ABSTRACT: We estimate the effect of land use regulation on the value of land by exploiting variation in regulation and land values across municipal borders. Since the value of land gives us the market’s measure of the attractiveness of a location, our estimates allow us to draw conclusions about the effect of land use regulation on welfare. Reductions to an aggregate measure of regulatory intensity are welfare improving. Looking at a more detailed description of regulation leads to a more subtle prescription. Complexity of the planning process and a planning process subject to political manipulation are most harmful. Not all land use regulation is harmful, however. Regulation which requires minimum lot sizes for residential development increases land values.

Key words: land regulation, zoning, urban economics, regulation.
JEL classification: R52, Q15, Q24.
1. Introduction

We estimate the effect of land use regulation on the value of land. Since the value of land gives us the market’s measure of the attractiveness of a location, our estimates allow us to draw conclusions about the effect of land use regulation on welfare. We find that reductions to an aggregate measure of regulatory intensity are welfare improving. Looking at a more detailed description of regulation, however, leads to a more subtle prescription. Complexity and susceptibility to political manipulation are the most harmful characteristics of a municipal planning process, while regulation which requires minimum lot sizes for residential development increases land values.

Common sense and a small empirical literature indicate that many of the same factors that determine land use regulation also determine land price.\(^1\) Thus, a naive estimate of the relationship between land price and regulation may conclude that regulation affects land values when no causal relationship exists. To resolve this problem we rely on a large national sample of geocoded land sales, on the best available national level data on regulation, and we develop a novel identification strategy.

Our identification strategy begins with the observation that land use regulation should generally have two effects on land value. The first, an ‘own-lot effect’ of regulation causes the value of any parcel to decrease because any binding regulation constrains the owner from using the parcel in his most preferred way. The second, an ‘external effect’ may change the value of a parcel by constraining the owners of nearby parcels from taking harmful (or beneficial) actions. For example, binding minimum lot size regulation will decrease the value of a parcel by constraining the developer to use larger lots than they would otherwise. It will also lead to low density neighborhoods which potential buyers may (or may not) prefer.

We estimate the own-lot and external effects of regulation separately. To estimate the own-lot effect of regulation we compare nearby parcels on opposite sides of a municipal boundary. If all other determinants of land value vary continuously across the border then the difference in prices across the border reflects the own lot effect of regulation. We estimate the external effect of regulation by comparing interior and peripheral parcels in the same municipality. The peripheral parcels are 50% exposed to a landscape shaped by regulation in the neighboring municipality, and 50% to a landscape shaped by regulation in the home municipality. Interior parcels, on the other hand, are entirely exposed to a landscape shaped by regulation in the home municipality. Since both parcels experience the same own-lot effect of regulation, if the external benefits (or costs) of proximity to a regulated landscape decay quickly enough then the difference between the price of interior and peripheral parcels reflects the external effect of land use regulation on land value.

The validity of our estimates rests on the assumption that the mean difference in unobservable parcel characteristics across a municipal border is not correlated with cross-border differences in land use regulation. We adopt three strategies to assure that our data satisfy this condition. First, we develop an algorithm to identify parcels for which the nearest municipal border is a straight line. Almost the entire area of the continental US outside of the original 13 colonies was surveyed in

\(^1\)For example, Saiz (2008), Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2009), Wallace (1998) and McMillen and McDonald (1991). Relying on different estimation techniques and data, all find evidence that regulation is more stringent where developable land is scarce.
accordance with the Land Ordinance Act of 1785 (Libecap and Lueck, 2009), and it likely that many of our straight borders reproduce these original survey lines. Such straight municipal borders are deliberately drawn without regard for local physical geography and therefore are unlikely to divide qualitatively different types of land. Second, because our land transactions are geocoded, we are able to locate transacted parcels very precisely. Together with the large size of our sample, this allows us to base our estimates on fine bands around municipal boundaries. This ability to compare parcels that are physically close to a boundary increases our confidence that parcels on either side of a municipal boundary have similar unobservable characteristics. Finally, we have detailed descriptions of each parcel. By including control variables based on this description, we reduce the scope for unobserved factors to bias our results. In particular, our data and estimating equations provide a basis for dealing with the possibility that heterogenous residents sort into municipalities on the basis of municipal characteristics correlated with land use regulation.

Our results are of interest for at least two reasons. First, land is among the most important assets in the US economy and the market for land is highly regulated. Understanding the impact of land use regulation on land value is an economic problem of the first order. Second, the policy debate surrounding land use regulation attracts many competing interest groups with conflicting agendas. “[T]he Sierra Club urges planning and policies which stimulate: ... ‘Infill’ residential and commercial development on unused or under-used land within city boundaries...”2 The National Association of Home Builders, on the other hand opposes “ urban growth boundaries, which restrict the amount of developable land and contribute to increased housing prices... ”3 Given the value of land and the durability of development, land use policy should be based on the careful analysis of high quality data, and not on interest group politics.

This paper is part of a large literature which looks at the relationship between land use regulation and the real estate market. However, only a small subset of these papers correct for the endogenous determination of regulation. Thus, only this handful of papers can claim to find a causal effect of land use regulation on real estate markets, and the conclusions of this handful of papers are mixed. Mayer and Sommerville (2000) instrument for regulation using historical demographic characteristics and find that housing starts respond more slowly to price changes as regulation is more stringent. Ihlanfeldt (2007) also uses historical demographic variables as instruments for regulation and finds that regulation increases house prices and decreases land prices. Saiz (2008) estimates a system of equations in which housing demand, housing supply and concludes that regulation increases housing prices. Wallace (1998) concludes that zoning generally has a large negative effect on land values in King County Washington. Zhou, McMillen, and McDonald (2008) consider a 1957 change to Chicago zoning, that appears to increase the value of land. Libecap and Lueck (2009) consider the effect of two different parcel demarcation schemes, ‘rectangular’ versus ‘metes and bounds’, on land prices and find higher prices land prices in areas where with rectangular parcels. There is also a large complementary literature which looks at the effects of nearby open space and amenities on real estate prices (see McConnell and Walls (2005) for

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a survey). To our knowledge the only paper in this literature to treat the problem of endogenous of amenities seriously is Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2009). Loosely, the literature on the effects of regulation is interested in our own-lot effect, while the literature on open space and amenities is interested in our external effect.

We improve on the existing literature in three ways. First, by examining a national level data set, we are able to estimate results for an average US municipality. By contrast, much (though not all) of the existing literature is based on data describing particular municipalities, or small regions. Thus, our results apply to a larger subset of municipalities without extrapolating from our sample. Second, we provide a basis for understanding the mixed results on the value of regulation in the existing literature. Since we exploit a relatively rich description of municipal regulations, we are able investigate exactly which types of regulation are harmful and which are beneficial. Our finding that some regulation is harmful and some beneficial suggest that different conclusions about the value of regulation in the extant literature probably do not reflect only differences in econometric technique across studies. Finally, as the only paper to attempt to estimate both the costs (our own lot effect) and benefits (our external effect) of land use regulation, we provide the foundations for a more thorough understanding of the effects of land use regulation.\(^4\)

Our two main econometric exercises are variants of a regression discontinuity design. The regression discontinuity design is increasingly popular and is used to investigate, for example, the effect of class sizes on educational attainment (Angrist and Lavy, 1999), the effect of changes in social assistance programs on employment (Lemieux and Milligan, 2008), or the effect of mayoral party affiliation on municipal policies (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009). Theory and best practice are described in Hahn, Todd, and der Klaauw (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008).

The method has also been used to investigate the effect of policies which vary over physical space as one crosses from one administrative unit to another. In this case, the cut-off of interest is an administrative boundary. Holmes (1998) looks at the impact of changes in right-to-work laws on manufacturing employment near state borders. Black (1999) and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) look at the effect of changes in property values near school attendance zone boundaries. Duranton, Gobillon, and Overman (2008) look at the effect of changes in municipal taxation across municipal boundaries on the behavior of firms near these boundaries. In effect, these authors identify the effect of their chosen policy in a two step process. In the first, they estimate the discontinuity of interest at many borders, and in the second they examine the correlation between the magnitude of these cross-border discontinuities and the corresponding cross-border change in the policy variable of interest. This is also the intuition behind our own-lot effect regression. To our knowledge, the intuition behind our external-effect regression is novel.

2. An econometric model of land use regulation and land rent

To develop an econometric model of land use regulation and land rent, we proceed in three stages. In section 2A we describe the effects of land use regulation in a simple spatial equilibrium near the border between a single pair of municipalities when land and residents are homogenous. In

\(^4\)Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) deals with both possible effects in the context of a calibration exercise.
section 2B, we generalize to allow heterogenous residents and land. In section 2C, we extend our model from one to many pairs of municipalities and develop our estimating equations.

A. Land use regulation and land rent around a single border with homogenous land and residents

To understand the effects of land use regulation on land rent in the neighborhood of a municipal border, consider two municipalities, L and R, occupying the real line between $-\bar{x}$ and $\bar{x}$. The two municipalities share a border at the origin, and the left municipality consists of points to the left of zero, while the right municipality occupies all to the right. Let $x$ denote locations on the real line and let $m \in \{L,R\}$ index the municipalities.

The two municipalities are populated from a pool of agents who all earn wage $w$, pay $p(x)$ for their residential location, and derive utility $V(x;\cdot)$ from their housing. The utility of each resident is $u(x) = e^{w-p(x)}V(x;\cdot)$. We discuss $V$ in more detail below. In this section, we suppose that all agents are identical and that locations differ only in their distance to the border. The opportunity cost of land in both municipalities is zero. Mobility is costless, and agents may move to an alternative city where they receive a reservation utility, $e^{\theta}$. In equilibrium all residents are indifferent between all locations in either municipality and the alternative city. Thus $\ln(u(x)) = \theta$ for all $x$. This implies that land rent is $p(x) = w - \theta + \ln(V(x;\cdot))$ for all $x$. Every location in each municipality is subject to development, but development in both municipalities is subject to regulation. Let $z^m$ denote regulation in municipality $m$ and let increasing values of $z^m$ reflect increasingly stringent regulation.

We would like to know how $p(x)$ varies with location and regulation. One possible effect of land use regulation is to decrease land values by constraining how a landowner develops his land. Call this effect of regulation an ‘own-lot effect’. This effect might operate in many ways: minimum lot size constraints may lead to houses and lots that are ‘too large’, waiting times for permits may increase financing or design costs, building codes may increase construction costs. The mechanics of how the own-lot effect impacts the value of land are not important, only that regulation $z^m$ is binding and affects land values. Formally, let $v_O(z^m) \in \mathbb{R}$ denote the component of land value attributable to the own-lot effect from regulation $z^m$. Consistent with the discussion above, we expect $v_O(z^m) > 0$ and $v'_O < 0$. Since regulation may vary at the municipal boundary, we define an own-lot effect function for the entire area of the two municipalities as,

$$V_O(x,z^L,z^R) = \begin{cases} v_O(z^L) & \text{if } x \leq 0 \\ v_O(z^R) & \text{if } x > 0. \end{cases}$$

Unless regulation is the same in both municipalities, i.e., $z^L = z^R$, $V_O$ is step function with a discontinuity at zero. It may also happen that land use regulation has an ‘external effect’ whereby the value of any given location is affected by the regulation affecting nearby locations. For example: the value of a parcel will vary with density permitted at nearby locations if residents have a taste for low (or high) density; minimum setback requirements decrease the risk of fire spreading from one house to another; a regulation requiring that neighbors’ garages not open facing the street increases the value of parcels to nearby residents who prefer not to see their neighbors’ cars. As for the own-lot
effect, the mechanics of how regulation causes an external effect are not important to our analysis. Formally, let $v_E(z^m) \in \mathbb{R}$ denote the component of land value attributable to the external from regulation $z^m$.

By construction, the external effect of regulation affects locations that are near other regulated locations. Thus, locations near $x = 0$ are exposed to the regulations of both municipalities. In particular, parcels in the right municipality but very close to zero are equally exposed to locations subject to $z_L$ as to locations subject to $z_R$. The same statement is true for locations close to zero in the left municipality. Locations progressively further from the border are progressively more affected by the regulation of their own municipality.

To formalize this intuition, define a continuous weakly increasing function $\delta(x)$ which satisfies:

$$\delta(x) = -1 \text{ if } x \leq -x_0; \delta(x) = 0 \text{ if } x = 0; \delta(x) = 1 \text{ if } x \geq x_0.$$ We then write the utility derived from the external effects of regulation as

$$V_E(x, z_L, z_R) = \frac{1 - \delta(x)}{2} v_E(z_L) + \frac{1 + \delta(x)}{2} v_E(z_R).$$

For $x \leq -x_0$ the external effects of regulation are entirely due to regulation in the left municipality. For $x \geq x_0$ the external effects of regulation are entirely due to regulation in the right municipality. As we move closer to the municipal boundary the utility derived from external effects of regulation is a weighted sum of exposure to regulation in both municipalities. When we are precisely at the municipal border, the regulations of each municipality are equally weighted. Since $\delta$ is continuous in $x$, $V_E$ is also continuous in $x$.

That the external costs or benefits of proximity to a regulated landscape decay with distance is one of the principal assumptions that we must make to identify the external effects of regulation. We assume that the decay function operates over spatial scales that are small relative to the size of municipalities. This is consistent with the literature that estimates the effects of open space on residential housing prices and typically finds that the effects of open space attenuate over distances of less than one mile, e.g., Irwin and Bockstael (2002) or for a survey, McConnell and Walls (2005).

We now define the $V(x; \cdot)$ term in our original formulation of utility as $V(x; \cdot) = V_O(x, z^L_R)^{A_1} V_E(x, z^L_R)^{A_2}$ and write utility as

$$u(x) = e^{w - p(x)} V_O(x, z^L_R) A_1 V_E(x, z^L_R) A_2.$$ (1)

With free mobility, land rent adjusts so that all agents are indifferent between every location in the two target municipalities and their reservation location. The resulting land rent gradient is

$$p(x) = w - \theta + A_1 \ln(V_O(x, z^L_R)) + A_2 \ln(V_E(x, z^L_R))$$ (2)

The solid line in figure 1 illustrates a land rent gradient of the sort described by equation 2. Recalling our convention that the left municipality is more highly regulated, land rent increases as we travel left from the border and exposure to the less regulated right municipality drops, reaching the level associated with full exposure to $z^L$ at distance $\bar{x}$ from the border. We see the opposite pattern in the right municipality. As we move to the interior of this municipality, land rent drops as exposure to $z^L$ decreases and exposure to $z^R$ increases. Land rent varies discretely at
the border. Locations on either side of the border face the same external effects of regulation, since both are equally exposed to regulation of each municipality, but municipalities on the right pay the lower own-lot effect associated with $z^R$, while those on the left pay the higher own-lot effect of more stringent $z^L$.

Figure 1 makes our approach to the problem clear. Locations close to, but on opposite sides of the border are each exposed to the same landscape. By comparing parcels on opposite sides of the border, we compare parcels that experience the same external effects of regulation but different own-lot effects. Using equation 2, we have

$$p(0^+) - p(0^-) = A_1 \ln(V_O(0^+, z^L, z^R)) - A_2 \ln(V_O(0^-, z^L, z^R)).$$

(3)

In words, we can infer the relationship between changes in regulation and changes in the magnitude of the own-lot effect from change in the land rent gradient across a municipal border. This intuition will be the basis for our ‘own-lot effect’ estimation, one of our two principal estimating equations.

If we instead compare a parcel near the border with a parcel far away from the border, then we are comparing parcels subject to the same own-lot effect, but different external effects. In particular, the boundary parcel is equally exposed to both types of regulation, while the interior parcel is wholly exposed to the external effect of its own municipality’s regulation. From equation 2, we have

$$p(-\bar{x}) - p(0^-) = A_2 \ln(V_E(-\bar{x}, z^L, z^R)) - A_2 \ln(V_E(0^-, z^L, z^R)).$$

(4)

This suggests that we infer the effect of a change from equal exposure to two levels of regulation, to sole exposure to one level of regulation by looking at changes in the land rent gradient as we move from a point very near a municipal border to a point far from the border. This intuition will be the basis for our ‘external effect’ estimation, our second principal estimating equation.
It is useful to note that, if we assume that $V_E$ is symmetric around $x = 0$ for given $z^L$ and $z^R$ then using 2 and a little bit of algebra, we have

$$p(-x) - p(x) = ((p(0^+)) - p(0^-)) + 2(p(-x) - p(0^-)).$$

(5)

Therefore, estimations of 3 and 4 together allow an estimate of the total effect of changes in land use regulation on land rent.

We note two issues which complicate the intuition behind our approach. First, it may be that land use regulation affects rent by affecting the supply of developable land. In a technical appendix argue that such ‘supply’ effects are not consistent with a spatial equilibrium in which at agents are free to choose their most preferred location. Second, it is also possible that different demographic groups value regulation differently. The technical appendix also considers this issue and argues that such preference heterogeneity by itself should not confound our estimates of the value of regulation. We note that other motivations for sorting into municipalities on the basis of demographic characteristics may be more problematic and are addressed below.

B. Land use regulation and land rent across a single municipal borders with heterogenous land and residents

To exploit the intuition developed in section 2A, we must develop a credible empirical description of land rent gradients near municipal borders. Such a description of the land rent gradient should reflect the following possibilities: that locations may differ in their intrinsic attractiveness; that members of different demographic groups may have a taste for proximity to others in their own group; that people may sort on the basis of their tastes for local public goods not related to land use; that different demographic groups may value land use regulation differently; that the process that generates municipal land use regulation may be driven by many of the same fundamentals as determine land rent.

We maintain the same description of physical space developed earlier: there are two municipalities, $L$ and $R$ which occupy the intervals $[-\bar{x},0)$ and $(0,\bar{x}]$ respectively. However, we now suppose that each location $x$ has an intrinsic attractiveness, $a(x)$, and that this intrinsic attractiveness can be decomposed into a deterministic component $f(x)$ and a stochastic component $\phi(x)$. We suppose that $f$ is positive and, to fix ideas, decreasing in $x$. We require that $f$ be continuous at 0 and suppose that for all $x$, $\phi(x)$ is mean zero, that $E(\phi(x))$ exists, and that $Cov(f(x),\phi(x)) = 0$. Intuitively, there is more sunshine or a shorter commute as we move from right to left with some noise around the trend. On average, the left municipality is nicer than the right. The assumption that $f$ is continuous at zero requires that the municipal border does not separate qualitatively different types of land.

Our main inference problem is that regulation and land rent may both be systematically affected by characteristics of residents and parcels, some of which may be unobservable. With our description of the heterogeneity of land in place, we can now begin to unravel this problem. To begin, it is helpful to have in mind a heuristic model of the settlement and regulation process.

We imagine that the municipalities are populated in two stages. At time zero, measure zero of immigrants locate in the two municipalities. Each immigrant has a type $N \in [0,1]$. $N$ can

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5 This assumption simplifies exposition but is not essential to the intuition we develop.
describe any demographic characteristic, but to ease exposition we call it education. Types match to locations on the basis of their attractiveness, and we let \( N_0(a(x)) \) describe this matching. If, for example, \( N'_0 > 0 \), then more highly educated people match to nicer places.

Time zero immigrants choose land use regulation for their respective municipalities democratically. Let \( N_{0L} \) denote the demographic characteristics of the mean resident at \( x \leq 0 \) and \( N_{0R} \) mean education for residents located at \( x > 0 \). As a stylized way to describe the choice of regulation, let \( z(N_0) \) describe this matching. If, for example, \( N'_0 > 0 \), then more highly educated people match to nicer places.

\[ z(N_0') > z(N_0) \]

As a stylized way to describe the choice of regulation, let \( z(N_0') \) denote the relationship between the mean voter and the resulting choice of regulation. We suppose that \( z > 0 \) and that \( z \) is continuous and increasing. It follows from our assumptions on \( f \), \( z(.) \) and \( \phi \) that if \( N'_0 > 0 \) then \( N_{0L} > N_{0R} \) and hence that \( z^L > z^R \). That is, if nicer places attract better educated people then they should be more intensively regulated. Let \( \hat{z} = [z(N_{0L}), z(N_{0R})] \) denote the observed pair of regulatory intensities in our two municipalities.

A second wave of immigrants, of measure \( 2_{\pi} \), now settles the remaining locations. These immigrants match to the location which gives them the highest utility. Denote the resulting distribution of immigrants by \( N_1(x) \). By assumption, the initial agents occupied measure zero of the available land, so that \( N_0 \) does not affect the supply of land available to the second wave of immigrants. The first wave of immigrants, \( N_0 \), affects the second wave, \( N_1 \), only through its choice of regulation, \( \hat{z} \).

As in section 2A, we suppose that each immigrant chooses between the left municipality, the right municipality and the alternative city. In the left or right municipality, an immigrant receives a wage that does not vary with location. We allow wages and outside options to vary with education. Let \( w(N_1) \) and \( \theta(N_1) \) denote type specific wages and outside options. We suppose that both functions are continuous and increasing: wages and outside options increase smoothly with education.

Land use regulation contributes to the welfare of immigrants in exactly the same way as described in section 2A, i.e., equation 1.

Finally, we allow the possibility that immigrants derive utility from proximity to other immigrants whose types are ‘close’ to their own. This effect will be determined by the immigrant’s own location \( x \), the immigrant’s type \( N_1(x) \), and the distribution of other agents, \( N_1 \). Let \( \gamma(x,N_1(x),N_1) \) denote the utility derived from proximity to other people.\(^6\)

We can imagine two basic mechanisms by which proximity to immigrants of particular types can affect utility. In the first, immigrants sort into municipalities on the basis of their tastes for local public goods. In this case, the value of \( \gamma \) is determined in much the same way as is regulation. It is based on the levels of public services and local taxes that are determined by election. In this case, we expect that \( \gamma \) varies discretely with the level of public services at \( x = 0 \). Note that in this case, the level of \( \gamma \) in the two municipalities depends on mean demographic characteristics in the two municipalities. Alternately, the value of \( \gamma \) may reflect a preference for proximity to people with similar characteristics.\(^7\) In this case, \( \gamma \) is determined by the whole distribution of \( N_1 \), but it should be expected to vary continuously at the municipal border.

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\(^6\)Since \( N_0 \) involves measure zero of immigrants, provided that \( \gamma \) is constructed by integrating any continuous objective function some real interval, \( N_0 \) does not affect the value of \( \gamma \).

\(^7\)One such \( \gamma \) is \( \gamma(x,N_1(x),N_1) = \int_{-\pi}^{\pi} e^{-\rho|x-y|}dN_1(x) - N_1(y)dy \) for \( \rho \) a positive real ‘decay rate’.
With this notation established, we write the utility of the agent at location $x$ as the product of the different components described above. That is,

$$u(x) = e^{\theta(N_1(x)) - p(x)} V_O(x, \hat{z})^{A_1} V_E(x, \hat{z})^{A_2} \gamma(x, N_1(x), N_1)^{A_3} e^{\phi(x)}. \quad (6)$$

An equilibrium is an arrangement of types and a land rent gradient such that all agents are indifferent between their own location and their reservation location and no agent would prefer another agent’s location. Thus we have, for all $x$, that $\ln(u(x)) = \theta(N_1(x))$. Together with equation 6, we have the generalization of the land rent gradient corresponding to equation 2,

$$p(x) = w(N_1(x)) - \theta(N_1(x)) + A_1 \ln(V_O(x, \hat{z})) + A_2 \ln(V_E(x, \hat{z})) + A_3 \ln(\gamma(x, N_1(x), N_1)) + a(x). \quad (7)$$

C. Land use regulation and land rent across many municipal borders

In the simple spatial model developed in section 2A, only regulation changes when we cross the municipal border. In the more realistic model of prices of section 2B, it is at least possible that other determinants of land rent change discretely at the border. This means that it will not generally be possible to identify the effect of regulation on land rents by looking at only a single border. Instead, we must look for a relationship between land rent and regulation across a set of many municipal borders. An analysis of many borders requires that we generalize our notation.

Let $j \in \{1,...,J\}$ index municipal borders, and let a $j$ superscript indicate a scalar or function that is particular to a border. We will adopt the convention that the more stringently regulated municipality is the left municipality, and refer to individual municipalities as ‘left’ or ‘right’ of border $j$. Informally, each $j$ refers to a replication of figure 1.

We also generalize our earlier description of intrinsic attractiveness to allow heterogeneity across border pairs. Let $a^j_i(x) = f(x, \mu^j) + \phi(x)$ be the intrinsic attractiveness of location $x$ of border $j$. As before, $f$ describes a trend around the border, but we now suppose that it is parameterized by the pair $\mu = (\mu_1, \mu_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ with $f(x, \mu) = \mu_1 + \mu_2 x$. We suppose that $\mu$ is a random variable with density $g_\mu : \mathbb{R}^2 \rightarrow [0,1]$, and that each border draws a single $\mu^j$. Thus, the $\mu^j$s are a generalization of a fixed effect and parameterize changes in the intrinsic attractiveness in a neighborhood of border $j$. Further suppose that $\phi(x)$ is a real valued random variable with density $g_\phi : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0,1]$. We suppose that $\phi(x)$ is identically distributed for all $j$ and $x$, that $E(\phi(x)) = 0$ and that $\text{Cov}(\phi(x), \phi(y)) = 0$ for all $x, y \in [-\bar{x}, \bar{x}]$ and all $j$. Note that the intuition behind $a^j_i(x)$ is not changed from our initial discussion: $a^j_i(x)$ describes the fact that as we move from one municipality to another, locations may become systematically more attractive and there will be some noise around this trend.

Our data describe transactions of particular parcels. To describe these data, as opposed to hypothetical rent gradients, we let $i$ index parcels in a border pair $j$. We refer to the sale price

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8With the multiplicative specification of utility, the marginal utility of changes in $z$ vary with income. This allows us to rationalize our observation that different municipalities choose different regulations. In an additive specification, the marginal utility of regulation does not vary with income, so it is hard to rationalize the heterogeneity of observed regulation.
of a particular parcel as $p^i_j$, with other parcel attributes indexed similarly. We refer to the location of parcel $i$ in border pair $j$ as $x^i_j$. The magnitude of $x^i_j$ is the distance from border $j$, with negative distances indicating displacement into the more intensively regulated municipality, and positive displacements indicating displacements into the less regulated municipality.

We will sometimes need to distinguish between the municipalities that form a border pair. To do this, we recall that municipalities within a border pair are indexed by $m \in \{L,R\}$ and introduce an extra superscript. Thus, $p^m_{i}^{j}$ refers to the price of parcel $i$ in the $m$ municipality of border pair $j$. Similarly, $p^{-m}_{i}^{j}$ refers to a parcel in the other municipality of border pair $j$.

Naive regression: If we ignore edge effects, then equation 7 lets us write the price for either municipality (say $R$) as,

$$p^i(x) = w(N^i_0(x)) - \theta(N^i_1(x)) + A_1 \ln(V^i_0(z(N^i_0R^j))) + A_2 \ln(V^i_E(z(N^i_0R^j))) + A_3 \ln(\gamma(x, N^i_1(x), N^i_0)) + a^i(x). \quad (8)$$

This is an ordinary hedonic regression and is the basis for much of the extant research on land use regulation.

The problem with this approach is clear. Recalling that $N^i_0L^j = E(N_0^i(a^i(x)|\overline{x} < x < 0)$ and that $z^i = z(N^i_0L^j)$, we see that $z$ depends on the distribution of the municipalities’ initial attractiveness, and in particular on $\mu^i$. It follows that if intrinsic attractiveness is not observed by the econometrician, as must surely be at least partly the case, then $z(N^i_0)$ must be correlated with the error term. Equation 8 also makes clear the problem with using historical demographic characteristics as instruments as is sometimes done. Since these variables are themselves functions of the intrinsic attractiveness of the location, they are not orthogonal to unobserved components of $a(x)$ and trivially fail the requirement that they be orthogonal to $a(x)$.

Own-lot effect regressions: To overcome the endogeneity problem that affects the cross-municipality regression described by equation 8, we exploit the intuition developed in section 2A to separately estimate the own-lot and external effects of regulation. We first develop our own-lot effect estimating equation, the empirical counterpart of equation 3.

To begin, substitute the more realistic description of the land rent gradient provided in equation 7 into description of the cross-border land rent differential of equation 3. Recall that $a^i(x) \equiv f^i(x) + \phi(x)$. By construction, $V^i_E$ is continuous at 0 and we here assume $f^i$ is continuous at zero. Thus we have,

$$p^i(0^-) - p^i(0^+) = \left[ w(N^i_0(0^-)) - \theta(N^i_1(0^-)) + A_1 \ln(V^i_0(0^-,z^i)) \right] + A_3 \ln(\gamma(0^-, N^i_1(0^-), N^i_0)) + \phi(0^-)$$

$$- \left[ w(N^i_0(0^+)) - \theta(N^i_1(0^+)) + A_1 \ln(V^i_0(0^+,z^i)) \right] + A_3 \ln(\gamma(0^+, N^i_1(0^+), N^i_0)) + \phi(0^+) \quad (9)$$

Given a sample of municipal borders, this expression describes the relationship between the land rent gap at the border and the cross-border difference in regulation, along with several possible
confounding factors. Our problem is to develop estimating equations that isolate the relationship between regulation and price.

To begin, we assume that only regulation varies discontinuously at the border. While we will relax this assumption in what follows, note that if \( \gamma \) reflects peoples’ preference for being near others in their own demographic group, then we expect it to be described by a ‘potential’ function of the sort given in footnote 7, and consequently to be continuous around zero. With this continuity assumption in place, we are left with

\[
p_j^l(0^-) - p_j^l(0^+) = A_1 \ln(V_O(0^-,\hat{z})) - A_1 \ln(V_O(0^+,\hat{z})) + \phi(0^-) - \phi(0^+)
\]

That is, if \( w, \theta, \) and \( \gamma \) are all continuous then any discontinuity in land rent across the municipal border entirely reflects differences in the own-lot effect in the two adjoining municipalities. These own-lot effects, in turn, are functions of regulation. To proceed, parameterize \( A_1 \ln(V_O(0^+,\hat{z})) - A_1 \ln(V_O(0^-,\hat{z})) \) as a linear function of the difference in municipal regulations. That is,

\[
A_1 \ln(V_O(0^+,\hat{z})) - A_1 \ln(V_O(0^-,\hat{z})) = B_0(z_l^j - z_r^j).
\]

\( B_0 \) measures the relationship between regulation and land rent and is the parameter of interest.

We have assumed that \( w, \theta \) and \( \gamma \) are all continuous at the border. If we restrict attention to transactions that are ‘close enough’ to the border we can treat \( w, \theta \) and \( \gamma \) as constant. Thus, in our narrow interval, prices on each side of the border are described by a constant and by parcel specific errors. The only systematic difference between cross-border parcels is due to regulation. Therefore, defining \( \chi_{ij}^l \) to be an indicator variable that is one if parcel \( i \) lies in the left municipality of border pair \( j \), we have the estimating equation,

\[
p^j_i = A_0^l + \chi_{ij}^l B_0(z^l - z^r) + \phi^l_i. \tag{10}
\]

Conditional on our other assumptions, this estimating equation will give us unbiased estimates of \( B_0 \) provided that \( z^l \) and \( z^r \) are orthogonal to \( \phi^l_i \). This orthogonality follows from the fact that regulation is a function of mean municipal characteristics. Loosely, since we are considering only a small section of the municipality, and since \( \phi(0) \) gives us no information about \( \phi \) at other values of \( x \), it follows that \( \phi(0) \) must be orthogonal to any function of municipal mean characteristics, land use regulation in particular.

While equation 10 allows us to estimate how the own-lot effect of regulation varies with regulation, this estimation relies on two strong assumptions: first, that we restrict attention to parcels close enough to the border that everything except own-lot effects and idiosyncratic error are constant; second, that only regulation varies discontinuously at the border. In particular, we require that the systematic part of the intrinsic attractiveness of the parcels, \( f \), does not vary discontinuously at the border. This is exactly analogous to the continuity assumption required for a standard RDD estimation (Hahn et al., 2001) and requires that municipal borders not divide one ‘quality’ of land from another.

To relax the assumption that factors other than regulation are constant in a neighborhood of the border, we allow the slope of the rent gradient to vary at each border and we parameterize
\[ w \theta + \gamma + f \]

as,

\[ w(N_i^j(x_i^j)) - \theta(N_i^j(x_i^j)) + \gamma(0^-, N_i^j(x_i^j), N_i^j) + f(x_i^j, \mu^i) = C_0^i + C_1^i x_i^j. \]

In this case, equation 10 becomes,

\[
p_i^j = (A_0^i + C_0^i) + C_1^i x_i^j + \chi_{ij}^1 B_0(z^{Lj} - z^{Rj}) + \phi_i. \tag{11}
\]

A few comments are in order. First, if equation 11 is correct, and we estimate equation 10, we expect the resulting estimates of \( B \) to be biased. In this case, since regulation is correlated with \( \mu^i \), regulation is endogenous. Second, it is straightforward to test the hypothesis that \( C_1^j = 0 \) for all \( j \), and thereby distinguish between equations 10 and 11. Third, note that 11 implicitly assumes that the slope of the rent gradient does not change at the border. It is straightforward to generalize this equation to allow the slope of the rent gradient to vary across the border. Finally, note that equation 11 requires that for each border pair of municipalities, we estimate two constants, an intercept and a slope, thus this estimation will be very demanding of our data.

Equation 11 continues to rely on the assumption that \( w, \theta \) and \( \gamma \) all vary continuously at the border. To relax this assumption, note that each of these functions depends solely on demographic characteristics. Thus, we can parameterize a border discontinuity as a function of demographic characteristics. To accommodate this, let \( w^{Lj} \) denote a vector of municipal mean demographic characteristics for the left municipality, and \( w^{Rj} \) the corresponding vector for the right municipality. We can then write

\[
\left[ w(N_i^j(0^-)) - \theta(N_i^j(0^-)) + \gamma(0^-, N_i^j(0^-), N_i^j) \right] - \\
\left[ w(N_i^j(0^+)) - \theta(N_i^j(0^+)) + \gamma(0^+, N_i^j(0^+), N_i^j) \right] = D_0 + D_1(w^{Lj} - w^{Rj}).
\]

If we include this term in equation 11, we have

\[
p_i^j = (D_0 + A_0^i + C_0^i) + D_1 \chi_{ij}^1 (w^{Lj} - w^{Rj}) + C_1^i x_i^j + \chi_{ij}^1 B_0(z^{Lj} - z^{Rj}) + \phi_i. \tag{12}
\]

Estimating this equation will allow us to assess whether border discontinuities are partly due to changes in demographics across borders. Two comments about this regression are in order. First, if we estimate equation 11 when equation 12 is correct, since regulation and demographics are correlated (by construction) we will attribute to regulation part of the border gap that equation 12 attributes to demographics. If regulation does not cause the difference in demographics, this means that equation 11 overstates the effects of regulation. On the other hand, if demographic sorting occurs because of land use regulation, then equation 11 estimates a long run or total effect of regulation, while equation 12 estimates a partial effect.

Note that parameterizing the cross-border gap with municipal mean demographics is not strictly correct. \( w, \theta \) and \( \gamma \) are all functions of \( f(x, \mu) \), the attractiveness of particular places, rather than of municipalities. It would be better to parameterize the cross border gap as a function of very local demographics as well. Since our data describe large unoccupied parcels, this approach is not possible. There are no demographic characteristics for unoccupied land. However, we can control for parcel specific measures of intrinsic attractiveness, measures of geography and commuting
distance in particular. To the extent that these variables measure location specific heterogeneity correlated with demographics and the cross-border gap in land rents, they at least partially resolve this problem. With this in mind, let \( y_i^j \) denote a parcel specific vector describing geography and commuting distance. We then write our final estimating equation based on equation 3 as

\[
p_i^j = (D_0 + A_0^j + C_0^j) + D_1 x_{i}^{Lj}(w^{Lj} - w^{Rj}) + D_2 y_i^j + C_1^j x_i^j + \chi_{i}^{Lj} B_0(z^{Lj} - z^{Rj}) + \phi_i^j.
\] (13)

There are two other objections to our estimation strategy. First, suppose that municipalities also choose a level of public service like the frequency of trash collection, denoted by \( z^{*L} \) and \( z^{*R} \), that may vary discretely at the municipal border and that this other regulation also impacts land prices. Allowing for this sort of regulation in equation 3 we have,

\[
p^j(0^-) - p^j(0^+) = A_1 \ln(V_O(0^+, \hat{z})) - A_1 \ln(V_O(0^-, \hat{z})) + A_2 \ln(V_O^*(0^+)) - A_2 \ln(V_O^*(0^-)) + \phi(-) - \phi(+),
\]

where \( V_O^* \) describes the contribution to land value of public services, \( \hat{z} \). It is clear that if regulation and public services are correlated, our approach will generally confound the effects of the two types of regulation. The exception to this is if \( \hat{z} \) is itself a function of \( z \). That is, if zoning for large lots leads to a community with twice weekly trash collection, then our estimator will estimate the total effect of zoning, including the effect of the induced high rates of trash collection. With this said, we expect that, given a democratic process for determining these other regulations, that the cross-border change in other regulation will be systematically related to the cross border change in observed demographics. Thus, equations 12 and 13 ought to substantially correct for these problems. If there are unobserved changes in other regulation at municipal borders then we require that, conditional on control variables, these changes be uncorrelated with land use regulation.\(^9\)

**External-effect regressions:** We now turn to estimating the external effect of regulation by looking at the price difference between peripheral and interior parcels. To develop this ‘external effect’ estimation, we substitute the description of the price gradient from equation 7 into the expression describing the price difference between interior and peripheral parcels, equation 4. Recalling that the own-lot effect of regulation must be the same for two parcels in the same municipality, this gives,

\[
p^j(-x) - p^j(0^-) = \left[ \frac{w(N_i^j(-x)) - \theta(N_i^j(-x)) + A_2 \ln(V_E(-x, \hat{z}))}{\gamma(\bar{x}, N_i^j(-x), N_i^j) + f(-x, \mu^j) + \phi(-x)} \right] - \left[ \frac{w(N_i^j(0^-)) - \theta(N_i^j(0^-)) + A_2 \ln(V_E(0^-, \hat{z}))}{\gamma(0^-, N_i^j(0^-), N_i^j) + f(0^-) + \phi(0^-)} \right].
\] (14)

This equation describes the relationship between cross-border changes in regulation and the price difference between peripheral and interior parcels, together with a detailed description of possible confounding factors.

\(^9\)A final objection to these estimates of the own-lot effect is that they do not allow the value of regulation to vary systematically with the intrinsic attractiveness of a place. To address this issue, one could allow regulation to interact with measures of landscape, climate or topography, and test whether these interaction terms predict changes in land prices across borders. In practice, our data do not allow us to identify such an effect.
With this notation in place, we write

\[ p^i(-\bar{x}) - p^i(0^-) = A_2 \ln(V_E(-\bar{x},\hat{z})) - A_2 \ln(V_E(0^-,\hat{z})) - \mu_2^i \bar{x} + [\phi(-\bar{x}) - \phi(0^-)]. \]  

Next we parameterize

\[ A_2 \ln(V_E(-\bar{x},\hat{z})) - A_2 \ln(V_E(0^-,\hat{z})) = B_0(z^L - z^R). \]

\( B_0 \) is the parameter of interest and describes the impact of the external effect of regulation on land prices. Finally, restrict attention to parcels that are either in a narrow interval near a municipal border, or in a narrow interval around \(-\bar{x}\) and define \( \chi^\text{lmj}_i \) to be an indicator variable that is one when a parcel \( i \) is an interior parcel lying within a narrow band around \( \bar{x} \) and zero otherwise. We can now write the estimating equation, 15,

\[ p^i_{mj} = A^i_{0 mj} + \chi^\text{lmj}_i B_0(z^{Lj} - z^{Rj}) + \chi^\text{lmj}_i \mu_2^i \bar{x} + \phi^i_{mj}. \]  

Inspection of this equation shows that our strategy of comparing interior and boundary parcels eliminates the influence of the level of \( f \), but not of its slope. However, since neither \( \mu_2^i \bar{x} \) nor \( z^{Lj} - z^{Rj} \) varies within a municipality, we cannot separate the effects of these two components on \( p \). To resolve this problem, we first introduce controls \( y^i_{mj} \) that allow us to estimate \( \mu_2^i (-\bar{x}) \) explicitly. These controls will include measures of physical geography and commuting distance. More formally, we parameterize

\[ \mu_2^i \bar{x} = C_1 y^i_{mj} + \epsilon^i_{mj}. \]  

Substituting in 17 gives,

\[ p^i_{mj} = A^i_{0 mj} + \chi^\text{lmj}_i B_0(z^{Lj} - z^{Rj}) + C_1 y^i_{mj} + \epsilon^i_{mj} + \phi^i_{mj}. \]  

In this equation 17, the municipality specific constant measures the level of land rent at the municipal border, and all variation between the border and interior points is attributed either to regulation or to changes in intrinsic attractiveness between interior and boundary locations. We have already established that regulation is orthogonal to \( \phi \). The additional orthogonality assumption required here is that regulation is orthogonal to \( \epsilon \). In words this orthogonality condition is that the unobservable component of the slope of \( f \) is uncorrelated with regulation. Given our strong controls for parcel level physical geography, this does not seem like a strong assumption.

To allow for the possibility that \( w, \theta, \) and \( \gamma \) are not constant between out two intervals, let \( w^{mj} \) and \( w^{-mj} \) denote a vector of demographic characteristics for municipality \( mj \) and for its counterpart \(-mj\). We parameterize the difference in these quantities as,

\[ \begin{align*}
[ w(N_i^j(-\bar{x})) - \theta(N_i^j(-\bar{x})) + \gamma(\bar{x},N_i^j(-\bar{x}),N_i^j) ] - \\
[ w(N_i^j(0^-)) - \theta(N_i^j(0^-)) + \gamma(0^-,N_i^j(0^-),N_i^j) ] = C_0(w^{Lj} - w^{Rj}).
\end{align*} \]  

With this notation in place, we write

\[ p^i_{mj} = A^i_{0 mj} + \chi^\text{lmj}_i B_0(z^L - z^R) + \chi^\text{lmj}_i C_0(w^{Lj} - w^{Rj}) + C_1 y^i_{mj} + \phi^i_{mj}. \]
As for the own-lot effect regression, it would be desirable to control for demographic characteristics exactly at the locations of our transactions. The fact that our data describe large unoccupied parcels prevents this. The specification above approximates this ideal.

It remains only to determine the widths and locations of the border and interior bins. While theory does not provide any guidance on this issue, the available literature suggests that the scale over which should expect the external effects to decay is less than a mile. Thus, we will experiment with different sizes and locations for the interior and peripheral bins. By inspection of figure 1, if increasing the distance of the interior bin from the border affects our estimates, then this bin should be moved further from the border.

3. Data

Implementing the regressions described in section 2C requires three principal types of data: a description of land transactions, in particular, the location, price, and other characteristics of parcels that changed hands; a description of land use regulation by municipalities; and finally, a map which allows the parcel and regulation data to be integrated and border distances calculated.

To measure land prices, we use the proprietary ‘COSTAR’ data. These data describe all land transactions in 25 major metropolitan areas between 1983 and 2009 for which the sale price was more than 250,000 dollars. In addition to recording the latitude and longitude of each parcel, the COSTAR data records transaction price and date, parcel size, and many other details about the parcel. Most of our empirical analysis restricts attention to transactions that occurred during 2000-2009, although we also experiment with samples transactions that occurred during 1990-2009 and during 2002-2009.

To measure municipal land use regulation, we use the Wharton Land Use Regulation data (WRLURI) (Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers, 2008). These data result from a 2005 survey of 2729 US municipalities and describe many different aspects of municipal land use regulation: minimum lot size, permit waiting times, growth controls, in addition to an index which summarizes overall regulatory intensity. We rely principally on this index as our measure of regulation, although we also experiment with measures of particular regulations.

The WRLURI describes regulation in both incorporated and unincorporated municipalities. Since the US census does not produce a map which shows the boundaries of both types of units, we overlay a 2000 census map of places on the corresponding map of county subdivisions. We then matched each municipality in WRLURI to this map. This allows us to assign regulation to places on the map. We note that the WRLURI samples 2729 municipalities, whereas there are about 55,000 municipalities on our map, so that only a small fraction of US area is covered by the WRLURI. Since the COSTAR data records the latitude and longitude of each transaction, we are also able to locate each COSTAR parcel in our map.

To implement our own-lot effect and external effects estimations, we must assign each observed transaction to a border that separates two adjacent municipalities. We do this by calculating the Euclidean distance from each parcel to the nearest municipal boundary and assigning the parcel to this boundary. This process simultaneously selects the neighboring municipality to each parcel.
Figure 2. Top: Distribution of parcels in metropolitan Phoenix, with a detail of one particular municipal border. Light blue/light grey indicates counties in the Phoenix MSA, pink/dark grey indicates municipalities and purple/black dots indicate parcel transactions. Bottom: Detail of Glendale-Phoenix border and parcels matched to this border. Glendale is on the right, Phoenix on the left.
Figure 3. Illustration of our algorithm for identifying straight borders. To determine whether a parcel matches to a straight border we first calculate the shortest vector which connects the parcel to a municipal border (the length of this vector is our calculated distance to a municipal border). We next calculate the terminal points of the two 1km long vectors originating on the border and orthogonal to the first vector. If these terminal points both lay within 75 meters of the border then the parcel is determined to ‘match to a straight border’, otherwise it ‘does not match to a straight border’. The figure above illustrates the algorithm. The thin dashed line represents a municipal border and the wider gray line a buffer around this border. Parcel \( x \) matches to a straight border, parcel \( y \) does not.

Thus we are able to organize our data around municipal boundaries in conformance with the econometric models developed above.

For a parcel to inform our estimation, we must observe the regulation in its home municipality and in its neighboring municipality. After restricting attention to the period between the last quarter of 1999 and before the second quarter of 2009 and dropping transactions for which no price data is available, we are left with 136,961 transactions. Of these, 9798 are matched to municipal borders for which the WRLURI records regulation in the home and neighboring municipality. Our main sample is restricted to this set of transactions. This sample of parcels lies in 513 of the 2729 WRLURI municipalities, and describes 598 municipal border pairs.

As a more concrete illustration of our data, the top panel of figure 2 maps all COSTAR parcels and municipalities in the Phoenix-Mesa MSA. Light blue indicates the extent of the MSA. Pink indicates the extent of WRLURI municipalities. Purple dots indicate COSTAR transactions. White indicates a county or municipality not in WRLURI or the MSA. The bottom panel provides a detail of the Glendale-Phoenix municipal boundary and of the COSTAR parcels matched to this boundary.

Our own-lot effect regressions require that municipal borders be exogenous. That is, we require that they not be drawn to systematically separate more attractive land from less attractive land, and in particular, that municipality boundaries not follow natural features where the attractiveness of land changes discretely.

To identify exogenous borders we restrict attention to municipal boundaries which are straight
We rely on an algorithm to identify parcels which are associated with straight municipal boundaries. For each parcel, we identify the shortest vector which reaches from the parcel to the nearest municipal border. We then calculate the two vectors orthogonal to this vector of length 1km, and originating at the intersection of the vector and the border. If both of these orthogonal vectors lie within 75 meters of the municipal boundary, we say that the parcel is associated with a straight boundary. Figure 3 illustrates this algorithm.

Applying this algorithm to our data, we find that of the 9798 transactions for which we have data on regulation, 2124 match to straight borders. These 2124 parcels lie in 185 distinct municipalities and provide information about the land price gradient near 190 municipal border pairs.

Table 1 describes the parcels in our sample. Column 1 describes the set of all parcel transactions present in the COSTAR data after we restrict attention to the period from 1990 to 2009 and drop transactions without price data. Column 2 further restricts attention to transactions of parcels in WRLURI municipalities and adjacent to WRLURI municipalities, our main sample. Columns 3 restricts attention to parcels in our main sample which match to straight boundaries.

The sample of parcels for which we have regulation information is almost certainly not representative of the universe of parcels sampled by COSTAR. Restricting attention to parcels for which WRLURI data is available leaves us with parcels that are smaller, more expensive per square foot and closer to the metropolitan region’s tallest building. Comparing columns two and three, we see that sample parcels matched to straight boundaries tend to be larger, and marginally more remote and less expensive than an average sample parcel, although all differences are small compared to standard deviations.

Mean municipal characteristics of straight boundary municipalities are also similar to sample mean municipal characteristics. Incomes and share of college educated population are marginally higher in the smaller sample, but the differences are quite small.

The WRLURI land use regulation index is constructed from eleven subindexes. Of these, two vary only at the state level and one is relevant only to New England. The eight remaining indices are: the Local Political Pressure index (LPPI) which is increasing in the propensity of survey respondents to state that local actors are important in the regulation process; the Local Zoning Approval Index (LZAI) ranges from 0-6 and is the count of the number of entities that must approve a zoning change, the Local Project Approval Index (LPAI) is analogous to the LZAI but gives the count, from 0-6 of entities that must approve a project, the Density Restriction Index (DRI) is zero if minimum lot size is less than one acre and one otherwise, the Exactions INDEX (EI) is one if the municipality mandates exactions to cover infrastructure costs, the Approval DELAY INDEX (ADI) reflects survey respondents’ statements about the length of time require to get administrative

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10 We also experimented with excluding municipal boundaries which are also water features from our sample. Such parcels are separated from their cross-border counterparts by a river, and hence it is at least possible that the two relevant municipalities occupy land with discretely different characteristics. However, so few of the borders in our sample were defined by water that we abandoned this exercise.

11 Almost the entire area of the continental US outside of the original 13 colonies was surveyed in accordance with the Land Ordinance Act of 1785. This act required that nearly all federal lands be surveyed and divided into regular ‘sections’ as a precursor to their eventual settlement. See Libecap and Lueck (2009) for details.
Table 1. Summary statistics for transaction data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>All with WRLURI</th>
<th>All straight with WRLURI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Price ($/ft^2)</td>
<td>29.63 (623.97)</td>
<td>77.34 (287.92)</td>
<td>68.13 (347.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size (0000 ft^2)</td>
<td>132.31 (1,483.42)</td>
<td>33.69 (172.93)</td>
<td>45.51 (186.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(Distance to tallest building)</td>
<td>3.43 (0.90)</td>
<td>3.05 (1.09)</td>
<td>3.40 (1.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share college</td>
<td>0.12 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.13 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median income</td>
<td>57,760 (18,036)</td>
<td>55,399 (18,069)</td>
<td>58,412 (18,750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRLURI</td>
<td>0.47 (0.94)</td>
<td>0.59 (0.92)</td>
<td>0.47 (0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPPI</td>
<td>0.67 (1.35)</td>
<td>0.68 (1.15)</td>
<td>0.67 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZAI</td>
<td>1.83 (0.70)</td>
<td>1.79 (0.59)</td>
<td>1.83 (0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPAI</td>
<td>1.40 (0.94)</td>
<td>1.54 (0.82)</td>
<td>1.40 (0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRI</td>
<td>0.07 (0.44)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.40)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRI</td>
<td>0.17 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.42)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI</td>
<td>0.70 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.67 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.70 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADI</td>
<td>8.07 (3.94)</td>
<td>8.25 (3.92)</td>
<td>8.07 (3.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>.620 (.49)</td>
<td>0.63 (.48)</td>
<td>.620 (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># transactions</td>
<td>136,961</td>
<td>9,798</td>
<td>2,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># WRLURI municipalities</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># WRLURI borders</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># school districts</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>182</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Own lot effect regression results for WRLURI index. Each cell reports results from a different regression. **Dependent variable** is Parcel price per square foot. First row of each cell reports coefficient on cross-border change in regulatory index. Second row of each cell reports standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by border pair. Third row of each cell reports the number of observations and borders on which the estimate is based. **Parcel controls I** are parcel ft$^2$, (parcel ft$^2$)$^2$, log of distance to CBD, (log of distance to CBD)$^2$, quarterly indicators, mean ruggedness of surrounding 0.5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 10km radius disk. **Demographics** are municipal share black, share asian, share of population under age 17, number of households, share with high school degrees, share with four year degree, median income all from the 2000 census. **Parcel controls II** are total employment from 1994 zip code business patterns in the 1km, 5km and 10km disk surrounding the parcel and the share of developed land in the corresponding disks from 1992 satellite images. **School district** is an indicator for each secondary or amalgamated school district computed from 2000 census boundary files.

approval for development, the OPEN SPACE INDEX (OSI) is an indicator variable that is one if a municipality has open space set-aside requirements.

In table 1 we see that the WRLURI index is marginally higher in the sample of straight boundaries, though the difference is small compared to both the standard deviations and to the range of the index (from -1.6 to 3.9 in the main sample). We also see that the means of various subindexes are almost identical across the two samples.

4. Results

A. Own lot effect regressions

Table 2 reports the results of our estimates of own-lot effects regressions using the sample of parcels that match to any municipal border for which we have WRLURI data. Each cell of this table reports the results of an estimate of a variant of our own-lot effect estimating equation (e.g. equation (10)).
Table 3. Own lot effect regression results for WRLURI index. Each cell reports results from a different regression. **Dependent variable** is Parcel price per square foot. First row of each cell reports coefficient on cross-border change in regulatory index. Second row of each cell reports standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by border pair. Third row of each cell reports the number of observations and borders on which the estimate is based. **Parcel controls I** are parcel ft\(^2\), (parcel ft\(^2\))^2, log of distance to CBD,(log of distance to CBD)^2, quarterly indicators, mean ruggedness of surrounding 0.5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 10km radius disk.\(^\Delta\) **Demographics** are municipal share black, share asian, share of population under age 17, number of households, share with high school degrees, share with four year degree, median income all from the 2000 census. **Parcel controls II** are total employment from 1994 zip code business patterns in the 1km,5km and 10km disk surrounding the parcel and the share of developed land in the corresponding disks from 1992 satellite images. **School district** is an indicator for each secondary or amalgamated school district computed from 2000 census boundary files.

<table>
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Own lot effect regression results for WRLURI subindexes. Each cell reports results from a different regression. **Dependent variable** is Parcel price per square foot. First row of each cell reports coefficient on cross-border change in regulatory index. Second row of each cell reports standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by border pair. Third row of each cell reports the number of observations and borders on which the estimate is based. **Parcel controls I** are parcel ft², (parcel ft²)², log of distance to CBD, (log of distance to CBD)², quarterly indicators, mean ruggedness of surrounding 0.5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 10km radius disk. **Demographics** are municipal share black, share asian, number of households, share of population under age 17, share with high school degrees, share with four year degree, median income all from the 2000 census.
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| Border pair FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Parcel controls I | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Demographics | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Parcel controls II | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

Table 5. Own lot effect regression results for WRLURI subindexes. Each cell reports results from a different regression. **Dependent variable** is Parcel price per square foot. First row of each cell reports coefficient on cross-border change in regulatory index. Second row of each cell reports standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by border pair. Third row of each cell reports the number of observations and borders on which the estimate is based. **Parcel controls I** are parcel ft$^2$, (parcel ft$^2$)$^2$, log of distance to CBD,(log of distance to CBD)$^2$, quarterly indicators, mean ruggedness of surrounding 0.5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 10km radius disk. **Demographics** are municipal share black, share asian, number of households, share of population under age 17, share with high school degrees, share with four year degree, median income all from the 2000 census.
For a particular specification each cell of the table reports the coefficient of the WRLURI index, $b_0$, its standard error in parentheses and the number of parcels and borders on which the estimate is based. The bottom panel indicates the control variables used for all regressions in each column.

As we move between rows in the top panel we change the sample of parcels used to estimate all regressions in the row. In the top row of each of the top two panels, we use all parcels that match to each border, that is, all parcels within 100 km of the relevant border. In the second row we restrict attention to parcels within 1 km of a municipal border. Moving down the remaining three rows we restrict attention to parcels within 500 m, 250 m and 100 m of a border, hence, the number of parcels and borders declines as we move from row one to row five of the table.

In the first five columns of the table we consider transactions which occurred from 2000Q1 to 2009Q1. In the sixth column we restrict attention to the period 2002Q1-2009Q1. In the seventh column we extend the sample to the period 1990Q1-2009Q1. Note from the first row of column 7 that the 1990Q1-2009Q1 increases our sample size to 14,981 parcels and 632 borders from 9798 parcels and 598 borders for the shorter 2000Q1-2009Q1 sample. By comparing columns 5-7 of table 6 we see that our estimates are qualitatively similar for the different time periods, so we focus our attention on the period 2000Q1-2009Q1. This period is close enough to the 2005 date of the Wharton survey that we should expect the survey to be informative about municipal regulations, but is still long enough to take in most of the transactions that we can match to WRLURI municipalities.

The first five columns of table 2 are based on transactions during 2000Q1-2009Q1 and estimates a variant of the own-lot effect estimating equation. All regressions in table 2 include a municipal border fixed effect and quarterly indicator variables. As we move from column 1 to column 5 we control for more possible sources of confounding variation. In the first column, in addition to a border pair fixed effect we include our first set of parcel characteristics as control variables. These parcel characteristics are the number of square feet of the parcel and the square of this quantity, the log of the distance to the tallest building in the metropolitan area and the square of this quantity and indicator variables describing the quarter in which the transaction took place. All of these variables are part of the COSTAR data set. In addition, for each parcel, the first set of parcel controls describes the ruggedness of the surrounding 0.5 km, 5 km and 10 km radius disk centered on the parcel. These data are based on data used in Burchfield, Overman, Puga, and Turner (2006) and are described there.

The second column of table 2 adds our second set of parcel controls. For each parcel, these controls describe the total employment from 1994 zip code business patterns in the 1 km, 5 km and 10 km disk surrounding the parcel and the share of developed land in the corresponding disks from 1992 satellite images. These data are based on data used in Eid, Overman, Puga, and Turner (2008) and are described there.

In the third column of table 2 we include our first set of demographic controls and controls for municipal demographic characteristics. These demographic characteristics are; share black, share asian, number of households, share with high school degrees, share with four year degree, median income. All are calculated for our sample of municipalities from the 2000 census.

The fourth column of table 2 uses our first set of parcel controls and a set of indicator variables, one for each secondary or amalgamated school district, reported in 2000 census boundary
files. Finally, column 5 includes both out sets of parcel controls and our municipal demographic controls.\textsuperscript{12}

Table 3 is identical to table 2, but restricts attention the sample of parcels which match to straight borders.

The results in tables 2 and 3 are unambiguous. The own-lot effect has the expected negative sign. In the top panel of the table the estimated effect of regulation is negative in almost all of the 35 specifications presented. As we move down the rows and consider parcels progressively closer to the border, we more and more nearly approximate the identification strategy described in section 2C. In the last row of the top panel of table 2, which considers only parcels within 100m of a border, every estimate of the effects of regulation is negative and the errors of these estimates are small enough to allow us to distinguish the estimates from zero at standard levels of confidence in all but two of the seven cases, and these two are close. The bottom panel of table 3 is similar.

Two differences between tables 2 and 3 deserve mention. First, where the bottom row of table 2 reports all negative estimates for the own-lot effect, the magnitude of these estimates varies dramatically from one specification to the other. In table 3, where we restrict attention to straight borders, estimates are also negative, but are smaller and do not vary as dramatically across specifications. Second, if we accept that the land on both sides of a straight border is the same in its intrinsic attractiveness, then the smaller estimates of the own-lot effect we obtain in the straight borders sample require that on average the intrinsic attractiveness of land fall discretely when we cross from a less regulated to a more regulated municipality. This is contrary to our intuition that more attractive places should be regulated more intensively, but is consistent with table 1 and with Gyourko et al. (2008) which suggest that more remote and less valuable land is regulated more intensively.

From table 1 we see that the standard deviation of the \textit{WRLURI} index is about 0.9 in the sample of straight borders, while the average price per square foot of land is about $68. From the last row of the second panel of table 3 we see that the effect of a one unit change in the \textit{WRLURI} index on the price of land is about $4. Multiplying by 0.9 and dividing by $68, we have that a one standard deviation increase in the \textit{WRLURI} index decreases the value of an average parcel by about 5%.

In order to assess whether different types of regulation are more or less costly, tables 4 and 5 duplicates the regressions performed in column 5 of tables 2 and 3 for each of the eight subindexes of regulation available in the Wharton survey. The structure of this table is similar to that of tables 2 and 3. Table 3 examines our main sample of borders while table 3 examines our straight border sample. Moving down rows in either table restricts attention to parcels close to a municipal border. However, unlike tables 2 and 3, as we move across columns, control variables and samples stay constant while the measure of regulation varies (as noted in the column headings). Looking at the last row of the second panel suggests that increases in Local Political Pressure (LPP\textit{I}), in the Local Project Approval Index (LPA\textit{I}) which counts the number of entities which must approve a project, and the Open Space Index (OS\textit{I}) are responsible for the costs of regulation, while other sorts of local

\textsuperscript{12}Note that we do not report the results of a regression, which like equation (10), contains border specific slope coefficients. We experimented extensively with variants of this regression, but in the end, our sample is not large enough to estimate this model accurately.
regulation impose costs too small to distinguish from zero using our data. In particular, the effect of the Density Restriction Index (DRI) is estimated fairly precisely and is indistinguishable from zero.

### B. External effect regressions

Table 6 reports the results of our estimates of external effects regressions. Each cell of this table reports the results of an estimate of a variant of equation 17 or 19. For a given specification each cell of the table reports the coefficient for the WRLURI index, \(B_0\), its standard error in parentheses, and the number of parcels and borders on which the estimate is based. The table consists of two panels. The top panel reports results based on the entire sample or parcels and borders. The bottom panel indicates the control variables used for all regressions in each column. Table 7 is identical to

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**Table 6.** External effect regression results for \textit{WRLURI} index or regulation. Each cell reports results from a different regression. \textbf{Dependent variable} is Parcel price per square foot. First row of each cell reports coefficient on cross-border change in the regulatory index. Second row of each cell reports standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by municipality and border. Third row of each cell reports the number of observations and borders on which the estimate is based. \textbf{Parcel controls I} are parcel ft

\[ (\text{parcel ft}^2), \text{log of distance to CBD}, \text{(log of distance to CBD)}^2, \text{quarterly indicators}, \text{mean ruggedness of surrounding 0.5km radius disk}, \text{mean ruggedness of surrounding 5km radius disk}, \text{mean ruggedness of surrounding 10km radius disk}. \]

\textbf{∆ Demographics} are cross border changes in municipal share black, share asian, number of households, share with high school degrees, share with four year degree, median income all from the 2000 census. \textbf{Interior=1} is an indicator that is 1 for interior parcels and zero otherwise. \textbf{Parcel controls II} are total employment from 1994 zip code business patterns in the 1km, 5km and 10km disk surrounding the parcel and the share of developed land in the corresponding disks from 1992 satellite images. \textbf{School district} is an indicator for each secondary or amalgamated school district computed from 2000 census boundary files.
## Straight borders

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**Table 7.** External effect regression results for WRLURI index or regulation. Each cell reports results from a different regression. **Dependent variable** is Parcel price per square foot. First row of each cell reports coefficient on cross-border change in the regulatory index. Second row of each cell reports standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by municipality and border. Third row of each cell reports the number of observations and borders on which the estimate is based. **Parcel controls I** are parcel ft$^2$, (parcel ft$^2$)$^2$, log of distance to CBD,(log of distance to CBD)$^2$, quarterly indicators, mean ruggedness of surrounding 0.5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 10km radius disk. **Demographics** are cross border changes in municipal share black, share asian, number of households, share with high school degrees, share with four year degree, median income all from the 2000 census. **Interior=1** is an indicator that is 1 for interior parcels and zero otherwise. **Parcel controls II** are total employment from 1994 zip code business patterns in the 1km,5km and 10km disk surrounding the parcel and the share of developed land in the corresponding disks from 1992 satellite images. **School district** is an indicator for each secondary or amalgamated school district computed from 2000 census boundary files.
table 6, but restricts attention to our sample of straight municipal borders.

As we move between rows in the top panel of table 6 we change the definitions of the ‘interior’ and ‘peripheral’ bins upon which the regression is based. In the top row of the top panel, the peripheral bin extends from the border to 500m from the border while the interior bin extends from 500m to 1000m from the border. In the second row the peripheral bin extends from the border to 250m from the border. In the third row the peripheral bin extends from the border to 100m from the border. In the fourth row the peripheral bin extends from the border to 250m from the border while the interior bin extends from 250m to 500m from the border. In the bottom row, row the peripheral bin extends from the border to 100m from the border. In each regression we restrict attention to parcels which fall into one of the two bins and construct an indicator that is one for the interior bin and zero otherwise. This indicator corresponds exactly to the indicator variable $\chi_{i}^{lmj}$ in equations 17 and 19. The number of parcels and borders on which our estimates are based declines as we move from row one to row five of the table.

In the first five columns of the table we consider transactions which occurred during the period 2000Q1-2009Q1. In the sixth column we restrict attention to the period 2002Q1-2009Q1. In the seventh column we consider the longer period 1999Q1-2009Q1. Comparing columns 5-7 of table 6 we see that our estimates are qualitatively similar for the different time periods, so we focus our attention on the period 2000Q1-2009Q1. Column 8 of table 6 is based on the same 2000Q1-2009Q1 period as used in columns 1-5, but restricts attention to parcels for which the buyer reported the intention to develop the parcel for residential use. Our intention here to investigate whether regulation affects residential property differently than non-residential property.

Each of the first five columns considers the same time period, but presents a different variant of external effect estimating equation. As we move from left to right we control for more possible sources of confounding variation. In the first column, in addition to a border pair fixed effect we include our first set of parcel characteristics as control variables. These parcel characteristics are; the number of square feet of the parcel and the square of this quantity, the log of the distance to the tallest building in the metropolitan area and the square of this quantity, and indicator variables describing the quarter in which the transaction took place. All of these variables are part of the COSTAR data set. In addition, for each parcel, the first set of parcel controls describes the ruggedness of the surrounding 0.5km, 5km and 10km radius disk centered on the parcel. These data are based on data used in Burchfield et al. (2006) and are described there.

The second column of table 6 also controls for cross-border changes in municipal demographic characteristics as described in equation 19. These demographic characteristics are; share black, share asian, number of households, share with high school degrees, share with four year degree, median income. All are calculated for our sample of municipalities from the 2000 census.

In the third column of table 6 we also include and indicator variable that is one for all interior parcels and zero otherwise. The object of this variable is to control for the possibility that the edges of municipalities are systematically less nice than their interiors, independent of regulation.

The fourth column of table 6 adds our second set of parcel controls. For each parcel, these controls describe the total employment from 1994 zip code business patterns in the 1km,5km and 10km disk surrounding the parcel and the share of developed land in the corresponding disks from
1992 satellite images. These data are based on data used in Eid et al. (2008) and are described there. Finally, column five of table 6 is our preferred specification and also includes indicator variables for each secondary or amalgamated school district computed from 2000 census boundary files. Columns 6-8 are based on the same specification as is used in column 5 but different samples.

The results reported in table 6 are striking. For example, in the second column of row three we see that a one unit cross border increase in the WRLURI index is associated with a 18.02$ change in the price per square foot of an average parcel. This is a very large change. From table 1 the standard deviation of the WRLURI index in the straight borders sample is about 0.9 while the price per square foot of land is about 68$. Thus, again using the second column of row three, a one standard deviation change in the WRLURI index across a municipal is associated with an 24% change in the price of land as we move from parcels within 250m of a border to one between 500 and 1000m from the interior. This effect is statistically different from zero at standard levels of confidence and this effect persists for each of the five specifications and three samples examined in the first seven columns of table 6. Each of the five rows in the top panel of table 6 tells a similar story, although except for row 2, coefficients tend to be smaller and to have less statistical significance. In sum, the top panel of table 6 suggests that regulation has a very large and statistically significant positive external effect on land prices.

In column 8 of the top panel of 6 we restrict attention to parcels reported to be for residential use. While coefficients here are generally positive (and in row one significant) these estimates are imprecise. Bearing in mind that our estimation strategy requires that we estimate one fixed effect per border, our inclination is to interpret this column as an indication that we do not have enough data to distinguish the effects of regulation on residential from its effects on non-residential land.

In the bottom panel of table 7 we duplicate the regressions reported in table 6, but restrict attention to straight borders and parcels which match to these borders. Table 7 tells a different story than 6. In table 7 there is not a single specification or sample with a statistically significant positive external effect of regulation on land prices. On the contrary. The preponderance of specifications yield negative point estimates for value of the external effect of land regulation and many of these, rows four and five in particular, are statistically significant at standard levels of confidence.

To understand these conflicting results recall that the central problem with which we are concerned is the simultaneous determination of land use regulation and land prices. We are concerned that land prices and land regulation are determined by the same unobserved factors. To overcome this problem, our analysis relies on municipal borders which separate similar land into distinct jurisdictions. When we consider the set of all municipal borders, we should be concerned that some of these borders follow landscape features which separate one type of place from another. When we consider straight borders, many of which likely date from the first federal surveys of the continent, this is less of a concern. These two observations, together with the different results presented in tables 6 and 7 suggest that, in fact, irregular municipal borders are not exogenous to the process that determines land prices and regulation. Thus, in the sample of all borders we observe a positive external effect of regulation, while the sample of straight borders suggests that the actual external effect of regulation is negative.

That is, if the bottom panel of table 6 correctly isolates the causal effect of regulation, then
regulation restricts development of land in a way that is harmful to nearby parcels. Since table 2 shows that regulation also has a negative own-lot effect, this suggests that changes to municipal land use regulation which reduce the WRLURI index are beneficial.

To further investigate the external effects of land use regulation, we turn to an investigation of the effects of the seven WRLURI subindices considered earlier. For completeness, table 4 replicates the regression of column 5 of table 6 for our sample of all municipal borders, but uses the WRLURI subindices in place of the main regulatory index. Given the endogeneity of non-straight borders, the results in this table probably do not indicate a causal effects of regulation and this table is presented for completeness. Table 5 replicates the regression of column 5 of table 7 for our sample of straight municipal borders, but uses the WRLURI subindices in place of the main regulatory index.

With one exception, the results presented in table 9 and 8 are similar to those presented in table 7 and 6. Except for the Density Restriction Index, each of the regulation sub-indices appears to have positive external effects on the whole sample but these effects are negative or not distinguishable from zero. Only the density restrictions index has a statistically significant positive external effect on the sample of straight borders. That is, restrictions that limit density appear to benefit surrounding land. Conversely, at the margin a reduction in the other sorts of planning and regulatory effort measured by the various indices is probably beneficial.

The density restriction index is an indicator variable which is one if a municipality has a minimum lot size greater than an acre. From the last row of the DRI column in the bottom panel of table ?? we see that about 250 meters interior from the boundary of a municipality which has a minimum lot size but adjoins one that does not results in an increase in land prices of about $8 per square foot, or about 12% of the value of the land. From equation 5 we calculate the total change in land value for an average interior parcel as twice estimated the external effect minus the own-lot effect. From the preceding calculation, twice the estimated external effect is $16 per square foot or 24% of the price. From table 4 we see that the estimated own-lot effect for DRI is not distinguishable from zero for any sample and the largest point estimate is not distinguishable from zero and is estimated fairly precisely. Thus our point estimate of the benefits of an increase in the minimum lot size is positive.

5. Conclusion

We estimate the effect of land use regulation on the value of land by exploiting variation in exposure to municipal land use regulation across municipal boundaries. Our estimations are based on a novel theoretical and empirical framework which allows us to separately estimate own-lot and external effects of regulation from variation in land prices and land use regulation across municipal boundaries. To implement these estimations we assemble data describing a large sample of land transactions and municipalities and implement an algorithm to identify parcel close to municipal borders which do not follow landscape features.

Since the value of land gives us the market’s measure of the attractiveness of a location, our estimates allow us to draw conclusions about the effect of land use regulation on welfare. Reductions to an aggregate measure of regulatory intensity are welfare improving. Looking at a more detailed
Table 8. External effect regression results for WRLURI subindexes. Each cell reports results from a different regression. **Dependent variable** is Parcel price per square foot. First row of each cell reports coefficient on cross-border change in regulatory index. Second row of each cell reports standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by municipality and border. Third row of each cell reports the number of observations and borders on which the estimate is based. **Parcel controls I** are parcel ft\(^2\), (parcel ft\(^2\))\(^2\), log of distance to CBD, (log of distance to CBD)\(^2\), quarterly indicators, mean ruggedness of surrounding 0.5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 10km radius disk. **\(\Delta\) Demographics** are cross border changes in municipal share black, share asian, number of households, share with high school degrees, share with four year degree, median income all from the 2000 census. **Interior=1** is an indicator that is 1 for interior parcels and zero otherwise. **Parcel controls II** are total employment from 1994 zip code business patterns in the 1km, 5km and 10km disk surrounding the parcel and the share of developed land in the corresponding disks from 1992 satellite images. **School district** is an indicator for each secondary or amalgamated school district computed from 2000 census boundary files.

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| Municipality-Border FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Parcel controls I | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| \(\Delta\) Demographics | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Interior=1 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Parcel controls II | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| School district | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
**Table 9.** External effect regression results for WRLURI subindexes. Each cell reports results from a different regression. **Dependent variable** is Parcel price per square foot. First row of each cell reports coefficient on cross-border change in regulatory index. Second row of each cell reports standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by municipality and border. Third row of each cell reports the number of observations and borders on which the estimate is based. **Parcel controls I** are parcel ft\(^2\), (parcel ft\(^2\))^2, log of distance to CBD, (log of distance to CBD)^2, quarterly indicators, mean ruggedness of surrounding 0.5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 5km radius disk, mean ruggedness of surrounding 10km radius disk. **Δ Demographics** are cross border changes in municipal share black, share asian, number of households, share with high school degrees, share with four year degree, median income all from the 2000 census. **Interior=1** is an indicator that is 1 for interior parcels and zero otherwise. **Parcel controls II** are total employment from 1994 zip code business patterns in the 1km, 5km and 10km disk surrounding the parcel and the share of developed land in the corresponding disks from 1992 satellite images. **School district** is an indicator for each secondary or amalgamated school district computed from 2000 census boundary files.
description of regulation leads to a more subtle prescription. Complexity of the planning and susceptibility to political manipulation are the most harmful characteristics of a planning process, while regulation which requires minimum lot sizes for residential development increases land values.

References


Libecap, Gary D. and Dean Lueck. 2009. The demarcation of land and the role of coordinating institutions. *Processed, University of California at Santa Barbara*.


6. Technical Appendix

A. Land supply and land value

A number of authors argue that land use regulation drives up the price of housing by restricting the supply of developable land, e.g., Quigley and Rafael (2005) and Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005). To understand how such a restriction operates in the context of this model, consider regulation which prohibits development in an interval \([a,b]\) of the left municipality and suppose that this regulation has no external effects. We see in equation 2 that land rent is determined by each consumer’s outside option. In the absence of external effects, restricting the supply of developable land does not affect consumers’ willingness to pay to live in municipality \(L\). Thus, a prohibition on development in \([a,b]\) forces land rent in this interval to zero, but does not otherwise affect land rent. In short, free mobility assures that the demand for land is perfectly elastic, and hence that prices do not respond to changes in supply.

The land rent gradient in municipality \(L\) with the prohibition on development in \([a,b]\) parallels the gradient without this prohibition, except on the interval where development is prohibited. In the region where development is prohibited, no transactions occur, so that this region is invisible.
to the econometrician. This means that in a world with free mobility, regulation that affects land supply (but which has no external effects) will not affect our estimates of land rent in regions where we observe transactions. Thus, we do not further consider the role of ‘supply restrictions’ separate from other regulation.

This does not mean that land use regulation does not affect the price of housing. Regulation which doubles a binding minimum lot size should be expected to increase the price of housing. However, the effect on welfare of such a change in housing prices is ambiguous. Regulation which constrains developers to use twice as much land per house may drive up housing prices even as it drives down total land rent. Assessing the welfare implications of such land use regulation requires that we calculate the overall change in unit land rent due to own and external effects.

B. Land use regulation and rent with heterogenous populations

Suppose that there are two types of agents, $A$ and $B$. If these agents differ only in that $w^A > w^B$, then we see from equation 2 that the type $A$ agents will always outbid the type $B$ agents, and both municipalities will be entirely populated by agents of type $A$. Similarly if the types differ only in their outside options. Thus, introducing heterogeneity in wages or outside options does not change the analysis in an interesting way. It does require that we interpret the municipal land rent gradients as reflecting the value of regulation to the agents who sort into the regulated municipalities.

More interesting sorting occurs if the two types have different tastes for regulation. Let $v^A_E$ and $v^B_E$ denote the value that type $A$ and type $B$ agents assign to the external benefits of the more regulated left municipality, and that $v^A_E(z) > v^B_E(z)$ for all $z > 0$. We suppose that types $A$ and $B$ are otherwise alike. From the definition of $V_E$ we have that $V^A_E(x,z^L,z^R) > V^B_E(x,z^L,z^R)$ for all $x < \bar{x}$ and are otherwise equal. Analogous to equation 2, with free mobility the bid rent functions for type $A$ and $B$ agents are

$$p^A(x) = w - \theta + A_1 \ln(V_O(x,z^L,z^R)) + A_2 \ln(V^A_E(x,z^L,z^R))$$

$$p^B(x) = w - \theta + A_1 \ln(V_O(x,z^L,z^R)) + A_2 \ln(V^B_E(x,z^L,z^R)).$$

Since $V^A_E > V^B_E$ it follows immediately that the type $A$ agents outbid type $B$ at every location where the external effect of the more stringent regulation of the left municipality is felt. That is, all locations to the left of $\bar{x}$. For locations where the external effect of the stringent left regulation is not felt, we have $p^A(x) = p^B(x)$, and types $A$ and $B$ are assigned to these locations at random. Our econometric strategy will rely on this result: for all types of immigrant heterogeneity, even type specific preferences for regulation, the region $[-\bar{x},\bar{x}]$ is entirely populated by agents of a single type.

This leads us to the following unsurprising conclusions. First, to the extent that regulation induces sorting of heterogenous agents, this must occur because different types place different values on the costs or benefits of regulation. Second, if sorting on the basis of type occurs in the neighborhood of a municipal border, then cross-border variation in land rents reflects the value placed on regulation by the type that lives near the border. Our econometric estimates of the value of land use regulation should be understood in this light.