Where Do Banks End and NBFIs Begin?

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Presentation at the NY Fed conference on NBFIs
June 21, 2024

* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve System, or any of their staff.
Our version of Goodhart’s Law for NBFIs

“As the banking perimeter is used for “control” (regulatory) purposes, but activity around the perimeter can be “manipulated” (via regulatory arbitrage) by banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, does the regulatory perimeter inexorably cease to be useful for control purposes?“

Are banks then actively transforming their risk exposures towards NBFIs?
1. Large increase of bank loans to NBFIs post GFC

Source: FR Y-14Q

NBFI loans as share of total bank loans

Term Loan Committed Exposure by NAICS

Bank loans by NBFI sub-segment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activities Related to Credit Intermediation</th>
<th>Insurance Carriers</th>
<th>Other Financial Investment Activities</th>
<th>Real Estate and Rental and Leasing</th>
<th>Agencies, Brokerages, and Other Insurance Related Activities</th>
<th>Nondepository Credit Intermediation</th>
<th>Other Investment Pools and Funds</th>
<th>Securities and Commodity Contracts Intermediation and Brokerage</th>
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<tr>
<td>2014 Q1</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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</table>

Graph showing the increase in term loans from 2014 Q1 to 2022 Q1.
2. Funding Interconnections across Banks and NBFIs

• Newly released Financial Flow of Funds (From Whom To Whom or FWTW) provides a useful window on bank-NBFI linkages

• Non-bank financial intermediaries heavily dependent on banks for funding
• Banks also dependent on non-bank financial intermediaries

• Asymmetric dependence:
  Non-bank reliance on banks far greater than bank reliance on non-banks

• Patterns stable over time
The figures represent (in %) the composition of liabilities for each segment issuer (on each row), by each corresponding holder (on each column).
But banks not as dependent on nonbanks

### MATRIX OF DEPENDENCE

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<tr>
<th>ISSUERS</th>
<th>ABS</th>
<th>Banks</th>
<th>B/Ds</th>
<th>eREITs</th>
<th>FCs</th>
<th>GSEs</th>
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The figures represent (in %) the composition of liabilities for each segment issuer (on each row), by each corresponding holder (on each column).
3. And large increase in credit lines to NBFIs as well

Bank credit lines by NBFI sub-segment

Source: FR Y-14Q

NBFI credit lines as share of total bank credit lines

Credit Line Committed Exposure by NAICS

Unused Commitments

- Activities Related to Credit Intermediation (5223)
- Insurance Carriers (5241)
- Other Financial Investment Activities (5239)
- Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (53)
- Agencies, Brokerages, and Other Insurance Related Activities (5242)
- Nondepository Credit Intermediation (5222)
- Other Investment Pools and Funds (5259)
- Securities and Commodity Contracts Intermediation and Brokerage (5231)
Banks have a unique advantage in providing liquidity insurance

- Banks back private credit funds (e.g., BCRED bank lines ~ 50% liabilities)

- CLs to finance derivatives margin
  - UK Pension Fund crisis (Sep 2022), European Electricity Producers (August 2022)

- Credit lines to help roll over funding risk (REITs in particular, but also CLOs)
  - NBFI credit line utilization rates large during COVID outbreak

- Ongoing work
  - “Shadow Always Touches the Feet: Implications of Bank Credit Lines to Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries” (Acharya, Gopal, Jager and Steffen, 2024)
**Differential drawdowns of REITs**

- REITs draw down more than non-financial corporations on average
- REITs have other spikes and cyclicality as well

Source: Acharya, Gopal, Jager and Steffen (2024)
Utilization rates of REITs vs non-financials in crises

Source: Acharya, Gopal, Jager and Steffen (2024)
Regional Banking Crisis?

Smaller Banks Have Greater Concentrations of CRE Loans than Larger Banks
Proportion of Banks (Y-Axis) with Varying CRE Loan Concentrations (Color), by Bank Size (X-Axis)

Source: Acharya, Gopal, Jager and Steffen (2024)
Banks’ Total Exposure to CRE

Source: Acharya, Gopal, Jager and Steffen (2024)
BankStockReturn$_{it} = \beta_{it} \text{Above-median REIT CL Share}_i \times 1_t + X_{it} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it},$
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Policy Implications

• Call for *integrated* monitoring of banks and NBFIs

• Enhanced bank stress testing to better capture NBFI exposures may not be enough

• “Congruent” regulation of NBFIs may be a solution only if regulation and monitoring as strict as that of banks. But that would effectively turn NBFIs into banks ...

• Regulation that restricts banks in scope of intermediation may be counterproductive
Regulating NBFIs

Yiming Ma

Columbia Business School

New York Fed-ECB Workshop on Nonbank Financial Institutions

June 21, 2024
Before: Banks and Leverage

- The defining feature of banks is deposit funding
- Short-term debt backed by illiquid assets seen as the culprit of crises
- Monitoring of leverage + imposition of bank capital requirements
NBFIs engaged in liquidity transformation are often equity-funded with much lower leverage than banks.
- E.g., Bond mutual funds, Bond ETFs, MMMFs, REITS, stablecoins

Remain subject to panic runs

Ma, Xiao, and Zeng 21
Need to rethink leverage: no longer captures aggregate risk

Need a coherent framework to monitor “risk” by functionality across banks and NBFIs

One possible option: Liquidity Provision Index (Ma, Xiao, Zeng, 24)
  - Liquidity transformation by demandable debt versus demandable equity
  - How much liquidity does $1 of bank deposits vs $1 fund equity provide?
The real problem: NBFI’s demandable equity is not really “equity” because its value is not fully forward-looking

- E.g. Mutual fund NAV does not sufficiently incorporate externalities
- E.g. Gov MMF and retail prime MMF offer fixed $1 NAV

Ideally: remove the debt-like features of NBFI equity as in swing pricing to make it “true equity”

Until then, need coherent framework to monitor liquidity mismatch in the financial system instead of leverage
Lessons for Regulating NBFIs

Because Banks and NBFIs have shared functionalities:

1. Regulate liquidity mismatch across banks and NBFIs instead of narrowly focusing on leverage
Lessons for Regulating NBFIs

Because Banks and NBFIs have shared functionalities:

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2. Consider spillover effects from investor flows between banks and NBFIs
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Spillover Effects between Banks and NBFIs

- Bank deposits and claims to NBFIs are imperfect substitutes for investors
- Investor switch between banks and NBFIs with increasing ease
  - E.g. March 2020: flight from NBFIs
  - E.g. March 2023: flight from Banks
- → the investor base in banks and NBFIs is time-varying and inter-dependent
Deposit Flightiness is Time-Varying

- Depositors’ flow sensitivity increases with aggregate deposit inflows
- Incoming depositors’ convenience value < existing depositors’

Li, Lu, and Ma 24
Bank run risk ↑ after influx of outside investors from NBFIs

→ monitor investment flows between NBFIs and banks
Policy Implications of Time-Varying Depositor Base

1. Bank run risk ↑ after influx of outside investors from NBFIs
   - → monitor investment flows between NBFIs and banks

2. Bank run risk ↑ after influx of investors from QE’s reserve injections
   - QE and APP alleviate asset market strains
   - Reserves can only be held by banks
   - QE expands bank deposits (Acharya and Rajan 22, Acharya et al. 24)
   - → Interventions for NBFIs may amplify depositor flightiness
Policy Implications of Time-Varying Depositor Base

1. Bank run risk ↑ after influx of outside investors from NBFIs
   - → monitor investment flows between NBFIs and banks

2. Bank run risk ↑ after influx of investors from QE’s reserve injections
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   - QE expands bank deposits (Acharya and Rajan 22, Acharya et al. 24)
   - → Interventions for NBFIs may amplify depositor flightiness

3. Rate hikes trigger more run risk after large influx of investors and QE
1. Regulate liquidity mismatch across banks and NBFIs instead of narrowly focusing on leverage

2. Consider spillover effects from investor flows between banks and NBFIs
   + interactions with unconventional and conventional monetary policy
Opening Remarks by Nellie Liang
Under Secretary for Domestic Finance
U.S. Department of the Treasury

New York Fed-ECB Workshop on Nonbank Financial Institutions
June 21, 2024
NBFIs and Systemic Risk

- NBFIs need access to liquidity in stress
- Liquidity can come from commercial banks or from selling Treasuries or other securities in the market
  - When banks and markets can’t or won’t provide liquidity to NBFIs, the official sector may feel compelled to respond
  - Responses are costly, creating a need for macroprudential policies
- Acharya et al. (2024) highlight the centrality of commercial banks as liquidity providers
- Treasury markets also are central to liquidity and financial stability
Treasury Market Liquidity and Yield Volatility

Notes: Index inputs are bid-ask, inverted depth, and price impact. For each security, calculated as a simple average of 3 year rolling z-scores for each input.

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury
Strengthening Treasury Market Resilience

• The work has been structured as five workstreams

• Four workstreams to improve the resilience of supply of Treasury-market liquidity
  • Improving the resilience of market intermediation
  • Improving data quality and availability
  • Evaluating expanded central clearing
  • Enhancing trading venue transparency and oversight

• A fifth to reduce surges in demand for liquidity
  • Examining effects of leverage and fund liquidity risk management
Long and Short Treasury Futures Positions by Category

**Long Positions**

- Hedge Fund
- Asset manager
- Other

**Short Positions**

- Hedge Fund
- Asset manager
- Other

Source: CFTC
Non-bank financial institutions – EU developments and policy perspectives

ECB-FRBNY Workshop on Non-bank Financial Institutions, New York, 21 June 2024
Steffen Kern, Head of ESMA Economics, Financial Stability and Risk Department
EU NBFI: State of the market

EU NBFI growth

More than doubled in size since the GFC

— Size: EUR 42tn of assets, up from EUR 18tn

— Investment funds as a key drivers: EA funds manage EUR 19tn; key investor in some sectors of the economy

— Staggering diversity: >60’ UCITS and AIF investment funds; plus wide range of pension funds, insurance companies, financial intermediaries

NBFIs can present risks to financial stability

— Leverage: Procyclicality of asset sales in stress

— Liquidity mismatches: Liquidity needs prompt asset sales due to liquidity mismatches or margin calls

— Interconnectedness: Transmit risks to other participants, esp. investors, counterparties
Unprecedented institutional cooperation: ESRB as forum for joint work

- **ESRB**: Coordination of activities across all levels
- **ESMA and ESRB cooperation**
  - Monitoring: NBFI monitor, risk dashboards
  - Stress test: MMFs, CCPs
  - Policy: Issues notes, Recommendations (MMFs, OEFs)

ESMA NBFI agenda

- **Risk Monitoring and Risk Analysis on NBFIs**
  - Risk Monitoring and Risk Analysis: Surveillance of key NBFI activities on basis of proprietary regulatory data (EMIR, SFTR, MMF, AIF), and commercial data
  - Stress simulation: OEFs
  - Public dissemination: TRV, Market Reports, Risk Analysis Articles
- **Policy implementation of key EU legislative frameworks**
  - Regulation: Advice to EU Commission (MMFs, AIFMD Review)
  - Macroprudential supervision: Data-driven supervision through Art. 25 AIFMD (annual assessment, Advice to NCAs), two successful examples (IE RE funds, IE/LU LDI)
Leverage in OEFs
• Risk assessment: (1) Ongoing regulatory reporting, quarterly leverage risk assessment by market participants NCAs and ESMA; (2) reporting based on ESMA Guidelines in line with IOSCO Recommendations (2019)
• Measures to address leverage-related risks: AIFMD Art. 25 measures activated in 2022 and 2024

Enhancement of liquidity risk management rules
• UCITS, AIFs: Quantity and price-based tools (e.g. swing pricing, dual pricing) more widely available and operational, in line with FSB and IOSCO Recommendations (2023)
• Loan-origination AIFs: New rules incl. leverage limits, retention of economic interest in loans granted, counterparty risk limits

Filling remaining data gaps
• AIFMD review: New or enhanced reporting set to improve the monitoring of fund sector, incl. UCITS and AIFs
• Data sharing: Ongoing efforts to further improve data sharing among competent authorities, incl. EBA, EIOPA, ESMA, ESRB, ECB, national authorities
2020 “Dash for Cash” revealed vulnerabilities in the fund sector

- **Liquidity risk materialised**
  - Large outflows exceeding GFC levels; corporate and EM bond outflows >10% NAV, HY bond funds 15% NAV
  - Limitations on asset valuation under stress (corporate bonds, real estate)
  - Suspension of redemptions for some funds

- **MMFs particularly affected**
  - Liabilities: Heightened redemptions, 10% to 30% of NAV depending on MMF type
  - Assets: CP and CD liquidity deteriorated quickly
  - **Interconnectedness**: High and sensitive exposures between bank and non-bank markets, connecting banks, short-term funding markets, funds, pensions, insurance, corporates

**Archegos, LDI: Critical combination of leverage, liquidity, concentration risks**

- **Archegos default, LDI funds stress**: Excessive use of leverage, amid low liquidity and high concentration of positions

- **Leverage-liquidity interplay**: Leverage magnifies positions, amplifies liquidity risks

- **Hidden spots**: (1) Leverage difficult to observe for complex strategies; (2) macroprudential risks from common (uncoordinated) strategies or exposures by funds (e.g. UST cash basis), with patterns and cumulative impacts hard to assess ex-ante
EU Commission review of NBFI macroprudential policy: Issues
EU Commission consultation: Next steps for NBFI policy

Commission consultation: Open approach to optimizing policy framework
- Policy issues: Liquidity, leverage, interconnectedness, public policy coordination
- Scope: Investment funds, MMFs, insurance, pension funds, other NBFIs and markets, incl. commodity markets, short-term funding markets

ESMA response: ESMA and NCAs to reflect on further improvements
- Backdrop: (1) State of NBFI markets in EU and global financial system, incl. size and diversity; (2) already well-functioning cooperation across EU authorities; (3) EU plans for more effective capital markets
- Reforms outstanding: Response to lessons from stress episodes, e.g. MMFs
- Tools for macroprudential interventions: Check need for more or different tools
- Risk assessment: Further refine and support risk assessment and monitoring, esp. on leverage, interconnectedness
- Cooperation on macroprudential policies: Enhance public policy cooperation, esp. on cross-border issues, crisis responsiveness
- Regulator perimeter: Addressing risk by NBFIs outside regulatory scope
Non-bank financial institutions – EU developments and policy perspectives

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