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Preference for the Workplace, Investment in Human Capital, and Gender

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Abstract

We use a hypothetical choice methodology to estimate preferences for workplace attributes and quantify how much these preferences influence pre-labor-market human capital investments. This method robustly identifies preferences for various job attributes, free from omitted variable bias and free from considering the equilibrium job match. Women on average have a higher willingness to pay (WTP) for jobs with greater work flexibility and job stability, and men have a higher WTP for jobs with higher earnings growth. These job preferences relate to college major choices and actual job choices, and explain as much as 25 percent of the gender wage gap.

Key words: workplace preferences, compensating differentials, human capital, college majors, gender

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1 Introduction

Economists have long recognized that job and occupational choices are not solely determined by expected earnings.¹ Although simple models based on earnings maximization abound (see for example the classic Roy, 1951, model), and are quite useful in some applications, it is also clear that individuals have a rich set of preferences for various aspects of jobs beyond expected earnings, including earnings and dismissal risk, and various non-pecuniary aspects such as work hours flexibility and enjoyment of workplace activities. We would expect then that these preferences for various job attributes affect not only job choices, as individuals choose jobs not solely to maximize expected earnings, but also human capital investments, as individuals alter their human capital investment in anticipation of particular future job choices.

However, empirically isolating the role of worker-side preferences for job attributes is difficult. One reason is that the equilibrium allocation of workers to jobs reflects not only the workers' preferences but the structure of the labor market and firm demands for workers. If one assumes the labor market is perfectly competitive with jobs of all types offered to all workers, then the equilibrium job choices and wages observed directly identify individual preferences-this is the classical model of compensating differentials (Rosen, 1984). If however firms have preferences for some types of workers and offer jobs only to a subset of workers with preferred characteristics (employment discrimination of some form), then the observed job choices do not reflect worker preferences only. Various kinds of labor market frictions, which prevent workers from matching with their most preferred job types, also break the direct connection between observed job choices and worker preferences. Even when the labor market is perfectly competitive, a second empirical challenge is that because jobs likely vary in many unobserved (to the researcher) characteristics, there exists a familiar omitted variable (selection bias) problem in identifying worker preferences from realized job choices. If the observed characteristics in realized choice data are correlated with the unobserved characteristics, then these estimates of the importance of the observed characteristics in workers' job choices are biased.

To address these empirical challenges, this paper presents a methodology for estimating individual preferences for workplace attributes prior to labor market entry. We collect data on job attribute preferences through a survey in which we present undergraduate students with a

¹See the famous quote by Adam Smith who lists a number of non-pecuniary job attributes which "make up for a small pecuniary gain in some employments, and counterbalance a great one in others." *Wealth of Nations*, 1776, Book 1, Chapter 10.

series of hypothetical job choice scenarios and elicit their expected future choices across the jobs. The hypothetical job scenarios were constructed to offer students a realistic menu of potential jobs varying in expected earnings and other characteristics such as future earnings growth, dismissal probability, and work hours flexibility. The students' stated preferences for these jobs allows us to construct a "pure" measure of individual preferences – at the time of the survey – for various job characteristics and estimate, in a simple and robust way, the distribution of their preferences for job attributes. In this way, our data isolates the preference for workplace attributes, free from making explicit assumptions about the equilibrium job allocation mechanism, preferences of employers, and free from considering key omitted variables.

In contrast to our approach, previous work addressing compensating differentials using observed job choices requires generally stronger assumptions about preferences and the firm side of the labor market. Several decades of direct empirical approaches using realized wage differentials to measure compensating differentials have yielded mixed results, some finding large, and others small, compensating differentials for various job attributes (Thaler and Rosen, 1975; Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Van Ommeren et al., 2000; Dale-Olsen, 2006). More recent work has incorporated compensating differentials into rich models of the labor market, allowing for important features such as search frictions, unobserved job attributes, and dynamic incentives for occupational choices (see for example, Bonhome and Jolivet, 2009; d'Haultfeouille and Maurel, 2013; Bronson, 2015; and Lim, 2015.). Motivating our approach, Hwang et al. (1992) and Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) conclude that search frictions can imply small equilibrium wage differentials although there are in fact substantial preferences for non-wage job amenities.

In a departure from this previous literature, our hypothetical choice methodology is a kind of "stated choice" analysis, similar to "conjoint analysis" and "contingent valuation" methods, used in fields including marketing, environmental and natural resource economics, and health.² Because our data collection in essence conducts a kind of "experiment" at the

²In the marketing and environmental contexts, these methods are often used to identify preferences for new, as yet unavailable, consumer products or for public goods like environmental quality, for which realized choices and markets do not exist. For examples in marketing and consumer choice, see Green and Srinivasan (1978), Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman (1981), Louviere and Woodworth (1983), Manski and Salomon (1987), and Ben-Akiva and Morikawa (1990). For examples, in environmental and resource economics see Smith (2004), Kling, Phaneuf, Zhao (2012), Carson (2012), and Hausman (2012). Studies using stated choice in health include Scott (2001) who estimates the preferences for pecuniary and non-pecuniary characteristics of workplaces among doctors; see also Lagarde and Blaauw (2009) and de Bekker-Grob. More recently Blass, Lach, and Manski (2010), Delavande and Manski (2015), Ameriks et al. (2015), and Fuster and Zafar (2015) have used this hypothetical choice methodology to analyze preferences for electricity reliability, political candidates,

individual student level, the "panel" data generated by our design allows us to estimate the *distribution* of preferences allowing for unrestricted forms of preference heterogeneity. We combine this data on job attribute preferences with rich data on students' educational choices and expectations, including data on how students believe potential college majors relate to the jobs which would be available to them, and test whether the job preferences young adults hold in college in fact affect their human capital investments during college.

In our sample of high ability students, we estimate substantial willingness-to-pay (WTP) for pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of jobs and considerable heterogeneity in their preferences for workplace attributes. We find that students have preferences reflecting, on average, a dis-taste for higher job dismissal potential, and a taste for workplace hours flexibility. We estimate that on average students are willing to give up 2.8% of annual earnings for a job with a percentage point lower probability of job dismissal. The largest average WTP estimate is for the availability of a part-time hours option. Individuals, on average, are willing to give up 5.1% of their salary to have a job which offers the option of working part-time hours rather than a job which does not offer this option. When dividing our sample by gender, we find that women have a higher average preference for workplace hours flexibility, with an implied willingness-to-pay of 7.3% compared to 1% for men. Women also have a higher average WTP for more secure jobs- they are willing to give up 4% of their salary for a percentage point lower probability of job dismissal (versus a 0.6% WTP for males). We find similar differences in the gender-specific median WTP estimates for these attributes. On the other hand, men have a higher average WTP for jobs with higher earnings growth: they are willing to give up 3.4% of annual earnings for a job with a percentage point higher earnings growth (the corresponding estimate for women is a statistically insignificant 0.6%). There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in preferences for workplace attributes, even within gender. In addition, the skewness of the estimated preference distributions is significantly different from zero for most attributes, suggesting that parametric distributional assumptions that impose symmetry in preferences are not supported in the data.

A natural question is whether preferences recovered from data on hypothetical choices relate to actual occupational outcomes. Using data on reported job characteristics for a subset of our respondents who are employed roughly four years after our original data collection,

nursing home care and asset allocation, and housing demand, respectively. Like these previous studies, we exploit the possibilities that hypothetical data can provide rich variation in product characteristics, allowing for identification of preferences under weak assumptions about the form of preference heterogeneity. However, our primary motivation for collecting hypothetical choice data is not because markets and realized choices do not exist, as is the issue in identifying preferences for new products or public goods, but to resolve problems of endogeneity of realized job choices.

reveals a strong and systematic relationship between estimated preferences and later actual workplace characteristics. Students with strong preferences for flexible hours, dis-taste for hours, and other non-pecuniary aspects of jobs were later found to be more likely to be working at jobs with those same preferred characteristics. Although these realized job characteristics do not solely reflect preferences (given the issues we raised above), our finding of a correlation between pre-labor market job preferences and later actual job characteristics suggests some added credibility of our research design.

Our finding of substantial differences in willingness-to-pay for job amenities between men and women is consistent with prior work noting that the gender segregation of occupations and jobs is such that women are more likely to be found in jobs offering greater workplace flexibility (Goldin and Katz, 2011; Flabbi and Moro, 2012; Goldin, 2014; Wasserman, 2015; Bronson, 2015). However, the observation that women tend to work in certain job types may not reveal women's preferences alone, but may also be affected by firm-side demands for specific workers and discrimination or be driven by some other job attributes that are unobserved in our datasets (Blau and Kahn, 2006).³ Our innovation is to quantify the willingness-to-pay for job attributes using a flexible and robust methodology. Our finding of a substantial and gender-specific preference for job attributes such as work hours flexibility, even among college students, indicates that these types of preferences form before entry into the labor market. Although the preferences we identify are not necessarily intrinsic, and can be, in part influenced, by the environmental influences particular to this cohort of students, these distinct preferences by gender suggest that part of the gender gap in earnings we observe is a compensating differential in which women are willing to give up higher earnings to obtain other job attributes.

In the second part of the paper, we test whether the job preferences young adults hold in college in fact affect their human capital investments during college. We collect beliefs about *expected* attributes of jobs students anticipate being offered if they were to complete particular majors. Importantly, these beliefs are elicited for not only the student's chosen major, but also the counterfactual majors. Following previous work on using expectations data to understand choices, we argue that perceptions or beliefs at the time of choice, whether accurate or biased in some way, are key, as these beliefs are the basis of decision making.

We find that students, on average, believe that completing a major in the Humanities/Arts

³Mas and Pallais (2016) bypass some of these issues by conducting a field experiment where job offers (in terms of wages and flexibility of the work arrangement) are exogenously varied. Consistent with our finding that females value part-time availability more, they find that women have a higher valuation for worker-friendly alternative work arrangements.

would lead to being offered jobs with fewer work hours, greater work hours flexibility, lower job dismissal probability, and lower earnings uncertainty than if they were to complete majors in Economics/Business. Students believe that the jobs they would be offered if they completed a major in Economics/Business would, on the other hand, offer higher salaries and greater earnings growth.

In order to quantify the importance of job attributes to major choice, we estimate a simple model of major choice where students receive utility from major-specific characteristics (such as perceived ability in those majors), job attributes conditional on major, and tastes for the major. We compute "marginal effects" to gauge the importance of job attributes in major choice, whereby we vary each job attribute keeping the other job- and major- specific attributes fixed at their average values. We find that job attributes have a sizable impact on major choice. For example, increasing the perceived job firing probability by a standard deviation reduces the probability of majoring in a major, on average, by 5% (4%) for females (males). To put this change in perspective, a standard deviation in average earnings leads to a 5% (16%) increase, on average, in the likelihood of majoring in that field for females (males). Thus, for females, this change is equivalent to the effect on major choice of increasing earnings by one standard deviation. We find meaningful impacts for the importance of other job attributes, such as work hours. In general, we find that females' major choices are more responsive to changes in non-pecuniary job attributes (relative to changes in earnings) than males. By linking job preferences directly to human capital investments, we contribute to our limited understanding of how career and workplace preferences shape educational choices.

Prior research on college major choice examines the role of earnings expectations, ability perceptions, college costs, and tastes, but generally does not examine other job attributes.⁴ An exception is Zafar (2013), which estimates a model of college major choice that incorporates some non-pecuniary workplace attributes. However, the framework does not allow for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, and incorporates a smaller set of workplace characteristics. Closely related to our work is Arcidiacono et al. (2015), which uses expectations data from male undergraduate students about earnings in different major-occupation pairs. They find evidence for complementarities in preferences between different majors and occupations, and conclude that non-monetary considerations are key determinants of occu-

⁴For examples of recent work, see Arcidiacono, 2004; Beffy, Fougere, and Maurel, 2012; Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang, 2012; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014a; Gemici and Wiswall, 2014; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015. However, most recently, Bronson (2015) shows the importance of work hours flexibility and changes in divorce law and divorce risk in explaining longer term gender-specific trends in major choices.

pational choice (conditional on graduating from a given college major). Our contribution is to directly quantify the role of specific non-monetary factors in major choice.

Finally, we turn to a key question in the social sciences and ask what our results imply for the gender wage gap. Systematic gender differences in workplace preferences may impact the gender wage gap through two channels: first, it may cause men and women to choose different fields of study, and second, choose systematically different jobs within the same field. Our analysis reveals that the gender gap in expected earnings would be reduced by at least 25 percent if women did not differ from men in the workplace preferences we consider. Remarkably, we find a similar impact on the gender gap in actual earnings for the subset of respondents for whom we have follow-up data. We find that the main channel for preferences operates through the second channel, with a smaller effect through major choice. Our evidence supports the notion that at least part of the gender wage gap is the result of women "purchasing" certain positive job attributes by accepting lower wages, and men accepting higher earnings to compensate for negative job attributes.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly provide some context for our analysis by using nationally representative surveys for the US on currently employed individuals to describe the distribution of realized job characteristics by past college major choice. Section 3 describes our data collection. Section 4 details the model of job choice, and shows how hypothetical data can solve important identification issues with realized choice data. Section 5 provides the empirical estimates of job preferences. Section 6 describes data on students' beliefs about the types of jobs (along various dimensions) they believe would be offered to them conditional on college major, and section 7 quantifies the importance of job attributes for college major choice. Finally, Section 8 investigates the extent to which gender-specific job preferences can explain the gender gap in earnings. Section 9 concludes.

2 Background: Job Choices and Human Capital Investments in the United States

To set the stage for the analysis of our hypothetical choice scenario data, we first briefly describe the distribution of college majors, jobs, and associated job characteristics. To do so, we use two large-sample representative datasets for the United States, the January 2010- December 2012 monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 2013 American Community Survey (ACS).

Table 1 shows the job attributes across sectors. For this purpose, we use the sample of

25-60 year old labor market participants with at least a Bachelor's degree in the 2010-2012 CPS. The first two columns of Table 1 show that the gender distribution across work sectors differs (Appendix A provides details on how variables in this table were constructed). While nearly half of college-educated women workers are in Health or Education, less than 20% of college educated male workers are employed in these sectors. These sectors differ substantially in their labor market returns: column (3) of Table 1 shows that average annual earnings of full-time workers are the lowest for Education and Health. But these sectors differ along other dimensions as well: more than a quarter of the workers in Health and Education are employed part-time, possibly suggesting the amiability of these sectors to work hours flexibility. Job stability, as measured by the likelihood of being fired, is lowest in Government and Education. Jobs in these sectors also differ in the skills that they demand of their workers. So what explains the propensity of men and women to work in different sectors-is it differences in preferences for workplace attributes, differences in tastes for occupations/industries, or differences in skills? Or is it a result of the labor market structure, firm labor demand, or discrimination by employers? This is something extremely challenging to answer with observational data. In addition, job characteristics may evolve endogenouslyfor example, part-time availability could be higher in Health and Education precisely because more females enter these sectors.

We next turn to Table 2 to document the link between field of study and associated job characteristics.⁵ The table is based on the 2013 ACS, restricting the sample to 25-40 year olds with more than a high school education (at least some college). The first two columns show that while nearly a third of women have a Bachelor's degree in Humanities, only about a fifth of men do. And, while 12% of males have a Bachelor's in Engineering, the corresponding proportion for females is only 3%. We can reject the equality of the distribution of major choices by gender.

Column (3) of Table 2 shows that these majors differ significantly in their average earnings (as reflected by the F-test for the joint equality of means in the last row of the table). Engineering – the field which females are least likely to be present in – has the highest average earnings, while Humanities – the most popular Bachelor's field for females – has the lowest average earnings among the four Bachelor's fields. These majors, however, differ along other dimensions too. Columns (4) and (5) show that work hours flexibility is the highest for jobs associated with Humanities: 38.6% of all Humanities graduates are part-time workers, versus 21.7% of Engineering bachelor's graduates. Among the four Bachelor's fields,

⁵Altonji, Kahn, and Speer (2015) provide a more detailed discussion of the relationships between college majors and labor market outcomes.

average hours per week for full-time workers are also the lowest in Humanities. The last two columns of the table show that job stability and earnings growth also vary significantly across the fields of study.

With observational data, the challenge in identifying the determinants of field of study should then be clear. Females, for example, may be more likely to choose Humanities majors for any number of reasons: because they have a lower preference for earnings, they value the associated job attributes more, they have perceived or actual differences in abilities to complete coursework in this subject, or they have differences in "tastes" for studying humanities subjects, relative to other fields. In addition, the observed patterns of jobs we see in the data are equilibrium outcomes, and we cannot ascertain from this data alone whether these outcomes are due to worker demand or due to the supply of certain jobs–for example, part-time work may either be a voluntary or involuntary decision.

Our experimental approach, which we describe next, attempts to overcome these identification challenges.

3 Data

This section describes the administration of the data collection, the form of the hypothetical choice scenarios, and the sample we use for the estimation.

3.1 Administration

Our data is from an original survey instrument administered to New York University (NYU) undergraduate students over a 2-week period, during May 2012. NYU is a large, selective, private university located in New York City. The students were recruited from the email list used by the Center for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) at NYU. Students were informed that the study consisted of some simple economic experiments and a survey about educational and career choices. Upon agreeing to participate, students could sign up for a 90-minute session, which was held in the CESS Computer Lab located on the main NYU campus.⁶

The data for this paper was collected through a computer-based survey (constructed using the SurveyMonkey software). The survey took approximately 30 minutes to complete, and

⁶During the same session, and immediately prior to completing the survey, students also took part in some economic experiments. Students also earned additional income through participation in the experiments. See Reuben, Wiswall, and Zafar (forthcoming) for information on this data collection.

consisted of several parts. Many of the questions had built-in logical checks (e.g., percent chances of an exhaustive set of events such as majors had to sum to 100). Students were compensated \$10 as a show-up fee, and \$20 for successfully completing the survey.

3.2 Data Collection Instrument

In addition to questions about demographics, family background, and educational experiences, the main survey instrument consisted of two parts. The first part collected data on students' preferences for job attributes using hypothetical job choices, while the second collected data on consequential life activities that would plausibly be key determinants of college major choice, such as attributes of jobs associated with each major and measures of the student's perception of her ability to complete the coursework for each major. We describe the hypothetical job choice data in detail next, and leave the description of major-specific data to the second part of the paper where we relate the job attribute preferences to college major choices.

Our hypothetical job choice data were collected by presenting students with a total of 16 job scenarios. Each scenario consisted of 3 different potential jobs. We exogenously varied different aspects of the job with the intention of creating realistic variation in job attributes. The first 8 hypothetical job scenarios were introduced as follows:

In each of the 8 scenarios below, you will be shown hypothetical jobs offers. Each job offer is characterized by:

Annual earnings when working full-time

Annual percentage increase in earnings from age 30 onwards until retirement

Full-time work hours per week

Work flexibility (whether part time work is an option); part time work is work where you only work at most half as many hours as full-time work and for half of the full-time salary

These jobs are otherwise identical in all other aspects.

Look forward to when you are 30 years old. You have been offered each of these jobs, and now have to decide which one to choose.

In each scenario, you will be asked for the percent chance (or chances out of 100) of choosing each of the alternatives. The chance of each alternative should

be a number between 0 and 100 and the chances given to the three alternatives should add up to 100.

Each scenario consisted of three jobs, with each job being characterized by four attributes. The notable point that was highlighted was that these jobs were *identical* in all other aspects. The jobs did not have any occupation labels on them.⁷ The last 8 scenarios were introduced in a similar way, except that the job offer was now characterized by a different set of attributes: annual earnings when working full-time; probability of being fired over a one year period; amount of additional annual bonus pay based on relative performance the respondent may qualify for (in addition to base pay); proportion of males in the firm in similar job positions. All survey respondents received identical scenarios in the same order.

Following the approach of Blass et al. (2010), we asked respondents to provide a choice probability instead of a discrete choice (that is, a zero or 1). This allows respondents to express uncertainty about their future behavior. It also allows individuals to rank their choices, providing more information than if we asked only about the most preferred job. As is standard in studies that collect subjective probabilistic data, a short introduction on the use of percentages was provided. In addition, respondents answered some practice questions in order to become familiar with expressing probabilistic answers.

Besides earnings, the scenarios focus on six different job attributes. We chose to not vary these six dimensions all at once since the cognitive load to process such information could have been overwhelming. We focus on these dimensions based on findings from prior literature, and the fact that there is considerable variation along these dimensions across occupations as well as majors (Tables 1 and 2). Earnings and earnings growth were included since they have been found to be a factor in career/education choice (see Wiswall and Zafar, 2015, and references therein). Work hours and work flexibility are included since they tend to be associated with the remuneration structure in jobs and the associated gender gap in earnings (Flabbi and Moro, 2012; Goldin, 2014; Cortes and Pan, 2016). We recognize that workplace flexibility is a multidimensional concept: for example, the number of hours to be worked matters but perhaps also the particular hours (Goldin, 2014; Mas and Pallais, 2016). We varied two hours-related attributes: number of hours and the availability of a part-time option, since these are easy to vary in a meaningful fashion. Job stability, as proxied by the likelihood of being fired from the job, is included because of the importance of risk and

⁷In addition, when presented with each scenario, respondents were told: "*Now consider the situation where* you are given the jobs offered above when you are aged 30, and you have decided to accept one of these jobs. What is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that you will choose each of these jobs?" That is, the options were mutually exhaustive, and not working was not an option.

uncertainty to job choices (Dillon, 2015) and gender differences in risk preferences (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Finally, relative performance compensation and proportion of males are meant to capture the competitiveness of the job environment, preferences for which have been found to differ by gender (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Flory, Leibbrandt and List, 2015; Reuben, Wiswall, and Zafar, forthcoming).⁸

To keep the scenarios realistic, the job attributes shown to respondents in the scenarios were based on the actual marginal distribution of job characteristics in the Current Population Survey (except for the bonus pay variable, since data were not available for that dimension).⁹ In addition, no scenario included a job that was clearly dominant or dominated along all dimensions. We also made a conscious effort to keep the variation in job attributes *within* each scenario relatively "local", so that the claim that the jobs were otherwise identical was credible; for example, two jobs offering \$50,000 and \$90,000, respectively, with little variation along the specified dimensions are unlikely to be identical. At the same time, we had substantial variation in the job attributes *across* the scenarios. This ensures that we are not recovering preferences in a local region only. Appendix Table A1 shows the range of the attributes across the scenarios.

3.3 Sample Description

A total of 257 students participated in the study. We drop 10 respondents for whom we have missing data for the relevant section of the survey. Sample characteristics are shown in Table 3. 35 percent of the sample (86 respondents) is male, 29 percent is white and 51 percent is Asian. The mean age of the respondents is 21.5, with 11 percent of respondents freshmen, 11 percent sophomores, 37 percent juniors, and the remaining seniors or higher. The average grade point average of our sample is 3.5 (on a 4.0 scale), and students have an average Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) math score of 696, and a verbal score of 674 (with a maximum score of 800). These correspond to the 93rd percentile of the US national population score distributions. Therefore, as expected, our sample represents a high ability group of college students. Parents' characteristics of the students also suggest that they are over-represented among high socioeconomic groups. The last panel of the table shows that

⁸Lordan and Pischke (2015) find a strong relationship between female job satisfaction and the proportion of males in that occupation.

⁹For each job attribute, we constructed a set of hypothetical job scenarios by using uniform random draws from an interval between the 10th and 90th percentile of the observed distribution for each attribute. For each set of job scenarios, we then rejected any set of job scenarios which included jobs which were dominated by another job in all attributes or had earnings differences across jobs which were greater than 30 percent.

48 percent of the students have a major in the Humanities and Social Sciences category, 31 percent have a major in Business and Economics, while the remaining have a major in Natural Sciences and Math (16%), and Engineering (5%).

Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 report the characteristics by gender. That last column of the table reports the p-value of tests of equality of the statistics by gender. We see that male and female respondents are similar in all dimensions, except two. One, male students in our sample have a significantly higher average SAT Math score than females, of about 33 SAT points. Second, the two genders choose very different college majors. Nearly half - 49 percent - of males report majoring in Business/Economics, with 30 percent majoring in Humanities and Social Sciences, and 12 percent in Natural Sciences/Math. On the other hand, 57 percent of the females report majoring in Humanities and Social Sciences, followed by about 22 percent majoring in Business/Economics, and 18 percent majoring in Natural Sciences/Math. That is, female students are almost twice as likely as males to major in the Humanities (the field, which we show below, is perceived to have the lowest average earnings among college graduates), and only half as likely as males to major in the highest earnings major category, Economics/Business. The gender-specific major distributions are statistically different (p-value < 0.001, using a Chi-square test for equality of distributions). These substantial gender gaps in major choice mirror the national patterns from the ACS data (Table 2).¹⁰

4 Model and Identification Analysis

In this section, we present a simple attribute-based job choice model and discuss identification of the model using two types of data: i) standard realized job choices (as observed after

¹⁰Compared to the NYU population, our sample has a similar proportion female: 63% of students graduating NYU in 2010 are female compared to 65% in our sample (data from the Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data System, IPEDS). For a comparison to the broader NYU population of students, for all incoming freshman in 2010, the 25th and 75th quartiles of the SAT math were 630 and 740 and for the SAT verbal were 610 and 710 (IPEDS). The equivalent quartiles in our sample are 650 and 770 for math and 620 and 730 for verbal.

Our sample is weighted more toward Business/Economics majors than in the actual NYU population graduating in 2010, possibly because the experimental laboratory is located in the building housing the economics department. However, the gender differences in major choice are similar. For the NYU population of students who graduated in 2010 (IPEDS), the fraction of students completing degrees in each field are as follows: For women, 14.1 percent graduated in economics or business, 71.7 percent in humanities or other social sciences, and 13.7 percent in natural sciences, math, or engineering. For men, 31.1 percent graduated in economics or business, 61.2 percent in humanities or other social sciences, and 7.8 percent in natural sciences, math, or engineering.

job choices are made), and ii) stated probabilistic job choices (as observed in our job hypothetical experimental data). We show that under weak conditions the job hypotheticals data identifies the distribution of job preferences, while standard realized job choice data does not. Later, we present the model of college major choice and our framework for analyzing the relationship between these choices and job preferences.

4.1 A Canonical Random Utility Model of Job Choice

Jobs are indexed by j, and there is a finite set of jobs j = 1, ..., J. Each job is characterized by a vector of K attributes $X_j = [X_{j1}, ..., X_{jK}]$. These job attributes include earnings as well as various non-pecuniary attributes, such as job dismissal probabilities and work hours flexibility. We explicitly allow for the possibility that individuals are not necessarily pure income or consumption maximizers, and may value many other outcomes associated with their job choice.

Let $U_{ij} \in R$ be individual *i*'s utility from job *j*. The utility from job *j* is

$$U_{ij} = u_i(X_j) + \epsilon_{ij}.\tag{1}$$

 $u_i(X) \in R$ is the preferences of individual *i* over the vector of characteristics X. $\epsilon_{ij} \in R$ is the additional job-specific preference component for job *j* reflecting all remaining attributes of the job which affect utility, if any. Let ϵ_i be the vector of these components for individual $i, \epsilon_i = \epsilon_{i1}, \ldots, \epsilon_{iJ}$. After observing the attributes X_1, \ldots, X_J for all jobs and ϵ_i , individual *i* chooses the one job with the highest utility: *i* chooses job *j* if $U_{ij} > U_{ij'}$ for all $j' \neq j$.

Population preferences for jobs is the collection of u_i preferences over the job attributes X and the job-specific components ϵ_i . The joint distribution of preferences in the population is given by $F(u_i, \epsilon_i)$. This distribution determines the fraction of individuals choosing each job, $q_i \in [0, 1]$:

$$q_{j} = pr(\text{choose job } j)$$

= $\int 1\{U_{ij} > U_{ij'} \text{ for all } j' \neq j \} dF(u_{i}, \epsilon_{i}),$ (2)

4.2 Identification using Realized Choice Data

Typically empirical research on job choice consists of analyzing data on actual or realized job choices, which provides the one best job chosen by each individual.¹¹ Using this realized job choice data, we compute the fraction of the sample choosing each job. In order to analyze the potential advantages of hypothetical data, we first detail the identification using realized choice data.

A common model of realized choice data assumes $\epsilon_{i1}, \ldots, \epsilon_{iJ}$ are i.i.d. Type I extreme value, and independent of preferences represented by u_i . Under these assumptions, we can write the population fraction choosing job j, given some characteristics X_1, \ldots, X_J for all jobs, as:

$$q_{j} = \int \frac{\exp(u_{i}(X_{j}))}{\sum_{j'=1}^{J} \exp(u_{i}(X_{j'}))} dG(u_{i}),$$
(3)

where we have kept the dependence of the job choice on the job characteristics X_1, \ldots, X_J implicit. $G(u_i)$ is the distribution of preferences over attributes u_i in the population. (3) is the mixed multinomial logit model of McFadden and Train (2000). They show that the distributional assumption on the ϵ_i terms that yield the logit form is without any meaningful loss of generality as this model can arbitrarily closely approximate a broad class of random utility models. For ease of exposition, we consider a linear model of utility given by $u_i(X) = X'\beta_i$.

A key concern in using realized job choices is that the dataset of job characteristics which the researcher has at hand is not complete in the sense that there are omitted unobserved job characteristics which are potentially correlated with the included observed characteristics. Divide the vector of job characteristics X into observed X(obsv) and unobserved characteristics X(unob), X = [X(obsv), X(unob)]. Similarly divide the vector of preference parameters $\beta_i = [\beta_i(obsv), \beta_i(unob)]$. The log odds of job j relative to job j', using (3), is then:

$$\ln(\frac{q_j}{q_{j'}}) = (X_j(obsv) - X_{j'}(obsv))\beta_i(obsv) + (X_j(unob) - X_{j'}(unob))\beta_i(unob)$$
$$= (X_j(obsv) - X_{j'}(obsv))\beta_i(obsv) + \eta_j,$$

where q_j and $q_{j'}$ is the probability of choosing job j and j', respectively (3), and $\eta_j =$

¹¹We confine attention to cross-sectional data. Panel data on repeated job choices over an individual's life-cycle may provide more identifying power but at the cost of requiring additional assumptions about the evolution of model features (e.g., preferences) as individuals age.

 $(X_j(unob) - X_{j'}(unob))\beta_i(unob)$ is the omitted variable.

The omitted variable bias problem is the generic one found in a variety of contexts: the omitted unobserved job characteristics $X_j(unob)$ are correlated with the observed characteristics $X_i(obsv)$. For example, if the researcher's dataset includes only current salaries, but not any of the non-pecuniary benefits of the job, we would expect that the estimate for preferences for salaries will be biased. The theory of compensating differentials (Rosen, 1984) predicts a close connection among various job characteristics – a trade-off between salary and non-pecuniary benefits - and therefore would suggest important omitted variable bias in estimates of job preferences using realized data. The omitted variable bias issue could also arise more subtly from the selection/matching mechanism to jobs, reflecting employer preferences over potential job candidates. If the labor market equilibrium is such that employers only offer a limited set of jobs to candidates, then the realized jobs they hold do not reflect their preferences only. Discrimination by employers, by which employers prefer not to hire workers of certain groups (e.g., women, minorities), is one example (Becker, 1957). In the presence of important demand side considerations, one would not want to interpret the equilibrium allocation of jobs as reflecting only worker preferences.¹² As we detail below, our hypothetical data avoids this issue because it experimentally manipulates the characteristics offered to individuals, thereby allowing a "pure" measure of preferences, free from considering the equilibrium job allocation mechanism, preferences of employers, or any omitted unobserved job characteristics.

4.3 Model of Hypothetical Job Choices

We next consider a framework for analyzing hypothetical job choice data, connecting the canonical model of realized job choice specified above in (1) with the hypothetical job choice data we collect. Our hypothetical data is asked prior to a job choice (while students are in school). We observe each individual's beliefs about the *probability* they would take each future job offered within the scenario (and not simply the individual's one chosen (realized) job). To analyze this type of data, we require a model of hypothetical future jobs. Our model of hypothetical job choices presumes individuals are rational decision makers who anticipate the job choice structure as laid out in the canonical model of job choice (1). To allow for the possibility of uncertainty about future job choices, we assume that the realizations of $\epsilon_{i1}, \ldots, \epsilon_{iJ}$ job-specific utility terms are not known at the time we elicit individual beliefs.

¹²We can represent demand side restrictions in jobs offered in the omitted variable framework by considering some unobservable job characteristic X(unob), such that $X(unob) \rightarrow -\infty$ if a job is not offered.

Individual *i* then faces a choice among *J* hypothetical jobs with characteristics X_1, \ldots, X_J . Each individual expresses their probability of taking a given job *j* as:

$$p_{ij} = \int 1\{U_{ij} > U_{ij'} \text{ for all } j' \neq j \} dH_i(\epsilon_i), \tag{4}$$

where $H_i(\epsilon_i)$ is individual *i*'s *belief* about the distribution of $\epsilon_{i1}, \ldots, \epsilon_{iJ}$ elements. As in Blass et al. (2010), ϵ_i has an interpretation of *resolvable uncertainty*, uncertainty at the time of our data collection but uncertainty that the individual knows will be resolved (i.e., known or realized) prior to making the job choice.¹³

It should be noted that the preferences for workplace attributes elicited in our data collection are potentially specific to the time at which the survey is collected (during the college years in our case). Preferences for job attributes may change as individuals age, and may be different when the students in our sample were younger (say prior to college) and different still when they actually enter the labor market and make job choices. With this caveat in mind, we can still use our research strategy to understand job preferences at a point in time and study how these preferences relate to important human capital investments that are being made contemporaneously.¹⁴

4.4 Identification using Hypothetical Choice Data

We previously analyzed identification of preferences using realized job choice data and discussed a key shortcoming: realized choice data potentially suffers from omitted variable bias. Hypothetical choice data can overcome this shortcoming and allow a general method to identify heterogeneity in job choice preferences.

First, because we can experimentally manipulate the hypothetical choice scenarios we provide individuals, we avoid bias from the correlation of observed and unobserved job characteristics. Rather than use naturally occurring variation in realized job choices–which are the result of many unobserved job characteristics and an unknown labor market equilibrium mechanism, as discussed above–we present individuals with an artificial set of job choices.

¹³An alternative model is that agents have uncertainty about preferences over attributes, that is the utility function $u_i(\cdot)$ is uncertain. For example, an individual may be uncertain about the number of children she may have at a future date, and the number of young children at home may affect her preference for workplace hours flexibility (an element of the X_j vector). We explore this later by relating preferences for job characteristics as revealed in our hypothetical data with a rich set of beliefs about future outcomes (e.g., individual beliefs about future own fertility and marriage).

¹⁴See Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2014a; 2014b) for evidence on the dynamics in beliefs formation among college students.

While the job characteristics we provide are certainly not exhaustive of all possible job characteristics, and are purposely kept limited so as not to "overload" the respondents with too many job features, the key feature of the hypothetical experimental setting is that we instruct respondents that the jobs differ only in the finite number of job characteristics we provide, and are otherwise identical. There is no additional information provided that the respondent could use to believe otherwise. Under this particular design then, our hypothetical data is free from omitted variable bias.¹⁵

A second advantage of the hypothetical data is that hypothetical data provides a kind of panel data on preferences which, under fairly weak assumptions, identifies the full preference rankings over job attributes. Notice the key distinction between (4) and (2). With job hypotheticals data, we observe for each individual *i* multiple subjective job probabilities p_{i1}, \ldots, p_{iJ} . The job hypotheticals provide a type of panel data allowing less restricted forms of identification, allowing identification of the $u_i(X)$ preferences without a parametric restriction on the population distribution of preferences.

Our assumption for identification of preferences is that the $\epsilon_{i1}, \ldots, \epsilon_{iJ}$ job specific terms are i.i.d. and independent of the job attributes X_1, \ldots, X_J . This is implied by the experimental design: respondents are instructed that the jobs vary only in the listed characteristics, and are otherwise identical. Under this assumption then the hypothetical data p_{i1}, \ldots, p_{iJ} identifies the preference ranking for individual *i* over all jobs *J* in the choice set: For any two jobs *j* and *j'*, the characteristics vector X_j is preferred to that of $X_{j'}$ if the probability of choosing that job is higher than that for job *j'*, $p_{ij} > p_{ij'}$.

Our identification concept is that each scenario approximates a multi-dimensional offer function from which a worker can choose the optimal bundle of job attributes. If this offer function were complete (that is, a continuum of choices rather than three job options in each scenario), the worker would choose the point that is tangent to their indifference curve. Rosen (1984) argues that worker preferences can then be identified if the offer curve shifts, forcing workers to re-optimize in a frictionless labor market, and tracing out the worker's indifference curve. This is effectively what happens when respondents are presented with another job choice scenario (another set of jobs to choose from) in our survey. The key

¹⁵This distinguishes our design from "audit" based studies in which employers are presented with resumes which are otherwise identical except for the one chosen attribute (say the gender of applicant). The criticism of audit studies is that even if you make two groups (say men and women) identical on observables, employers might have very different distributions in mind about unobservables for the two groups, biasing the inference (for an analysis of this issue, see Neumark, Burn, and Button, 2015). In our case, students are instructed that the hypothetical jobs are identical in all other ways. Students may have different preferences for these job attributes, but we can identify this heterogeneity flexibly using our rich panel data.

simplification relative to the Rosen case is that our choice set is discrete, so we can instead think of preferences as being identified by a set of job preference inequalities. This is an important improvement relative to identification using observed job choices because there is information in our data on *rejected* job opportunities which is not typically available in real labor-market settings.¹⁶ This rejected offer information provides both lower and upper bounds on preferences in a discrete choice setting, which can point-identify preferences non-parametrically under the assumption of full support of the variation.

In practice, we of course have a only finite number of job scenarios and cannot in reality vary job offers to saturate the full support of the job characteristics. As in the literature examining identification of these models using observed choices (see Fox et al., 2012, for a recent review), some support condition or restriction on preferences is therefore necessary. As described below, we assume preferences take a parametric form, $u_i = X'_i\beta_i$, but allow the β_i parameters to be freely varying in the population. This allows for the distribution of preference parameters β_i to be completely unrestricted *across* individuals; thereby we avoid making assumptions about the population distribution of preferences (such as assuming preferences β_i are Normally distributed). In the estimation, we use this identification result constructively and simply estimate preferences for each sample respondent one-by-one. We then use the sample distribution of preferences as the sample estimator of the population distribution of preferences. Therefore, we allow the distribution of preferences to take any form. Details on estimation are provided next.

5 Estimates of Preferences for Job Characteristics

5.1 Variation in Choice Probabilities

Identification relies on variation in probabilities that respondents assign to the various jobs in the hypothetical scenarios. We next present some evidence on this, which should allow the reader to become familiar with the sources of identifying variation. The top panel of Table 4 shows two examples from the data sample using the first set of hypothetical scenarios. Recall that each of these 8 scenarios included 3 different job offers, which differed according to the characteristics shown in the table. The last two columns of the table show the mean

¹⁶In an innovative related approach, Stern (2004) collects data on job offers and accepted jobs from a sample of PhD biologists to estimate the willingness-to-pay to take a research job over others. However, the limited data on job offers does not allow for identification of heterogeneity in preferences. In addition, this approach only yields unbiased preference estimates in frictionless labor markets.

probability assigned by each gender to the jobs.

Turning to the first example, we see that, for males, Job 3 is the most preferred job in our sample (that is, it received the highest average probability). Job 3 is the job without part-time availability and the highest earnings growth. For females, on the other hand, this job received the lowest average probability. Women assigned the highest probability, on average, to Job 2, the job with a part-time option and an intermediate number of work hours per week and intermediate earnings. In this example, the distribution of choices differs significantly by gender. The gender-specific distributions of average probabilities do not differ in the second example.

Panel B of Table 4 shows two examples from the second set of hypothetical scenarios, which vary a different set of attributes. In the first example, the distribution of average probabilities again differs by gender. For females, Job 1 receives the highest probability on average (37 percent). Job 1 is the job with the lowest probability of being fired, and the lowest proportion of men as colleagues. Male respondents, on the other hand, assign the highest average probability to Job 3, the job with the highest earnings and proportion of men, but with a high likelihood of being fired.

Another notable aspect of Table 4 is the large standard deviation in elicited choice probabilities, reflective of substantial heterogeneity in choices, even within gender. Figure 1 shows the histogram of elicited percent chance responses for Job 1, pooled across the 16 hypothetical scenarios. Several things are of note. First, responses tend to be multiples of 10 or 5, a common feature of probabilistic belief data (Manski, 2004), reflecting a likely rounding bias; this is something that we return to below. Second, while there is pooling at multiples of 5, there is little evidence of excessive heaping at the standard focal responses of 0, 50, and 100. The most prevalent response is 20 percent, but even that receives a response frequency of only 0.11. Third, most respondents (87.5 percent) report values in the interior (that is, not 0 or 100), reflecting a belief that there is some chance they might choose each of the jobs. This underscores the importance of eliciting probabilistic data, rather than simply the most preferred option, as respondents are able to provide meaningful probabilistic preferences for the full set of choices.

5.2 Empirical Model of Job Preferences

Next, we discuss our empirical model of job preferences, which we estimate using our hypothetical data. Our estimator here follows the identification analysis we laid out above. For the job preferences over attributes, we use the form $u_i(X) = X'\beta_i$, where $\beta_i = [\beta_{i1}, \ldots, \beta_{iK}]$ is a K dimensional vector which reflects the individual *i*'s preferences for each of the K job characteristics. The X vector of job characteristics is described below and we consider several different functional forms. We assume beliefs about future job utility $H_i(\cdot)$ in equation (4) are i.i.d. Type I extreme value for all individuals. The probability of choosing each job is then:

$$p_{ij} = \frac{\exp(X'_j \beta_i)}{\sum_{j'=1}^J \exp(X'_{j'} \beta_i)},\tag{5}$$

where it is important to note that the probabilities assigned to each job j are individual i specific.¹⁷ While we maintain a particular assumption about the distribution of probabilistic beliefs, we place no parametric restrictions on the distribution of preferences, represented by the vector β_i . Our goal is to estimate the population distribution of preferences β_i . We maintain a maximum degree of flexibility by estimating the preference vector β_i separately for each sample member, and do not impose any "global" distributional assumptions about the population distribution of preferences (e.g., that preferences $\beta_i \sim N(\mu, \Sigma)$).

Applying the log-odds transformation to equation (5) yields the linear model:

$$\ln(\frac{p_{ij}}{p_{ij'}}) = (X_j - X_{j'})'\beta_i.$$

 β_i has the interpretation of the marginal change in the log odds for some level difference in the X characteristics of the job. Given the difficulty of interpreting the β_i preference parameters directly, we also present results in which we compute individual-level willingness-to-pay statistics.

5.3 Measurement Error

One potential issue in using hypothetical data for estimating preferences is that individuals may report their preferences with error. Given that these preferences have no objective counterpart (we cannot ascertain the "accuracy" of a self-reported preference), we cannot point to definitive evidence on the extent of measurement error. The most apparent potential measurement issue is that individuals report rounded versions of their underlying preferences (rounded to units of 5 or 10 percent). To guard against the potential of rounding bias or other sources of measurement error, we follow Blass et al. (2010) in introducing measurement error to the model and in flexibly estimating the model using a least absolute deviations (LAD)

¹⁷Note that utilities across alternatives are correlated through the shared job attributes, therefore the independence of irrelevant alternatives problem does not apply to our model.

estimator.

We assume that the actual reports of job choice probabilities in our data, denoted \tilde{p}_{ij} , measure the "true" probabilities p_{ij} with error. The measurement error takes a linear in logs form such that the reported log-odds take the following form:

$$\ln(\frac{\tilde{p}_{ij}}{\tilde{p}_{ij'}}) = (X_j - X_{j'})\beta_i + \omega_{ij},$$
(6)

where ω_{ij} is the measurement error. We assume that the $\omega_{i1}, \ldots, \omega_{iJ}$ have median zero, conditional on the X_1, \ldots, X_J observed job characteristics. Given these measurement error assumptions, we have the following median restriction:

$$M\left[\ln(\frac{\tilde{p}_{ij}}{\tilde{p}_{ij'}})|X_j, X_{j'}\right] = (X_j - X_{j'})\beta_i,\tag{7}$$

where $M[\cdot]$ is the median operator. This median restriction forms the basis for our estimator. Our measurement error assumptions are limited compared to commonly imposed fully parametric models which assume a full distribution for the measurement error process. In contrast, our assumption is that the measurement errors are only median unbiased.¹⁸

5.4 Estimation

We estimate the K dimensional vector β_i by Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) for each student *i* separately. In our data, each student makes choices across 16 scenarios, assigning probabilities to 3 possible jobs in each scenario. Equation (7) therefore is estimated for each respondent using 16 x 2 = 32 unique observations. Variation in the job attributes (X's), which is manipulated exogenously by us, and variation in respondents' choice probabilities allows us to identify the parameter vector β_i . From the full set of estimates of β_1, \ldots, β_N for our size N sample we estimate population statistics, such as mean preferences, $E(\beta_i)$. We conduct inference on the population statistics using block or cluster bootstrap by re-sampling (with replacement) the entire set of job hypothetical probabilities for each student. The block bootstrap preserves the dependence structure within each respondent's block of responses, and allows for within-individual correlation across job-choice scenarios.

As discussed in the study design section, we varied 4 job attributes at a time in each

¹⁸Note we do not impose that ω_{ij} measurement errors are independent across individuals or jobs and do not assume any particular joint distribution for the measurement errors, beyond the conditional median independence with the X variables. For inference, we use a cluster bootstrap method, re-sampling the entire set of job scenarios for each sample member, to preserve any correlation in residual errors.

scenario. For estimation, we combine all of these scenarios and assume the dimensions that were not varied in a given scenario were believed by the respondent to be held constant, as we instructed. As mentioned earlier, we instruct respondents that the jobs differ only in the finite number of job characteristics we provide, and are otherwise identical. There is no additional information here that the respondent could use to believe otherwise. The vector of job attributes is as follows: $X = \{\log age 30 \text{ earnings}; \text{ probability of being fired}; \text{ bonus as a proportion of earnings}; proportion of males in similar positions; annual increase in earnings; hours per week of work; availability of part-time \}.¹⁹ We also include job number dummies in equation (7) to allow for the possibility that the ordering of the jobs presented could affect job preferences, although there is no prior reason to suspect this given our experimental design.²⁰$

5.5 Job Preference Estimates

We first discuss the sign and statistical significance level of the β_i estimates. Because of the difficulty of interpreting the magnitude of these estimates, below we also present results in which we convert the parameter estimates into an individual-level willingness-to-pay measure.

The first column of Table 5 shows the average estimate for each job characteristic (averaged across all individual-level estimates). The standard errors in parentheses are derived from a block bootstrap procedure. We see that the average estimates have the expected signs: estimates for the probability of being fired and work hours per week are negative, while the others are positive. The positive estimates indicate that individuals, on average, prefer jobs with these characteristics: individuals prefer higher salaries and work-time flexibility, and dislike jobs with a high probability of being fired and high numbers of work hours. The only estimate that is not statistically or economically significant is the proportion of males at the job, indicating that we cannot reject that, on average, individuals are indifferent to the gender composition of the workplace. Turning to the average estimates by gender, reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5, we see similar qualitative patterns. We return to the differences in magnitudes of the preferences by gender below, and also provide a willingness-to-pay interpretation.

An advantage of our approach is that we can identify the β_i vector without a parametric

¹⁹We also estimate the model with the utility specified as linear in earnings (instead of log earnings). Results are qualitatively similar. Later in this section, we also discuss results from alternative specifications.

²⁰This is related to the possibility of "session effects" in laboratory experiments. See Frechette (2012).

restriction on the population distribution of preferences. This allows us to flexibly estimate the distribution of population preferences. Table 6 shows various statistics of the estimated distribution of preferences. For brevity, the table does not present the bootstrap standard errors, but the precision of the estimates, derived from the bootstrap procedure, is denoted by asterisks.

There is substantial heterogeneity in preferences within gender. Take, for example, the probability of being fired. The median and 25th percentile of the individual-specific estimates is negative, indicating a distaste for a higher likelihood of job dismissal, and is statistically different from zero for both males and females. The 75th percentile is negative for both genders, but only statistically significant for females, indicative of a greater distaste for job instability among female respondents. Underscoring the heterogeneity in preferences, we see that the standard deviation of the estimates of preferences, for all job characteristics, are sizable and statistically different from zero. Notably, we also see that the skewness of the estimates is sizable and statistically different from zero in all cases (except for proportion of males at jobs, where preferences seem to be symmetric around zero). This indicates that we can reject that the individual parameter estimates are distributed Normal, as is commonly assumed when estimating heterogeneous preferences using standard revealed choice data, is not supported in this sample.

5.6 Willingness-to-Pay (WTP)

The parameter estimates in Table 5 are difficult to interpret given the necessarily non-linear nature of the model. To ease interpretation, we next present willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates, by translating the differences of utility levels into earnings that would make the student indifferent between giving up earnings and experiencing the outcome considered.

5.6.1 Computing Willingness-to-Pay

Willingness-to-pay (WTP) to experience job attribute X_k is constructed as follows. Consider a change in the level of attribute X_k from value $X_k = x_k$ to $X_k = x_k + \Delta$, with $\Delta > 0$. Assume X_k is a "bad" attribute. Given our linear utility function, we can write an indifference condition in terms of earnings Y as:

$$x_k\beta_{ik} + \beta_{i1}\ln(Y) = \beta_{ik}(x_k + \Delta) + \beta_{i1}\ln(Y + \mathsf{WTP}_{ik}(\Delta)),$$

where Y is the level of earnings, one of the job attributes included in every job scenario. WTP_{ik}(Δ) > 0 is individual *i*'s willingness-to-pay to avoid increasing the "bad" attribute k by Δ . Solving, WTP is given by:

$$WTP_{ik}(\Delta) = \left[\exp\left(\frac{-\beta_{ik}}{\beta_{i1}}\Delta\right) - 1\right] \times Y.$$
(8)

WTP for individual *i* depends on her preference for the attribute β_{ik} versus her preference for earnings β_{i1} . Given that we allow for a log form to utility in earnings (allowing for diminishing marginal utility in earnings and implicitly consumption), willingness-to-pay for an individual also depends on the level of earnings.

5.6.2 Willingness-to-Pay by Gender

Table 7 shows the average and median WTP estimates for changing each of the job characteristics by one unit (for the probabilistic outcomes, this is increasing the likelihood by 1 percentage point; for hours per week, increasing it by an hour; for part-time availability, this is going from a job with no part-time option to one which does).²¹ The first three columns of the table present the estimates in dollars, evaluating WTP at the average annual earnings across all scenarios, \$75,854 (fixed by the experimental setup and does not vary across respondents). The last three columns show the estimates as a proportion of the average earnings. We focus on the latter here.

We estimate, for example, that increasing the likelihood of being fired by 1 percentage point, that is, $X_k = x_k + 1$, would yield an average WTP of 2.8% for the full sample. That is, for students to remain indifferent, students on average would have to be compensated by 2.8% of annual earnings if job stability were to be decreased. The gender-specific averages, reported in the last two columns of Table 7, paint a very interesting picture. Women, on average, have to be compensated by 4% of average earnings for a unit increase in the likelihood of being fired, with the estimate being statistically significant at the 1% level and statistically different from the much smaller male average of 0.6%. Recall that we fix average earnings at the same level for all respondents, so the gender differences in WTP reflect only differences in preferences, not earnings. The median estimates also differ by gender, with females exhibiting a higher WTP for job stability. The median estimate for females is, however, lower than the average estimate, suggestive of a skewed distribution.

²¹The WTP is computed for each individual, using the individual-specific β_i estimates. The table reports the mean WTP across respondents, with bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, and the median WTP.

The average and median WTP estimate for the availability of the part-time option is sizable. Individuals, on average, would have to be compensated by 5.1% of their annual salary (that is, they are willing to give up 5.1%) when going from a job with no part-time option to one that does. The estimate is driven by the female respondents in the sample, for whom the average WTP is -7.3%, versus -1.0% for males (with the male estimate not being statistically different from zero). The much higher average preference among women for the part-time option is statistically significant from zero and statistically different from the male average, at the 5 percent level. The median estimate also differs by gender and is larger in magnitude for females.

Looking at the other estimates, we see that the average WTP for annual earnings growth is statistically precise for males, who are willing to give up 3.4% of average annual earnings for a 1 percentage point increase in earnings growth; the female average coefficient is indistinguishable from zero (although not statistically different from the male estimate). The median estimates for the two genders are similar. We see that women have a stronger distaste for the number of hours of work, with the average WTP indicating that they need to be compensated by 1.3% of annual earnings for an increase of 1 hour in the work week; the male estimate is not precise (but we cannot reject the two gender-specific averages being equal). Both genders are, on average, willing to give up 0.8-1.7% of annual earnings for a percentage point increase in bonus compensation (in addition to base salary).²² Finally, the average WTP for proportion of men at jobs is economically and statistically insignificant.

5.6.3 Heterogeneity in Willingness-to-Pay

Table 7 reports the average WTPs only. As seen in Table 6, there is substantial heterogeneity in preferences for workplace characteristics, and overlap in the male and female distributions of preferences.

The job scenarios provided to respondents are incomplete scenarios, that is, respondents are given only a subset of the information about themselves they would have in actual choice settings. Differences in estimated preferences then may reflect true underlying heterogeneity in preferences, or may be driven in part by differences in how students think about the unspecified dimensions when answering these questions. For example, our finding that male

²²That the WTP for a percentage point increase in bonus is greater than 1 in magnitude for females is surprising, since it implies that women are on average willing to give up more in base salary to gain a smaller increase in bonus compensation. This is driven by a few outliers. In fact, we cannot reject that the mean WTP for women is different from either -1 (that is, a one-to-one substitution between base pay and bonus pay), or from the mean of -0.8 for male respondents.

respondents on average have a higher WTP for earnings growth may be a result of males assigning a higher value to earnings growth over the lifecycle, or females expecting a shorter tenure at the jobs than men. Likewise, an individual may be uncertain about the number of children she may have at a future date, and the number of young children at home may affect her preference for workplace flexibility. Similarly cognitive biases such as the exponential growth bias (Stango and Zinman, 2009) may lead certain respondents to underestimate the implications of a given earnings growth rate for earnings over the lifecycle. It is important to note that these cross-sectional differences in processing of information or in perceptions regarding the unspecified dimensions have implications for understanding the heterogeneity in the estimated preferences; the process of preference estimation itself is not biased by this heterogeneity since the estimation uses the panel of choices to produce estimates for each individual separately. We next investigate how the WTPs are associated with various individual-level characteristics.²³

Table 8 shows the average WTP for these attributes (expressed as a percentage of average earnings) for various sub-samples. Parents' income and race seem to be the only demographic variables that are systematically related to the heterogeneity in WTP. We see that students from households with below sample median income (in our sample, \$87,500) are more sensitive to workplace characteristics: their average WTP for job stability (probability of being fired), work hours, and part-time availability is significantly larger than that of their counterparts.²⁴ Nonwhite students are also more sensitive to certain workplace characteristics, in particular those related to work flexibility (work hours per week and part-time availability) and work stability.

Notably, student ability (as measured by SAT scores) is not systematically related to the average WTPs, as would have been the case if differences in preferences were driven by differences in respondent ability to comprehend the scenarios. We see some evidence of sorting into majors based on job preferences: students who assign a likelihood of 50 percent or less to majoring in Economics/Business (74% of the sample), on average, value job flex-ibility (part-time availability and work hours) and job stability more than their counterparts;

²³An alternative is to make the scenario more complete by specifying the job conditional on a number of characteristics, such as tenure at the job and the individual's household structure (number of children, etc.). There is a trade-off– by making the situation more specific and stylized, the scenario may become unrealistic from the individual's perspective.

²⁴To the extent that the student's wealth is increasing in their parent's income, one would expect a lower willingness-to-pay for non-pecuniary aspects of a job for lower-income students (as the marginal utility of labor earnings is higher for low-wealth households). We see the opposite pattern here. One hypothesis consistent with our empirical finding is that students with lower-income parents expect less parental support (to provide childcare, for example) and therefore have a higher willingness-to-pay for job hours flexibility.

however, only the difference in WTP for work hours is statistically different. We return to the importance of job characteristics to major choice below in a more systematic analysis incorporating all of the data on perceived major-specific attributes.

We also examine whether preferences for workplace characteristics differ by the student's expected future household composition (whether they expect to be married and their expected number of children) and labor supply. Notably, the likelihood of being married by age 30 and the expected number of children by age 30 – data that we collect directly from respondents – are not significant correlates of the willingness-to-pay; that is the case even when we look within gender.²⁵ Respondents who assign a higher likelihood (80 percent or more) to working full-time at age 30, on average, value earnings growth at the job more (and part-time availability less) than their counterparts: for example, they are willing to give up 3.3% of age 30 earnings for a percentage point increase in earnings growth versus an average of 0.1% for their counterparts (difference statistically significant at the 10% level).

To understand the extent to which these individual-level correlates drive the underlying heterogeneity in WTP, Appendix Table A2 conducts multivariate linear regressions of the WTP onto these covariates. The R-squared of these regressions indicate that less than 10% of the variation in the WTP can be explained by these individual correlates. Even after including these controls, the gender difference in the WTP for part-time availability and probability of being fired continues to be significant. WTP for non-pecuniary job attributes, while quantitatively meaningful and displaying a distinct gender difference, is not well explained by standard demographic variables (other than gender). Overall, this suggests that these types of preferences are difficult to "control for" by simply conditioning on these types of variables. In addition, the fact that observables explain a small part of the variation in the WTPs suggests that the heterogeneity in preferences is largely a result of true underlying variation in preferences, and not driven by differences across individuals in how they answer and perceive these hypothetical scenarios. In the next section, using data on actual workplace characteristics for a subset of our respondents, we present further evidence on this.

²⁵We do not find any systematic differences in WTP on the extensive margin of expected fertility either (that is, when we cut the sample by having a non-zero probability of having children, instead of by expected number of children, as we do in the table).

5.7 Estimated Preferences and Actual Workplace Characteristics

Do the pre-labor market preferences we estimate relate to the actual characteristics of jobs these students actually end up working in?²⁶ We are able to shed light on this issue through a recent follow-up survey of a subset of our respondents conducted in 2016, about 4 years after the original data collection and when respondents were on average aged 25. Of the 247 respondents who took the survey and answered the hypothetical questions, 115 had also participated in an earlier survey conducted by us in 2010 (data that we have analyzed in Wiswall and Zafar, 2015a, b) and given consent for future surveys. In January 2016, we invited these 115 respondents to participate in a short 15-minute online survey about their current labor market status. 70 of the eligible 115 respondents (~61%) completed the follow-up survey.²⁷

The follow-up survey collected information about respondents' workplace characteristics (for those currently working). Of the 70 respondents, 59 were working (either full-time, part-time, or self-employed) at the time of the follow-up survey, with the remainder enrolled in school. Appendix Table A4 shows the earnings and various other workplace characteristics for the overall sample, as well as for male and female workers, separately. Earnings, conditional on working full-time, are higher for males (by nearly \$70,000). Bonus, hours of work, likelihood of being fired, fraction of male employees, and typical annual growth in earnings are all higher for our male respondents (though not all of the differences are statistically significant). The last row of the table shows that females' workplaces are more likely to have a part-time or flexible work option.²⁸

²⁶While being able to document a systematic relationship can provide some credibility to our methodology, on the other hand, a failure to find a systematic relationship between the two would not necessarily invalidate our method since students' preferences for jobs may change over time, or labor market frictions may prevent workers from matching with jobs that they prefer. Answering this question most directly would require both revealed choice data that is free of any confounds and stated choice data– data that are usually not available. However, the little evidence that exists shows a close correspondence between preferences recovered from the two approaches (see Hainmuleller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto, 2015).

²⁷Respondents were initially contacted through the email addresses. Those with inactive email addresses were then approached through LinkedIn. Respondents received a link to the survey that was programmed in SurveyMonkey, and were compensated for completing the survey.

As shown in Appendix Table A3, there is little evidence of selection on observables (reported in 2012) in terms of who participates in the follow-up survey. Based on a joint F-test, we cannot reject that the covariates are jointly zero (p-value = .332). Note that for students to have taken both the 2010 and 2012 surveys, the sample from which we have consent would have had to be in the junior year or higher in 2012.

²⁸Appendix Table A5 shows that the sample for which we have consent, the sample that takes the follow-up survey, and the sample that was working when the follow-up survey was conducted are all very similar to the full sample. The only dimensions along which they differ are school year and age (which, as explained above, is by construction) and race. Importantly, there are no statistical differences along the dimensions of gender, major, ability, or socioeconomic background. Also note that the follow-up samples, in columns (3) and (4), are

Are these systematic gender differences in actual workplace characteristics consistent with our estimates of job preferences elicited several years prior, before labor market entry? To investigate this, we regress characteristics of each respondent's current job onto our individual-specific estimate of their past WTP for that attribute. WTP is defined as the amount the individual needs to be compensated by for a unit change in a given characteristic, with a higher WTP reflecting a lower taste (or greater distaste) for that outcome. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between WTP and the job characteristic. Estimates are presented in Table 9. Directionally, all six estimates are negative, with three significant at the 5% level or higher. A joint test that all coefficients are zero can be rejected (the p-value of this joint test is less than 0.001).

To interpret the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in Table 9, we also report "effect sizes" in the table. The effect size gives us the estimated change in the dependent variable (that is, the actual workplace attribute) for a one standard deviation change in the WTP for that workplace characteristic. For example, we see that a one standard deviation increase in the WTP (that is, higher distaste) for work hours translates into an estimated decrease of 4.1 in hours worked. Given that the standard deviation of hours worked is 14.8 in the sample, this is a sizable impact. Likewise, a one standard deviation increase in the WTP (that is, lower taste) for availability of flexible work options is associated with a 15 percentage point decline in the actual availability of these options in the respondent's workplace (on a base of 61). The effect sizes for bonus percentage and proportion of male are also economically meaningful.

While we have shown that estimated preferences for attributes are jointly systematically related to actual future workplace characteristics in the cross-section, a natural question to ask is if the relationship also holds within-individual, that is, whether a higher WTP for a given attribute translates into more of that attribute for an individual. For each attribute, we rank the 59 individuals in terms of both the estimated WTP and the actual value at the job. This gives us a six-dimensional vector of ranked WTPs and a six-dimensional vector of ranked attribute values for each individual. We then compute the individual-level correlation between the two vectors. We expect a negative correlation if a higher WTP (that is, a lower taste or a greater distaste) for an attribute translates into more of that attribute. That is exactly what we find: the mean correlation coefficient across the individuals is -0.158 (significant with a p-value = 0.017) and the median correlation coefficient is -0.250 (p-value = 0.036), indicative of a systematic relationship between estimated WTPs and actual attributes even

not statistically different from the consent sample along any dimension.

within individuals.

Overall, these results strongly indicate that our estimated preferences capture true underlying heterogeneity that is also reflected in actual job outcomes several years later. We view these results as a joint validation of our methodology, data quality, and empirical specification. Our finding that estimated WTPs predict respondents' actual workplace choices is all the more remarkable given that the hypothetical scenarios were fielded to respondents when they were still in college. This suggests that individuals have well-developed preferences for workplace characteristics even before they enter the workforce. In the next section, we will investigate whether these workplace preferences impact major choice.

5.8 Robustness Checks

The utility from jobs, specified in equation (1), is linear and separable in outcomes. We check the robustness of our conclusions by estimating variants of the baseline model. Appendix B outlines the different models that we estimate. These include a model where earnings grow at an exponential growth rate; the model includes an interaction of earnings and earnings growth. We also estimate a model where the value of part-time flexibility is allowed to depend on the number of work hours at the job. In general, the median WTP estimates that we obtain are qualitatively similar to our baseline results.

6 Perceptions of Future Employment Opportunities

The preceding section used a robust hypothetical choice methodology to estimate individuallevel preferences for various job attributes. In particular, the estimates reveal important heterogeneity in preferences, with a substantial mass of individuals having a large willingnessto-pay in foregone earnings for non-pecuniary characteristics such as a low probability of job dismissal and work-time flexibility. We next turn to understanding how students *believe* their human capital investment – choice of college major – will affect the availability of being offered jobs with these attributes. To the extent that students believe that jobs with various attributes (earnings, dismissal probability, work-time flexibility, etc.) would be offered to them at rates irrespective of which major they complete, then the preferences for job attributes would have no relevance to major choice.

To provide some direct evidence on this issue, our survey collected data from respondents on their perceptions of characteristics of the jobs that would likely be offered to them *if* they were to complete each type of major. An important characteristic of our dataset is that we gather students' beliefs about workplace characteristics (such as likelihood of being fired and earnings) for a set of different majors, and not just for the one major they intend to complete. Because of survey time constraints, we aggregated the various college majors to 5 groups: 1) Business and Economics, 2) Engineering and Computer Science, 3) Humanities and Other Social Sciences, 4) Natural Sciences and Math, and 5) Never Graduate/Drop Out.²⁹

Descriptive statistics for these job attributes questions are shown in Table 10. The top and bottom panels show the statistics for the male and female respondents, respectively. The questions on perceived job attributes instructed the respondents to think ahead about the future labor market when they are 30 years old and take into account any advanced degrees (beyond their undergraduate major) they might complete.

6.1 Earnings Beliefs

We start with student beliefs about the future earnings they would receive after completing each major. Age 30 earnings beliefs were elicited as follows: "*If you received a Bachelor's degree in each of the following major categories and you were working FULL TIME when you are 30 years old, what do you believe is the average amount that you would earn per year?*". The second column of Table 10 shows that both genders expect average earnings to be the highest in Economics/Business, followed by Engineering, and then Natural Sciences. Humanities are expected to have the lowest average earnings among the graduating majors, with the average earnings expected to be less than two-thirds of the average conditional on graduating in Economics. The mean beliefs reported by males are significantly higher than those reported for females for each of the five fields. The large standard deviations indicate there is considerable heterogeneity in beliefs.

We also elicited perceptions about earnings growth.³⁰ Column (3) shows the perceived earnings growth at the jobs. While there is no clear trend, we reject the null hypothesis that the perceived average growth is the same across the five majors (as shown by the p-value of the F-test in the last row of each panel).

²⁹We provided the respondents a link where they could see a detailed listing of college majors (taken from various NYU sources), which described how each of the NYU college majors maps into our aggregate major categories.

³⁰Perceived earnings growth is derived from the age 30 and age 45 full-time expected earnings, assuming a constant growth rate.

6.2 Non-Pecuniary Characteristics Beliefs

We also elicited the students beliefs about the perceived non-pecuniary characteristics of the jobs they would be offered if they completed various majors. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 10 describe two measures of the perceived "competitiveness" of the jobs. Similar to the earnings question above, respondents were asked: (1) the probability of being fired, and (2) bonus pay based on relative performance, as percent of annual base pay, for job offers they expect to receive at age 30 conditional on college major. We see that, among graduating majors, both male and female students expect jobs in Economics/Business to generally be the most "competitive"- it is the major category with the highest perceived average ratio of bonus pay and probability of being fired. Engineering jobs are, on average, perceived to be closer to those in Economics/Business, along the dimension of bonus pay. Jobs in Humanities are perceived to be the least competitive according to the ratio of bonus pay, while jobs in Natural Sciences are considered to have the lowest probability of being fired. Column (6) reports beliefs about the fraction of male employees; both males and females expect the proportion of males to be highest at jobs in Economics/Business and Engineering, and lowest at jobs in Humanities.

Turning to perceptions of workplace flexibility, columns (7)-(8) of Table 10 show that, among graduating majors, jobs in Humanities are on average perceived by both male and female respondents to have the lowest hours and highest workplace flexibility (that is, part-time availability). Economics/Business is perceived to be the most demanding in terms of work hours and lack of work flexibility, followed by Engineering. Jobs in Natural Sciences are perceived to be in between. The difference in perceived part-time opportunities by major choice is large. For example, on average, women perceive that the likelihood they would be offered a job with a part-time work option is nearly 45 percent if they graduate with a Humanities degree, but only about 29 percent if they graduate with an Economics/Business degree.

There is also substantial heterogeneity in these beliefs as reflected by the large standard deviations. Figure 2 shows the distribution of female respondents' beliefs regarding the likelihood of part-time availability in jobs conditional on graduating in Humanities and in Economics/Business. We see there is substantial variation in beliefs across individuals, as well as across majors. In addition, the beliefs distribution conditional on Humanities first order stochastically dominates the distribution conditional on Economics. For example, nearly 60 percent of the female students assign a probability of more than 40% to the likelihood of part-time availability conditional on graduating in Humanities. On the other hand, less than

a quarter of students assign a probability of more than 40% to this outcome in the case of jobs in Economics.

The patterns in Table 10 show clearly that both males and females perceive that they will be offered very different jobs conditional on their college major choice. For each attribute in the table, we reject the equality of mean beliefs being the same across majors, for the two genders. Comparing the two panels, we see that male and female respondents generally have similar relative beliefs regarding the attributes conditional on major, but the levels are quite different in several cases. For example, females assign a higher probability of being fired and a higher likelihood of part-time availability for all majors, compared to their male counterparts.

6.3 "Accuracy" of Perceptions

One might wonder about the accuracy of these expectations about future job offers. We cannot speak to that directly because, by construction, these outcomes would be realized only in the future and, importantly, would be observed only for the one chosen major. We have, however, provided strongly suggestive evidence from a follow-up survey of our respondents (discussed above), which shows that current job characteristics are correlated with elicited job preferences prior to labor market entry. In addition, a comparison of students' perceptions in Table 10 with realizations of current workers (in Table 2) indicates that, on average, the students' relative ranking of majors in terms of perceived workplace characteristics, particularly job hours, earnings, and work flexibility are consistent with the realized job data from the ACS, suggesting that these beliefs are in some sense reasonable.³¹

³¹A comparison of students' expected job attributes conditional on college major with those of current college-graduate workers may not be very informative for several reasons: (1) our sample consists of high ability students at a selective private university, and the ACS sample may not be the correct reference group; (2) students may have private information about themselves that may justify having perceptions that differ from current realizations; or (3) the distribution of realizations may not be stationary, and so future outcomes may differ from past realizations. It is important to note that it is the *expected* job attributes, as perceived by the respondent at the time of choosing a college major, which matter in the choice decision. Whether these perceptions are biased is then not directly relevant from the perspective of understanding the decision. Systematic biases in expectations do, however, imply a policy case for information interventions, something that is not the subject of the current study (interested readers should look at Wiswall and Zafar, 2015a, and references therein).

6.4 Potential Sources of Different Workplace Attributes Perceptions

A natural question that arises is where do the differences in perceptions of job offers conditional on major come from. One plausible explanation is that students perceive a close connection between majors and particular industries. Given that industries seem to differ significantly in their workplace characteristics (as shown in Table 1), this would then result in different perceptions of job attributes conditional on major. In a separate set of questions, we also asked our respondents: "What do you believe is the percent chance that you would be working in the following [Science/Technology; Health; Business; Government/Non-profit; Education] at age 30 if you received a Bachelor's degree in each of the following?"

Appendix Table A7 shows the beliefs of working in each sector conditional on major, by gender. Several findings are of note. One, the average perceived probability of entering the different sectors varies substantially by college major (the p-values reported in the last row of the table reject the equality of the average likelihood of being in a given sector across the majors). Second, certain majors seem to be more closely tied to certain sectors: for example, the perceived probability of working in Business (Science) exceeds 50 percent, conditional on graduating in Economics (Engineering). Third, it is certainly not the case that there is a one-to-one mapping of majors to sectors. None of the majors are concentrated in one or two sectors. The mean probability exceeds 5 percent for all sectors, for each of the majors. Fourth, there is little systematic difference by gender in the perceived mapping of majors to sectors. Arcidiacono et al. (2015), in their survey of Duke undergraduate students, find similar patterns regarding the perceived mapping of majors to occupations. And, finally, there is substantial dispersion across students in the perceived mapping, as reflected by the large standard deviations. Thus, it seems that the different mapping of majors to workplace characteristics that we documented in Table 10 is driven, at least in part, by students' perceived link between majors and sector of work.

7 Job Preferences and Major Choice

The preceding sections used a robust hypothetical choice methodology to estimate individuallevel preferences for various job attributes and analyzed data on student perceptions of the likelihood of being offered jobs with these characteristics given their major choice. This section relates these preferences and perceptions to human capital investments, quantifying the importance of job characteristics to college major choices.

First, to set the stage for this analysis, we describe the anticipated major choices re-

ported by our sample. Given our sample consisted of currently enrolled students, we asked the students to provide their beliefs they would complete a degree in 1 of the 5 major categories. The first column of Table 10 shows the response to the question: "*What do you believe is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that you would either graduate from NYU with a PRIMARY major in the following major categories or that you would never graduate/dropout (i.e., you will never receive a Bachelor's degree from NYU or any other university*)?" The most likely major for males is Economics/Business (43 percent), followed by Humanities/Social Sciences (29 percent). For females, on the other hand, the most likely major is Humanities/Social Sciences (53 percent), followed by Economics (23 percent). The probability of not graduating is less than 3 percent for both genders. The average probabilities assigned to the majors differ significantly by gender for all majors except Engineering and Natural Sciences.

We next decompose the choice of major into various factors, including potential job characteristics associated with each major. In order to gauge the importance of job attributes to major choice, we estimate a model of major choice incorporating our flexible estimates of preferences for job attributes, and use this estimated model to quantify the importance of each job attribute.

As described in section 6, students report their expectation for job attributes conditional on each major. We refer to *i*'s perceived job attributes in major *m* as X_{im} . With hopefully minimal confusion, we use the same notation *X* to refer to job attributes as in our hypothetical job choice analysis and to perceptions about job attributes associated with each major. Note that here the *X* vector is indexed by *i* as these attributes are each student's *perception* of the job attributes (that are allowed to depend on the major *m*) rather than the exogenously determined attributes in the hypotheticals we created.

The estimation details for the major choice model are provided in Appendix C. Here, for the sake of brevity, we comment on only its main features. We start with a simple framework in which we suppose that utility for student i from major m is given by:

$$V_{im} = X'_{im}\alpha_i + Z'_{im}\gamma + \kappa_m + \eta_{im},\tag{9}$$

where X_{im} are the job characteristics associated with each major, and Z_{im} is a vector of major-specific characteristics perceived by student *i* (including major-specific perceptions of ability and perceived hours of study needed to obtain a GPA of 4.0 in that major-beliefs that are described in Table 10). κ_m is a major-specific constant, capturing tastes for the major, and η_{im} captures the remaining unobservable attributes of each major.

The student-specific preference for each job attribute is given by the vector $\alpha_i = [\alpha_{i1}, \ldots, \alpha_{iK}]$. α_i , the preference for job characteristics as it relates to the utility from each major, is potentially distinct from the preferences for job characteristics in the job choice problem, given by β_i (in equation 5). Job characteristics, such as earnings at the job, may be quite important when choosing among different job offers, but might have a more limited value to choosing majors, relative to other major characteristics given by Z_{im} , κ_m and η_{im} . To allow for this possibility, for each job characteristic k, we specify that each α_{ik} is proportional to the β_{ik} up to some free (to be estimated) parameter δ : $\alpha_{ik} = \beta_{ik}\delta$. δ indicates the importance of job attributes to major choice, relative to other determinants of college major as given by Z_{im} , κ_m and η_{im} , and can reflect standard discounting given that the utility from working at jobs occurs later in life than utility derived from taking courses while in school.

Table 11 presents the LAD estimates of equation (9) using the hypothetical data to estimate the job preference vector β_i for each student, and a robust cluster bootstrap over all estimation steps for inference (see Appendix C for estimation details). The estimate of δ is positive and precise, indicating that the preferences of students over job attributes and the major-specific beliefs about the distribution of job attributes has a statistically significant relationship with major choices. Estimates on the major-specific ability measures are negative, as one would expect (note that higher "ability rank" denotes lower ability in our data). The major-specific dummy terms are all negative, indicative of negative median tastes for the non-Humanities majors (the omitted category): all else equal, students prefer to major in Humanities.

Given the non-linear nature of the model, it is difficult to assess the importance of job attributes in major choice from the estimated coefficients alone. To quantify the effects, we use standard methods to evaluate "marginal effects" in non-linear models (see Appendix C for details). The marginal effect of a job attribute in major choice is computed for a standard deviation change in the value of that specific job attribute, while keeping the other (job- and major- specific) attributes and preferences fixed at their sample average values.

Table 12 presents the marginal effects for specific changes in job attributes, averaged across the majors, and separately by gender (in the two panels of the table). The table also shows the start and end value for the attribute at which the marginal effect is computed. The start value is the gender-specific belief for that attribute (averaged across majors and respondents), while the end value is the start value shifted by one gender-specific standard deviation (again, across majors and respondents) in the beliefs for that attribute. Column (1), for example, shows that increasing the perceived probability of being fired from jobs

by one standard deviation decreases the likelihood of majoring in that major, on average, by 4% for males and by 5% for females. A standard deviation increase in part-time availability increases the probability of completing a major by 0.2%. Column (3) shows that a standard deviation increase in weekly work hours reduces the likelihood of majoring in a major by 2.5% for males and 1.4% for females. Bonus pay and earnings growth both also have sizable average marginal effects. The last column of Table 12 shows the percent change in the major probability for a standard deviation increase in log age 30 earnings.

A comparison of the effects in the first three columns with those in the last column for earnings (also shown in the last row of each panel) gives a sense of the relative importance of these other job attributes in major choice. We see that, for females, the average effect for the probability of being fired is as large as that for earnings, and for hours is nearly a third of the effect of earnings. For males, the *relative* impacts are smaller (though still sizable). Overall, this indicates that job attributes matter for major choice, and that they are particularly relevant for women's choices.

8 Job Preferences and the Gender Gap in Earnings

In the previous sections, we have shown systematic gender differences in workplace preferences and the importance of these preferences to major choices. In this section, we explore the extent to which gendered job preferences explain the "gender gap" in earnings. Differences in job preferences can give rise to differences in earnings through two channels. First, as explored above, job preferences can affect college major choices, and, given the wide dispersion in earnings across fields, affect the overall distribution of earnings for men and women. Second, even conditional on major choice, gender differences in workplace preferences can affect the distribution of earnings. The gender gap in earnings we observe could be, at least partially, the result of women "purchasing" certain positive job attributes by accepting lower wages, or conversely, men accepting higher earnings to compensate for negative job attributes.

To quantify the first channel (job preferences affecting earnings through major choice), we conduct the following exercise. Using the estimated major choice model in section 7, we predict the likelihood of women choosing different majors *if* their workplace preferences were the same as those of the average male. We then predict the likelihood of each female respondent choosing the different majors, and use these to weight the individual's major-specific expected earnings. This provides the impact on the gender wage gap if women had

the same job preferences as men, but only through the major choice channel. Note that, for this exercise, we keep women's earnings expectations fixed in that major (which could also be impacted by workplace preferences). In this exercise, the change in women's major choices lowers the expected gender gap in age 30 earnings from about 23.8 percent to 22.7 percent, about a 4.6 percent reduction in the expected gender gap. Given our highly aggregated major categories, this is a likely a *lower* bound on the importance of preferences to the gender earnings gap through major choices, and human capital more generally. Previous work has emphasized that important job segregation by gender occurs through choices of sub-fields (see for example, Goldin and Katz, forthcoming, on choice of medical specialties).

Turning to the second channel, we consider the following simple exercise. We ask how the gender gap in expected earnings changes once we "control" for individual-specific workplace preferences (the estimated WTPs in section 5). If the gender gap in earnings is solely because women are accepting lower wages for desirable jobs, and/or men are compensated with higher wages for undesirable jobs, then men and women with *identical* workplace preferences would have equal earnings. If, on the other hand, a gender gap remains, even after conditioning on preferences, then we can conclude that other demand-side factors, such as employment discrimination, play a role in the gender gap.

We implement this exercise using a simple set of regressions. Column (1) of Table 13 reports a regression of an individual's log expected earnings for the major they are most likely to graduate with onto a female dummy. We see a gender gap of about 35% in age 30 expected earnings, a gap similar to that in realized earnings data.³² The second column shows that the gender gap declines to about 20% once the individual's major is controlled for, reflecting the fact that women are less likely to graduate in higher-earnings majors. Columns (3) and (4) show how the gender gap changes once we control for the estimated vector of WTP measures. Importantly, a comparison of column (4) with column (2) shows that, even conditional on major choice, workplace preferences reduce the expected earnings gender gap by about a quarter, from about 20% to 15%. In Appendix Table A8, we repeat the exercise using actual earnings reported by the follow-up respondents. The sample here is smaller, but the qualitative results are strikingly similar to those that we observe for expected earnings: conditional on major, the gender gap in realized earnings declines from 45% to 32% (that is, by nearly 30%) once we control for respondents' workplace preferences.

We conclude from this analysis that gender differences in workplace preferences can explain a sizable part of the gender gap in expected earnings. And, albeit with a smaller

³²In 2014, among college-educated full-time workers, median male earnings are 32 percent higher than female earnings (BLS Reports, November 2015).

sample, our evidence points to similar conclusions for realized earnings as well. We also find that the main channel by which workplace preferences affects the gender earnings gap is through job choices, and not through major choices, at least at the aggregated major level we have available in this dataset.

9 Conclusion

The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, using a novel hypothetical job choice framework that experimentally varies different dimensions of the workplace, we are able to robustly estimate individual preferences for workplace attributes. Second, these workplace preferences, combined with unique data on students' perceptions of the characteristics of jobs which would be offered to them conditional on their major choice, allow us to investigate the role of anticipated future job characteristics – particularly the non-pecuniary aspects of these jobs – in choice of major, a key human capital investment decision.

We document substantial heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay for job amenities, both within and across genders. On average, females have a stronger taste for workplace flexibility (as proxied by work hours and part-time availability) and job stability. Males, on average, have a greater willingness-to-pay for jobs with higher earnings growth.

Using data on perceptions of job offers given college major choices, we find that students perceive systematic differences in attributes of job offers they would receive if they completed different majors. Combining this with information on expected and actual college major choices, we find that job preferences matter in college major choice. Women, in particular, are found to be more sensitive to non-pecuniary job aspects in major choice than men. Our analysis indicates that at least a quarter of the gender gap in earnings – expected as well as actual (for the subsample for which we observe earnings) – can be explained by the systematic gender differences in workplace characteristics. That is, a substantial part of the gender gap in earnings we observe is a compensating differential in which women are willing to give up higher earnings to obtain other job attributes.

On the methodological front, we argue that we are able to produce estimates of individual preferences for various job characteristics, that are unbiased and free from considering the equilibrium job allocation mechanism, the preference of employers, and the concern that jobs may differ along unobservable dimensions (see Blau and Kahn, 2006). In addition, given that we have multiple revealed choices for each participating student, we can use the *panel* structure of the data to construct a preference vector over the attributes student-by-student.

The richness of the experimental data allows us to estimate the distribution of preferences while imposing minimal assumptions on the parametric distribution of preferences.

Importantly, for a subset of the sample for whom we collect data on actual workplace characteristics (nearly four years after the survey), we find a robust systematic relationship between estimated preferences and self-reported actual characteristics. Individuals who are found to be more (less) desiring of specific workplace characteristics in our hypothetical job choice framework are found to in fact be working in jobs that are better (worse) in that dimension. The predictive power of the estimated preferences at the individual level strengthens the credibility of our approach, and makes a case for employing this methodology in other settings to understand decision-making.

In terms of future avenues of research, while we find substantial variation in workplace preferences in our particular sample of high-ability students enrolled at a selective private US college, it is not clear how this heterogeneity compares to that in the broader population. It would clearly be useful to follow our design and collect similar data in other settings. At a more fundamental level, the sources of the systematic gender differences in workplace preferences that we document are unclear. For example, they may be a consequence of social factors including anticipated discrimination (Altonji and Blank, 1999). We cannot therefore claim that these preferences are intrinsic and immutable in the sense that they may be due to, at least in part, to environmental influences particular to this cohort of students. Research that sheds light on the underlying channels would be immensely valuable.

Finally, given that prior literature on educational choice finds that the residual unobserved "taste" component is the dominant factor (Arcidiacono, 2004; Beffy et al., 2001; Gemici and Wiswall, 2014; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015a), our approach can be viewed as trying to get into the black box of tastes by directly incorporating certain non-pecuniary dimensions into choice models. We believe the approach in this paper illustrates the potential of using such methods to understand the determinants of human capital and occupational choice.

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


Figure 1: Choice probabilities for Job 1 (pooled across hypothetical scenarios)




Figure 2: Female respondents' beliefs about part-time availability in jobs

		<u>% of</u>	% of Annual Hrs/wk Prop. of	Hrs/wk	Prop. of	Yearly	Prop.	Annual %
	males working in^a	temales working in	earnings for full-time	for full-time	part-time workers	tırıng rate	male workers ^b	raise in earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)
Science	9.6	4.0	82739 (35989)	44.2 (7.2)	$ \begin{array}{c} 15.5 \\ (3.0) \end{array} $	3.6(1.6)	67.7 (1.1)	3.8 (19.9)
Health	8.6	22.5	65427 (35246)	43.6 (7.8)	28.6 (1.1)	4.0 (0.7)	20.6 (0.5)	4.2 (22.9)
Business	14.2	11.5	77079 (39023)	45.0 (7.8)	19.9 (1.8)	4.0 (1.3)	44.6 (0.8)	4.9 (21.4)
Government	6.8	5.8	67603 (32322)	43.3 (6.9)	16.2 (5.0)	1.5 (0.9)	52.9 (0.6)	5.8 (22.4)
Education	11.2	25.5	60588 (29159)	44.0 (7.5)	30.0 (2.9)	(1.3)	30.9 (0.4)	4.2 (21.1)
Manufacturing & Agriculture	22.4	7.99	77354 (37257)	45.4 (7.93)	17.6(1.6)	6.3 (1.0)	78.0 (0.4)	5.7 (22.4)
Services & Trade	27.2	22.8	65734 (37883)	45.3 (8.3)	34.4 (1.0)	6.6 (0.9)	51.7 (0.3)	4.9 (22.2)
p-value ^{c}	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Table reports means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Statistics are based on the $2010-2012$ CPS monthly data. Sample restricted to those with at least a Bache degree, between ages 25-60. See Appendix A for details on construction of variables. Variables in columns 3, 4 and 8 are based on full-time workers, and are based on individual-level data. Columns (5)-(7) show the average statistics by sector, with the sector-level standard deviation across the	with standard de 1 the 2010-2012 25-60. See App 3, 4 and 8 are by v the average sta	eviations in pare CPS monthly c endix A for det ased on full-tim tistics by sector	ndard deviations in parentheses. 10-2012 CPS monthly data. Sample restricted to those with at least a Bachelor's See Appendix A for details on construction of variables. I 8 are based on full-time workers, and are based on individual-level data. srage statistics by sector, with the sector-level standard deviation across the	stricted to the stion of varial are based on r-level standa	sse with at les bles. individual-le ard deviation	ast a Bache vel data. across the	slor's	
Columns (5) - (7) show months in parentheses	v the average sta s.	tistics by sector	r, with the secto	r-level stands	ard deviatio		n across the	n across the

^a Proportion of all male workers who are employed in each sector (column sums to 100). ^b Males as a proportion of all workers in that sector. ^c F-test of equality of means/proportions across the industry categories.

	Tabl	e 2: Workp	Table 2: Workplace Attributes by Major	by Major			
	SI	Shares	Annual	Hrs/wk	%	UE	Ann $\%$
	Males	Males Females	Earnings for full-time	for full-time	Part-time workers ^{a}	Rate ^b	${f Salary}{f Raise}^c$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)
Bachelor's (or more) in: Business	13.0	10.3	77377	45.5	27.0	4.3	3.9
Engineering	11.7	3.2	(00/00) 83142 (24705)	45.0	21.7	3.5	4.5
Humanities	19.6	30.5	59306 59306	(0.7) 44.4	38.6	3.9	4.0
Natural Science	6.5	9.5	(50494) 72889 (59494)	(7.0) 45.0 (9.4)	34.3	2.3	5.2
Some College ^d	49.2	46.5	42565	43.5	43.8	7.3	3.3
$\mathrm{F}\text{-test}^e$	0	0	$\begin{pmatrix} cnonz \end{pmatrix}$	(6:7) 0	0	0	0
Table shows statistics from the 2013 American Community Survey (ACS), restricting the sample to 25-40 year olds with at least some college education. Sample size is 376,113 respondents. Means (standard devs.) shown for annual earnings and hrs/week for full-time workers.	ne 2013 A some coll n for ann rkers fron	merican Co ege educational al earnings pool of the	mmunity Survey on. Sample size and hrs/week fo se currently emj	(ACS), rest s 376,113 re r full-time w ployed.	rricting the sa espondents. vorkers.	mple to	
^b Unemployment rate is number not employed and currently looking for a job, divided by sum of unemployed and employed respondents. ^c Calculated by linearly regressing log earnings on age for that major group. ^d Individuals with 1-4 years of college (and no bachelor's degree), or some college. ^e p-value of F-test of equality of means across majors (rows).	ber not er espondent essing log of college v of mean	nployed and s. earnings on (and no bac s across maj	l currently lookin a age for that ma chelor's degree), lors (rows).	ig for a job, or group. or some coll	divided by su lege.	im of	

Table 3: S				
	All	Males	Females	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of respondents	247	86	161	
School Year:				
Freshmen	10.9%	9.3%	11.8%	0.549
Sophomore	10.9%	11.6%	10.6%	0.798
Junior	36.4%	32.6%	38.5%	0.355
Senior or more	41.7%	46.5%	39.1%	0.262
Age	21.49	21.69	21.37	0.103
C	(1.5)	(1.8)	(1.2)	
Race:		. ,		
White	29.2%	33.7%	26.7%	0.248
Asian	50.6%	51.1%	50.3%	0.898
Non-Asian Minority	17.8%	14.0%	19.9%	0.247
Parent's Characteristics:				
Parents' Income (\$1000s)	137	141	135	0.731
	(121)	(126)	(118)	01701
Mother B.A. or More	67.6%	74.4%	64.0%	0.095
Father B.A. or More	69.6%	72.1%	68.3%	0.539
Ability Measures:	(0)(0)	7177	(04.2	0.000
SAT Math Score	696.0	717.7	684.3	0.006
CAT Varbal Case	(88)	(72)	(94)	0.704
SAT Verbal Score	674.0	677.0	672.5	0.704
	(84)	(78)	(88)	0.028
GPA				0.938
Intended/Current Major	(0.52)	(0.55)	(0.52)	
	31 20%	18 80%	21.7%	0.000
GPA Intended/Current Major Economics/Business Engineering Humanities and Soc Sciences Natural Sciences/Math	3.5 (0.32) 31.2% 4.9% 47.8% 16.2%	3.5 (0.33) 48.8% 8.1% 30.2% 12.8%	3.5 (0.32) 21.7% 3.1% 57.1% 18.0%	0.938 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.289

Table 3: Sample Statistics

For the continuous outcomes, means are reported in the first cell, and standard deviations are reported in parentheses. P-value reported for a pairwise test of equality of means (proportions) between males and females, based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum (Chi square) test.

					Probability	Probability assigned by:
Panel A	Earnings per year at age 30 if working full time	Annual percentage increase in earnings from age 30 on	Average work hours per week for full-time	Work flexibility: Part-time work available?	Males	Females
Example 1 Job 1	\$96,000	3%	52	Yes	31.93 [30]	31.46 [30]
Job 2	\$95,000	2%	45	Yes	(22.48) 31.16 [30]	(21.50) 39.34^{***} [40]
Job 3	\$89,000	4%	42	No	(25.71) 36.91 [30] (24.71)	$29.20^{(22.71)}$ (22.57)
Example 2 Job 1	\$76,000	4%	50	Yes	19.38 [20]	20.65 [20]
Job 2	\$81,000	3%	44	Yes	(19.34) 49.47 [50]	(12.2.1) 49.45 [50]
Job 3	\$88,000	2%	49	No	31.15[25] (25.36)	29.91[25] (21.98)
Panel B	Earnings per year at age 30 if working full time	Probability of being fired from the job in the next year	Amount of bonus based on relative performance (% of full time earnings)	Proportion of men in the firm in similar positions	Males	Females
Example 1 Job 1	\$87,000	1%	\$4,350 (5%)	49%	30.34 [30]	36.68* [30]
Job 2	\$84,000	6%	\$10,920 (13%)	67%	26.86 [30]	30.27 [30]
Job 3	\$95,000	5%	\$4,750 (5%)	69%	(22.71) (24.71) (24.71)	(21.50) 33.05*** [30] (20.83)
Example 2 Job 1	\$61,000	1%	\$6,710 (11%)	41%	25.48 [20]	26.80 [20]
Job 2	\$65,000	5%	\$7,800 (12%)	71%	12.14 [9.5]	15.53^{**} [10]
Job 3	\$67,000	2%	\$10,050 (15%)	60%	(12.36) 62.38 [60] (21.55)	57.67 [60]

Pairwise t-tests conducted for equality of means by gender. Significance denoted on the female column by asterisks: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table 5: Estimates of	Overall ^a	Males	Females
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age 30 log earnings	15.40***	22.86***	11.42***
	(1.65)	(3.88)	(1.43)
Probability of being fired	-0.38***	-0.39***	-0.37***
, ,	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)
Bonus, as a prop. of earnings	0.28***	0.38***	0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Prop of males in similar positions	0.00	-0.01	0.005
1 1	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% increase in annual earnings	0.55***	1.09***	0.27**
e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.10)
Hours per week of work	-0.15***	-0.21***	-0.12***
1	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Part-time option available	0.79***	0.86***	0.76***
1	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.12)
Observations	247	86	161

Table 5: Estimates of Job Choice Model

Table reports the average of the parameter estimates across the relevant sample. Asterisks denote estimates are statistically different from zero based on bootstrap standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

		Overall ^a	Males	Females
		(1)	(2)	(3)
Age 30 log earnings	Median	7.37***	9.33***	6.72***
	25th pct.	2.68***	2.91*	2.58***
	75th pct.	16.18***	29.65***	13.61***+
	Std. dev	26.67***	36.42***	$18.20^{***+} + -$
	Skewness	2.12***	1.37***	2.35^{***+}
Probability of being fired	Median	-0.17***	-0.15***	-0.20***
	25th pct.	-0.42***	-0.39***	-0.44***
	75th pct.	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.05***
	Std. dev	0.68^{***}	0.85^{***}	$0.56^{***+} +$
	Skewness	-2.02***	-1.49***	-2.59***+
Bonus, as a prop. of earnings	Median	0.12***	0.16***	0.11***
	25th pct.	0.03***	0.04^{**}	0.03**
	75th pct.	0.31***	0.71***	0.24^{***+++}
	Std. dev	0.42***	0.50***	0.35^{***+++}
	Skewness	1.88***	1.02***	2.71^{***+++}
Prop of males in similar positions	Median	-0.003***	-0.009	-0.002**
1	25th pct.	-0.024***	-0.037***	-0.016***++
	75th pct.	0.017***	0.011**	0.02^{***}
	Std. dev	0.066***	0.07^{***}	0.062***
	Skewness	0.591	0.382	0.837
% increase in annual earnings	Median	0.19***	0.39***	0.13^{***++}
	25th pct.	-0.07*	0.001	-0.11***+
	75th pct.	0.69***	1.75***	0.55^{***+}
	Std. dev	1.61***	2.05***	1.21 * * * + + +
	Skewness	1.58***	1.20***	1.12
Hours per week of work	Median	-0.07***	-0.09***	-0.06***
	25th pct.	-0.19***	-0.26***	-0.16^{***+}
	75th pct.	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.02**
	Std. dev	0.33***	0.43***	0.26^{***++}
	Skewness	-1.89***	-1.50***	-1.76
Part-time option available	Median	0.47***	0.43***	0.48***
	25th pct.	-0.01	-0.14	0.02
	75th pct.	1.12^{***}	1.39***	1.02^{***}
	Std. dev	1.70***	2.01***	1.49***
	Skewness	1.66***	1.41***	1.73***
Observations		247	86 d on bootstrap	161

Table 6: Heterogeneity in Job Preferences

Asterisks denote estimates are statistically different from zero based on bootstrap standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + on the female column denote estimates for males and females are statistically different from each other at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	IaDle /	.: WIIIIIgness-lo	1able /: Willingness-to-Fay (W 1 F) Estimates			
		WTP(dollars		WTP (as	WTP (as % of average earnings)	ge earnings)
	Overall	Male	Female	Overall	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Prob. of being fired	2147.40*** (525.46) [1125.94]**	467.79 (670.29) [504.69]**	$\begin{array}{c} 3044.58***+++\\ (715.28)\\ [1841.27]**+++\end{array}$	2.83% *** (0.69%) [1.48]**	$\begin{array}{c} 0.62\% \\ (0.88\%) \\ [0.67]^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 4.01\% *** +++ \\ (0.94\%) \\ [2.43] ** ++ \end{array}$
Bonus as percent of earnings	-1069.78*** (258.47) [-975.36]**	-645.92* (368.77) [-761.57]**	-1296.19*** (345.77) [-1139.44]**++	-1.41% *** (0.34%) [-1.29]**	-0.85% * (0.49%) (0.100] * *	-1.71% *** (0.46%) (1.50] **++
Prop. of men at jobs	$\begin{array}{c} 43.20 \\ (38.31) \\ [59.15] ** \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 63.74 \\ (46.81) \\ [71.82] * * \end{array}$	32.24 (53.93) [43.17]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.06\% \\ (0.05\%) \\ [0.08]^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.08\% \\ (0.06\%) \\ (0.09]^{**} \end{array}$	0.04% (0.07%) [0.06]
Annual % raise in earnings	-1186.28 (773.44) [-2596.68]**	-2564.93** (1226.42) [-2934.51]**	-449.86 (957.85) [-2514.55]**	-1.56% (1.02%) [-3.42]**	-3.38%** (1.62%) [-3.87]**	-0.59% (1.26%) [-3.31]**
Hours per week of work	854.65*** (235.25) [626.52]**	594.70 (416.17) $[600.89]^{**}$	993.50^{***} (267.19) [634.22]**	$\begin{array}{c} 1.13\% *** \\ (0.31\%) \\ [0.83] ** \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.78\% \\ (0.55\%) \\ [0.79] ** \end{array}$	1.31% *** (0.35%) [0.84] **
Part-time option available ^a	-3892.01*** (1024.91) [-2709.40]**	-829.94 (1822.82) [-1866.56]**	-5527.65***++ (1221.72) [-3237.95]**+	-5.13%*** (1.35%) [-3.57]**	-1.09% (2.40%) [-2.46]**	$^{-7.29\% ***++}_{(1.61\%)}$
Table reports mean (bootstrap standard errors) [median] WTP (amount of earnings an individual needs to be compensated for a tenange in the job attribute). change in the job attribute). ^a WTP for moving from a job without a part-time option to one that has it. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests conducted for differences in means and medians by gender. +++, ++, + denote estimates differ at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.	idard errors) [mec nout a part-time o ne 1%, 5%, and 10 means and media	lian] WTP (amou ption to one that] 0% levels, respec uns by gender. ++	errors) [median] WTP (amount of earnings an individual needs to be compensated for a unit a part-time option to one that has it. , 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. is and medians by gender. +++, ++, + denote estimates differ at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,	ridual needs to be ites differ at 1%,	5%, and 10%	l for a unit levels,

Table 7: Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) Estimates

55

	Table 8: Corre	elates	8: Correlates of Heterogeneity in WTP	ity in WTP				
Characteristics		z	Prob of being Fired	Bonus as % of Salary	Prop. of Males	Annual % Raise	Hrs/wk of Work	Part-time Available
Gender	Female Male	161 86	4.01^{**+++} .62	-1.71*** 85	.04 .08	59 -3.38**	1.31^{***} .78	-7.29***++ -1.09
SAT Math Score	Above Median (710) Below Median	$126 \\ 121$	2.18^{***} 3.51^{***}	-1.92***+ 88**	01 .12	-1.67 -1.45	1.39^{***} .85*	-3.62* -6.71***
SAT Verbal Score	Above Median (690) Below Median	$\begin{array}{c} 129\\ 118 \end{array}$	2.1^{**} 3.63^{***}	-1.46*** -1.35***	.07 .04	-1.98 -1.11	$.9^{*}_{1.37^{***}}$	-4.1* -6.26***
Race	White Nonwhite	72 175	$1.64 \\ 3.32^{***}$	97*** -1.59***	.17* .01	-4.39**+ 4	$.01^{++}$ 1.59^{***}	-2.68 -6.14***
Parents' Income	Above Median (\$87,500) Below Median	$\begin{array}{c} 121\\ 126\end{array}$	1.34^{++} 4.26^{***}	-1.55*** -1.28***	.04 .07	-2.57* 59	$.64 \\ 1.59^{***}$	-2.71 ⁺ -7.46***
Marriage Probability a	Above Median (60%) Below Median	$115 \\ 132$	2.83*** 2.84***	-1.86*** -1.02***	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00\\ 0.10 \end{array}$	43 -2.55	1.28^{**} 1^{***}	-4.69** -5.51***
Expected Fertility ^b	Above Median (0.91) Below Median	$123 \\ 124$	2.83*** 2.84***	95** -1.87***	$0.04 \\ 0.07$	82 -2.3*	1.09^{**} 1.16^{***}	-4.75** -5.51***
School Year	Senior or older Junior or younger	$103 \\ 144$	$^{1.75}_{3.6^{***}}$	-1.67*** -1.23***	$0.20^{*++}_{-0.05}$	-2.15 -1.14	$.8\\1.36^{***}$	-5.18** -5.10***
Prob of Full-time Work ^{c}	$\geq 80\%$ $\leq 80\%$	$122 \\ 125$	2.39*** 3.26***	-1.78*** -1.04***	.06 .06	-3.29^{*+} .12	1.27^{**} .99***	-4.99** -5.27***
Economics Probability ^d	>50% < 50%	$65 \\ 182$	1.7^{**} 3.24^{***}	-1.57** -1.35***	.06 06	-1.7 -1.51	$.48^{*+}$ 1.36^{***}	-1.14 -6.55***
Table reports the mean WTP ***,*** denote significance A t-test is conducted for whe	Table reports the mean WTP (as % of average annual earnings) for each group. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A t-test is conducted for whether means differ within each group (males versus females: below median SAT verbal score versus above	respect , respect roun (r	each group. :tively. nales versus fen	ales: below me	dian SAT verb	al score vers	us above	

A t-test is conducted for whether means differ within each group (males versus females; below median SAT verbal score versus above median, etc.) Significance denoted by plus signs shown on the means of the second row within each sub-group. +++,++,+ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

 b Students report the expected number of children by age 30, conditional on major. This is the probability weighted by the major choice probabilities.

^c Students report the likelihood of working full-time at age 30, conditional on major. This is the probability weighted by the major choice probabilities.

^d Students' reported likelihood of majoring in economics (on a 0-100 scale).

56

Ta	able 9: Job (Characteristics	and Estima	ated WTP		
	Prob. of	Bonus	Prop. of	Earnings	Hours	Flex Work
	Fired	Percentage	Males	Growth	Worked	Option
Willingness-to-Pay ^a	-0.07	-1.00	-7.32**	-0.02	-1.70**	-0.94**
	(0.20)	(1.23)	(2.82)	(0.08)	(0.64)	(0.29)
Constant	10.70***	3.64	52.60***	7.32***	46.37***	55.61***
	(1.90)	(2.67)	(2.82)	(1.71)	(2.00)	(6.37)
Effect Size ^b	-0.658	-4.35	-6.89	-0.319	-4.09	-14.74
p-value ^c			0.0	00		
Mean of dep var	10.4	5.8	50.9	7.3	44.6	61.0
Std dv of dep var	(14.72)	(12.79)	(22.79)	(13.34)	(14.76)	(49.19)
R-squared	.002	.16	. .092 ´	.0001	. 077´	. 090 ´
Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50

Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 OLS estimates presented. Dependent var is the actual job characteristic in that column. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote sig. at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. ^a The estimated WTP of the respondent based on the hypothetical job choice scenarios.

^b The predicted change in the dependent variable for a one std dev. change in the WTP. ^c p-value of a test that the six estimates on the WTP (in the first row) are jointly zero.

		Table 10:	Perceived Job Attributes,	lob Attribu		Conditional on Major	Major			
	Prob of majoring	Annual age 30	Annual % inc in	Prob of being fired	Bonus as % of Salary	Prop of males	Hrs/ week	Likelihood of Part-time	Ability rank ^{a}	Hrs/wk of study
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	au jous (6)	(1)	(8)	(6)	(10)
Male respondents Econ/Business	43.4	135267	1.5	13.1	46.2	60.8	55.5	24.0	32.0	22.7
Encirconing	(45.2)	(77501)	(4.2)	(16.4)	(54.1)	(15.8)	(13.2)	(23.3)	(28.2)	(16.1)
Eugineering	0.4 (21.3)	1021/4	(3.5)	(7.2)	19.2 (22.0)	00.7	(6.6)	20.7 (22.9)	42.J	27.0 (17.5)
Humanities	28.9	67802) 4 4 6		13.0	42.5	44.0	36.5	25.4	19.2
Natural Sciences	(c.65) 16.5	(20290) 85790	(5.2)	(9.1) 6.4	(20.7) 14.2	(14.2)	(9.9) 47.6	(25.8) 29.0	(23.1)	(16.3) 27.7
	(31.1)	(34264)	(3.6)	(6.8)	(19.3)	(17.5)	(10.2)	(24.1)	(29.1)	(17.9)
INO Legree	(9.1)	42518 (17739)	6.2) (4.3)	(18.8)	9.9 (23.9)	(16.0)	(11.5)	(32.5)	(40.3)	ı
$\mathrm{F}\text{-test}^c$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Female respondents	nts									
Economics	23.3***	100469***	1.2	19.1**	39.4	61.4	52.5	28.6 28.1	46.7***	24.8
Engineering	(30.0) 5.7	(02440) 92247*	(0.0)	(1.7.9) 14.8***	(7.0c) 26.3	(10.1) 65.6^{**}	(17.0) 47.8	(20.7) 32.6**	(20.8) 53.6***	(12.4) 29.3
) ;	(17.0)	(37364)	(3.8)	(16.1)	(38.9)	(18.4)	(12.3)	(21.5)	(29.7)	(16.5)
Humanities	52.6*** (13.0)	600595*** (18767)	1.4 4.1	18.2***	15.4	40.8	42.8	44.8*** (21-7)	31.1*	19.3
Natural Sciences	17.2	75710**	1.5	14.0^{***}	19.4	55.0	46.4	35.8**	44.7	28.1
	(32.3)	(29787)	(2.8)	(14.8)	(30.5)	(17.7)	(12.5)	(21.9)	(28.3)	(14.0)
INO Degree	(3.6)	(12746)	(2.8)		(13.9)	4/.5 (18.5)	(11.9)	(31.0)	0.06) (40.6)	ı
F-test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Table reports the mean belief regarding the and female respondents Standard deviation	n belief regar ts_Standard	ding the charact deviations in pa	teristic of 1 rentheses	he job conditional on the major	itional on th	he major (r	ow), as pe	(row), as perceived by male ((top panel)	
T-test conducted for whether means differ	whether mean	ns differ by ge	nder. Signific	cance denot	ed by aster	isks shown	on the fe	gnificance denoted by asterisks shown on the female means. ***,	**, * denote	0
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,	, 5%, and 10	% levels, resp	ectively.	other universities) who will	itiae) who	will araduate in	ate in each	of these categori	as or haver	

^a Ånswer to: Think about the other individuals (at NYU and other universities) who will graduate in each of these categories or never graduate/drop out. On a ranking scale of 1-100 (where 1 is the HIGHEST rank), where do you think you would rank in terms of ability when compared to all individuals in that category? ^bAnswer to: How many hours per week do you think you would need to spend studying in each of the following majors in order to achieve an average GPA in that major of 4.0? ^cF-test of equality of means across majors.

Table 11: LAD Estimates o	f Major Choice
Job attributes (δ)	0.018** (0.007)
Ability rank	-0.064*** (0.006)
Study time	-0.009 (0.025)
Economics Dummy	-0.583 (0.435)
Engineering Dummy	-1.155*** (0.363)
Natural Sci Dummy	-0.816** (0.381)
Total Observations Number of Individuals Bootstrap standard errors in ***, **, * denote significar 5%, and 10% levels, respect	nce at the 1%,

Table 12: Marginal	Contribution	of Job Attributes	in Major Choice
Tuble 12. Mughu	Continuation	or soo runnoutes	m major choice

	0						
	Fired	Part-time	Hours	Bonus	Earnings	Prop	Log
	Prob.	Available			Growth	Males	Earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Males							
Start Value ^a	8.82	0.29	48.88	18.37	1.42	54.86	11.38
End Value ^b	19.38	0.53	60.40	41.37	5.20	73.21	12.03
Avg. change ^c	-4.10%	0.23%	-2.48%	9.20%	4.30%	-0.20%	15.90%
Relative change ^d	-0.26	0.01	-0.16	0.58	0.27	-0.01	-
Panel B: Females	5						
Start Value	16.51	0.35	47.36	19.12	1.35	56.13	11.22
End Value	33.14	0.58	61.15	43.11	4.44	75.22	11.70
Avg. change	-5.12%	0.15%	-1.40%	4.58%	0.70%	0.10%	4.78%
Relative change	-1.07	0.03	-0.29	0.96	0.15	0.02	-

Table shows the average percent change in the probability of majoring in a given major ("marginal effect") for a standard deviation change in the job attribute (column variable). See Appendix C for details.

 $a^{(b)}$ The initial (final) value of the attribute at which the major probability is computed, with all other attributes fixed at the sample mean. ^c The average change (across majors) in the probability of majoring in a given major for a standard deviation change in the attribute. ^d The average change in the probability of majoring in a given major for a std deviation change in an attribute, relative to a corresponding change in earnings.

Table 13: Gender Gap in Age 30 Expected Earnings and Workplace Preferences

Dependent Variable: Log(Age 30	Expected Ea	rnings)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.346***	-0.195***	-0.289***	-0.150***
	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.057)
Constant	11.483***	11.69***	11.36***	11.55***
	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.068)
Major Controls ^a	N	Y	N	Y
Workplace Preferences Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Mean of Dep. Var	11.26	11.26	11.26	11.26
R-squared	.1209	.3386	.2013	.3967
Number of Observations	247	247	247	247
OIS actimates presented Dependents	= • •	= . ,	= . ,	

OLS estimates presented. Dependent variable is the log of age 30 expected earnings for the individual's reported major. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote sig. at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. ^a Dummy for the major the respondent is majoring in (the major with the modal probability).

Appendix A: Summary for Table 1 variables

Table 1 was generated using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Statistics regarding job attributes of each sector were computed using pooled monthly samples from January 2010 to December 2012.

Based on the 4-digit census industry codes, we categorize the jobs into the following six broad sectors. Our sector category definitions are the following:

• *Science:* Architectural, engineering, and related services; Computer systems design and related services; Scientific research and development services; Administration of economic programs and space research; Data processing, Hosting and Related Services

• *Health:* Offices of physicians; Offices of dentists; Offices of chiropractors; Offices of optometrists; Offices of other health practitioners; Outpatient care centers; Home health care services; Other health care services; Hospitals; Nursing care facilities; Residential care facilities, without nursing; Individual and family services; Community food and housing, and emergency services; Vocational rehabilitation services; Child day care services. These occupations are grouped in the CPS as "Health Care and Social Assistance".

• *Business:* Banking and related activities; Savings institutions, including credit unions; Non-depository credit and related activities; Securities, commodities, funds, trusts, and other financial investments; Insurance carriers and related activities; Real estate; Accounting, tax preparation, bookkeeping, and payroll services; Management, scientific, and technical consulting services; Advertising and related services; Management of companies and enterprises.

• *Government*: Executive offices and legislative bodies; Public finance activities; Other general government and support; Justice, public order, and safety activities; Administration of human resource programs; Administration of human resource programs; Administration of environmental quality and housing programs; National security and international affairs. These occupations are grouped in the CPS as "Public Administration"

• *Education:* Elementary and secondary schools; Colleges and universities, including junior colleges; Business, technical, and trade schools and training; Other schools, instruction, and educational services. These occupations are grouped in the CPS as "Educational Services".

• *Manufacturing and Agriculture:* Includes a total of 106 individual industry codes, such as Dairy product manufacturing; Ship and boat building; Oil and gas extraction. Detailed breakdown available upon request.

• Services and Trade: Includes a total of 116 individual industry codes, such as Au-

tomobile dealers; Department stores and discount stores; Barber shops. Detailed breakdown available upon request.

To construct our job attributes of interest, we restricted the 2010-2012 CPS sample to those with at least a Bachelor's degree, and between the ages of 25 and 60. Our sample consists of 804,779 individuals. When computing the statistics, we used the CPS sampling weights.

• **Prop. of Part-time workers:** We define a worker to be full-time if he/she was "employed full time", "full time for economic reason", or "full time for non-economic reason". The percent of people working part-time within each industry is obtained by dividing the total number of part-time people by the total number of employed workers in that industry. We calculate the percent of part-time workers for each month, and report the average and standard deviation across the 36 months.

• Yearly firing rate: To construct the yearly probability of being fired in each sector, we computed the monthly probability of being fired for workers in each sector. We first flagged all workers who are laid off in a given month but have been unemployed for less than one month. Their sum is divided by the total number of (part-time and full-time) employed workers at the beginning of that month, giving us an estimate of the monthly probability of being fired, p_m . The yearly probability of being fired is $1 - (1 - p_m)^{12}$. We compute this yearly probability for each of the 36 monthly surveys and report the average and standard deviation.

• **Proportion of male workers:** For each survey month, we calculated the proportion of workers employed in each sector who are male. We compute this for each survey month, and report the average and standard deviation over the 36 months.

When constructing the following variables, we further restricted the CPS sample to those employed and working full-time.

• **Hours/week worked:** We used the number of hours actually worked in the last week (as opposed to the number of hours usually worked) – this was available for all workers who were employed in the last week. We chose to drop the top and bottom 1%. We calculate this for each survey month, and report the average over the 36 months.

• Annual earnings: The nominal annual earnings were calculated from the weekly earnings variable. This variable included overtime pay, tips and commissions, and is before taxes or other deductions. We dropped the bottom 1% of weekly earnings. We also dropped observations where the reported weekly earnings were less than the number of hours they

actually worked in the past week times the federal minimum wage (\$7.25/hour). Weekly earnings are multiplied by 52 to get the annual earnings. We compute this for each survey month, and report the average and standard deviation over the 36 months.

• Annual % raise in earnings: This is constructed by using the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS. Earnings are reported by the respondent in their fourth and eighth interview (which are separated by 12 months). We use this to compute the percent increase in the respondent's nominal earnings. We report the average earnings growth, by dropping the top and bottom 10% of the observations in the computed earnings growth distribution.

Appendix B: Robustness- Job Choice Model Specifications

In the baseline model, the utility that individual *i* gets from job *j* is $U_{ij} = \beta_{0i} \ln(Earnings_j) + \sum_{k=1}^{6} \beta_{ki} x_{kj} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where X_{kj} is the vector of job characteristics: {probability of being fired; bonus; proportion of males; earnings growth; hours; part-time}.

We estimate the following models:

• Model 1: allows for geometric growth in earnings:

$$U_{ij} = \beta_{0i} \ln(Earnings_j) + \beta_{4i} \sum_{t=31}^{65} \gamma^{t-30} \ln[Earnings_j \times (1+x_{4j})^{t-30}] + \sum_{k=\{1,2,3,5,6\}} \beta_{ki} x_{kj} + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

where x_{4j} is the earnings growth in job j and γ is the discount factor (set to 0.95). The assumption is that the respondent works from age 30 to 65. This model is more restrictive than our baseline model (where the growth rate enters separately).

• Model 2: is similar to the baseline model but also includes a quadratic term in hours:

$$U_{ij} = \beta_{0i} \ln(Earnings_j) + \sum_{k=1}^{6} \beta_{ki} x_{kj} + \beta_{7i} x_{5j}^2 + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

where x_{5j} is the hours per week of work for job j. This model allows for the effect of hours to be non-linear.

• Model 3: includes an interaction term between part-time availability and hours:

$$U_{ij} = \beta_{0i} \ln(Earnings_j) + \sum_{k=1}^{6} \beta_{ki} x_{kj} + \beta_{7i} (x_{5j} \times x_{6j}) + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

This allows for the possibility that the value of part-time availability may depend on the full-time work hours.

• **Model 4**: is identical to the baseline model but is estimated using only the subset of 8 scenarios (4 each from the two block of eight scenarios) with above-median earnings. The purpose of this robustness is to check if our estimates are sensitive to the variation that was exogenously created in the scenarios.

In order to compare these models, we compute the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for each job attribute for each of the models. For example, in the case of Model 1, the WTP for a change of Δ in the earnings growth (x_4) is:

$$WTP_{i4}(\Delta) = \left[\exp\left(\frac{-\beta_{4i} \sum_{t=1}^{30} \gamma^t t \ln(\frac{1+x_4+\Delta}{1+x_4})}{\beta_{0i} + \beta_{4i} \gamma \frac{1-\gamma^{30}}{1-\gamma}}\right) - 1 \right] \times Y.$$

As can be seen, this is a function of the growth rate, x_4 . We compute the WTP at the average value of the growth rate across our scenarios. For this model, the WTP for a change of Δ for the other job attributes (x_k ; $k \neq 4$) is:

$$WTP_{ik}(\Delta) = \left[\exp\left(\frac{-\beta_{ki}\Delta}{\beta_{0i} + \beta_{4i}\gamma\frac{1-\gamma^{30}}{1-\gamma}}\right) - 1 \right] \times Y.$$

The WTP expressions for the other models are available upon request.

Appendix Table A6 shows the WTP estimates from these models; the table presents median estimates since the average estimates can be sensitive to a few outliers. For all models, we see that females tend to have a higher WTP for job stability and part-time availability, and a lower WTP for earnings growth (though gender differences are not always statistically significant). None of the estimates in models 2 and 3 are statistically different from those in the baseline model. While estimates for some of the attributes in models 1 and 5 differ from the baseline model (for example, not surprisingly, the WTP for earnings growth is much higher in model 1), the qualitative patterns are similar. Therefore, our conclusions regarding gender differences seem to generally be robust to alternative specifications.

Appendix C: Major Choice Model Estimation Details

This Appendix provides details for the estimation of the major choice model, described in section 7.

Utility for student i from major m is given by:

$$V_{im} = X'_{im}\alpha_i + Z'_{im}\gamma + \kappa_m + \eta_{im},\tag{C1}$$

where Z_{im} is a vector of other major-specific characteristics perceived by student *i*. This vector consists of student *i*'s perceived major-specific ability (on a 1-100 scale, where 1 is the highest ability) and hours of study required to attain a GPA of 4.0. These two measures are summarized in the last two columns of Table 10. According to the two measures, both males and females consider Engineering the most difficult, and Humanities the least difficult major category. Economics/Business and Natural Sciences fare somewhere between the two.

 X_{im} are the job characteristics associated with each major, κ_m is a major-specific constant, and η_{im} captures the remaining unobservable attributes of each major (unobservable to the econometrician but observable to the student). We restrict the choice set to graduating majors, that is, $m = \{\text{Economics/Business}; \text{Engineering}; \text{Humanities}: \text{Natural Sciences/Math}\}$, since beliefs about study hours do not apply to the not graduate major.

The student-specific preference for each job attribute is given by the vector $\alpha_i = [\alpha_{i1}, \ldots, \alpha_{iK}]$. α_i , the preference for job characteristics as it relates to the utility from each major, is potentially distinct from the preferences for job characteristics in the job choice problem, given by β_i (in equation 5). Job characteristics, such as earnings at the job, may be quite important when choosing among different job offers, but might have a more limited value to choosing majors, relative to other major characteristics given by Z_{im} , κ_m and η_{im} . To allow for this possibility, for each job characteristic k, we specify that each α_{ik} is proportional to the β_{ik} up to some free parameter δ :

$$\alpha_{ik} = \beta_{ik}\delta.$$

 δ indicates the importance of job attributes to major choice, relative to other determinants of college major as given by Z_{im} , κ_m and η_{im} We expect $\delta \ge 0$, indicating that job characteristics have weakly the same direction of relationship with major choice as with utility specifically about jobs. Given that there are two choice problems here, one for job choice directly and one for college major, δ plays the role of providing the mapping between the two levels of utility, which in general need not have the same scale. In particular, δ can reflect standard discounting given that the utility from working at jobs occurs later in life than utility derived from taking courses while in school.

Under the assumption that the random terms $\eta_{i1}, \ldots, \eta_{iM}$ in equation (C1) are independent and identically distributed Type 1 extreme value across individuals and majors m, the probability that student i chooses major m is:

$$q_{im} = \frac{\exp(X'_{im}\alpha_i + Z'_{im}\gamma + \kappa_m)}{\sum_{m'=\{1,...,M\}} \exp(X'_{im'}\alpha_i + Z'_{im'}\gamma + \kappa_{m'})}.$$
 (C2)

As before, once we apply the log-odds transformation, we have:

$$\ln(\frac{q_{im}}{q_{im'}}) = (X_{im} - X_{im'})\alpha_i + (Z_{im} - Z_{im'})\gamma + (\kappa_m - \kappa_{m'}) + \omega_{im},$$
(C3)

where ω_{im} is the error due to rounding. We continue to assume that the $\omega_{i1}, \ldots, \omega_{iM}$ have median zero, conditional on X, Z, and κ .

Estimation of the major preferences proceeds in two steps. In the first step, using equation (7), we estimate the job characteristic preference vector β_i for each individual. Call the estimate $\hat{\beta}_i$. We then create an individual- and major- specific scalar of weighted job characteristics for each major m:

$$B_{im} = X'_{im}\hat{\beta}_i. \tag{C4}$$

The second step of the estimator is as before, where we use the LAD estimator. However, in this case, we use a pooled estimator over the whole sample and estimate δ , the vector γ , and κ_m (normalizing the major-specific constant for the reference category m' (in our case, Humanities, to zero).

$$M\left[\ln(\frac{q_{im}}{q_{im'}}) \mid X\right] = (B_{im} - B_{im'})\delta + (Z_{im} - Z_{im'})'\gamma + \kappa_m.$$
(C5)

As with the job preferences estimation, we use a cluster bootstrap for inference.

Table 11 presents the LAD estimates of equation (C5). The estimate of δ is positive and precise, indicating that the preferences of students over job attributes and the major-specific beliefs about the distribution of job attributes has a statistically significant relationship with major choices. Estimates on the ability measures are negative, as one would expect (note that higher rank denotes lower ability with our measures). The major-specific dummy terms are all negative, indicative of negative median tastes for the non-Humanities majors.

Given the non-linear nature of the model, it is difficult to assess the importance of job attributes in major choice. To quantify the effects, we use standard methods to evaluate "marginal effects" in non-linear models. The marginal effect of job attribute x_k in major choice is computed by varying the value of that job attribute, while keeping the other job and major-specific attributes and preferences fixed at their sample average values. The likelihood of majoring in m, for a given value of $X_k = x_k$ and evaluated at the sample mean for the other attributes and preferences, is given as:

$$\overline{q_m}(x_k) = \frac{\exp(x_k\overline{\alpha}_k + \overline{X'_{-km}}\overline{\alpha} + \overline{Z'_m}\gamma + \kappa_m)}{\exp(x_k\overline{\alpha}_k + \overline{X'_{-km}}\overline{\alpha} + \overline{Z'_m}\gamma + \kappa_m) + \sum_{m'=/m}\exp(\overline{X'_{m'}}\overline{\alpha} + \overline{Z'_{m'}}\gamma + \kappa_{m'})}, \quad (C6)$$

where $\overline{\alpha}_k$ is the sample average preference for attribute k, $\overline{X'_{-km}}$ is the vector of job attributes excluding k (at the sample mean for each of the attributes in major m), and $\overline{Z'_m}$ is the average major-specific beliefs for m. The effect for a given attribute is then obtained by computing (C6) at two distinct values of that attribute. We use the sample gender-specific belief of a given attribute, averaged across majors and individuals, as the first (starting) value at which the likelihood is computed. For the second value, we shift this starting value by one standard deviation in the belief (across majors and individuals), and re-compute the likelihood of majoring in that major. This then informs us about the impact of a standard deviation change in a given attribute on the likelihood of majoring in a given major. This "marginal effect" is computed for each major separately. Table 12 shows the average effect across majors, by gender.

Table A1: Variation in the Hypothetical Job Choice Scenarios

Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
75854	15631	44000	100000
3.29	0.95	2.00	5.00
47.75	4.25	40.00	54.00
0.5	0.51	0	1
3.88	1.98	1.00	7.00
15.88	18.67	4.00	80.00
52.88	14.03	26.00	72.00
	75854 3.29 47.75 0.5 3.88 15.88	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

Table shows the range of each attribute in the hypothetical job choice scenarios.

Dependent Variable:	Firing Prob	Bonus	Prop. Males	Annual Raise	Work Hrs/wk	Part-time Available
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	2.74**	-1.19*	-0.03	1.61	0.42	-5.37*
	(1.31)	(0.62)	(0.09)	(1.94)	(0.68)	(3.03)
Above-median SAT Math	-1.26	-1.05+	-0.07	-0.85	0.30	2.71
	(1.48)	(0.72)	(0.10)	(1.94)	(0.65)	(2.79)
Above-median SAT Verbal	-0.94	0.10	0.00	0.17	-0.22	1.16
	(1.42)	(0.66)	(0.10)	(2.22)	(0.58)	(2.91)
White	-1.44	0.09	0.11	-3.59+	-1.36**	3.50
	(1.47)	(0.66)	(0.11)	(2.24)	(0.67)	(3.09)
Above-med Parent Income	-2.67*	-0.47	-0.04	-1.52	-0.84	3.94
	(1.51)	(0.72)	(0.11)	(2.04)	(0.59)	(2.81)
College-educated Parent	0.91	0.70	0.01	-1.60	0.26	-0.37
	(1.54)	(0.85)	(0.12)	(2.40)	(0.55)	(2.60)
Above-med Marriage Prob	0.15	-0.86	-0.07	2.44	0.00	0.72
	(1.43)	(0.75)	(0.11)	(2.01)	(0.66)	(2.76)
Above-median Exp Fertility	-0.40	1.05+	0.01	0.01	-0.18	1.10
	(1.51)	(0.73)	(0.11)	(2.33)	(0.75)	(2.93)
Above-median Work Prob	-0.62	-0.54	0.01	-3.99*	0.15	-0.15
	(1.44)	(0.64)	(0.10)	(2.27)	(0.64)	(2.87)
Senior	-1.54	-0.57	0.23*	-0.63	-0.36	-0.47
	(1.38)	(0.65)	(0.12)	(2.08)	(0.65)	(2.69)
Constant	4.36+	-0.04	0.02	1.71	1.61	-6.93+
	(2.85)	(1.34)	(0.21)	(4.00)	(1.42)	(4.65)
Mean of Dep. Var.	2.83	-1.41	.057	-1.56	1.13	-5.13
R-squared	.0532	.0407	.0334	.0408	.0385	.0392
Number of Observations	247	247	247	247	247	247

Table A2: Correlates of WTP (Multivariate Regression Framework)

Table presents correlates of the WTP. OLS estimates presented. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, *, + denote sig. at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, respectively.

Table A3: Selection into Follow Dep Var: Participate in the Fol	
Male	-0.119
White	(0.103) 0.070
Asian	(0.128) -0.127
Age	(0.137) -0.013
School Year: Senior or More	$(0.019) \\ 0.156$
Parents' Income (\$1000s)	(0.095) 0.0008*
Mother B.A. or More	(0.0005) -0.101
Father B.A. or More	(0.124) 0.034
SAT Verbal Score	(0.123) 0.0002
SAT Math Score	(0.0007) -0.0001
GPA	(0.0007) -0.078
Economics/Business	(0.107) 0.205
Engineering	$(0.126) \\ 0.081$
Natural Sciences	(0.247) 0.215*
Constant	(0.127) 1.04
	(0.626)
F-test (p-value) ^a	0.332
Mean of Dep. Var. R-squared	.609 .138
Number of Observations	115

Number of Observations	115
OLS estimates presented. Std devs repo	
***, **, * denote sig. at 1%, 5%, and 1	10% levels, respectively.
^a P-value reported for a joint F-test of s	

Table A4. Cullent J	ob Charac	teristics		
	Overall	Male	Female	p-value ^a
Number of Observations	(1) 70	(2) 21	(3) 49	(4)
Labor Force status (%):				
Èmployed, full-time	64.3%	57.1%	67.3%	
Employed, part-time	12.9%	19.0%	10.2%	
Šelf-employed	7.1%	14.3%	4.1%	
Not employed (in school)	15.7%	9.5%	18.4%	
Characteristics for employed ^{b}				
Log Income full-time employed	11.2	11.8	11.1	0.001
	(0.66)	(0.94)	(0.39)	
Bonus (as % of salary)	`5.8 ´	`10.9 [´]	3.4	0.034
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(12.8)	(19.1)	(7.5)	
Hours of work/week	`44.6´	`47.9´	À 3.Í	0.245
	(14.8)	(19.3)	(12.0)	
Fired Probability (over next 12 months)	`10.4´	`13.3´	` 9.1 ´	0.311
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(14.7)	(17.9)	(13.0)	
Fraction of male employees	` 50.9´	59.5	46.8	0.044
I I I I I	(22.8)	(22.9)	(21.9)	
Annual % increase in earnings	7.3	8.1	7.0	0.775
	(13.3)	(7.1)	(15.5)	
Part-time or Flex work available (%)	61	47	68	0.143
Mean (standard deviations) reported for conti	nione verie			

Table A4: Current Job Characteristics

Mean (standard deviations) reported for continuous variables. ^a p-value of test of equality of means by gender. ^b Except log income, all other variables are unconditional on working full-time.

5: Sample Stat			A
Full Sample	Consent ^a	Follow-up ^b	Follow-up (Working) ^c
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
247	115	71	60
65.2%	67.0%	69.0%	66.7%
10.9%	0.0%***	0.0%***	0.0%***
10.9%			0.0%***
36.4%	45.2%	38.0%	35.0%
41.7%	54.8%**	62.0%***	65.0%***
21.49	21.76*	21.80*	21.85*
(1.45)	(0.76)	(0.81)	(0.85)
			43.3%**
			31.7%***
17.8%	23.5%	23.9%	25.0%
136.88	129.76	143.77	138.33
			(107.31)
67.6%	70.4%	67.6%	66.7%
69.6%	70.4%	71.8%	70.0%
696.04	700.93	697.12	692.18
			(80.62)
			683.09
			(72.36)
		3 50	3.48
			(0.31)
(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)
31.2%	29.6%	32.4%	35.0%
			5.0%
			48.3%
			11.7%
	Full Sample (1) 247 65.2% 10.9% 10.9% 36.4% 41.7% 21.49 (1.45) 29.1% 50.6% 17.8% 136.88 (120.62) 67.6%	Full SampleConsenta(1)(2)247115 65.2% 67.0% 10.9% $0.0\%^{***}$ 10.9% $0.0\%^{***}$ 36.4% 45.2% 41.7% $54.8\%^{**}$ 21.49 21.76^{*} (1.45)(0.76)29.1% 35.7% 50.6% $40.9\%^{*}$ 17.8% 23.5% 136.88 129.76 (120.62) (109.20) 67.6% 70.4% 696.04 700.93 (88.03) (77.69) 674.04 680.09 (84.39) (72.82) 3.46 3.50 (0.32)(0.31) 31.2% 29.6% 4.9% 5.2% 47.8% 49.6%	(1)(2)(3) 247 11571 65.2% 67.0% 69.0% 10.9% $0.0\%^{***}$ $0.0\%^{***}$ 10.9% $0.0\%^{***}$ $0.0\%^{***}$ 10.9% $0.0\%^{***}$ $0.0\%^{***}$ 10.9% $0.0\%^{***}$ $0.0\%^{***}$ 10.9% $0.0\%^{***}$ $0.0\%^{***}$ 10.9% $0.0\%^{***}$ $0.0\%^{***}$ 10.9% $0.0\%^{***}$ $0.0\%^{***}$ 10.9% $0.0\%^{***}$ $0.0\%^{***}$ 11.7% $54.8\%^{**}$ $62.0\%^{***}$ 21.49 21.76^{*} 21.80^{*} (1.45) (0.76) (0.81) 29.1% 35.7% $40.8\%^{*}$ 50.6% $40.9\%^{*}$ $35.2\%^{**}$ 17.8% 23.5% 23.9% 136.88 129.76 143.77 (120.62) (109.20) (114.39) 67.6% 70.4% 67.6% 69.6% 70.4% 71.8% 696.04 700.93 697.12 (88.03) (77.69) (77.83) 674.04 680.09 682.73 (84.39) (72.82) (69.89) 3.46 3.50 3.50 (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) 31.2% 29.6% 32.4% 4.9% 5.2% 5.6% 47.8% 49.6% 46.5%

Table A5:	Sample	Statistics	for	various	Sub-samples	
10010 1 10.	Dumple	Dunburg	TOL	various	Duo bumpico	

For the continuous outcomes, means are reported in the first cell, and standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ^{*a*} The subsample which had given consent for follow-up surveys in 2010.

^b The sample which had given consent for follow-up survey in 2010.
^b The sample which took the post-graduation follow-up survey in 2016.
^c The set of respondents in the 2016 follow-up who were working.
***, **, * denote the statistic in columns (2)-(4) is different from the "All" sample at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Tests also conducted for equality of the statistics in columns (3) and (4) against column (2). No statistic is significantly different.

Models Males Females	Model 1	0.60** 1.32***+^^^ -0.98*** -0.96***^^ 0.05* 0.04	××		$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$						n the job attribute).	nates differ by gender	es differ at the		
Table A6: Robustness- WTP Estimates (as % of Average Earnings) for Various ModelsOverallMalesFemalesOverallMales		0.99***^/ -0.97***^^ 0.04**	-10.03***^^ -11 0.81*** (-3 57*** -1		1.45*** _1 30***								nsated for a unit change i	lle estimates) denote estir	^^^, ^^, ^ denote estimate		rnings.
s % of Average Females	del	2.43^{***+++} -1.50***++ 0.06	-3.31*** 0.84*** -4.27**+	-	$1.79^{***+++}_{-1.79^{***}}$	0.06**	0.97*** 0.97*** -4.78***+		0.9/**+^^^ -1_05***^	0.18***^^ 3 48***	0.82***	-3.69***	eds to be compen- actively	reported on fema	Model estimate.		above-meulan ea
Estimates (a Males	Baseline Model	0.67^{**} -1.00*** 0.09^{**}	-3.87*** 0.79*** -2.46***	Model 2	0.61**	0.13^{**}_{23***}	-2.63*** -2.63***	Model 4	0.10-1.01***	0.19***^	0.73***	-2.16***	individual ne levels resne	+++, ++, + (m Baseline l	and the second	inarios wiui a
tness- WTP E Overall		1.48^{***} -1.29*** 0.08***	-3.42*** 0.83*** -3.57***	222	1.3]*** -1 23***	0.08***	0.92*** -4.18***		0.81***^ -1.02***^	0.18***^^	0.81***	-2.98***	of earnings an i	ans by gender.	vely. mate differs fro ls:	th term. action.	esuricting to see
Table A6: Robus		Probability of being fired Bonus as a prop. of earnings Prop of males in similar positions	% increase in annual earnings Hours per week of work Part-time ontion available		Probability of being fired Romis as a mon of earnings	Prop of males in similar positions	Hours per week of work Part-time option available		Probability of being fired Bonus as a prop. of earnings	Prop of males in similar positions	Hours per week of work	Part-time option available	Table reports the median WTP (as a % of earnings an individual needs to be compensated for a unit change in the job attribute). *** ** ** denote significance at the 1% 5% and 10% levels respectively.	Tests conducted for differences in medic	at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests conducted for whether model estimate differs from Baseline Model estimate. $^{\wedge,\wedge}$, $^{\wedge,\wedge}$, $^{\wedge}$, denote estimates differ at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. See Appendix B for details of the models:	Model 1 has a geometric earnings growth term. Model 2 has a quadratic term in hours. Model 3 has a part-time and hours interaction.	Model 4 esumates the baseline inouel re

		Table	A7: Perce	ived Mapp:	ing of Maj	Table A7: Perceived Mapping of Majors to Work Sector	Sector			
	Scie Males	Science ss Females	He. Males	Health s Females	Bus Males	Business ss Females	Government Males Fema	'nment Females	Education Males Fem	ation Females
	(1a)	(1b)	(2a)	(2b)	(3a)	(3b)	(4a)	(4b)	(5a)	(5b)
Economics	$14.30 \\ [10] \\ (14.95)$	$12.76 \\ [10] \\ (14.82)$	9.00 [5] (12.32)	11.67 [5] (16.08)	59.14 [60] (24.46)	54.45 [60] (23.85)	$11.03 \\ 110] \\ 110] \\ (11.38)$	13.72^{*} [10] (10.73)	$\begin{array}{c} 6.52 \\ [5] \\ (8.43) \end{array}$	7.40 [5] (7.29)
Engineering	55.27 [60] (24.99)	56.37 [60] (22.58)	$\begin{array}{c} 9.31 \\ [10] \\ (9.12) \end{array}$	12.15^{*} [10] (13.80)	18.79 [20] (15.80)	$13.06^{***} [10] (12.38)$	8.64 [5] (9.61)	10.28 [10] (9.39)	$\begin{array}{c} 7.99\\ [5]\\(10.28)\end{array}$	8.15 [5] (8.44)
Humanities	$\begin{array}{c} 13.69 \\ [10] \\ (14.06) \end{array}$	$12.94 \\ [10] \\ (15.03)$	$18.21 \\ [15] \\ (19.10)$	17.83 [15] (17.48)	20.33 [20] (19.48)	14.92^{**} [10] (14.96)	23.78 [20] (16.43)	26.49 [20] (18.99)	24.00 [20] (19.47)	27.82 [25] (19.88)
Natural Sciences	38.76 [35] (18.85)	$\begin{array}{c} 38.84 \\ [40] \\ (21.96) \end{array}$	22.44 [20] (18.26)	25.66 [20] (20.45)	16.17 [10] (16.07)	11.16^{**} [10] (11.53)	8.85 [7] (9.23)	9.24 [5] (9.79)	$\begin{array}{c} 13.78 \\ [10] \\ (11.73) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 15.11 \\ [10] \\ (14.63) \end{array}$
No Degree	$\begin{array}{c} 12.97 \\ [10] \\ (13.48) \end{array}$	$11.98 \\ [10] \\ (11.34)$	$\begin{array}{c} 13.73 \\ [12.5] \\ (12.28) \end{array}$	18.26^{**} [20] (16.01)	29.71 [20] (22.67)	23.01^{**} [20] (20.29)	30.10 [20] (22.65)	28.62 [20] (22.50)	13.49 [10] (14.62)	$18.13^{**} \\ [20] \\ (18.01)$
F-test ^a	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Table reports the mean [meman] c and female respondents. Standard T-test conducted for whether mean * 4000000000000000000000000000000000000	whether mean	deviation deviation as differ	deviations in parentheses is differ by gender. Signif	ne given sec neses. ignificance	denoted by	working in the given sector (continut) contairout on the fundior (now), as perceived by intate ons in parentheses. by gender. Significance denoted by asterisks shown on the female means. ***, **,	out the main on the	female mea	s percerveu	

* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. ^{*a*} F-test of equality of means across majors, in each industry.

Table A8: Gender Gap in Actual Earnings and Workplace Preferences

Table A8. Gender Gap III A	Cluar Darning	gs and work		
Dependent Variable: Log(Actual	2016 Earning	gs)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.612***	-0.451***	-0.442**	-0.318
	(0.169)	(0.167)	(0.191)	(0.230)
Constant	12.12***	12.31***	11.91***	12.12***
	(0.145)	(0.147)	(0.190)	(0.188)
Part-time work dummy	Y	Y	Y	Y
Major Controls ^a	N	Y	N	Y
Workplace Preferences Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Mean of Dep. Var	11.65	11.65	11.65	11.65
R-squared	.226	.384	.395	.495
Number of Observations	56	56	56	56

OLS estimates presented. Dependent variable is the log of actual earnings for the subset of individuals who took the follow-up survey and were working in 2016. Block bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote sig. at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.