
Fiscal Drivers of r*

AMEC Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of NY, March 2025



The role of fiscal policy in r*

* In baseline LW and NK models, *r** is largely **independent of fiscal policy**


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- * Ricardian equivalence: transfers & debt don't matter

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
- * Next: explore role of fiscal policy in driving r*
 - * long run
 - * short to medium run



* In long run, best way to think about *r** is via safe asset demand and supply

Demand (e.g. from households)

Supply of safe gov. debt




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




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
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Demand (e.g. from households)

Supply expansion (e.g. post-Covid)

Supply of safe gov. debt





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Demand (e.g. from households)


 $\Delta r^* = \frac{1}{\varepsilon^d + \varepsilon^s} \Delta debt$

Greater gov. debt (e.g. post-Covid)

Supply of safe gov. debt



* In long run, best way to think about *r** is via safe asset demand and supply



Fiscal policy and r* in the long run

Demand (e.g. from households)

$$\Delta r^* \approx \frac{1}{\varepsilon^d} \Delta debt$$


Greater gov. debt (e.g. post-Covid)

Debt / GDP



How sensitive is *r** to gov. debt?

- * Why does higher debt lead to higher r^* ? (Why is $\varepsilon^d < \infty$?)
 - * starts exhausting demand for safe & liquid assets (lower convenience yield)
 - * starts exhausting asset demand more generally (e.g. buffer stock saving, OLG)




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- * Reduced-form way to model these: "bonds in utility function" u(c) + v(b)

$$r^* = \rho + g - v'(b)$$

Sensitivity:
$$\varphi = \frac{\partial r^*}{\partial \log b} = -v''(b)b$$




How large is the sensitivity φ ?

* Hard to estimate! Review literature in appendix of Mian Straub Sufi (2024) * Range: $\varphi = 1.2 - 2.2\%$ (= 12-22 bps per 10% higher debt). Anecdotal evidence:

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Figure A.9: The change in real interest rates around the January 5th, 2021 Georgia run-off election.

Georgia Senate Election




Mian Straub Sufi (2024)

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-~`
_^^

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Mian Straub Sufi (2024)

Recent reform of German debt brake

* Imagine the government sends stimulus checks over 10% of GDP


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- * Short run effect on $r^* \gg \log run$ effect!
- * Example raises broader questions:
 - * Why is short-run \gg long run?
 - * What even is *r** in the short run?
 - * And how long is the "short run"?

- * Next: put some numbers on this! (Caveat: proof of concept) * Strategy:
 - * Figure out effect of fiscal stimulus on output
 - * Figure out effect of monetary policy on output
 - * Obtain interest rate path that stabilizes fiscal stimulus $\rightarrow r^*$

- Most households don't spend fiscal stimulus right away (especially when large!)
- They spend some (captured by MPC), but also save some to spend later
 - these delayed consumption responses are captured by "intertemporal MPCs"
- Can be captured in modern HANK models




Auclert Rognlie Straub (2024)


* Take model able to match iMPCs, and feed in Covid stimulus (keep r const.)



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
Note. Primary deficits minus 2% (pre-Covid level), assumed constant across quarters within the year




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
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


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
* Strong and persistent output response. Cumulative multiplier ≈ 1




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
* Simply use Romer-Romer monetary policy shocks




Monetary policy and output




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


* Simply use Romer-Romer monetary policy shocks



Next: Add monetary shocks to fiscal stimulus output response until output gap is close to zero!


Monetary policy and output



- * Assume anticipated interest rate movements act like Romer-Romer shocks, too.
- * Will find r^* by minimizing $\sum \beta^t (x_t^2 + \lambda (r_t^* r_{t-1}^*)^2)$ to avoid volatility in r^*

Effect of fiscal policy on r*






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
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Output gap









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
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


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




How does this change estimates of *r**?

* Can add this *r** response to the current HLW (2017) estimates

* *r** much greater, in short <u>and</u> in medium run!



Conclusion

- * Fiscal policy is key for *r**
- * Both in long run <u>and</u> in short to medium run
- * Merits more work!