Off the Cliff and Back? Credit Conditions and International Trade during the Global Financial Crisis

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Off the cliff...

A sharp and sudden drop in trade flows witnessed in the final quarter of 2008:

- World trade fell by 12% in 2009 (WTO)
- Greatly exceeds the projected 6% fall in industrial output and 2.5% fall in income per capita (IMF projections)
- Especially acute for small open economies
- Contagion: Exports fell even for countries with relatively sound banking sectors
- Impact on trade is drawing a lot of attention:
  Freund (2009), Bricogne, Fontagné, Gaulier, Taglioni and Vicard (2009), Levchenko, Logan and Tesar (2009), Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2009), Bems, Johnson and Yi (2010), Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2010)
Effect of the global financial crisis on international trade

Why have trade flows contracted?

1. Producer side: Collapse in financial intermediation (financing constraints)
2. Consumer side: Collapse of aggregate demand
Effect of the global financial crisis on international trade

Why have trade flows contracted?

1. Producer side: Collapse in financial intermediation (financing constraints)
2. Consumer side: Collapse of aggregate demand

What we do:

- Establish and quantify the effects that the severe tightening of credit conditions had on trade flows
- Use monthly US import data from Nov 06 to Oct 09
- Exploit the variation in financial dependence across sectors and the variation in the cost of credit (proxied by the interbank lending rate) across countries and over time
What we find: Summary

▶ **Cross-country**: Higher interbank rates associated with lower trade volumes

Thus, lower export volumes for countries where credit conditions were tighter
What we find: Summary

- **Cross-country**: Higher interbank rates associated with lower trade volumes
  
  Thus, lower export volumes for countries where credit conditions were tighter

- **Cross-country and Cross-industry**: Effects are more severe in industries that
  
  ▶ require more external financing (Rajan and Zingales 1998);
  
  ▶ have fewer collateralizable assets (Braun 2003, Claessens and Laeven 2003);
  
  and

  ▶ have poorer access to trade credit (Fisman and Love 2003)

- For such financially dependent sectors, this sensitivity to credit conditions intensified during the peak of the financial crisis (post Sep 08)
What we find: Summary

- Examine robustness to:
  - An extensive set of fixed effects
  - Country factor endowments
  - Initial GDP and GDP per capita
  - Domestic production (industrial production index)

- Additional corroborating evidence using private credit over GDP or accounting standards:

  Countries with stronger initial financial development were better able to withstand the contraction in trade in more financially dependent industries
What we find: Summary

Interpreting the magnitudes:

Consider two scenarios to provide bounds on how much credit conditions mattered for trade volumes:

(i) Suppose that interbank rates remained at their Sep 08 highs

(ii) Suppose that interbank rates fell immediately to their Aug 09 lows

Find:

- Large level effects of credit conditions on trade volumes, both in the cross-country and within-country experiences

- Large and systematic differences in the trade response of sectors depending on their level of financial vulnerability (external finance dependence, asset tangibility, access to trade credit)
What we find: Discussion

Important implications:

- New evidence of the effect of credit constraints and short-term fluctuations in the cost of capital on international trade
- Large real effects from financial crises
- Potentially significant scope for welfare gains from policy interventions to mitigate trade collapse
What we find: Discussion

Important implications:

- New evidence of the effect of credit constraints and short-term fluctuations in the cost of capital on international trade
- Large real effects from financial crises
- Potentially significant scope for welfare gains from policy interventions to mitigate trade collapse

Two potential explanations for the heightened sensitivity of exports to credit conditions during the crisis:

- Reduced consumer demand and lower expected export revenues in the US
- Decline in the availability of trade credit and trade financing in the US
- Both interact with and magnify the effect of tight credit conditions in exporting countries, with particularly detrimental consequences for financially dependent sectors
Related literature

1. Importance of external financing for export activities:
   Beck (2002, 2003), Becker and Greenberg (2007), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005), Hur et al. (2006), and Manova (2008a,b)

2. Firm level evidence on credit constraints and exporting:
   Greenaway et al. (2007), Muûls (2008), Manova et al. (2009), Amiti and Weinstein (2009), Minetti and Zhu (2009)

3. Impact on output and trade during a crisis:

4. Impact on trade during this crisis:
   Freund (2009), Bricogne et al. (2009), Levchenko et al. (2009), Eaton et al. (2009), Bems et al. (2010), Alessandria et al. (2010)
Plan of Talk

1. Introduction and Motivation

2. A glance at the data

3. Empirical strategy

4. Findings and Results
   4.1 Level effects
   4.2 Cross-industry effects
   4.3 Interpreting the magnitudes

5. Conclusions (and caveats)
US Trade Flows during the Global Financial Crisis

Data from the US Census Bureau:

- Monthly exports and imports (for the US’ top 100 trade partners)
- Nov 06 to Oct 09 (previous version up to Apr 09 only)
- Available at up to the NAICS 6-digit level, but we focus on the 3-digit level of aggregation
US Trade Flows during the Global Financial Crisis

Figure 1
The Decline in US Trade Volumes during the Global Financial Crisis

Source: US Census Bureau.
US Trade Flows during the Global Financial Crisis

Table 1
The Month-on-Month Fall in US Manufacturing Imports (Oct-Nov 2008)

A: Industries (NAICS 3-digit) with sharpest declines in imports (top 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAICS Code</th>
<th>Industry Name</th>
<th>Decline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>324:</td>
<td>Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing</td>
<td>-54.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>315:</td>
<td>Apparel Manufacturing</td>
<td>-33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>331:</td>
<td>Primary Metal Manufacturing</td>
<td>-23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316:</td>
<td>Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing</td>
<td>-22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>335:</td>
<td>Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing</td>
<td>-22.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B: Industries (NAICS 3-digit) with smallest declines in imports (bottom 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAICS Code</th>
<th>Industry Name</th>
<th>Decline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>321:</td>
<td>Wood Product Manufacturing</td>
<td>-12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336:</td>
<td>Transportation Equipment Manufacturing</td>
<td>-11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326:</td>
<td>Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing</td>
<td>-10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>311:</td>
<td>Food Manufacturing</td>
<td>-7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>337:</td>
<td>Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing</td>
<td>-5.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Calculated from US Census Bureau Data on US imports from the rest of the world.
US Trade Flows during the Global Financial Crisis

Observations:

1. Sudden and severe contraction between Oct and Nov 08
   This comes shortly after two key events (collapse of Lehman Brothers and the bailout of AIG) that marked the peak of the crisis in Sep 08

2. Contraction in US imports (−19.3%) was more severe than that in US exports (−13.8%)

3. Focusing on manufacturing: Decline was very broad-based, although there is interesting variation in the severity across sectors (Table 1)
Why does credit matter for international trade?

- Exporting entails additional fixed costs: Learning about export market profitability, foreign distribution networks, regulatory compliance etc

- More risky than domestic transactions $\Rightarrow$ need for trade insurance

- Involves longer lags (eg median shipment time of 2-3 months) $\Rightarrow$ need credit lines to maintain a healthy cash flow
Why does credit matter for international trade?

- Exporting entails additional fixed costs: Learning about export market profitability, foreign distribution networks, regulatory compliance etc
- More risky than domestic transactions ⇒ need for trade insurance
- Involves longer lags (eg median shipment time of 2-3 months) ⇒ need credit lines to maintain a healthy cash flow

**Hence:** A very active market for trade finance (insurance, letters of credit etc)

- Up to 90% of world trade relies on some form of trade finance, estimated at $10-12 trillion per year (Auboin 2009)
- Shortfall in trade finance in second half of 2008 estimated at $25-500 billion (Auboin 2009, Chauffour and Farole 2009)
- IMF-BAFT survey of 88 banks in 44 countries reported a rise of 31-64 basis points in the average spreads on various trade-related credit instruments in 2008Q4 relative to 2007Q4 (quoted in Amiti and Weinstein 2009)
Interbank rates

From Thomson Datastream: One-month / 30-day interbank rates

- Take monthly averages of daily quoted rates (sample of 31 countries)
- Caveats: What is the interbank rate?
  - Different quotes: Central bank, banker associations, large banks
  - More relevant as a measure of the cost of credit in countries with reasonably well-developed banking sectors
Interbank rates

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- Caveats: What is the interbank rate?
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  - More relevant as a measure of the cost of credit in countries with reasonably well-developed banking sectors

- Rise in interbank rates during the Global Financial Crisis reflects the severe tightening of credit conditions
- Started to decline after aggressive expansionary monetary policies to unfreeze credit markets
- Nevertheless, interesting variation across countries in the timing and extent of intervention
Interbank rates

Figure 2
Interbank Rates during the Global Financial Crisis

Source: Thomson Datastream.
Plan of Talk

1. Introduction and Motivation
2. A glance at the data
3. **Empirical strategy**
4. Findings and Results
   4.1 Level effects
   4.2 Cross-industry effects
   4.3 Interpreting the magnitudes
5. Conclusions (and caveats)
Level effects of *IBRATE* on trade volumes

\[
\ln Y_{ikt} = \beta_1 IBRATE_{it} + \beta_2 D_{crisis} \times IBRATE_{it} + D_{kt} + \epsilon_{ikt}
\]

- \(i\): exporting country; \(k\): industry; \(t\): month
- \(D_{crisis}\): equal to 1 if Sep 08 - Aug 09
- \(D_{kt}\): industry-month fixed effects; control for
  - sector-specific aggregate demand shocks in the US
  - shocks related to credit conditions in the US
- Cluster by country (similar if by country-industry)
Cross-industry effects of *IBRATE* on trade volumes

Triple interactions:

\[
\ln Y_{ikt} = \beta_1 IBRATE_{it} \times EXTFIN_k + \beta_2 D_{\text{crisis}} \times IBRATE_{it} \times EXTFIN_k + D_{it} + D_{kt} + D_{ik} + \epsilon_{ikt}
\]

- **$D_{kt}$**: industry-month fixed effects; control for
  - sector-specific aggregate demand shocks in the US
- **$D_{it}$**: country-month fixed effects; control for
  - aggregate conditions (eg production shocks) in the exporting country
- **$D_{ik}$**: country-industry fixed effects; control for
  - other comparative advantage forces that are not time-varying

- Cluster by country (similar if by country-industry)
Industry measures of financial dependence

1. **EXTFIN**: Dependence on external credit
   
   Fraction of total capital expenditures not financed by internal cash flow (Rajan and Zingales 1998)

2. **TANG**: Asset tangibility
   
   Net plant, property and equipment divided by total assets (Braun 2003)

3. **TCRED**: Access to trade credit
   
   Change in accounts payable divided by change in total assets (Fisman and Love 2003)

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Findings: Level effect of credit conditions on trade volumes

Focusing on cross-country variation, tighter credit conditions associated with...

- Reduced trade volumes

### Table 2
Country Credit Conditions and Trade Volumes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Log (Industry exports to the US)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBrate</td>
<td>-0.162*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.079]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis X IBrate</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.167]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor endowments controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial income controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind-Month fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>22145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Findings: Level effect of credit conditions on trade volumes

Focusing on cross-country variation, tighter credit conditions associated with...

- Reduced trade volumes (Table 2)
  - Indicates that higher interbank rates indeed reflect a tightness of supply, rather than a high level of demand for credit
  - Some signs of an intensifying effect after Sep 08
Findings: Cross-industry effects

Tighter credit conditions during the crisis period associated with...

- Lower export volumes in industries that are more dependent on external finance

Table 3
The Global Financial Crisis and Credit Channels of Comparative Advantage: EXTFIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Log (Industry exports to the US)</th>
<th>Less TUR</th>
<th>Lag IBrate</th>
<th>US exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBrate X EXTFIN</td>
<td>-0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.002 0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis X IBrate X EXTFIN</td>
<td>-0.007* -0.009** -0.014* -0.009** -0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.004] [0.003]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors:

- Factor endowments controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Initial income controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Observations 22901 22901 20208 19461 20208 20375
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.965 0.966 0.965 0.967
Findings: Cross-industry effects

Tighter credit conditions during the crisis period associated with . . .

- Higher export volumes in industries with more collateralizable assets

### Table 4
The Global Financial Crisis and Credit Channels of Comparative Advantage: TANG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Log (Industry Exports to the US)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less TUR Lag IBrate US exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBrate X TANG</td>
<td>0.152* 0.120 0.137 0.048 0.148 -0.068*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.081] [0.092] [0.109] [0.148] [0.104] [0.037]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis X IBrate X TANG</td>
<td><strong>0.057</strong>* <strong>0.057</strong> <strong>0.132</strong> <strong>0.040</strong> -0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.017] [0.041] [0.050] [0.039] [0.035]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor endowments controls?</td>
<td>No No Yes Yes Yes Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial income controls?</td>
<td>No No Yes Yes Yes Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>22901 22901 20208 19461 20208 20375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.964 0.964 0.965 0.966 0.965 0.967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Off the Cliff and Back? Credit Conditions and International Trade during the Global Financial Crisis
Findings: Cross-industry effects

Tighter credit conditions during the crisis period associated with...

- **Higher** export volumes in industries with more access to trade credit

### Table 5

**The Global Financial Crisis and Credit Channels of Comparative Advantage: TCRED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dependent variable: Log (Industry Exports to the US)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Less TUR</td>
<td>Lag IBrate</td>
<td>US exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBrate X TCRED</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.565*</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[0.293]</td>
<td>[0.275]</td>
<td>[0.311]</td>
<td>[0.527]</td>
<td>[0.331]</td>
<td>[0.214]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis X IBrate X TCRED</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.495***</td>
<td>0.587***</td>
<td>0.675**</td>
<td>0.517***</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[0.109]</td>
<td>[0.174]</td>
<td>[0.260]</td>
<td>[0.158]</td>
<td>[0.243]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor endowments controls?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial income controls?</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td>22901</td>
<td>22901</td>
<td>20208</td>
<td>19461</td>
<td>20208</td>
<td>20375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Findings: Cross-industry effects

Robustness:

- Controls for (i) factor endowments interacted with factor intensities; (ii) GDP, GDP per capita interacted with industry fixed effects; (iii) the respective interactions with $D_{crisis}$

- Using the one-month lagged interbank rate

- Dating crisis to start at Mar 08 instead of Sep 08

- Treating Europe as a cluster when adjusting the standard errors
Findings: Cross-industry effects

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- Treating Europe as a cluster when adjusting the standard errors

Remarks:

1. Credit conditions in source vs destination country: placebo results using log US exports

2. Effect of credit conditions above and beyond that on domestic production: controls for log industrial production index interacted with industry FEs

3. All three triple interactions simultaneously: strongest for $TCRED$
Cross-industry effects: An Illustration

Consider a flexible regression specification that allows a time-varying \( IBRATE_{it} \times EXTFIN_k \) coefficient:

\[
\ln Y_{ikt} = \sum_{m=1}^{M} \beta_m D_{t=m} \times IBRATE_{it} \times EXTFIN_k + D_{it} + D_{kt} + D_{ik} + \epsilon_{ikt}
\]

Figure 3 plots the evolution of the \( \beta_m \) coefficients:

- No trend before Sep 08
- A distinct jump in Sep 08 in the importance of each credit channel
- This appears to taper off for \( TANG \) and \( TCRED \)
Cross-industry effects: **EXTFIN**

A: Interbank rate X EXTFIN

![Graph showing the relationship between interbank rate and EXTFIN over time](image-url)

- Coefficient of IBrateXextfin
- 90% CI upper
- 90% CI lower

**Figure 3** The Importance of Credit Channels of Comparative Advantage over Time

- A: Interbank rate X EXTFIN
- B: Interbank rate X TANG

**Coefficient of IBrateXtang**

- Jan 07
- Jul 07
- Jan 08
- Jul 08
- Jan 09
- Jul 09

**Month**

**90% CI upper**

**90% CI lower**

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Off the Cliff and Back? Credit Conditions and International Trade during the
Cross-industry effects: \textit{TANG}

B: Interbank rate $\times$ TANG

![Graph showing the relationship between Interbank rate and TANG over time. The graph includes a trend line and 90% confidence intervals.](#)
Cross-industry effects: \( TCRED \)

C: Interbank rate X TCRED

A glance at the data
Empirical strategy
Findings: Credit conditions and trade

Notes:
Panel A plots the coefficients \( \beta_t \) obtained from the regression specification:

\[
\text{LogTrade}_{ijm} = \sum \beta_t \cdot D_m=t \cdot \text{Interbank}_{im} \cdot \text{EXTFIN}_j + D_{im} + D_{jm} + D_{ij} + \epsilon_{ijm}
\]

Here, \( i, j, \) and \( m \) index the exporting country, industry, and month respectively, while \( D_{im}, D_{jm}, \) and \( D_{ij} \) are exporter-month, industry-month, and exporter-industry fixed effects respectively. \( D_{m=t} \) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the month in question is \( t \). We use a full set of these dummy variables for each month in our sample, and interact each against the product of the one-month interbank rate in country \( i \) in month \( m \) and the external finance dependence characteristic of the industry \( j \). The \( \beta_t \) coefficients are plotted, to illustrate the importance credit channel of comparative advantage over time. Panel B and C do likewise, with \( \text{EXTFIN} \) replaced by \( \text{TANG} \) and \( \text{TCRED} \) respectively. In each panel, the dotted lines indicate the bounds of the 90% confidence intervals of each \( \beta_t \) coefficient. Two linear regression trend lines for the \( \beta_t \)'s are plotted, one for pre-September 2008 and a second line for September 2008 and after. A horizontal line at 0 is included.
Additional findings using standard measures of financial development

- Private credit over GDP: Triple interaction signs are consistent with intuition

### Table 6
Financial Development and Trade Flows during the Global Financial Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09</th>
<th>Ind Char:</th>
<th>PC/GDP = Private Credit / GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXTFIN</td>
<td>EXTFIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis X PC/GDP X Ind Char</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.059***</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.019]</td>
<td>[0.028]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                             | (3)      | (4)                          |
|                             | TANG     | TANG                         |
|                             | -0.358*  | -0.831***                    |
|                             | [0.205]  | [0.278]                      |

|                             | (5)      | (6)                          |
|                             | TCRED    | TCRED                        |
|                             | -1.685   | -4.185**                     |
|                             | [1.217]  | [1.984]                      |

Factor endowments controls?  No Yes No Yes No Yes
Initial income controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57144 44891 57144 44891 57144 44891
R-squared 0.953 0.958 0.953 0.958 0.953 0.958
Additional findings using standard measures of financial development

- Accounting standards: Similar results for $EXTFIN$ and $TANG$, but statistical significance weaker

Table 7
Accounting Standards and Trade Flows during the Global Financial Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis = 1: Sep 08 to Aug 09</th>
<th>Ind Char: $EXTFIN$</th>
<th>$EXTFIN$</th>
<th>$TANG$</th>
<th>$TANG$</th>
<th>$TCRED$</th>
<th>$TCRED$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>[0.001]</td>
<td>[0.001]</td>
<td>[0.005]</td>
<td>[0.007]</td>
<td>[0.052]</td>
<td>[0.060]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Factor endowments controls?</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Initial income controls?</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cty-Ind, Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>29489</td>
<td>28353</td>
<td>29489</td>
<td>28353</td>
<td>29489</td>
<td>28353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Plan of Talk

1. Introduction and Motivation

2. A glance at the data

3. Empirical strategy

4. Findings and Results
   4.1 Level effects
   4.2 Cross-industry effects
   4.3 Interpreting the magnitudes

5. Conclusions (and caveats)
Interpreting the magnitudes

Using reduced-form point estimates, consider two scenarios:

(i) Interbank rates remained at their Sep 08 levels throughout

(ii) Interbank rates dropped immediately in Oct 08 to Aug 09 rates

Compare predicted trade flows under these scenarios against predicted trade flows under the actual observed path of interbank rates
Interpreting the magnitudes

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(i) Interbank rates remained at their Sep 08 levels throughout
(ii) Interbank rates dropped immediately in Oct 08 to Aug 09 rates

Compare predicted trade flows under these scenarios against predicted trade flows under the actual observed path of interbank rates

Level effects based on the cross-country variation: (Table 2)

- Under (i), exports to the US would have been 35.2% less for the average country and sector
- Under (ii), exports to the US would have been 30.5% higher
Interpreting the magnitudes (cont.)

Cross-country, cross-industry effects: (Tables 3-5)

▶ Under (i), US import performance would have been ... 

▶ 13.4% weaker in the most external finance-dependent sector (chemical manufacturing) relative to the least dependent sector (leather and allied manufactured products)

▶ 17.0% weaker in the industry with the lowest share of tangible assets (leather and allied manufactured products) relative to the industry with the hardest assets (petroleum and coal products)

▶ 16.9% weaker in the sector with least availability of trade credit (textiles) relative to the sector with the greatest access to buyer and supplier credit (petroleum and coal products)

▶ Corresponding figures under scenario (ii) are: 8.2%, 9.7%, 9.7%
Additional Findings

Level effect of $IBRATE$ within countries:

- With country-month and industry-month fixed effects (fully saturated)
- For entire sample period

Table 9
Country Credit Conditions and Trade Volumes: The Within-Country Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Log (Industry exports to the US)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 06 to Oct 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBrate</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.008]</td>
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<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.961</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log (Exchange Rate)?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log (IPI)?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cty-Mth, Ind-Mth fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</table>
Additional Findings (cont.)

Level effect of $IBRATE$ within countries:

- Breaking up across different sub-periods

Table 9 (cont.)
Country Credit Conditions and Trade Volumes: The Within-Country Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<td>Log (Industry exports to the US)</td>
<td>Log (Industry exports to the US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 06 to Aug 08</td>
<td>Sep 08 to Dec 08</td>
<td>Jan 09 to Oct 09</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.033***</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.012</td>
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<td>[0.010]</td>
<td>[0.009]</td>
<td>[0.021]</td>
<td>[0.025]</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.981</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log (Exchange Rate)?</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Additional Findings (cont.)

Level effect of $IBRATE$ within countries:

- Repeat the same thought experiments for the Sep 08 - Dec 08 regression
- Under (i), trade flows in Dec 08 would have been 2.5% lower in the average country and sector
- Under (ii), trade flows in Dec 08 would have been 5.5% higher
- Relatively large in comparison to the overall 12% drop in world trade flows in 2008
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Concluding Remarks and Caveats

- Using interbank rates as a measure of the cost of credit, and monthly data on US imports:

  Find evidence of a link between tight credit conditions and the collapse in international trade observed during the recent global financial crisis

- Level effect: Higher interbank rates associated with lower exports

- Cross-industry effect: Differential effects of higher interbank rates across sectors, depending on their external finance dependence, asset tangibility, and access to trade credit

- Cross-industry effects appear to intensify post Sep 08
Concluding Remarks and Caveats

**Open questions:**

1. Can more be done to distinguish between the credit constraints and the aggregate demand hypotheses? vs other alternative hypotheses?

2. Has access to credit become more important as a determinant of trade / comparative advantage?

   Implications for trade shares: Will the crisis confer a permanent gain to exporting countries with better financial development?

3. Examining the pattern of the “recovery” of trade flows