Dash for dollars

By Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Robert Czech and Fernando Eguren-Martin

Discussion by Iñaki Aldasoro (BIS)

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Disclaimer: Views are mine and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank for International Settlements

• February-March 2020: Dash for cash

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Not *any* cash, **dollars**!

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February-March 2020: Dash for cash





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- P: Bond-level data; key for identification: firms with bonds in >1 currency (within-firm analysis)
- Q: Transaction-level data (secondary market): within-firm-investor \rightarrow higher selling of dollar bonds

February-March 2020: Dash for cash





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
Currency dimension of corporate bond spreads: dollar-denominated saw larger spike

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
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- Why? → Dominant currency
 - Medium of exchange: liquidity
 - → dollar bonds have lower bid-ask spreads ex ante
 - Unit of account: dollar obligations
 - → insurers with higher dollar payment needs sell more
 - "A dollar (cash) is a dollar (deposits) is a dollar (securities)"... until it's not



#1 Some early choices would benefit from additional justification



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Why look only at **NFCs**? (more on this in next slide)


The universe of debt securities is considerably **larger**

 Liquidity (incentive to sell) and need to settle debts (pressure to sell) should apply to these as well


Why the focus on maturity > 1yr?

- Well-known action in shorter maturity instruments (eg CPs, MMFs); also Haddad et al (2021)
- Core arguments should apply as well

#2 Which NFCs? Issuance through offshore NBFI affiliates huge



#3 Stating the obvious: It's a dollar world



- Dollar (financially) punches well above its (real economy) weight
- How much you sell = f(how much you own)? How to disentangle this from say liquidity?

#4 On liquidity

- Results for GFC sort of undermine the "perceived liquidity of USD" argument
 - If investors learned from the past, they should know that ex ante liquidity != ex post liquidity
- Liquidity inversion not surprising given key documented stylized fact
 - Spreads for USD bonds going up is starting point!
 - So only piece missing is lower bid-ask spreads pre-crisis, but... can you really say GBP meaningfully different from USD (Fig5)?
- Can you control for liquidity in baseline regressions? Might be better to assess its role
 - Bid-ask spreads throughout sample (or initial, or Amihud, etc)
- Side remark: pattern of bid-ask spreads (Fig6) does not match that of OAS (Fig2)
 - Former picking up considerably earlier in March than latter
 - What to make of this? Are samples consistent?

#5 Digression on unit of account

- Key defining quality of money: means of payment/settlement
 - All other moneys (eg GBP, EUR) are unit of account just as the USD is
 - It's just that a lot of obligations are in USD (back to "it's a dollar world")
- At times of stress the survival constraint kicks in and the "chickens come home to roost"
 - Your promise to deliver money (credit) cannot be extended and you have to deliver
 - And the promise is mostly to deliver cash dollars (again, "it's a dollar world", "a dollar is a ...")
- Of course: this is not inconsistent with what you have! I would just reframe it slightly
- Full disclosure: I am all in on the second explanation, and think the first one is a sideshow
 - Problem is: it is very hard to fully back or disprove either!

#6 Additional (minor and disjoint) comments

- In the spirit of adding (yet more!) robustness, consider distinguishing bonds along two additional dimensions (used for defining BIS IDS): listing location and governing law
- Provide some descriptives on the multi-currency bond sample
 - How many firms issuing USD+EUR, USD+GBP, USD+EUR+GBP and so on
 - Robustness only looking at this three currencies, and only EUR
- Why exclude interdealer trades (MiFiD sample)? Don't they also scramble to meet margins?
- Don't understand why you don't make more use of EMIR: you have the actual margins! By counterparty! Daily! By currency!
- Not fully clear why the focus on ICPF (12% of trading volumes) only: others also faced massive (USD/other) margin calls (answer: Fig B5 \rightarrow give it more prominence, how would it look for GBP?)
 - Figure A3 (derivatives by currency): GBP share very large, why don't we see similar effects?

Conclusion: "rumors of my death have been greatly exaggerated"



- Really enjoyed reading the paper, learned a great deal from it
 - You should read it too!
 - Intuitive, very thoroughly done, great data and use of it, policy-relevant
- Important contribution to our collective understanding of the dominant role of the dollar (Goldberg & Tille (2008), Gopinath (2016), Maggiori et al (2020), Eren & Malamud (2022))
 - My takeaway: need to settle payments in USD entrenches dominance
 - Despite crises, USD goes from strength to strength
- I look forward to the next version!