# Off the Cliff and Back? Credit Conditions and International Trade During the Global Financial Crisis

Davin Chor and Kalina Manova

Comments by Philippe Martin<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Sciences Po (Paris) and CEPR

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 4, 2010

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- ► This negative effect was more pronounced during the months of the credit crisis

  Interpretation of the results:
- Credit conditions in both exporter (interbank rates) and importer (US financial crisis) magnified the effect on trade: this complementarity may be key to understand the trade collapse (not only the addition of the two effects)
- ▶ Importance of credit conditions and financial intermediation for international trade: one of the very few papers able to identify and quantify such an effect

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
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Figure 2
Interbank Rates during the Global Financial Crisis



Source: Thomson Datastream.

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- ► The spread must be very correlated to the dummy crisis but has a country dimension
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- 1. Were exporters with long transport time to the US more affected by crisis and higher interest rates?
- 2. In your data: interact interbank rate with distance (or average time to transport to US)
- On US imports (Jan 05 Aug 09; USITC): interact distance to US (proxy for time to transport) with months of crisis (sept 08 - march 09); country-month dummies (seasonality) and time dummies
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Table 1: Trade in the Current Financial Crisis

Dep. Var.	Log(Bilateral US Imports)	
Estimation	a	b
Log(Bilateral Exchange Rate)	-0.328***	-0.338***
Log(Commodity Price Index, all)	(0,020) 0,313 (0,870)	(0,020)
Log(Commodity Price Index, energy)	-0,082 (0,727)	
Log(US Industrial Production)	0,832 (0,843)	
Financial Crisis	4.331** (1,946)	
Financial Crisis*Distance	-0.468** (0,216)	-0.491** (0,218)
Observations	7351	7414
R-squared	0,6	0,6
Country Dummies	No	No
Country*Month Dummies	Yes	Yes
Time Dummies	No	Yes

Panel (within) estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust SE in parentheses.

\* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

Financial crisis: dummy equal to 1 from Sept. 2008 to March 2009, 0 otherwise.

# Some results of a recent paper CEPR 7765, Berman and Martin, 2010

Confirms some of the results of present paper on:

- 1. Importance of financial crises on trade (controlling for GDP, RER, country pair fixed effects...) on past crises (1976-2002)
- 2. Exporters more dependent on trade credit more affected by financial crisis

Proxy for dependence on trade credit (Ronci, 2004): average level of ST credit in dollars/exports




Figure 5b: African exports after financial crisis, high **Trade Finance** 0,4 0,2 High Trade Finance **Excess Trade Ratio** -0,8 Years since crisis -1,2

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