


The K-Shaped Economy

AMEC Symposium @ NYFed

Markus K. Brunnermeier

New York City, NY, April 3rd, 2026

Capex as % of GDP: AI boom



Railroads (1865-1890): 2.4%

Electrification (1905-1925): 1.1%

Highways (1956-1973): 1.6%

Telecom/fiber (1996-2003): 0.8%

Artificial Intelligence (2025-2032): 2.8%

In 2025.Q4, AI buildout accounted for **100% of U.S. GDP growth**

Note: Hyperscaler companies include Oracle, Microsoft, Meta, Amazon, Google and Telecom companies include Level 3 Communications, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Nortel Networks, Verizon, AT&T, Nokia, Cisco Systems, Williams Companies and XO Communications. Sources: Bloomberg, FactSet, Apollo Chief Economist

Source: Apollo

Stijn von Nieuwerburgh webinar, 2026, <http://markusacademy.substack.com>

Tech innovation and stock market bubble

- Yes, it is common that innovation and stock market bubble **go hand in hand**
- See extended **bubble classification** e.g. in Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2016), ...

Years	Technology / Era	Frac of Stock Market	Financing	Moat
1840s–1870s	Railroads	63% of US market (1881); 92% in 1870	Heavily debt (bonds 1.6x equity by 1880s)	Weak — parallel routes, commodity service, near-zero switching costs
1900s–1920s	Automobiles	GM ~ 8% of market (1928)	Mix; equity-heavy; consumer credit (installment plans)	Low switching costs (buy different car); scale economies as moat
1920s	Radio, Consumer Tech & Margin Trading	Top 10 ~ 30% ; AT&T alone 13%	Equity + massive margin debt (broker call loans)	IP & brand moats; but margin lending had no moat (commodity credit)
1960s–1970s	Nifty Fifty (Blue-chip growth)	Top 5 = 23% of S&P 500 (1972)	Mostly equity ; low leverage	Strong brand & scale; medium-high switching costs (institutional adoption)
Late 1990s	Telecom / Fiber Optic Infrastructure	Telecom = major index weight; \$2T in value	Heavily debt (\$500B+ in bonds; \$1T total industry debt)	Minimal — bandwidth is commodity; deregulation destroyed moats; near-zero switching costs
Late 1990s	Dot-com / Web 1.0 Software Startups	Top 10 = 24% of S&P (2000)	Mostly equity/VC ; IPO-funded	Weak — pre-network-effect; low switching costs; first-mover illusion
2004–	Web 2.0 / Platform Economy	Mag 7 = 37% of S&P 500 (2025)	Equity/VC → strong free cash flow; minimal debt	Deep — network effects, data flywheels, ecosystem lock-in; very high switching costs
2023–	AI Infrastructure (Data Centers / GPUs)	Part of Mag 7; top 10 = 35%	Rapidly shifting to debt (\$121B hyperscaler bonds in 2025 alone)	Uncertain — obsolescence risk; commodity GPU-hour pricing emerging; moderate switching costs
2023–	AI Foundation Models (LLMs)	N/A (mostly private)	Equity/VC (for now)	Uncertain — open source competition; API switching costs low-medium; data moats developing
2023–	AI Chips / Semis (CUDA ecosystem)	Nvidia = ~ 7-8% of S&P 500	Primarily equity ; strong cash flow	Deep — CUDA lock-in, fab barriers, developer ecosystem; very high switching costs

Type of Financing


- **Equity financing**

- **Debt financing**

- Leverage
- Maturity mismatch
- Margin calls

- ***New trends:***


- **Circular financing**



- **Passive investing** amplification and

- correlated crash risk + **liquidity illusion** (hold same positions)
- Space X


Hyperscaler Capex



Source: FactSet, Apollo Chief Economist (capex); Yahoo Finance & company earnings releases (OCF 2020-2025).
 *2026E OCF = aggregate estimate only, derived as capex (655bn) / 90% = 728bn, per Bank of America research (Seliger & Lee, ~Nov 2025). Company-level breakdown not available.

From Financing out of Cash flow to Debt Financing

Annual change in hyperscaler long term debt (bonds, loans and leases), US\$, billions




Source: Bloomberg, Company sources, JPMAM, 2025

Financing: Cash flow to Debt to Structured Products

- CMBS Financing

Turnkey data centers have accounted for most SASB CMBS transaction collateral in recent years

Data center SASB CMBS annual issuance, billions



Sources: Trepp LLC and Moody's Ratings

Type of Technology and Valuation with Moats

■ TFP Growth

- High growth rate & era of abundance $\Rightarrow u' \searrow 0$
 \Rightarrow risk \nearrow

- Middle growth rate (for a while) \Rightarrow sustainability
 - Weak link theory – Chad Jones and Chris Tonetti

- Low growth rate



$\Rightarrow r \searrow < g \Rightarrow$ valuations \nearrow

\Rightarrow bubble implodes (more later)

■ Moat/switching costs

- High fixed costs + medium marginal costs
(smaller platform externalities, less scale effects)
- “Commodification” of foundation models
- Second-mover advantage and/or rents goes to sectors, which apply technology
 - DeepSeek, Chance for Europe

SaaSocalypse as a Moat Erosion Event

- SaaS companies had seemingly impenetrable moats through switching costs
 - SAP, Salesforce, Workday, ...
 - Platform structure and economies of scale
- LLMs destroy the moat of many AI firms
 - iShare Expanded Tech-Software ETF (IGV) plummeted over 20%

Likely Turning Points and Stock Market Spillovers to GDP

- **Turning point:** analogy cholesterol and heart attack
 - Technological obsolescence shock
 - Open-source commoditization moment (another DeepSeek)
- **Stock market spillovers to real economy**
 - *Consumption:* Wealth effect (incl. 401 retirement accounts) + confidence effect
 - Top 10% of earners now account for nearly half of consumption spending
 - *Investments:* Capex Cliff
 - Data center buildout/capex is massive contributor to GDP (2%).

Sovereign Debt & Safe Asset Status (BruMerSan JPE 2024)

- US Treasury: The “US AI bet”
 - If “AI bet” does not pay off, then fiscal debt situation is unsustainable
 - Loss of safe asset status of US Treasury depends on alternatives (“the least ugly horse theory”)
- Europe:
 - Growth rate g stays low, but r increases (due to global markets)
 - ⇒ fiscal situation in certain euro area countries are less sustainable
 - ⇒ sovereign debt crisis
 - Second mover advantage or rent for sectors which apply AI ⇒ tensions within the West
- Other middle powers
 - similar