

Discussion

Bank and FinTech Lenders


Tomasz Piskorski

Last Decade: Dramatic Change in Lending Landscape

- Rise of shadow banks (SBs) in the lending market
- Fintech lenders important part of this broader trend
 - Shadow banks early adopters of fintech technology




Shadow bank share in the \$10 trillion US mortgage market



Largest Mortgage Lenders, by Originations in Q1 2018
In \$ billions, purchase mortgages & refis

"Shadow banks" in red





Last Decade: Dramatic Change in Lending Landscape

- Rise of shadow banks (SBs) in the lending market
- Fintech lenders important part of this broader trend
 - Shadow banks early adopters of fintech technology



Shadow bank share in the \$10 trillion US mortgage market




Rise of Fintech & Shadow Banks: Key Questions

- Key drivers of shadow bank expansion
 - Post-crisis regulatory changes vs financial technology
- Impact on consumers
 - E.g., access/distribution/pricing of credit/financial services
- Impact on the structure of lending market
 - Including impact of incumbents (e.g, traditional banks)
- Broader welfare consequences
 - Would hope new technologies would make us better off
 - There could be winners and losers in the transition period
- Implications for financial stability and regulation
 - Need to rethink current regulatory framework?

1st Paper: Philippon (2018)

- Focus: Assessment of fintech potential
- Can fintech bring down costs of financial intermediation?
- Impact of fintech on financial stability?
 - Leverage, narrow vs broader banking, systemic risk
 - Regulatory challenges due to new financial models/strategies



Figure 2: Unit Cost of Financial Intermediation



Fintech Premium: Fintech vs Bank Mortgage Rates


The Longer the Mortgage Process,
The More Customer Satisfaction Declines

Overall satisfaction based on a 1,000-point scale



Fintech Premium: Fintech vs Bank Mortgage Rates

- Fintech can offer borrowers convenience rather than costs savings
 - Such benefits harder to capture in simple cost intermediation metrics



2nd Paper: Di Maggio and Yao (2018)

- Focus: **Fintech borrowers in personal loan market**
 - Great data: Credit bureau panel of fintech and non-fintech borrowers
- Main findings:
 - Fintech borrowers are quite creditworthy
 - Fintech borrowers: lower credit outcomes after loan origination
 - Seem to have immediate consumption needs (suggestive of present-bias)
- Going forward more work on
 - What would happen in the absence of fintech lenders?
 - More assessment of welfare consequences
 - What fraction of fintech borrowers seem “present-biased”?
- Evidence on fintech consumers broadly consistent with other markets
 - E.g., Relatively more creditworthy fintech borrowers in the mortgage market
 - Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2018a)

3rd Paper: Cornaggia, Wolfe, Yoo (2018)


- Focus: **Impact of P2P fintech lenders on traditional banks**
- Main findings (unsecured consumer credit market)
 - Suggestive of higher risk fintech loans substituting for bank loans
 - Fintech entry expansionary for lower risk loans
- Comments
 - **Patterns also consistent with the effects of ↑ bank regulatory burden**
 - Bank partly exit, especially riskier segment, due to increased burden
 - Non-bank fintech lenders partly fill this gap
 - Fintech comparative advantage: Lower regulatory burden & technology
 - Identifying causal effect of P2P entry challenging
 - Authors: IV strategy exploiting local variation in P2P funding availability
 - Relative contribution of technology vs regulation in this market?

4th Paper: Braggion, Manconi, Zhu (2019)

- Focus: [Bank regulation and fintech lending](#)
- Context: LTV caps in the Chinese mortgage market
 - Meant among others to “cool” the housing market
- Main findings
 - P2P lenders helped households to borrow alleviating the impact of caps
 - Impact on effectiveness of policy to slow house price growth?
- [Broadly consistent with US evidence](#)
 - [Increase in bank regulatory burden crucial factor in shadow bank expansion](#)
 - [Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru \(2018a\)](#)


Shadow Bank Expansion in the Residential Mortgage Market

2008



Shadow Bank Expansion in the Residential Mortgage Market




2015



Shadow Bank Entry in the US Residential Mortgage Market

- Asses shadow expansion in response to bank regulatory burden
 - Shocks to Regulatory Burden (BMPS 2017)
 - Banks retreated and shadow banks expanded where regulatory burden ↑



ROLE OF REGULATION IN SHADOW BANK EXPANSION



$$\Delta \text{Shadow Bank Lending Share}_c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta \text{Regulatory Burden}_c + X'_c \Gamma + \epsilon_c$$

Rise of Fintech & Shadow Banks: Broader Implications

- Implications for Financial Stability
 - SBs have no deposit funding base, limited balance sheet capacity
 - Dependent on ability to sell loans/warehouse lines/GSEs/crowdfunding




Rise of Fintech & Shadow Banks: Broader Implications

- Implications for Financial Stability
 - SBs have no deposit funding base, limited balance sheet capacity
 - Dependent on ability to sell loans/warehouse lines/GSEs/crowdfunding
 - SBs can quickly shutdown in the face of funding problems like in 2007
 - Mortgage market shadow bank share: 2007 \approx 25% vs Now $>$ 50%
 - New lending models have not been tested during downturn
 - In case of the shutdown of fintech/SB lenders who will pick up the slack?
 - Traditional banks (TB) may be unable due to limited experience/market presence


Rise of Fintech & Shadow Banks: Broader Implications

- Implications for Regulatory Framework
 - Need to recognize important role of shadow banks
 - SBs can significantly affect transmission of various policies
 - Quantity, pricing, distribution of credit, bank stability

Mortgage Lending Change (\$B) and Capital Ratios



Mortgage Lending Change (\$B) and Conforming Limit



Rise of Fintech & Shadow Banks: Broader Implications

- **Taxpayer Exposure**
 - No direct FDIC exposure...but GSE exposure in the mortgage market
 - Increased taxpayer risk due to limited regulation and GSE guarantees?
 - Can make scaling down the role of GSEs even harder
- **Consumer Welfare**
 - Need more work on it
 - Use of big data/credit scoring algorithms create regulatory challenges
- **Traditional Bank Response**
 - Shadow banks were early adopters of new technologies
 - Less concern about regulatory implications, no legacy investments/systems
 - Traditional banks are catching up
 - Evolving market structure can create further regulatory challenges

References

- Buchak, G., G. Matvos, T. Piskorski, A, Seru, 2018a, “Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks”, *Journal of Financial Economics* 130, 453-483.

Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941561

- Buchak, G., G. Matvos, T. Piskorski, A, Seru, 2018b, “The Limits of Shadow Banks”, *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper* 25149.

Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3260434