deviate from standard monetary practice for a long period of time, it would be fair to expect revisions in agents' beliefs.

5.2 Impulse response analysis

The first two rows of figure 4 show respectively the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock under the *Hawk* and *Dove* regimes. The initial shock is equal to the standard deviation of the monetary policy shock under regime 1, the high volatility regime. Both inflation and output decrease following an increase in the FFR. The responses are remarkably similar across the two regimes.

The third and the fourth rows illustrate the impulse responses to a demand shock. Output and inflation increase under both regimes but their responses are stronger under the *Dove* regime. This is consistent with the response of the Federal Funds rate that is larger under the *Hawk* regime, both on impact and over time. Note that the dynamics of the variables are otherwise similar across the two regimes. The Fed does not face any trade-off when deciding how to respond to a demand shock, therefore, the only difference lies in the magnitude of the response.

Finally, the last two rows contain the impulse responses to an adverse supply shock, i.e. to an unexpected decrease in z_t . This last set of results is particularly interesting given that, as several economists would agree, one of the causes of the high inflation of the '70s was a series of unfavorable supply-side shocks. The behavior of the Federal Reserve differs substantially across the two regimes. Under the *Hawk* regime the Fed is willing to accept

⁸This pattern is even more evident using the latest data.




Figure 4: Impulse response functions. The graph can be divided in three blocks of two rows each. The three blocks display respectively the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock (R), a demand shock (g), and an adverse technology shock (z). For each block, the first row shows the response of output gap, annualized quarterly inflation, and the FFR under the *Hawk* regime, whereas the second one assumes that the *Dove* regime is in place.

a recession in order to contrast inflation. The Federal Funds rate reacts strongly on impact and it keeps rising for one year. On the contrary, under the *Dove* regime the response of the policy rate is much weaker because the Fed tries to keep the output gap around zero, at the cost of higher inflation. Note that on impact the economy experiences a boom: the increase in expected inflation determines a negative real interest rate that boosts the economy in the short run.

Three considerations are in order. First, it is quite evident that the gains in terms of lower inflation achieved under the *Hawk* regime are modest. This can be explained in light of the low value of κ , the slope of the Phillips curve. Second, under the *Dove* regime the Fed is not able to avoid a recession, but the recession turns out to be significantly milder. Third, it is commonly accepted that the '70s were characterized by important supply shocks. At the same time, the results of the previous section show that the *Dove* regime has been in place for a large part of those years. Therefore, it might well be that in those years a dovish monetary policy was perceived as optimal in consideration of the particular kind of shocks hitting the economy. This seems plausible especially if the Fed was regarding the *sacrifice ratio* as particularly high, as suggested by Primiceri (2006). However, to explore this argument more in detail the probability of moving across regimes should be endogenized (Davig and Leeper (2006a)). This extension would further complicate the model, especially for what concerns the solution algorithm. I regard it as a fascinating area for future research.

5.3 Counterfactual analysis

An interesting exercise when working with models that allow for regime changes consists of simulating what would have happened if regime changes had not occurred, or had occurred at different points in time, or had occurred when they otherwise did not. This kind of analysis is even more meaningful in the context of the MS-DSGE model employed in this paper. First of all, like a standard DSGE model, the MS-DSGE can be re-solved for alternative policy rules to address the effects of fundamental changes in the policy regime. The entire law of motion changes in a way that is consistent with the new assumptions around the behavior of the monetary policy authority. Furthermore, the solution depends also on the transition matrix used by agents when forming expectations and on the nature the of alternative regimes. Therefore, we can investigate what would have happened if agents' beliefs about the probability of moving across regimes had been different. This has important implications for counterfactual simulations in which a regime is assumed to have been in place throughout the sample because the expectation mechanism and the law of motion are consistent with the fact that no other regime would have been observed. Finally, it is also possible to conduct counterfactual simulations in which agents are endowed with beliefs about regimes that never occurred and that will never occur, but that could have important effects on the dynamics of the variables. An example that I will be explore concerns the appointment of a very conservative Chairman whose behavior can be described by a remarkably hawkish Taylor rule. This particular kind of counterfactual analysis is not possible in the context of time-varying VAR models like the ones used by Primiceri (2005), Cogley and Sargent (2006), and Sims and Zha (2006).

Two main conclusions can be drawn according to the results of this section. First, little would have changed for the dynamics of inflation if the *Hawk* regime had been in place through the entire sample or if agents had put a large probability on going back to it. According to the results shown below, the only way to avoid high inflation would have been to cause a long and deep recession. The reason is quite simple: The model attributes the large increase in inflation to a technological slowdown that was not under the direct control of the Fed. Second, if agents had put a large enough probability on the occurrence of an even more hawkish regime, inflation would have not reached peaks as high as the ones observed in the late '70s. Furthermore, the cost of keeping inflation low would have been smaller with respect to the counterfactual hypothesis of the *Hawk* regime being in place over the entire sample, suggesting that expectations around alternative regimes can have important effects on the behavior of the economy. Considering that the Volcker era was characterized by a remarkably hawkish monetary policy, we might want to rephrase this result in a suggestive way: If agents had anticipated the appointment of Volcker, the Great Inflation would have been a much less spectacular phenomenon.

5.3.1 No Monetary Policy Shocks

The first set of counterfactual series is obtained by shutting down the monetary policy shocks. For each draw from the posterior the disturbance in the Taylor rule is set to zero independently from the regime in place. The parameters of the model, the sequence for the monetary policy regimes, and the remaining disturbances are left unchanged. Therefore, if the policy rule disturbances had not been set to zero, the simulations would have coincided with the actual series.

Figure 5 shows the actual and counterfactual series.⁹ The path for inflation is virtually

⁹For clarity, the figures report only the median of the counterfactual series. Analogous graphs endowed




Figure 5: Counterfactual simulation obtained setting the Taylor rule distrurbances to zero.

identical to the observed one. Deviations can be detected in the series for the output gap, but they are negligible. Interestingly, the FFR would have been lower around the years 1983-1984, suggesting that during those years monetary policy was extremely tight, even under the assumption that the *Hawk* regime was in place. This result corroborates the findings of section 5.1: To some extent Volcker made monetary policy less responsive to inflation. Note that this is in line with the intent of building credibility for a renewed commitment to low and stable inflation.

5.3.2 A Fixed Hawk regime

Figure 6 shows the results for the counterfactual simulations obtained by imposing the Hawk regime over the entire sample. To make the results consistent with this assumption, the model is solved assuming that agents regard the Hawk regime as the only possible one. In

with error bands can be found in appendix C.




Figure 6: Counterfactual simulation based on the Hawk regime being in place over the entire sample. Consistently with this hypothesis, the solution is obtained assuming that agents regard the Hawk regime as the only possible one.

other words, I solve a fixed coefficient DSGE in which the behavior of the Fed is described by the *Hawk* regime parameters. It is apparent that the Fed would not have been able to completely avoid the rise in inflation, but only to partially contain it, at the cost of a substantial and prolonged loss in terms of output. In particular, annualized quarterly inflation would not have reached a peak as high as 15%, like it did in the first half of 1980.

During the mid-60s, output would have been slightly larger. This is in line with the finding that during those years monetary policy was too tight given a target for inflation around 3%. On the other hand, output would have been lower during the '91 recession. However, these differences are not significant, given that the 90% error bands for the counterfactual series contain the actual ones.

Summarizing, the model does not attribute the rise inflation to changes in the conduct of monetary policy. It seems that the Fed could have partially contained the rise of inflation




Figure 7: Counterfactual simulation based on having a regime, the Eagle regime, that is behind the scenes when the Dove regime is in place, but it never occurres.

causing a deep recession. Moreover, while the loss in terms of output would have been certain and large, the gain in terms of inflation seems quite modest. This has to do with the finding that the high inflation was driven by a series of shocks on which the Fed had little, if any, control.

5.3.3 An *Eagle* behind the scenes

From what has been shown so far it seems that no reduction in inflation could have been achieved without a substantial output loss. However, the role of agents' beliefs about alternative monetary policy regimes has not been explored yet. The simple and intriguing exercise conducted in this section asks what would have happened if during the high inflation of the '70s agents had put a relatively large probability on the appointment of a very conservative Chairman, willing to fight inflation without any real concern for the state of the real economy. I shall label this hypothetical third scenario *Eagle* regime. The *Eagle* regime differs from the *Hawk* regime in terms of the response to inflation, that is assumed to be twice as large, and to output, that is halved. Note that this implies a strong response to deviations of inflation from the target and makes the role of output gap secondary. The Eagle regime never occurs over the sample, but I assume that when agents observe the *Dove* regime, they regard the *Eagle* regime as the alternative scenario and they put a relatively large probability on its occurrence. To that end, the probability of staying in the *Dove* regime is reduced by 30 percent. The probability of staying in the *Eagle* regime is equal to the persistence of the *Hawk* regime. From the *Eagle* regime the economy can move only to the *Hawk* regime. These assumptions imply an interesting interpretation of the *Eagle* regime: It is a regime that occurs with high probability after a period of passive monetary policy in order to restore credibility, leading the way to the ordinary active regime.¹⁰

The left column of figure 7 contains the actual and counterfactual series. The results for inflation look somehow similar to the ones obtained in the previous section. However, there are some notable differences for the output gap and the Federal Funds rate. The former turns out to be larger, while the latter is remarkably lower over the second half of the '70s, the years during which the Dove/Eagle regime prevails. To make this point stronger, the right column of figure 5 displays, for each series, the difference between the Hawk- and the Eagle- counterfactual. It turns out that the threat of the Eagle regime is enough to deliver the same, if not better, results in terms of low inflation, with a substantial reduction in the output loss. Note that all the results are driven by the high probability that agents assign to the Eagle regime. The FFR is low not only because inflation is relatively low, but also because agents are anticipating the possibility of extremely tight monetary policy.

The goal of this exercise is not to propose a new way to conduct monetary policy: Maintain loose policy today while trying to persuade the public that you are going to be extremely active in the future. This kind of strategy clearly presents a problem of credibility. However, two lessons can be learned from this experiment. First, it is quite possible that the problem in the '70s was not that the Fed was not reacting strongly enough to inflation, but that there was a lack of confidence around the possibility of a substantial change in the conduct of monetary policy. In general, this exercise suggests that the alternative scenarios that agents have in mind are at least as important as the regime that is in place.

5.3.4 An *Eagle* on stage

The final counterfactual simulation replaces the Hawk regime with the *Eagle* regime described in the previous section. Even in this case, the transition matrix is twisted: The probability of staying in the active regime is kept unchanged, while the persistence of the

 $^{^{10}}$ Ideally, it would be nice to make the probability of moving to the *Eagle* regime endogenous, but the algorithm used to solve the model is based on the assumption that the transition matrix is exogenous.




Figure 8: Counterfactual simulation in which the *Hawk* regime is replaced with the *Eagle* regime, i.e. a regime in which the response to inflation is two times larger, whereas the response to output is half as large. The transition matrix is twisted: the probability of the active regime is decreased by 30%.

passive regime is lowered by 30 percent.

The left column of figure 8 contains the counterfactual and actual series. Note how inflation and output would have been lower during the '70s, without substantial increases in the FFR. Even in this case the result is driven largely by the expectation mechanism. Then, in the early '80s the *Eagle* regime becomes effective and we observe a jump in the FFR and a further reduction in inflation. Quite interestingly, during the early '80s, the path for the FFR is hardly distinguishable from the actual one, suggesting that the *Eagle* regime does a good in job in replicating the behavior of the Federal Reserve during the early years of Volcker's chairmanship.

How do these outcomes differ from the case in which the *Hawk* regime is assumed to be in place throughout the sample? The right column of figure 8 compares the two counterfactual simulations. If the *Hawk* regime had been replaced by the *Eagle* regime, inflation would have been lower and the slowdown of the early '80s more abrupt. However, it is not clear if the final cost in terms of output would have been different: Output is lower in the early '80s, but it is higher in the second half of the '70s, when the *Dove* regime is in place. In




Figure 9: Analytical standard deviations of the macroeconomic variables for different regime combinations $(1 \rightarrow [\text{High volatility}, Hawk], 2 \rightarrow [\text{High}, Dove], 3 \rightarrow [\text{Low}, Hawk], \text{and } 1 \rightarrow [\text{Low}, Dove]).$

fact, it seems that the gains and costs are likely to cancel out. Therefore, the *Eagle-Dove* combination could be preferable, given that it delivers lower inflation with a similar cost in terms of lower output. The last two counterfactual simulations point toward an important conclusion: If a Central Bank were able to commit to a flexible inflation targeting, in which severe shocks are temporarily accommodated and followed by a strong commitment to bring the economy back to the steady state, then it would be possible to achieve low inflation with a substantially smaller cost in terms of output. In other words, the effective sacrifice ratio would be much smaller. Admittedly, this kind of policy is not readily practicable. Among other things, the duration of the passive regime matters a lot. When supply-side shocks are large and persistent, like they were in the '70s, if the Central Bank decides to implement a dovish monetary policy, agents are likely to be discouraged about the possibility of moving back to an active regime. In this context, there is not any immediate way to persuade them that a regime change is around the corner.

5.4 Variance decomposition

In this section, I compute the contributions of the structural shocks to the volatility of the macroeconomic variables for all possible combinations of the monetary policy and volatility regimes. It is well known that high inflation is often associated with high volatility. This was




Figure 10: Contributions of the different structural shocks to the volatility of the macroeconomic variables for different regime combinations $(1 \rightarrow [\text{High volatility}, Hawk], 2 \rightarrow [\text{High}, Dove], 3 \rightarrow [\text{Low}, Hawk]$, and $1 \rightarrow [\text{Low}, Dove]$). The graph reports the median and the 68% error bands.

surely the case in the '70s. This exercise will help us understand what would have changed if the *Hawk* regime had been in place during those years.

Consider the model in state space form (21)-(25). For each draw of the Gibbs sampling algorithm we can compute the conditional covariance matrix as implied by the different regime combinations (ξ^{sp}, ξ^{er}) :¹¹

$$V(S_t|\cdot) = T(\xi_t^{sp})V(S_t|\cdot)T(\xi_t^{sp})' + R(\xi_t^{sp})Q(\xi^{er})R(\xi_t^{sp})'$$
$$V(Y_t|\cdot) = ZV(S_t|\theta^{sp}, \theta^{er}, \xi_t^{sp}, \xi_t^{er}, H^m)Z' + U$$

where for each variable x_t , $V(x_t|\cdot)$ stands for $V(x_t|\theta^{sp}, \theta^{er}, \xi_t^{sp}, \xi_t^{er}, H^m)$ and $V(S_t|\cdot)$ is obtained solving the discrete Lyapunov equation. The contribution of the shock *i* is obtained replacing $Q(\xi^{er})$ with $Q_i(\xi^{er})$, a diagonal matrix in which the only element different from zero is the one corresponding to the variance of the shock *i* under regime ξ^{er} .

Figure 9 plots the analytical standard deviations for the three macroeconomic variables. The first two values, on the left of the red dashed line, refer to the high volatility regime, while the third and the fourth values assume that the low volatility regime is in place. In each sub-group, the first point marks the standard deviation under the *Hawk* regime. It is evident that the overall volatility is largely determined by the variance of the underlying structural shocks: Moving from the left to the right side of the dashed line implies a remarkable reduction in the volatility of all macroeconomic variables. Not surprisingly, being in the *Dove* regime implies higher inflation volatility, but the difference is not statistically relevant.

Figure 10 presents the variance decomposition for the four possible regime combinations. It is quite evident that for inflation the monetary policy regime does not really matter: A large fraction of volatility comes from the supply shocks independent of the behavior of the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, monetary policy shocks play a marginal role. On the other hand, the monetary policy regime is definitely important in explaining the volatility of output. Demand shocks account for almost the entire output volatility when the *Dove* regime is in place. More importantly, supply shocks are relevant only under the *Hawk* regime. Under the *Hawk-high volatility* combination, supply shocks explain around 30% of output volatility, while when the *Dove* regime is in place, their contribution is basically null, independent of the volatility of the supply shock. This result is quite interesting and in line with the impulse response analysis of the section 5.2. Under the *Dove* regime, the Fed accommodates supply

¹¹Here the term "conditional" refers to the regime combination. Note that in fact I am computing an unconditional variance using the law of motion implied by a particular regime combination.

shocks in order to minimize output fluctuations. This seems to accurately describe what was going on in the '70s. As for the FFR, the volatility is largely determined by the systematic component of the Taylor rule. Obviously, under the *Hawk* regime monetary policy shocks explain a smaller fraction of the FFR volatility, given that the Fed has a stronger incentive to bring the economy back on track.

6 Alternative specifications

In this section I consider two alternative specifications to capture alternative explanations of the macroeconomic dynamics observed over the last fifty years.

6.1 Just Good Luck (Constant structural parameters)

A natural alternative to the benchmark specification is represented by a model that allows for heteroskedasticity but assumes no change at all in the behavior of the Federal Reserve. Such a model would explain the Great Moderation invoking Good Luck, i.e. a substantial reduction in the volatility of macroeconomic shocks. Table 2 reports posterior mode estimates and 90% error bands for the DSGE parameters and the transition matrices, while figure 11 plots the probability of regime 1 ($\xi^{er} = 1$). Once again, regime 1 is the low volatility regime. It prevails around 1958 and between 1970 and 1985, with a break between the two oil crises. Even the estimates of the volatilities are remarkably similar to the ones obtained under the benchmark case.

As for the structural parameters, the response to inflation turns out to be modest but larger than 1, while the output gap coefficient and the level of interest rate smoothing are relatively large. Moreover, the steady state real interest rate and the target for inflation are substantially unaffected. The point estimates for the autocorrelation parameters of the shocks are also very close to the ones obtained in the benchmark model, while the degree of interest smoothing is somehow larger. The remaining structural parameters are substantially unchanged when compared with the estimates obtained under the benchmark specification. In particular, the slope of the Phillips curve is still remarkably low, implying a very high sacrifice ratio.




Figure 11: Posterior mode estimates: Probability of regime 1 (high volatility)

Parameter	$\overline{\xi}_t^{sp} = 1$	Parameter	$\xi^{er} = 1$	$\xi^{er} = 2$		
$\frac{1}{\psi_1}$	1.1710	σ_R	0.3674 (0.3085,0.4384)	$0.0974 \\ (0.0851, 0.1110)$		
ψ_2	(1.0156, 1.3838) 0.4071	σ_g	$\underset{(0.2853,0.4817)}{0.3716}$	$\underset{(0.1300,0.1959)}{0.1605}$		
$ ho_R$	(0.3009, 0.5332) 0.8380	σ_z	$\underset{(1.0941,2.6905)}{1.7961}$	$\underset{(0.3871, 0.836)}{0.5916}$		
τ	(0.8045, 0.8688) 3.0374 (2.2075, 2.0877)	σ_y	$\underset{(0.0314,0.1143)}{0.0623}$			
κ	(2.2075,3.9877) 0.0289 (0.0183,0.0423)	σ_p	$\underset{(0.2439, 0.3152)}{0.2782}$			
$ ho_g$	0.8347 (0.7930,0.8746)	σ_r		290 ,0.0523)		
$ ho_z$	0.9005 (0.8630,0.9338)		$diag(H^{er})$			
r^*	0.4232 (0.3334,0.5117)	=	0.8869			
π*	$\underset{(0.6475, 0.9649)}{0.8065}$		(0.8094, 0.9222) 0.9555 (0.9490, 0.9808)			
		=				

Table 2: Posterior mode estimates of DSGE parameters and transition matrices

6.2 One-time-only switch

In their seminal contribution Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) consider a model analogous to the one employed in this paper extending the solution for the case of indeterminacy. They construct posterior weights for the determinacy and indeterminacy region of the parameter space and estimates for the propagation of fundamental and sunspot shocks. According to their results, U.S. monetary policy post-1982 is consistent with determinacy, whereas the pre-Volcker policy is not.

Here I consider a specification that is in the same spirit but with some important modifications. First, I do not impose a turning date. I let the data decide when the regime change occurred using a Markov-switching model with an absorbing state. Second, I consider a larger sample, spanning the entire WWII postwar era (1954:IV-2008:I). On the other hand, in line with the authors, I assume that: 1) There is only one regime change 2) The regime change is once-for-all and fully credible¹² 3) All parameters of the model are allowed to change. This last assumption allows the steady levels to change across regimes. I impose that regime 1 implies indeterminacy and I use the results of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) to compute the likelihood under this hypothesis. The solution under indeterminacy is characterized by some additional parameters.

Table 3 contains the parameter estimates. The change across regimes is somehow more extreme than the one found by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and suggested by the results of the MS-DSGE model. The response to inflation jumps from 0.7191 to 2.4644 while the target for (annualized) inflation decreases from 4.24 to 3.09. Along the same lines, the response to output gap is substantially reduced: from 0.45 to 0.18. Furthermore, the slope of the Phillips curve is remarkably larger under the current regime (0.0953 and 0.4067). The values of the other structural parameters of the model do not present dramatic changes across regimes and are also quite similar to the ones obtained under the previous specifications.

The time of the change is quite interesting. Figure 12 plots the probability of regime 2, the current regime. This probability does not start moving before 1982 and hits 1 in 1985. In section 4.1 the MS-DSGE picked up with remarkable precision the appointment of Volcker. Here, the regime change seems to occur several years later. This shows a potential advantage of the benchmark model that allows volatilities and monetary policy rules to evolve according to two independent chains. The MS-DSGE model seems to be able to recognize when the change in the *intents* of the Fed occurred, even if the control over inflation and the break in

 $^{^{12}\}mathrm{An}$ alternative approach would consist of using the solution algorithm of FWZ imposing an absorbing state.

the volatility of the shocks took place only some years later.

7 Model comparison

Different specifications provide competing explanations regarding the causes of the Great Moderation. In this section I compute the marginal data density for the different models. This is the most sensible way to determine which of them returns the most accurate description of the data.

Bayesian model comparison is based on the posterior odds ratio:

$$\frac{P(M_i|Y_T)}{P(M_j|Y_T)} = \frac{P(Y_T|M_i)}{P(Y_T|M_j)} \frac{P(M_i)}{P(M_j)}$$

The second term on the RHS is the prior odds ratio, i.e. the relative probability assigned to the two models before observing the data, while the first term is the Bayes factor, the ratio of marginal likelihoods. Assuming that all models are regarded as equally likely *a priori*, the Bayes factor is all we need to conduct model comparison.

Let θ be a $(k \times 1)$ vector containing all the parameters of model M_i . Moreover denote the likelihood function and the prior density by $p(Y_T|\theta)$ and $p(\theta)$ respectively. The marginal data density is given by:

$$p(Y_T) = \int p(Y_T|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta$$
(26)

The modified harmonic mean (MHM) method of Gelfand and Dey (1994) can be used to approximate (26) numerically. This method is based on the following result:

$$p(Y_T)^{-1} = \int_{\Theta} \frac{h(\theta)}{p(Y_T|\theta)p(\theta)} p(\theta|Y_T) d\theta$$
(27)

where Θ is the support of the posterior probability density. The weighting function $h(\theta)$ is a probability density whose support is contained in Θ . A numerical approximation of the integral on the right hand side of (27) can be obtained by montecarlo integration:

$$\widehat{p}(Y_T)^{-1} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N m\left(\theta^i\right)$$
$$m\left(\theta^i\right) = \frac{h(\theta^i)}{p(Y_T|\theta^i, M_i)p(\theta^i)}$$




Figure 12: Lubik and Schorfheide specification,

				Parameter	$\xi^{er} = 1$	$\xi^{er} = 2$
Parameter	$\xi_t^{sp} = 1$	$\xi_t^{sp} = 2$		σ_R	$\underset{(0.2211, 0.2785)}{0.2470}$	0.0876 (0.0658,0.1180)
ψ_1	0.6472 (0.3915,0.8741)	3.0000 (2.1296,4.0286)		σ_g	0.2626 (0.1780,0.3663)	$\underset{(0.1054,0.1694)}{0.1345}$
ψ_2	$\underset{(0.3351, 0.8092)}{0.5574}$	0.1704 (0.0499,0.3404)		σ_z	$\underset{(1.4473,2.9247)}{2.0845}$	$\underset{(0.3717, 0.5096)}{0.4343}$
$ ho_R$	$\underset{(0.8192,0.9124)}{0.8716}$	$\underset{(0.6874, 0.8552)}{0.7855}$		$ ho_{gz}$	$\underset{(0.2952,0.6914)}{0.4817}$	$\underset{(0.4026, 0.5096)}{0.6756}$
τ	$\begin{array}{c} 2.3999 \\ \scriptscriptstyle (1.7044, 3.1923) \end{array}$	1.8087 (1.1561,2.5997)	. —	σ_η	$\underset{(0.0178,0.1218)}{0.0564}$	_
κ	0.0953 (0.0502,0.1654)	0.4067 (0.1483,0.7387)		$M_{\eta r}$	$\underset{(0.9258,2.7096)}{1.8032}$	_
$ ho_g$	$\underset{(0.7124, 0.8753)}{0.8002}$	$\underset{(0.8461, 0.93371)}{0.8918}$		$M_{\eta g}$	$\underset{(0.3687,1.0948)}{0.7705}$	_
$ ho_z$	0.7655 (0.6820,0.8333)	$\underset{(0.7556, 0.8783)}{0.8222}$		$M_{\eta z}$	-0.1966 (-1.1046,-0.1421)	_
r^*	0.4466 (0.2785,0.6262)	0.4684 (0.3133,0.6556)		σ_y	0.06 (0.0307,0	
π^*	$\underset{(0.6207,1.0860)}{0.8446}$	$\underset{(0.6470,0.8435)}{0.7443}$		σ_p	$\underset{(0.3638,0)}{0.40}$	
				σ_r	$\underset{(0.0152,0}{0.03}$	

Table 3: Posterior mode estimates of DSGE parameters and transition matrices

where θ^i is the *i*th draw from the posterior distribution of $p(\theta|Y_T)$. As long as $m(\theta)$ is bounded above the montecarlo approximation converges at a reasonable rate.

Geweke (1999) suggests an implementation based on the posterior simulator. The weighting function $h(\theta)$ is a truncated multivariate Gaussian density.

The mean $\overline{\theta}$ and the covariance $\overline{\Omega}$ are obtained from the posterior simulator. To ensure the boundness condition, choose $p \in (0, 1)$ and take

$$h(\theta) = p^{-1} N\left(\theta; \overline{\theta}, \overline{\Omega}\right) I_{\widehat{\Theta}_{M}}$$
$$\widehat{\Theta}_{M} = \left\{ \theta : \left(\theta - \overline{\theta}\right)' \overline{\Omega}^{-1} \left(\theta - \overline{\theta}\right) \le \chi_{1-p}^{2}\left(k\right) \right\}$$

where $I_{\widehat{\Theta}_M}$ is an indicator function that is equal to one when $\theta \in \widehat{\Theta}_M$. If $\widehat{\Theta}_M \subsetneq \Theta$, the domain of integration needs to be redefined as $\widehat{\Theta}_M \cap \Theta$.

Sims *et al.* (2008) point out that while the approach proposed by Geweke works generally well when dealing with fixed coefficients models, problems can arise when it is applied to Markov-switching models. When allowing for time variation of the parameters the posterior tends to be Non-Gaussian. Therefore, they suggest replacing the Gaussian distribution with elliptical distributions centered at the posterior mode, $\overline{\overline{\theta}}$. Then, the sample covariance matrix $\overline{\Omega}$ is replaced with:

$$\overline{\overline{\Omega}} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left(\theta^{i} - \overline{\overline{\theta}} \right) \left(\theta^{i} - \overline{\overline{\theta}} \right)'$$

The density form of an elliptical distribution centered at $\overline{\overline{\theta}}$ and scaled by $\overline{\overline{S}} = \sqrt{\overline{\Omega}}$ is

$$g\left(\theta\right) = \frac{\Gamma\left(k/2\right)}{2\pi^{k/2} \left|\det\left(\overline{\overline{S}}\right)\right|} \frac{f\left(r\right)}{r^{k-1}}$$

where k is the dimension of θ , $r = \sqrt{\left(\theta^i - \overline{\overline{\theta}}\right)' \overline{\overline{\Omega}}^{-1} \left(\theta^i - \overline{\overline{\theta}}\right)}$, and f() is any one-dimensional density defined on the positive reals. Sims *et al.* (2008) explain how to draw from the elliptical distribution. In what follows I report the results based on this second method.

Table 4 reports the log marginal data density for different values of p. A smaller value of p implies a better behavior of $m(\theta)$ over the domain $\widehat{\Theta}_M$, but also a greater simulation error due to a smaller number of draws $\theta^i \in \widehat{\Theta}_M$. The best performing model coincides with the benchmark specification in which the Taylor rule parameters are allowed to switch across

Model	p = 0.1	p = 0.3	p = 0.5	p = 0.7
$\overline{\text{MS T.R.+heter.+ind } H^m}$	2,385.9	2,384.6	2,383.7	2,383.2
MS T.R.+heter.	2,385.4	2,383.3	2,381.8	2,380.6
Fixed parameters+heter.	2,376.1	2,375.8	2,375.6	2,375.4
One-time-only switch	2,243.9	2,243.5	2,242.7	2,241.9

Table 4: Marginal data density (log)

regimes. I consider two versions of this model. In one case agents are assumed to know the transition matrix observed ex-post by the econometrician $(H^m = H^{sp})$, while in the other the two matrices are allowed to differ. The second specification returns slightly better results. The third and fourth models correspond respectively to the "Just Good Luck" and "Just Good Policy" specifications. Quite interestingly, the former dominates the latter. This result suggests that there are important gains from allowing for heteroskedastic disturbances.

8 Conclusions

Many economists like to think about US monetary policy history in terms of pre- and post-Volcker. The underlying idea is that since the Volcker disinflation the Fed has acquired a better understanding of how to manage the economy and provide a stable and reliable anchor for agents expectations.

This paper has shown that in fact the appointment of Volcker came with a substantial change in the conduct of monetary policy, with the Fed moving from a passive to an active regime. However, the assumption that this represented an unprecedented and once-and-forall regime change turns out to be misleading.

According to a Markov-switching model in which agents form expectations taking into account the possibility of regime changes, the Fed has moved back and forth between a *Hawk* and a *Dove* regime. Under the *Hawk* regime the Fed reacts strongly to deviations of inflation from the target, while under the *Dove* regime output stability turns out to be at least equally important.

The two regimes have very different implications for the dynamics of the economy. In particular, given an adverse technology shock, the Fed is willing to cause a large recession to contrast inflation only under the *Hawk* regime.

The '70s were surely dominated by the *Dove* regime, with the Fed trying to minimize output losses. However, this is not enough to explain the rise in inflation that occurred

in those years. In fact, little would have changed if the *Hawk* regime had been in place over the entire sample: Inflation would have been slightly lower, but with important losses in terms of output. Furthermore, the estimates support the idea that a break in the shock volatilities has a role in explaining the remarkable economic stability of recent years, whereas uncertainty was much higher in the '70s.

The paper then explored the role of agents' beliefs around the behavior of the monetary authority. Through counterfactual simulations, I have shown that if agents had put a large probability on the appointment of an extremely conservative Chairman, inflation would not have reached the peaks of the late '70s-early '80s. Moreover, the cost in terms of lower output would have been relatively low compared to the case in which the *Hawk* regime is assumed to be in place over the entire sample. Therefore, it seems that the main problem in the '70s was a lack of confidence in the possibility of quickly moving back to an active regime. If agents had anticipated the appointment of Volcker, the Great Inflation would have been a less extreme event.

These results imply that there could be important gains in terms of low inflation and stable output from committing to a flexible inflation targeting regime. In such a regime the Fed would accommodate those shocks that would otherwise have pervasive effects on the economy. At the same time, once the shocks are gone, there should be a clear commitment to generate a recession large enough to bring the economy back to equilibrium. Compared to the case in which the Fed simply follows a hawkish regime, the final disinflation can be more painful, but the cumulative cost is likely to be smaller.

Even if the US did not enter an absorbing state, there is some hope that events like the Great Inflation will not occur again. Not because the Fed is likely to behave differently on impact, but because agents have now seen what follows a period of loose monetary policy. Obviously, this is an optimistic view. First of all, it is not clear to what extent agents learn from the past. More importantly, the probabilities attached to the different regimes are likely to depend on the persistence of the shocks. Policy makers should avoid trying to accommodate those shocks that are likely to persist for a long time because this would determine a change in the probabilities that agents attach to the different regimes. These considerations seem particularly relevant in light of the recent economic turmoil. In the past year, the Federal Reserve has dealt with a pervasive and severe financial crisis. This led to substantial deviations from common monetary policy practice, and monetary policy has been remarkably loose. In light of the results of this paper, this deviation does not represent a problem as long as agents do not revise their beliefs. Paraphrasing Leeper and Zha (2003),

modest regime changes are going to be well received, while long-lasting ones will trigger a learning mechanism involving agents' expectations.

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A Bayesian algorithms

A.1 Priors

This section describes the priors for the DSGE parameters and the transition matrices

DSGE parameters

The specification of the prior distribution is summarized in Table 5, which reports prior densities, means, and standard deviations. I assume that the parameters are *a priori* independent. The priors are the same across the two regimes and they resemble the ones used by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).

Parameter	Density	Range	Mean	Std. deviation
ψ_1	Normal	\mathbb{R}^+	1	0.5
ψ_2	Normal	\mathbb{R}^+	0.25	0.15
$ ho_R$	Beta	[0,1)	0.5	0.2
τ	Gamma	\mathbb{R}^+	2	0.5
κ	Gamma	\mathbb{R}^+	0.3	0.15
$ ho_g$	Beta	[0,1)	0.8	0.1
ρ_z	Beta	[0,1)	0.7	0.1
r^*	Gamma	\mathbb{R}^+	0.6	0.3
π^*	Normal	\mathbb{R}^+	0.75	0.17
σ_R	Inv. Gamma	\mathbb{R}^+	0.25	0.14
σ_{g}	Inv. Gamma	\mathbb{R}^+	0.4	0.3
σ_z	Inv. Gamma	\mathbb{R}^+	1	0.5
σ_y	Inv. Gamma	\mathbb{R}^+	0.15	0.1
σ_p	Inv. Gamma	\mathbb{R}^+	0.15	0.1
σ_r	Inv. Gamma	\mathbb{R}^+	0.1	0.05

Table 5: Prior distributions for DSGE model parameters

Markov-switching transition matrices

Each column of H^{sp} , H^m , and H^{er} is modeled according to a Dirichlet distribution:

$$\begin{aligned} H^{sp}(\cdot,i) &\sim D(a_{ii}^{sp},a_{ij}^{sp}) \\ H^{er}(\cdot,i) &\sim D(a_{ii}^{er},a_{ij}^{er}) \\ H^{m}(\cdot,i) &\sim D(a_{ii}^{m},a_{ij}^{m}) \end{aligned}$$

I choose $a_{ii}^{sp} = a_{ii}^{er} = a_{ii}^m = 10$, and $a_{ij}^{sp} = a_{ij}^{er} = a_{ij}^m = 1$. The priors imply that the regimes are fairly persistent.

A.2 Gibbs sampling algorithm

At the beginning of iteration n we have: θ_{n-1}^{sp} , θ_{n-1}^{ss} , θ_{n-1}^{er} , S_{n-1}^{T} , $\xi_{n-1}^{sp,T}$, $\xi_{n-1}^{er,T}$, H_{n-1}^{sp} , H_{n-1}^{m} , and H_{n-1}^{er} .

Step 1: Sampling the Markov-switching states $(\xi_n^{sp,T} \text{ and } \xi_n^{er,T})$

Conditional on the DSGE parameters and on S_{n-1}^T , we have a Markov-switching VAR with known hyperparameters:

$$S_t = T\left(\xi_t^{sp}\right) S_{t-1} + R\left(\xi_t^{sp}\right) \epsilon_t \tag{28}$$

$$\epsilon_t \sim N(0, Q(\xi_t^{er})), \ Q(\xi_t^{er}) = diag(\theta^{er}(\xi_t^{er}))$$
(29)

$$H^{sp}(\cdot, i) \sim D(a_{ii}^{sp}, a_{ij}^{sp}), \ H^{er}(\cdot, i) \sim D(a_{ii}^{er}, a_{ij}^{er})$$
 (30)

Therefore, for given H_{n-1}^{sp} and H_{n-1}^{er} , the Hamilton filter can be used to derive the filtered probabilities of the different regimes. Then, the multimove Gibbs-sampling of Carter and Kohn (1994) can be used to draw $\xi_n^{sp,T}$ and $\xi_n^{er,T}$ (see step 4 for a description of method).

Step 2: Sampling the transition matrices $(H_n^{sp} \text{ and } H_n^{er})$

Given the draws for the MS state variables $\xi_n^{sp,T}$ and $\xi_n^{er,T}$, the transition probabilities are independent of S_{n-1}^T and the other parameters of the model and have a Dirichlet distribution. For each column of H_n^{sp} and H_n^{er} the posterior distribution is given by

$$\begin{aligned} H_n^{sp}(\cdot,i) &\sim D(a_{ii}^{sp} + \eta_{ii}^{sp}, a_{ij}^{sp} + \eta_{ij}^{sp}) \\ H_n^{er}(\cdot,i) &\sim D(a_{ii}^{er} + \eta_{ii}^{er}, a_{ij}^{er} + \eta_{ij}^{er}) \end{aligned}$$

where η_{ij}^{sp} and η_{ij}^{er} denote respectively the numbers of transitions from state i^{sp} to state j^{sp} and from state i^{er} to state j^{er} and $(a_{ii}^{sp}, a_{ij}^{sp}, a_{ii}^{er}, a_{ij}^{er})$ are the parameters describing the prior.

Step 3.a: Sampling the DSGE parameters $(\theta_n = \{\theta_n^{sp}, \theta_n^{er}, \theta_n^{ss}\})$

Start drawing a new set of parameters from the proposal distribution: $\vartheta_n^{sp} \sim N\left(\theta_{n-1}^{sp}, c^{sp}\overline{\Sigma}^{sp}\right)$, $\vartheta_n^{er} \sim N\left(\theta_{n-1}^{er}, c^{er}\overline{\Sigma}^{er}\right)$, $\vartheta_n^{oe} \sim N\left(\theta_{n-1}^{oe}, c^{oe}\overline{\Sigma}^{oe}\right)$ (if a block optimization algorithm has been used to find the posterior mode) or $vec\left(\vartheta\right) \sim N\left(\theta_{n-1}, c\overline{\Sigma}\right)$. Here $\overline{\Sigma}$ is the inverse of the Hessian computed at the posterior mode and c is a scale factor. If n = 1, set $\theta_{n-1} = \overline{\theta} + c\overline{\Sigma}$, where $\overline{\theta}$ is the posterior mode estimate of the DSGE parameters. A Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to accept/reject ϑ . Conditional on $\xi_n^{sp,T}$ and $\xi_n^{er,T}$ there is no uncertainty

around the hyperparameters characterizing the state space form model:

$$y_t = D(\theta^{ss}) + ZS_t + v_t \tag{31}$$

$$S_t = T\left(\xi_t^{sp}\right) S_{t-1} + R\left(\xi_t^{sp}\right) \epsilon_t \tag{32}$$

$$\epsilon_t \sim N(0, Q(\xi_t^{er})), \ Q(\xi_t^{er}) = diag(\theta^{er}(\xi_t^{er}))$$
(33)

$$v_t \sim N(0,U), \ U = diag\left(\sigma_x^2, \sigma_\pi^2, \sigma_R^2\right)$$
(34)

Therefore, the Kalman filter can be used to evaluate the conditional likelihood according to θ_{n-1} , the old set of parameters, and ϑ , the proposed set of parameters. Then the conditional likelihood is combined with the prior distributions of the DSGE parameters. Compute $cut = min \{1, r\}$ where

$$r = \frac{\ell\left(\vartheta^{sp}, \vartheta^{er}, \vartheta^{ss} | Y^T, \xi_n^{sp,T}, \xi_n^{er,T}, \ldots\right) p\left(\vartheta^{sp}, \vartheta^{er}, \vartheta^{ss}\right)}{\ell\left(\theta_{n-1}^{sp}, \theta_{n-1}^{er}, \theta_{n-1}^{ss} | Y^T, \xi_n^{sp,T}, \xi_n^{er,T}, \ldots\right) p\left(\theta_{n-1}^{sp}, \theta_{n-1}^{er}, \theta_{n-1}^{ss}\right)}$$

Draw a random number d from an uniform distribution defined over the interval [0, 1]. If d < r, $(\theta_n^{sp}, \theta_n^{ss}, \theta_n^{er}) = (\vartheta^{sp}, \vartheta^{er}, \vartheta^{ss})$, otherwise set $(\theta_n^{sp}, \theta_n^{ss}, \theta_n^{er}) = (\theta_{n-1}^{sp}, \theta_{n-1}^{ss}, \theta_{n-1}^{er})$.

Step 3.b: Sampling the transition matrix used by agents H_n^m

Start drawing a new set of values for the columns of H^m using a Dirichlet distribution: $\widetilde{H}^m(\cdot, i) \sim D(b_{ii,n-1}^m, b_{ij,n-1}^m)$, where $b_{ii,n-1}^m$ and $b_{ii,n-1}^m$ depend on the columns of H_{n-1}^m . This step defines the transition probability $q\left(\widetilde{H}^m|H_{n-1}^m\right)$. Then, use a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to accept/reject \widetilde{H}^m . Compute $cut = min \{1, r\}$ where

$$r = \frac{\ell\left(\widetilde{H}^m | Y^T, \theta_n, \xi_n^{sp,T}, \dots\right) p\left(\widetilde{H}^m\right) q\left(H_{n-1}^m | \widetilde{H}^m\right)}{\ell\left(H_{n-1}^m | Y^T, \theta_n, \xi_n^{sp,T}, \dots\right) p\left(H_{n-1}^m\right) q\left(\widetilde{H}^m | H_{n-1}^m\right)}$$

Draw a random number d from an uniform distribution defined over the interval [0, 1]. If $d < r, H_n^m = \tilde{H}^m$, otherwise set $H_n^m = H_{n-1}^m$.

Step 4: Sampling the DSGE state vector (S_n^T)

For a given set of DSGE parameters and MS states, (31)-(34) form a state-space model with known hyperparameters. Step 3 returns a filtered estimate of the state variable: $S_n^T | Y^T$. The multimove Gibbs-sampling of Carter and Kohn (1994) can be used to draw the whole vector of S_n^T . Note that:

$$p\left(S_n^T | Y^T\right) = p\left(S_{T,n} | Y^T\right) \prod_{t=1}^{T-1} p\left(S_t | S_{t+1}, Y^T\right)$$

Therefore, the whole vector $S_n^T | Y^T$ can be obtained drawing $S_{T,n}$ from $p(S_{T,n} | Y^T)$ and then using a backward algorithm to draw $S_{t,n}$, t = 1...T - 1. Note that the state space model (31)-(34) is linear and Gaussian. It follows that:

$$S_{T,n}|Y^T \sim N\left(S_{T,n|T}, P_{T,n|T}\right)$$

$$S_t|Y^T, S_{t+1} \sim N\left(S_{t,n|t,S_{t+1}}, P_{t,n|t,S_{t+1}}\right)$$

where

$$S_{T,n|T} = E\left(S_{T,n}|Y^T\right) \tag{35}$$

$$P_{T,n|T} = Cov\left(S_{T,n}|Y^{T}\right) \tag{36}$$

$$S_{t,n|t,S_{t+1}} = E\left(S_t|Y^T, S_{t+1}\right)$$
(37)

$$P_{t,n|t,S_{t+1}} = Cov\left(S_t|Y^T, S_{t+1}\right)$$

$$(38)$$

Step 3 returns $S_{T,n|T}$ and $P_{T,n|T}$, while $S_{T,n|T}$ and $P_{T,n|T}$ can be obtained updating the estimate of $S_{t,n}$ combining $S_{t,n|T}$, the filtered estimate from step 3, with the new information contained in $\widetilde{S}_{t+1,n}$, the drawn value of $S_{t+1,n}$. See Kim and Nelson (1999) for further details.

Step 5

If $n < n_{sim}$, go back to 1, otherwise stop, where n_{sim} is the desired number of iterations.

Step 1, step 2 and step 3.b when $H^m = H^{sp} = H^{sp,m}$

In this case we cannot draw H_n^{sp} simply counting the number of transitions across the MS states, because a change in the transition matrix implies also a change in the law of motion of the DSGE states. Instead, we can apply a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm treating S_{n-1}^T as observed data and using the Hamilton filter to evaluate the likelihood. In this case, define $cut = min \{1, r\}$ where

$$r = \frac{\ell\left(\widetilde{H}^{sp,m}|S_{n-1}^{T}, \theta_{n-1}, \dots\right) p\left(\widetilde{H}^{sp,m}\right) q\left(H_{n-1}^{sp,m}|\widetilde{H}^{sp,m}\right)}{\ell\left(H_{n-1}^{sp,m}|S_{n-1}^{T}, \theta_{n-1}, \dots\right) p\left(H_{n-1}^{sp,m}\right) q\left(\widetilde{H}^{sp,m}|H_{n-1}^{sp,m}\right)}$$

As a side product, we obtain filtered estimates for the MS states and we can use them to draw $\xi_n^{sp,T}$ and $\xi_n^{er,T}$ with the usual backward drawing algorithm. Finally, H^{er} can be drawn according to the standard procedure described above.

B The model

The economy consists of a continuum of monopolistic firms, a representative household, and a monetary policy authority. The household maximizes the following utility function:

$$E_t \left[\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \left(\frac{C_s^{1-\tau} - 1}{1 - \tau} + \chi \log \frac{M_s}{P_s} - h_s \right) \right]$$
(39)

The household budget constraint is:

$$C_t + \frac{B_t}{P_t} + \frac{M_t}{P_t} + \frac{T_t}{P_t} = W_t h_t + \frac{M_{t-1}}{P_t} + R_{t-1} \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_t} + D_t$$
(40)

Each of the monopolistically competitive firms face a downward-sloping demand curve:

$$Y_t(j) = \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{-1/\nu} Y_t \tag{41}$$

The parameter 1/v is the elasticity of substitution between two differentiated goods. The firms take as given the general price level, P_t , and level of activity, Y_t . Whenever a firm wants to change its price, it faces quadratic adjustment costs represented by an output loss:

$$AC_t(j) = \frac{\varphi}{2} \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} - \pi \right)^2 Y_t(j)$$
(42)

Labor is the only input in a linear production function:

$$Y_t(j) = A_t h_t(j) \tag{43}$$

where total factor productivity A_t evolves according to an exogenous unit root process:

$$\ln A_t = \ln \gamma + \ln A_{t-1} + \widetilde{a}_t \tag{44}$$

$$\widetilde{a}_t = \widetilde{a}_{t-1} + \epsilon_{a,t} \tag{45}$$

Here \tilde{a}_t can be interpreted as an aggregate technology shock. This specification determines a stochastic trend.

The firm's problem consists in choosing the price $P_t(j)$ to maximize the present value of future profits:

$$E_t\left[\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} Q_s\left(\frac{P_s(j)}{P_s}Y_s(j) - W_sh_s(j) - \frac{\varphi}{2}\left(\frac{P_s(j)}{P_{s-1}(j)} - \pi\right)^2 Y_s(j)\right)\right]$$

Where Q_s is the marginal value of a unit of the consumption good: $Q_s/Q_t = \beta \left[u_c(s)/u_c(t) \right] = \beta^{s-t} (C_t/C_s)^{\tau}$.

The central bank sets the nominal interest rate in response to deviations of inflation and output from their target levels:

$$\frac{R_t}{R^*} = \left(\frac{R_{t-1}}{R^*}\right)^{\rho_R} \left[\left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi^*}\right)^{\psi_1} \left(\frac{Y_t}{Y_t^*}\right)^{\psi_2} \right]^{(1-\rho_R)} e^{\epsilon_{R,t}}$$

 R^* is the steady-state nominal rate, Y_t^* is the target for output and π^* is the target level for inflation.

Government expenditure is a fraction ζ_t of total output and it is equally divided among the *J* different goods. We define $g_t = 1/(1 - \zeta_t)$ and we assume that $\tilde{g}_t = \ln(g_t/g^*)$ follows a stationary AR(1) process:

$$\widetilde{g}_t = \rho_g \widetilde{g}_{t-1} + \epsilon_{g,t} \tag{46}$$

Therefore $\epsilon_{g,t}$ can be interpreted as a shock to Government expenditure. The government collects a lump-sum tax (or provides a subsidy) to balance the fiscal deficit:

$$\zeta_t Y_t + R_{t-1} \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_t} + \frac{M_{t-1}}{P_t} = \frac{B_t}{P_t} + \frac{M_t}{P_t} + \frac{T_t}{P_t}$$