Measuring Corporate Bond Market Dislocations
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Abstract
We link bond market functioning to future economic activity through a new measure, the Corporate Bond Market Distress Index (CMDI). The CMDI coalesces metrics from primary and secondary markets in real time, offering a unified measure to capture access to capital market credit. The index correctly identifies periods of distress and predicts future realizations of commonly used measures of market functioning, while the converse is not the case. We show that disruptions in access to corporate bond markets have an economically material, statistically significant impact on the real economy, even after controlling for standard predictors including credit spreads, which emphasizes the need to evaluate credit market conditions from a broader perspective than secondary market spreads.

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1 Introduction

The financial system and the real economy are directly linked through corporate bond markets, which fund more than two thirds of American corporate debt. In this paper, we introduce a new measure of conditions in the corporate bond market – the U.S. Corporate bond Market Distress Index (CMDI) – that aims to capture access to corporate bond markets rather than focusing solely on trading conditions in the secondary market. We show that impaired corporate bond market functioning predicts deteriorations in future real economic activity, especially when both primary and secondary markets are distressed.

If access to debt markets is impaired, productive borrowers are unable to obtain financing and are forced to reduce their activities. While an individual firm may lose access to the corporate debt market for idiosyncratic reasons such as loss of a customer or poor business prospects, widespread market access freezes have the potential to propagate through the economy, weakening aggregate economic activity. The seminal literature on the so-called “financial accelerator” channel (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, and subsequent papers) formalizes this intuition, linking vulnerabilities in credit availability to the future evolution of the real economy. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence for this channel, documenting that primary corporate bond market conditions are an important and distinct source of predictive information for output, investment and employment of both public firms and the economy as a whole. These results highlight the importance of market-based credit provision for the U.S. economy, adding to the empirical literature establishing links between financial markets and real activity.

Measuring access to corporate bond markets is not straightforward as issuance is lumpy and issuer risk is variable. Despite these inherent challenges, primary market information is valuable as it helps to distinguish between times where prices in the secondary market are moving due to changes in risk from times when market functioning is breaking down. The theoretical literature on asymmetric information and other frictions in debt markets
has identified conditions that indicate when access to the corporate debt market is impaired: (i) primary market issuance slows down (e.g. Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011); (ii) secondary market prices decrease and liquidity dries up (e.g. Dang et al., 2015; Benmelech and Bergman, 2018); and (iii) secondary market trading volume may or may not increase (e.g. Benmelech and Bergman, 2018).

Informed by this literature, we use data on primary market activity from Mergent FISD, on secondary market activity from the supervisory version of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), and on pricing of non-traded bonds from ICE – Bank of America corporate bond indices to construct a broad set of metrics for the myriad aspects of market functioning for corporate bond markets. We use insights from the image recognition literature to coalesce the information contained in these metrics into a unified measure of distress – the CMDI – taking a “preponderance of metrics” approach to quantifying overall corporate bond market conditions in real time.

We document that the CMDI identifies commonly-accepted periods of market distress such as those around the global financial crisis peaking in late 2008 and early 2009, with the next largest peak during the COVID-19-related market stress in March 2020. Comparing the evolution of the CMDI with that of indices that focus on primary and secondary markets separately, we show that the CMDI is particularly elevated when conditions in both markets appear stressed. In other words, the CMDI down-weights periods when only a subset of indicators signal market stress.

In addition to identifying periods of market dysfunction, the CMDI also predicts future realizations of some commonly used measures of credit market conditions. For example, the CMDI forecasts cross-market measures, such as the CDS-bond basis and the ETF-NAV basis, which policy makers and market participants frequently use as a proxy for credit market conditions. However, the converse is not the case, suggesting that the CMDI provides more timely information about access to public corporate debt markets than commonly-used alternative measures.
In constructing the index, we rely on the substantial academic literature on pricing and measures of secondary market liquidity in the corporate bond market (e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001, Geske and Delianedis, 2001, Longstaff et al., 2005, Chen et al., 2007, Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012, Friewald et al., 2012, Helwege et al., 2014, Chen et al., 2017, and Friewald and Nagler, 2019). A key contribution of the paper and a feature of the CMDI is that it combines both primary market and secondary market measures to offer a full picture of corporate bond markets functioning. The addition of primary market measures is important as they capture information about credit conditions for non-financial borrowers that is not being revealed by secondary market trading. The CMDI approach also allows for the integration of different dimensions of market functioning, eliminating the need to run a horse-race among metrics (see, for example, Schestag et al., 2016).

Several principles guide the index. First, while information on prices and price volatility is included, changing prices in either the primary or the secondary market are not by themselves a sufficient statistic to measure market disruptions: price changes are consistent with functioning markets when risk and risk tolerance change. Second, market liquidity – both in the primary market, capturing the ability of issuers to issue new debt, and in the secondary market, capturing the ability of market participants on both sides of the market to transact – plays a key role in the index. Third, the standardized metrics take into account the real-time historical properties of market conditions, so that the index can be back-tested and measured in a historical context. The CMDI serves as a template in terms of how to measure stress in a particular market and the predictive power of that stress for real economic output.

This paper is related to the literature on measuring financial distress. Starting with the seminal paper of Illing and Liu (2006), a number of indices of financial market distress at the economy level have been proposed for developed economies across the world. For the U.S.,\(^1\) examples include Nelson and Perli (2007) (“financial fragility indicator”), Hakkio and Keeton (2009) (“Kansas City Financial Stability Indicator”), Kliesen and Smith (2010) \(^1\)See the literature review in Hollo et al. (2012) for a discussion of indices developed for other advanced economies.
(“St. Louis Fed’s Financial Stress Index”), Brave and Butters (2011) (“National Financial Conditions Index”), and Oet al. (2011) (“Cleveland Financial Stress Index”). The approach is inspired by measures developed to aggregate information on economic stress, specifically, the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS, Hollo et al., 2012), but adapted to the empirical constraints of capturing the systematic distress of a market.

In addition to these and other economy-wide measures of market distress, the literature after the financial crisis has proposed a number of distress measures for individual financial institutions. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and Acharya et al. (2017) both propose measures of risks at financial institutions that contribute to financial instability at the economy level and thus serve as a complement for the aggregate indices of financial conditions. The CMDI represents an intermediate level of aggregation – more focused than the aggregate indices of financial conditions but broader than measures of individual financial institutions’ distress – capturing functioning of debt capital markets.

In related work categorizing market distress, Pasquariello (2014) measures aggregate, time-varying intensity of arbitrage parity violations across assets and constructs a monthly market dislocation index (MDI), capturing episodes in which financial markets on aggregate cease to price assets correctly on a relative basis. This approach is informative in the aggregate, but not to identify which individual market (or markets) is in distress, as the CMDI does. Furthermore, we also show that (i) contemporaneous movements in the CMDI are only weakly related to arbitrage violations between CDS and corporate bond markets, and between corporate bond ETFs and the underlying securities; (ii) the CMDI predicts future arbitrage violations in these markets but not vice versa; (iii) arbitrage violations are not correlated with primary market activity. This is important context to studies that use arbitrage violations to imply issues in the bond market, by offering a measure that can identify if the dislocations may be instead in the derivatives markets.

While our focus in this paper is the corporate bond market, the methodology can be applied to measure dislocations in other markets. Since the global financial crisis and the on-
set of the pandemic-related market distress, central banks around the world are increasingly instituting programs to support market functioning (see, for example, “Market dysfunction and central bank tools” which lays out backstop principles for market interventions), making robust measures of market dislocations particularly salient. The methodology is particularly advantageous when when multiple volatile signals exist such as when both primary and secondary market functioning is of interest.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We summarize the data used in the paper and the properties of the raw market conditions indicators in Section 3. Section 4 describes the construction of the CMDI, and documents how the index evolves over time. We investigate the differential information in the CMDI relative to common measures of financial stress in Section 5. Section 6 then considers the predictive information in the CMDI for future market conditions, while Section 7 evaluates the predictive information in the CMDI for future real outcomes. We examine the differential information from primary market metrics in Section 8. Section 9 concludes. Technical details can be found in the Appendix, and additional results and robustness exercises can be found in the Online Appendix.

2 Distress and distress recognition

2.1 What is corporate bond market distress?

Borio (2004) defines a functioning secondary market as one in which transactions can take place rapidly and with little impact on price, so that the difference between buy and sell prices is small, the size of the transaction volume that can be absorbed without undue influence on prices is large, execution is immediate, and prices return quickly to “normal” levels after temporary order imbalances. Episodes of market distress – or “liquidity black holes” in practitioner parlance – are marked by heavily one-sided order flow, rapid price changes, and financial distress on the part of many market participants. As noted in Morris and Shin (2004), large price changes alone are not sufficient to characterize a liquidity black hole as
large price changes can instead indicate a smoothly functioning market that incorporates new information quickly.

A policy maker monitoring market functioning is plausibly concerned about not just functioning in the secondary market but also functioning in the primary market. Indeed, the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, which specifies the so-called 13(3) authority of the Federal Reserve, states that in order to supply backstop lending that

...the Federal Reserve Bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.

That is, from a statutory perspective, distress of a market is characterized by a shut-down of the primary market itself, not an inability to execute secondary market transactions rapidly and with little impact on the secondary market price. Similarly, the BIS Markets Committee\(^2\) highlights the flow of credit, stating

Market dysfunction has the potential to disrupt the flow of credit to the economy, thereby impacting real activity and price stability and, as a result, attainment of central banks’ monetary policy goals.

2.2 How do we recognize distress?

We now outline an information-theoretical framework that motivates the construction of the CMDI. Consider a risk-averse policy maker who has the option of intervening to improve market conditions but has limited resources to do so and thus would only like to intervene when the market is truly in distress.\(^3\)

The policy maker can construct \(N\) measures of market functioning, denoted by \(s_i, i = 1, \ldots, N\). These measures capture \(K \leq N\) different, possibly overlapping, aspects of market

\(^2\)“Market dysfunction and central bank tools”

\(^3\)The question of how to determine the optimal threshold in a binary classification problem has been studied extensively in medical applications (see e.g. Pepe, 2003; Baker and Kramer, 2007) and more recently in applications to “leaning against the wind” (see e.g. Drehmann and Juselius, 2014; Greenwood et al., 2022).
functioning, so that the policy maker cannot simply average across the measures to obtain a single indicator. The policy maker can, however, interpret increases in any individual measures as deteriorations in the corresponding aspect of market functioning, so that distress in aspect $i$ at time $t_1$ is strictly higher than distress at time $t_2$ if $s_{i,t_1} > s_{i,t_2}$.\(^4\)

In this setting, how can a policy maker coalesce the information about distress or functioning in different aspects of the market into a single indicator? A simple average of multiple measures is often the default approach (or, its more sophisticated version, principal-components analysis [PCA]). But here, identifying distress requires measures of different aspects rather than different measures of the same aspect. When the simple average approach (or its more sophisticated extensions such as PCA) is not appropriate, the policy maker should want to put more weight on measures that provide more similar information to other measures in distressed times and downweigh conflicting information. That is, the policy maker wants to intervene when the market is in distress along a greater number of features, not when the “average” feature is more distressed.

To illustrate the difference between distress of the average feature and distress along a greater number of features, consider the following simple example. Suppose that we were to only use bid-ask spreads and primary market volume as measures of market functioning. In which of the following two situations is the market more distressed?

1. The bid-ask spread is in its top tenth historical percentile, so that liquidity in the market is poor, while primary market volume is also in its top tenth historical percentile, so that issuance is nonetheless high.

2. Both the bid-ask spread and issuance volume are at their corresponding historical medians.

From the perspective of a single measure that averages across metrics, market distress is at the same level in both situations, as the average metric is in the center of the distribution\(^4\) Measures can be “signed” in this way without loss of generality. If an indicator usually falls during periods of stress, the signal would be the decreases in the indicator, rather than increases and vice versa.
in both cases. A measure that instead identifies market distress as distress along a greater
number of features will perceive the second situation as being potentially more concerning
as the bid-ask spread and issuance volume provide conflicting signals in the first example.

The problem of identifying similarity of features has been extensively studied in the
machine learning literature, particularly in applications to image recognition and language
processing. From a theoretical perspective, Lin (1998) derives a “similarity theorem” that
states that the similarity between two features \( A \) and \( B \) is measured as the information
needed to convey the commonalities between \( A \) and \( B \) relative to the information needed to
describe \( A \) and \( B \) fully.\(^5\)

In practice, measuring similarity is complicated by variations in how features are ob-
served. For example, in a facial recognition setting, images of the same face can vary due to
expressions, illumination conditions, aging and accessories. Likewise, in language processing,
comparisons between, for example, company names may be contaminated by different abbre-
viation and punctuation choices. In our context, comparisons between measures of different
features of market functioning are complicated by potentially differential natural scales of
measures. The machine learning literature (see e.g. Deng et al., 2005) suggests the following
steps to measure feature similarity in this context.

1. Put all measures on an equal footing. In the financial market setting, the (pseudo-
real-time empirical cumulative distribution function provides a non-parametric stan-
dardization of measures of market functioning. For the case of normally-distributed
measures, this is equivalent to a \( z \)-score transformation, with the mean and variance
estimated on a (pseudo-)real-time basis.

2. Reduce dimensionality of the measure vector to extract a compact feature vector. In our
setting, different aspects of primary and secondary market functioning provide natural
groupings of measures. That is, it is natural to, for example, group all measures of
secondary market liquidity together, and separate from measures of primary market

\(^5\)For example, if \( A \) and \( B \) are identical, the similarity between \( A \) and \( B \) is exactly 1.
issuance. Within each group of market functioning measures, we apply a simple average to reduce the dimensionality, constructing a set of sub-indices corresponding to each feature.\footnote{In the Appendix, we investigate alternative dimension reduction approaches, as well as alternative groupings of the underlying measures.}

3. Evaluate similarity of the reduced feature vector. A common measure of similarity is regularized cosine similarity, or, in other words, correlation. For each pair of sub-indices, corresponding to pairs of features, we compute the (pseudo-)real-time correlation. Sub-indices that have historically had higher pairwise correlation are sub-indices that provide more similar information.

We use the full pairwise correlation matrix as weights to construct the overall index.

2.3 Why not just use secondary market measures?

If distress in the secondary market coincides with or even precedes distress in the primary market, then there would be no need for additional measures that look directly at the flow of credit. We explore this relationship through the secondary market measure for which the longest time series exists, the excess default premium (EBP) of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). Figure 1 plots the quarterly growth rate of total non-financial corporate bond amount outstanding from Flow of Funds together with average EBP over the quarter. The figure shows that, at least contemporaneously, the EBP is unrelated to changes in bond amount outstanding, so that quarters with high EBP are not quarters with slow downs in corporate bond issuance. Table 1 investigates this relationship more formally by estimating an amount outstanding version of the predictability regressions in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012):

\[
\Delta y_{t+H} = \alpha + \varphi \Delta y_{t-H,t} + \beta_{\text{FF real eff.}} FFR_t + \beta_{\text{slope 10y/1y TSY slope}} \text{slope}_t + \gamma' \text{CS}_t + \epsilon_{t+H},
\]
where $\Delta y_{t,t+H}$ is the annualized log change in amount outstanding over $H$ quarters, Real eff. FFR$_t$ is the real effective federal funds rate, 10y/1y TSY slope$_t$ is the difference between the yield on a 10 year constant maturity Treasury and a one year constant maturity Treasury, and CS$_t$ are measure of corporate bond market conditions.$^7$ In columns (1) and (5) we also report results using quarterly net issuance as the proxy for contemporaneous primary market conditions. Starting with primary market conditions for non-financial corporates in columns (1)--(4), we see that, contemporaneously, there is no relationship between EBP and net issuance and amount outstanding growth. In columns (3) and (4), there is a statistically significant relationship between EBP and changes in amount outstanding, but with the wrong sign: increases in EBP today predict increases in amount outstanding in the future, over the same horizons that they predict decreases in economic activity. Turning to results for corporate bonds issued by banks, in columns (5)--(8), we see that increases in EBP correspond to decreases in amount outstanding only at the one year horizon. Overall, Figure 1 and Table 1 suggest that, while linked, conditions in primary and secondary markets are potentially asynchronous. Results are similar when estimated for shorter time horizons with measures of secondary market distress such as the CDS-bond basis.

Taken together, this suggests that, as a whole, the corporate bond market is in distress when both the primary and secondary markets are struggling. This is times when borrowers cannot access the primary market and the secondary market experiences increases in bid-ask spreads, decreases in market depth, declines in the speed of immediacy, and a decline of market resilience to temporary order imbalances. Thus, market distress is multifaceted and is unlikely to be captured by a proxy for any of its facets alone.

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$^7$We construct the real effective federal funds rate as the difference between the effective federal funds rate and the 12 month change in the core CPI (series CPILFESL).
3 Data

3.1 Secondary market measures

We use corporate bond transactions data from a regulatory version of TRACE, which contain price, uncapped trade size, and buyer and seller identities as well as other trade terms. Registered FINRA dealers are identified by a designated Market Participant Identifier (MPID), and non-FINRA members are identified either as $C$ (for client), or as $A$ (for a non-member affiliate). Transactions are required to be reported in real-time, with 15 minutes delay, with occasional cancelled or corrected trades. In the regulatory version of TRACE, cancelled and corrected records are linked with a control number, so we keep the most up to date record of the trade. We also address multiple reporting of interdealer trades, as well as trades that were executed through a non-exempt Alternative Trading System (ATS). Additional details on cleaning of TRACE data are available in Appendix A.1.

After applying these cleaning steps, we keep secondary-trades only, and exclude trades with price and size outliers, trades on weekends and SIFMA holidays, and special-processing trades. The remaining dataset includes 171,194,725 bond-trade level observations, corresponding to 151,642 unique CUSIPs or 19,563 unique issuers. We then combine the trading activity data with bond and firm characteristics from Mergent FISD, and construct bond-trading date level measures of liquidity and secondary market spreads. It is important to note that although we use the regulatory version of Corporate TRACE, in the construction of the liquidity measures we do not use any measures that depends on dealers’ identities. This is to show that the CMDI can be re-produced by non-regulatory TRACE users. Even using standard TRACE, which includes capped trade sizes, and calculating liquidity measures based on approximated trade size (based on the historical relationship between capped and uncapped trade sizes; MarketAxess, for example, offers their users such an approximation) results in very similar levels of CMDI that is calculated using TRACE uncapped trade size.
We construct five sets of weekly metrics of secondary market functioning, capturing secondary volume, liquidity, duration-matched spreads, default-adjusted spreads and conditions for non-traded bonds. These measures are described qualitatively in this section, and with greater detail in Appendix A.2.

**Measures of volume** We use four metrics of trading volume in the secondary market: dealer-to-customer volume as a fraction of gross trading volume (which we dub “intermediated volume”), average dealer-to-customer trade size, ratio of customer buy volume to customer sell volume (which we dub “customer buy-sell pressure ratio”), and turnover. Intermediated volume captures how easily customer volume can be absorbed by dealers in the market, with a lower intermediated volume indicating that the same dealer-to-customer volume generates a greater dealer-to-dealer volume. Turnover measures the fraction of amount outstanding that trades every day. Figure 2a plots the time series of the measures of secondary market volume. Turnover tends to be high and intermediated volume, average trade size and customer buy-sell pressure ratio all tend to be low during periods of market stress, as customers re-balance portfolios and dealers require a greater volume of interdealer trading before finding the ultimate customer buyers to offset customer sales.

**Measures of liquidity** We construct four standard metrics of market liquidity for corporate bonds: effective bid-ask spread, Thompson and Waller (1987) spread, Amihud (2002) price impact, and imputed round-trip cost. Figure 2b plots the time series of these four metrics. Figure 2b shows that, although the absolute level of each metric is different, with imputed round-trip cost generally the lowest measure of illiquidity and the Thompson and Waller spread the highest, the four spreads co-move tightly together, rising during periods of market distress. Indeed, the first principal component of the four spreads explains 88% of the variation.
Measures of duration-matched spreads. To capture information about the pricing of the corporate bond market relative to Treasuries, we compute duration-matched spreads as in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) at the bond-level, and construct time series of average spreads, spread volatility (time series standard deviation), and interquartile range of spreads (cross-sectional standard deviation). To keep the index interpretable as a real-time index of market conditions, we compute the average spread and spread volatility from an ARCH-in-mean model (Engle et al., 1987) estimated on an expanding window, using the first two years of the sample (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2006) as the initial sample. Figure 2c plots the time series of the three moments of duration-matched spreads. Though all three metrics increase during periods of broad market distress, such as the 2008-2009 financial crisis and March 2020, spread volatility tends to normalize much more quickly and does not increase as much during less significant periods of disruptions, such as the European debt crisis and the 2015–2016 manufacturing recession.

Measures of default-adjusted spreads. Duration-matched spreads capture the pricing of corporate bonds relative to similar duration Treasuries but reflect both expected default rates and default risk premia. To isolate the latter, we construct default-adjusted spreads at the bond-level, and construct time series of average spreads, spreads volatility (time series standard deviation), and interquartile range of spreads (cross-sectional standard deviation). To keep the index interpretable as a real-time index of market conditions, we estimate the predictive regression for the default-adjusted spread on an expanding window basis, using the first two years of the sample (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2006) as the initial sample. As with the duration-matched spreads, we further compute the average spread and spread volatility from an ARCH-in-mean model (Engle et al., 1987) estimated on an expanding window, using the first two years of the sample (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2006) as the initial sample. Figure 2d plots the time series of the three moments of default-adjusted spreads. As with the duration-matched spreads, all three metrics increase during periods of
broad market distress, with spreads volatility normalizing much quicker than the other two measures.

**Measures of conditions for non-traded bonds** While TRACE provides a wealth of information on market conditions for bonds that are actually traded on the secondary market, TRACE does not capture information about market conditions for bonds which are not regularly traded. Instead, we use price quotes from ICE - BAML for bonds included in ICE - BAML U.S. corporate bond indices to construct average default-adjusted spreads, spreads volatility (time series standard deviation), and interquartile range of spreads (cross-sectional standard deviation). As with the traded spreads, we compute the average spread and spread volatility from an ARCH-in-mean model (Engle et al., 1987) estimated on an expanding window, using the first two years of the sample (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2006) as the initial sample. Figure 2e shows that the quoted-traded spread increases during periods of market stress, such as the financial crisis and March 2020 market disruption, so that conditions for non-traded bonds deteriorate even more than those for traded bonds during periods of market stress.

**3.2 Primary market measures**

We obtain information about the functioning of the primary market of U.S. corporate bonds from Mergent FISD. From the overall set of fixed income securities reported in Mergent FISD, we select securities that are identified as corporate securities, excluding convertible securities. As with the secondary market metrics, we start with the granular data on issuance at the bond level. We construct two sets of weekly metrics of primary market functioning, with details available in Appendix A.3.

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8As with the default-adjusted spread index based on TRACE trades, to keep the index interpretable as a real-time index of market conditions, we estimate the predictive regression for the quoted default-adjusted spread on an expanding window basis, using the first two years of the sample (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2006) as the initial sample.
Measures of primary market issuance  We construct two metrics of primary market issuance: dollar amount issued relative to the average issuance in the same week of the year over the previous five years and dollar amount issued relative to the amount outstanding maturing in the next year. Considering issuance relative to historical issuance allows us to account for both the overall positive time trend in bond issuance as well as seasonality in the timing of corporate bond issuance, while issuance relative to maturing within the next year captures the ability of companies to satisfy their re-financing needs. Figure 2f shows that while these two metrics mostly co-move together, with the rate of issuance declining during periods of distress, the information they provide is not identical.

Measures of primary market spread  Finally, we use offering yields to construct average default-adjusted offering spreads and offering spreads volatility (time series standard deviation). As with the secondary market spreads, we compute the average spread and spread volatility from an ARCH-in-mean model (Engle et al., 1987) estimated on an expanding window, using the first two years of the sample (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2006) as the initial sample. Figure 2g shows that, while the primary-secondary spread is positive and relatively small during “normal” periods, the spread becomes negative and large during periods of distress. That is, while during normal times primary market pricing reflects a positive spread to prevailing secondary market prices and issuers are freely able to access the market, market access during downturns is restricted to better-performing issuers, and the average price in the primary market is above the average price in the secondary market.

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9As with the secondary market default-adjusted spread indices, to keep the index interpretable as a real-time index of market conditions, we estimate the predictive regression for the primary market default-adjusted spread on an expanding window basis, using the first two years of the sample (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2006) as the initial sample.
4 Corporate Bond Market Distress Index

4.1 Aggregating to an index

Armed with weekly time series of primary and secondary market conditions metrics, we follow the procedure in Hollo et al. (2012) to construct a weekly index of corporate bond market dislocations. We summarize here the steps involved in this procedure. Note that we have normalized the “sign” of all series so that a high value of each standardized metric corresponds to a period of stress identified by that metric.

**Standardizing each metric** We begin by standardizing each individual metric using the empirical cumulative distribution function of the metric. The appeal of this transformation is that it allows us to combine variables with different “natural” units by imposing a common support without assuming a particular parametric transformation, as would, for example, be the case with a $z$-score transformation. More specifically, given a time series $\{x_{it}\}_{t=1}^{T}$ of the $i$th metric and a corresponding ranked sample $(x_{i[1]}, \ldots, x_{i[T]})$, with $x_{i[1]} \leq x_{i[2]} \leq \ldots \leq x_{i[T]}$. The standardized times series $\{z_{it}\}_{t=1}^{T}$ of the $i$th metric is then given by:

$$z_{it} = \hat{F}_{iT}(x_{it}) = \begin{cases} \frac{r}{T} & \forall x_{i[r]} \leq x_{it} < x_{i[r+1]}, \quad r = 1, 2, \ldots, T - 1 \\ 1 & \forall x_{it} \geq x_{i[T]} \\ 0 & \forall x_{it} < x_{i[1]} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

As discussed in Hollo et al. (2012), the transformation (1) can be applied to the full sample of each variable, creating an “in-sample” transformation, or on an expanding sample, producing a pseudo-real-time estimate of the index. As observations get added to the sample, so that $T$ grows, the shape of the empirical CDF can change, as shown in the comparison between the full-sample and the expanding sample empirical CDFs plotted in Figure A.3.

We use the expanding sample transformation in our construction of the index as it cor-
responds more closely to the objective of monitoring market conditions in real time and allowing a true test of the approach with historical data. We use the first two years of the data (January 2, 2005 – December 30, 2006) as the initial sample, and add one week at a time to create the transformed series.

**Creating sub-indices** We group metrics into 7 categories: secondary market volume, secondary market liquidity, secondary market duration-matched spreads, secondary market default-adjusted spreads, traded-quoted spreads, primary market issuance, and primary-secondary market spreads. For each category, we construct the category-specific sub-index as the equal-weighted average of the standardized constituent series. Figure 3 plots the time series of all 7 sub-indices. Although each individual sub-index is quite noisy, as we will see in the next figure, the combined index is not. In addition, Figure 3 hints that a simple average across the sub-indices may omit important information about time-varying co-movement across the sub-indices without eliminating the noise of the individual sub-indices.

**Time-varying correlation weights** The final step in the construction of the corporate bond market distress index is to combine the sub-indices using time-varying correlation weights, corresponding to cosine-similarity weighting across features of the market. To that end, as in Hollo et al. (2012), we estimate time-varying correlations \( \rho_{ij} \) between our 7 sub-indices on a recursive basis using an exponentially-weighted moving average approach:

\[
\sigma_{ij,t} = \lambda \sigma_{ij,t-1} + (1 - \lambda) \tilde{s}_{it} \tilde{s}_{jt}, \quad i, j = 1, \ldots, 7
\]

\[
\rho_{ij,t} = \frac{\sigma_{ij,t}}{\sqrt{\sigma_{ii,t} \sigma_{jj,t}}},
\]

where \( \sigma_{ij,t} \) is the estimate of the time-varying covariance between sub-indices \( i \) and \( j \) (and \( \sigma_{ii,t} \) is the estimate of the time-varying variance of sub-index \( i \)), and \( \tilde{s}_{it} = (s_{it} - 0.5) \) is the deviation of the value \( s_{it} \) of sub-index \( i \) from its theoretical mean of 0.5.\(^{10}\) The exponentially-
weighted moving average assigns relatively more weight to the recent history and relatively less weight to more distant observations. For our baseline results, we choose $\lambda = 0.9$ so that observations more than one year in the past receive essentially no weight in the index. As with the empirical CDF, we use the first two years of the data to initialize the covariance matrix in the recursion (2).

Figure 4 plots the estimated time-varying correlation matrix across the 7 sub-indices. A couple of features are worth noting. First, the exponentially-weighted moving average accommodates meaningful time-variation in correlations without excessive high-frequency fluctuations. Second, for a number of sub-index pairs, the sign of the correlation switches over time, so that series that were positively correlated in the past can become negatively correlated and vice versa. Figure 4 thus demonstrates the importance of taking into account time variation in the co-movement between even closely-related sub-indices. For example, even the correlation between the secondary market duration-matched and default-adjusted spread indices is almost never 1 and, moreover, dips below 0.5 during both the financial crisis and the European debt crisis. Importantly, we see that toward the end of our sample, the sign of the correlation switches for a number of sub-index pairs, a feature that might be missed by alternative weighting schemes.

Given the estimated time-varying correlation matrix $\mathcal{R}_t$, with $(i,j)$ element given by $\rho_{ij,t}$, we construct the CMDI as

$$\text{CMDI}_t = \frac{\sqrt{s_t' \mathcal{R}_t s_t}}{7},$$

where $s_t$ is the column-vector of the seven sub-indices $s_t = [s_{1t}, \ldots, s_{7t}]'$. In the special case when all the sub-indices are perfectly correlated, so that $\mathcal{R}_t$ is the $7 \times 7$ matrix of ones, the CMDI collapses to the equally-weighted average across the sub-indices: $\sum_{i,j=1}^{7} s_{it} s_{jt} = (\sum_{i=1}^{7} s_{it})^2$, so that $\text{CMDI}_t = (\sum_{i=1}^{7} s_{it}) / 7$. 18
4.2 Results

We begin by examining the time series of the CMDI, plotted in Figure 5 for both the full sample (Figure 5a) and zoomed-in for 2020 (Figure 5b). Starting with the full sample, we see that the CMDI peaks in the fall of 2008 and remains elevated beyond the end of the Great Recession (first gray shaded area). The CMDI then has a local peak at the height of the European debt crisis (first peach shaded area), and then a smaller peak in the middle of the 2015–2016 manufacturing recession (second peach shaded area). The final pre-2020 peak is at the end of 2018, corresponding to market turmoil in both equity and credit markets, which was ameliorated by the Federal Open Market Committee pausing its cycle of interest rate increases. In addition to plotting the index, which varies from 0 to 1, we show the percentile of the pre-2020 distribution on the right axis, which offers a more intuitive context, as well as highlighting the historically extreme levels of dislocation reached in 2020.

Turning to the more recent period in Figure 5b, we see that, prior to the start of the COVID-19-related disruptions to asset markets in March 2020, the CMDI was noticeably below the pre-2020 historical median. The CMDI rose above the historical 90th percentile – estimated based on data prior to January 2020 – the week ending on March 21. This was the first time it had reached that percentile since the financial crisis. The announcement of Federal Reserve interventions on March 22 halted any further increases in the level of the CMDI, but the index remained above this historical benchmark until the week ending on April 11, which coincided with the announced expansion of the Corporate Credit Facilities in both size and scope. Over the course of April and May, the CMDI continued its gradual decline and was modestly below the historical median by the end of July 2020. Interestingly, the commencement of ETF purchases by the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility on May 12 did not immediately accelerate the pace of improvement of the index; indeed, the index did not drop below the historical 75th percentile until after the start of purchases of cash bonds on June 16. This is consistent with the larger impact of cash bond purchases on
secondary market pricing and liquidity documented in Boyarchenko et al. (2022).

We expand the understanding of the how conditions in primary and secondary markets enter into the overall index in Figure 6, which shows a decompositon of the square of the CMDI into the underlying sub-indices.\textsuperscript{11} Note that, unlike the index itself, the square of the index is additive in these components, making a linear decomposition feasible.

Increases in the secondary-market-related sub-indices tend to somewhat lead increases in the primary-market-related sub-indices, consistent with the conventional wisdom that trading-activity-based measures react more quickly to changing economic conditions. Moreover, since corporate bond issuances take a relatively long time to “come to market”, intuitively, we would expect primary market deteriorations to be more sluggish.

For example, while the secondary market measures were already elevated starting in the second half of 2007, the primary market conditions only deteriorated to historical highs in Fall 2008. Consistent with the fluctuating sign of pairwise correlations we see in Figure 4, the sign of the contribution from both primary and secondary market volume measures fluctuates over time. What characterizes periods of broad market distress (financial crisis, European debt crisis, 2015 – 2016 manufacturing recession, end of 2018 market turmoil, 2020 recession) is rapid deterioration in both secondary market measures accompanied by a deterioration in the primary-secondary spread and primary market issuance volumes. That is, during periods of broad market distress, conditions across both the primary and secondary markets deteriorate, amplifying the individual contribution of each market to the overall index. In contrast, outside these periods of market distress, the contribution from the interaction terms is either negligible or negative, suggesting that, during normal times, this secondary-primary market amplification spiral does not arise. This decomposition also adds intuition as to how the index methodology can add more information than a simple average or principal components approach.

Examining the contributions from these components to 2020, we see that the secondary

\textsuperscript{11}More specifically, the contribution from index $i$ is $s_{it} \sum_{j=1}^{7} \rho_{ij,t} s_{jt}/49$. \hfill 

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market conditions deteriorated dramatically in March. This coincided with a mild increase in contribution to the index from the primary-secondary spread. Notice that the relatively mild deterioration in the primary market is consistent with Federal Reserve’s interventions in the broad market forestalling a credit crunch for corporate issuers. Since the March 22 facilities announcement, all components retraced, with the primary market issuance index contributing negatively at the end of the sample. Driven by the record issuance since April 2020, conditions in the primary market approached those prior to the COVID shock (February 2020); likewise, conditions in the secondary market improved substantially.

Prior literature has argued that dealer balance sheet constraints play an important role in shaping corporate bond market conditions. We now investigate how individual contributions to the CMDI are related to a commonly-used proxy for dealer balance sheet constraints – the average 5-year CDS spread for the so-called “G14” dealers. In particular, we estimate the following predictive regression for $h$ period ahead metric:

$$\text{Contribution}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \text{Avg. dealer CDS}_{i,t} + \varphi_i \text{Contribution}_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{i,t}. \quad (5)$$

When $\beta_i$ is positive, the contribution of sub-index $i$ is greater when dealer balance sheets are more impaired. In this and the rest of the regression specifications below, we include additional lags of our variables of interest; as shown in Olea and Plagborg-Møller (2020), this augmentation implies that standard inference can be conducted based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, despite the persistence of both the dependent and independent variables in the regression.13

Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients from regression (5). In the full 2005 – 2020 sample, the average dealer 5-year CDS spread is significantly associated with contributions to the CMDI (squared) from secondary market credit spreads (both the duration-matched and default-adjusted spread), secondary-market liquidity, the spread between traded and

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12 See e.g. Ang et al. (2011).
13 We include 13 additional lags in the weekly regressions. Results are robust to alternative lag choices.
quoted prices, and primary market issuance. In particular, when the 5-year CDS spread is higher, so that dealer balance sheets are more likely to be constrained, contributions from these sub-indices are larger.

While the full sample provides us with the most power to detect these relationships, the literature on dealer participation in the corporate bond market has noted that there may have been distinct regimes (see e.g. Adrian et al., 2017a; Bessembinder et al., 2018). We follow this literature and investigate how the relationship between the average dealer 5-year CDS spread and contributions to the CMDI change across 4 sub-periods: the pre-crisis period (characterized by loose market conditions and looser dealer balance sheet constraints, Jan. 1, 2005 – Dec. 31, 2006); the crisis period (characterized by tight market conditions and tight dealer balance sheet constraints, Jan. 1, 2007 – Dec. 31, 2009); the “rule writing period” (characterized by the proposal of new post-crisis regulations Jan. 1, 2010 – Dec. 31, 2013); and the “rule implementation period” (characterized by the implementation of post-crisis regulations, Jan. 1, 2014 –).

Table 2 shows that, in the pre-crisis period, there is no relationship between the average dealer 5-year CDS spread and contributions of the different sub-indices to the CMDI, with the exception of the volume sub-index, which has a counter-intuitive negative correlation. This may be due to either the relatively poor quality of CDS quotes pre-crisis or relatively little fundamental variation in dealer balance sheet constraints during this period. In contrast, in all three remaining sub-periods the relationship between credit spreads and liquidity metrics with CDS spreads is positive and generally significant, suggesting that the overall relationship we see in the full sample is not driven by any one sub-period.

5 CMDI and common measures of financial stress

As we see in Figure 5, the CMDI increases during periods that have colloquially been identified as periods of stress in the corporate bond market, with the peak of the CMDI occurring
during the financial crisis and the next largest peak during the COVID-19-related market stress in March 2020. We now compare and contrast the information about corporate bond market functioning provided by the CMDI with that provided by common measures of financial stress used by market participants and in the prior literature.

**Measures of broad market risk-aversion** We begin by comparing the time series evolution of the CMDI to two commonly used proxies for market participants’ overall risk-aversion: VIX and Treasury curve fitting errors (Treasury market “noise”) for both the nominal and the real Treasury curves.\(^{14}\) Figure 7a shows that, while the CMDI is relatively highly correlated (74% correlation in levels) with the VIX, the CMDI does provide distinct information. For example, while the CMDI increases already in the summer of 2007, the sharp increases in the VIX during the financial crisis only materialize in the fall of 2008. On the other hand, the VIX rises noticeably at the beginning of the European debt crisis in spring of 2010 when Greece requested initial assistance,\(^{15}\) whereas the CMDI only signals a deterioration in bond market conditions starting in the second half of 2011, when additional peripheral European countries began to experience marked sovereign distress. Similarly, the VIX spiked up at month end January 2018, reportedly caused by an unwinding of “short volatility” trades. While this represented equity market stress, the CMDI remained flat during the same period, highlighting that the CMDI measures corporate bond market distress in particular, rather than stress of related markets.

Turning to Figure 7b, we see that the CMDI has a much weaker relationship with measures of Treasury market frictions. While all three measures rise dramatically in the later stages of the financial crisis and during the March 2020 broad market turmoil, there is little co-movement between the CMDI and the nominal and real Treasury curve fitting errors otherwise. Thus, the CMDI provides distinct information about the overall condition of the

\(^{14}\)See Appendix A.4 for details on the construction of the Treasury curve fitting errors. We obtain these data from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Hu et al. (2013) show that Treasury noise predicts fixed income hedge fund arbitrage returns.

\(^{15}\)On April 23, 2010, the Greek government requested an initial loan of €45 billion from the European Union and International Monetary Fund, triggering an increase in global uncertainty.
corporate bond market rather than commonly used proxies of market participants’ attitudes towards risk.

**Measures of corporate borrowing conditions** Potentially more closely related to the CMDI are measures which reflect frictions in corporate borrowing markets more broadly. The corporate bond market is closely linked to two derivatives markets: corporate bond ETFs and credit default swaps (CDS). The relationship of the corporate bond market with each of these derivatives markets is usually summarized using the ETF-NAV basis and the CDS-bond basis, respectively. In particular, the absolute ETF-NAV basis measures the absolute relative deviation of the ETF price from the price of the replicating basket of corporate bonds, with a large basis indicating greater divergence between the value of the ETF and the value of the corporate bond portfolio it holds.\(^\text{16}\) Figure 7c plots the CMDI together with the ETF-NAV basis for exchange traded funds (ETFs) that specialize in investment-grade bonds, as well as the ETF-NAV basis for ETFs that specialize in high-yield bonds. A couple of features are readily apparent. The ETF-NAV basis is fairly volatile, with periods of stress manifesting as an increased amplitude of fluctuations, rather than a prolonged period of elevated basis. Moreover, the ETF-NAV basis exhibits this increased volatility during some periods of corporate bond market stress but not others, suggesting that the information value of signals from this measure is limited. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the corporate bond ETF market is relatively novel, with a large number of corporate bond ETFs only launched in the post-crisis period, which complicates historical comparisons. Both of these features translate into the ETF-NAV basis having low co-movement with the CMDI.

Similarly, the absolute CDS-bond basis measures the absolute relative deviation of a CDS-market-implied bond yield for a particular firm to the yield on a matched-maturity bond of the same firm, with a larger CDS-bond basis indicating that buying protection against corporate default in the CDS market is relatively mispriced. As with the ETF-NAV basis in Figure 7c, Figure 7d shows that the absolute CDS-bond basis is only weakly correlated with

\(^{16}\)See Appendix A.4 for details on the construction of the ETF-NAV basis series.
the CMDI outside of the financial crisis and the 2020 pandemic.

Finally, considering the relationship between corporate bond markets and commercial and industrial (C&I) loan market for similarly-sized borrowers, Figure 7e plots the CMDI against the net tightening of lending standards for C&I loans made to medium and large firms as reported in the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS). Broadly speaking, the low frequency movements in the CMDI are mirrored in the SLOOS series, suggesting that periods of bond market distress are also periods when the C&I loan market is also constrained. This is consistent with theories of intermediary asset pricing, with bank holding companies (BHCs) acting as the marginal intermediary in both bond and loan markets (see e.g. Adrian et al., 2017a,b, for evidence on the role of BHCs in corporate bond market liquidity). That said, the precise timing of deterioration in corporate borrowing conditions is somewhat asynchronous across the two markets. The asynchronicity suggests that, while the SLOOS series provides a useful summary of conditions in the corporate loan market, it is not a substitute for the CMDI, both in terms of the periods of stress captured by each metric, as well as in terms of the timeliness and observation frequency of the metric.  

**Broad indicators of financial conditions**  Moving to measures of financial conditions more generally, Figure 7f compares corporate bond market conditions to the Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI)\(^\text{18}\) and ECB’s Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS)\(^\text{19}\) for the U.S. In general, consistent with both NFCI and CISS capturing aggregate financial conditions, the three series broadly co-move, with CISS exhibiting the

\(^{17}\) Notice that the SLOOS series is only available at a quarterly frequency, with the survey timed so that results are available for the January/February, April/May, August, and October/November meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee. Note that in prior periods of increased economic uncertainty or stress, such as 1998 and 2001, additional surveys had been conducted.

\(^{18}\) The NFCI is computed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, available at https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/nfci/index. The NFCI provides a weekly estimate of U.S. financial conditions in money markets, debt and equity markets, and the traditional and shadow banking systems. The index is a weighted average of 105 measures of financial activity, each expressed relative to their sample averages and scaled by their sample standard deviations. The list of indicators is provided at https://www.chicagofed.org/~media/publications/nfci/nfci-indicators-list-pdf.pdf. The methodology for the NFCI is described in Brave and Butters (2011) and is based on the quasi maximum likelihood estimators for large dynamic factor models developed by Doz et al. (2012).

most and NFCI exhibiting the least high frequency variation. Similar to the VIX, both the CISS and the NFCI increase around the start of the European debt crisis in April 2010 and at month end January 2018. Furthermore, the CMDI shows a deterioration in corporate bond markets in summer of 2007, before either CISS or NFCI.

**Dealer constraints** Recent literature (see e.g. Adrian et al., 2017a, and the literature within) has emphasized the role that dealer constraints play in determining bond liquidity. Figure 7g plots the CMDI together with average dealer value-at-risk (VaR) per unit of dealer equity.\(^{20}\) While dealer VaR has broadly the same time series behavior as the CMDI, there are important differences in the post-crisis sample, with the dealer VaR exhibiting a secular decline starting in 2009 up until the start of the pandemic. In contrast, as we have discussed above, the CMDI increases during the European debt crisis, the 2015 – 2016 manufacturing recession, and during the market distress episode at the end of 2018.

Overall, Figure 7 demonstrates that, although at times the CMDI gives similar signals as commonly used measures of financial market stress, the information provided by the CMDI is distinct and captures conditions specific to the corporate bond market. Moreover, the construction of the CMDI offers a distinct advantage over the principal component approach used in prior literature for coalescing information from multiple metrics in this market, honing the signal from the underlying (somewhat noisy) indicators. Finally, Table 3 summarizes the correlation in levels between the CMDI and the alternative measures, both for the full sample and the sample excluding the financial crisis (August 1, 2007 – December 31, 2009) and 2020 (January 1, 2020 – November 28, 2020). Correlations of the CMDI with the VIX, NFCI, and CISS remain relatively large and positive even if we exclude periods of broad market and economic distress.

To investigate the relationship between the CMDI and these measures of market condi-

\(^{20}\)See the Appendix for details on the construction of the aggregate VaR time series.
tions more formally, we estimate the following regression:

$$CDM_1 = \alpha + \varphi CDM_{t-1} + \beta' \mathcal{M}_t + \epsilon_t,$$

where $\mathcal{M}_t$ is the (vector of) market condition metrics.\footnote{We include 13 additional lags in these weekly regressions. Results are robust to alternative lag choices.} Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from the above regression. Across all specifications, including the market conditions variables adds little explanatory power for movements in the CMDI beyond that explained by lags of the CMDI itself. Beyond explanatory power, the statistical significance of the estimated $\beta$ coefficients on these measures is concentrated in a few variables, namely the VIX, CISS, bid-ask spreads and duration-matched spreads. In column (13), which includes all the measures, only bid-ask spreads and duration-matched spreads have a statistically-significant relationship with the CMDI. Thus, while the CMDI is correlated with commonly-used measures of market conditions, it contains differential information, which we investigate in the next sections.

6 Bond market distress and future market conditions

We now examine whether market dislocations today predict future realizations of commonly-used proxies for corporate credit market conditions. Similarly to the analysis in Section 5, we focus here on high frequency measures of aggregate risk-aversion (VIX), measures that suggest dislocations between markets (CDS-bond basis, ETF-NAV basis), and measures of secondary market pricing and liquidity (duration-matched spreads, bid-ask spreads). A predictive relationship between the CMDI and future realizations of such commonly-used metrics would indicate that the index provides relevant and timely information, identifying imminent distress that may not be consistently captured by any one metric.
Formally, we estimate the following predictive regression for $h$ period ahead metric:

$$X_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i + \sum_j \varphi_{ij}X_{j,t} + \epsilon_{i,t+h},$$

where $X_{i,t}$ is a single measure of market stress (including the CMDI). Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients from regression (7) for horizons of up to 18 months, across the VIX, duration-matched spreads, bid-ask spreads, IG and HY CDS-bond basis, IG and HY ETF-NAV basis, and the CMDI.

Three features are notable. First, the CMDI is a significant predictor of other measures of market stress across all but one of the horizon-variable pairs. Thus, for example, from the first column of Table 5a, we can observe that a 0.1 increase in the CMDI predicts a 2.6 increase in the VIX in 6 months’ time at the 5% significance level. Looking at the rest of the estimated coefficients in the first column, we observe that none of the other variables are statistically significant predictors of future VIX values.

Second, while the CMDI is consistently statistically significant, the other predictors may become significant for some variables and some horizons. Indeed, including the CMDI often drives out the significance of even the lagged values of the predicted series (e.g. when predicting future VIX realizations, the current level of the VIX is not significant at any of the three horizons once we control for the CMDI).

Third, future realizations of the CMDI (last column in all three panels) are not consistently predicted by the other market distress measures. The only predictors that are statistically significant at all are the bid-ask spreads at the 6 month horizon (but with a counterintuitive negative coefficient), and the HY ETF-NAV basis at the 12 month and the 18 month horizon.

Overall, the results in Table 5 show that CMDI predicts future realizations of commonly-used measures of market stress, even when controlling for contemporaneous realizations of those measures, but not vice versa. In other words, the CMDI Granger-causes future market
conditions, highlighting the benefits of using the CMDI to measure corporate bond market distress. We conjecture that the index provides more timely and precise signals of market functioning exactly because it is an aggregate index. While any individual measure is noisy, signalling both false positives (e.g. credit spreads increasing when credit risk rises) and false negatives (primary market volume remaining flat during the 2015–2016 manufacturing recession), the index coalesces information from multiple sources. Thus, false positives are discounted when deteriorations are idiosyncratic to a single measure; likewise, false negatives are “corrected” when other metrics indicate dislocations.

7 Bond market distress and real outcomes

Recent literature (see e.g. Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012; López-Salido et al., 2017; Krishnamurthy and Muir, 2017) has stressed the predictive content of credit spreads for future real activity. We now investigate the natural question of whether incorporating information about corporate bond market distress more broadly contains additional predictive information for real outcomes over and above that contained in credit spreads. More formally, similar to Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), we estimate the following predictive regression for cumulative one-year-ahead growth rates in real outcomes as a function of lagged real outcomes, risk-free interest rates and credit market conditions:

\[
\Delta y_{t,t+H} = \alpha + \varphi \Delta y_{t-H,t} + \beta_{\text{FF}} \text{Real eff. } \text{FFR}_t + \beta_{\text{Slope}} 10y/1y \text{ TSY slope}_t + \gamma' \text{CS}_t + \epsilon_{t+H},
\]

where Real eff. FFR\(_t\) is the real effective federal funds rate, 10y/1y TSY slope\(_t\) is the difference between the 10 year and the 1 year constant maturity Treasury yields, and CS\(_t\) is the vector of credit conditions variables. For monthly variables (log industrial production and unemployment rate), \(\Delta y_{t,t+H}\) is the 12 month change (\(H = 12\)); for quarterly variables (log real business fixed investment, log real GDP, log Compustat capital expenditures, log...
Compustat sales),\textsuperscript{22} $\Delta y_{t,t+H}$ is the 4 quarter change ($H = 4$). We estimate this regression on the sample excluding observations in 2020 to ensure that our estimates are not driven by the unprecedentedly large movements in economic conditions during the pandemic.

Consider first the predictive relationship between aggregate credit market conditions and future real outcomes (coefficient $\gamma$ in predictive regression (8)). Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) of Table 6 report the estimated coefficient when credit market conditions are measured using the market-level CMDI.\textsuperscript{23}

Across all measures of real activity, a higher level of CMDI – more distressed corporate bond market – is associated with reduced real economic activity over the next year. This effect is both economically and statistically significant, with a 0.1 point change in the CMDI corresponding to a 2.6 percentage point (p.p.) decrease in annual industrial production growth, a 47 bps increase in the unemployment rate over a 12 month period, a 3.2 p.p. decrease in annual real business fixed investment growth, a 87 bps decrease in annual real GDP growth, a 5.6 p.p. decrease in capital expenditures by publicly-listed firms and a 4.8 p.p. decrease in sales of publicly-listed firms.\textsuperscript{24}

Turning to the even columns, we see that these results are robust to controlling for the commonly-used “G-Z” spread (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012) measure of average duration-adjusted credit spreads. For all our measures of real outcomes, the CMDI remains statistically (at at least the 5% significance level) and economically significant. The G-Z spread, instead, is either not statistically significant in most specifications or, in the case of sales growth, is statistically significant but with the wrong sign. The only exception is the unemployment rate, where both the CMDI and the G-Z spread are statistically significant.

Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that corporate bond market functioning, over and above the information contained in credit spreads alone, has predictive information about

\textsuperscript{22}In unreported tables, we find similar results for payroll growth as for changes in the unemployment rate and similar results for profitability (EBITDA) growth as for sales growth.

\textsuperscript{23}We include 3 additional lags in the monthly regressions and one additional lag in quarterly regressions. Results are robust to alternative lag choices.

\textsuperscript{24}In unreported results, we also find that the CMDI contains predictive information for downside risk to real activity, over and above information contained in credit spreads.
future real outcomes. Although we have a relatively short sample (15 years) for which we can construct the CMDI, the reliability of the CMDI as a predictor across a variety of real outcome variables provides reassurance about the robustness of these results.

8 Information in primary market metrics

We now turn to the question of whether the primary market metrics included in the CMDI provide distinct information about the state of the corporate bond market itself and future real outcomes than the secondary market metrics. We follow the same procedure as for the CMDI to construct a primary corporate bond market conditions index (PM-CMDI) and a secondary corporate bond market conditions index (SM-CMDI). The PM-CMDI uses only the primary market issuance and the primary-secondary spread sub-indices as components, while the SM-CMDI uses secondary market volume, secondary market liquidity, duration-matched spread, default-adjusted spread, and quoted-traded spread sub-indices. While the PM-CMDI captures measures of ease of access to the corporate bond market contemporaneously, the SM-CMDI captures conditions in the secondary market and thus potentially future primary market conditions.

Figure 8 plots the time series of the PM-CMDI (in black) and the SM-CMDI (in green), together with the full market index (in blue). The figure highlights that the information in primary market conditions is distinct from the information in secondary market conditions, with slowdowns in the primary market sometimes occurring without slowdowns in the secondary market and vice versa. The overall index is highest when both the PM-CMDI and the SM-CMDI signal dislocations.

Table 7 shows clearly that both the PM-CMDI and SM-CMDI provide predictive information for future real outcomes.\textsuperscript{25} With the exception of sales growth, we find a statistically

\textsuperscript{25}In unreported results, we show that, only the SM-CMDI provides predictive information for downside risk to future real activity. One potential explanation for the lack of predictive information for the tails in the PM-CMDI is that distress in the secondary market reduces underwriter willingness to intermediate in the primary market, leading to more adverse real outcomes than a slowdown in primary market conditions alone.
significant relationship between PM-CMDI and future real outcomes, controlling for the SM-CMDI. Across all variable, a higher level of PM-CMDI — more distressed primary corporate bond market — is associated with reduced real economic activity over the next year. The magnitude of the coefficients on PM-CMDI is also comparable with that on the SM-CMDI, indicating once again the importance of conditions in both the primary and secondary market for future real outcomes.

Beyond the predictability of future real outcomes, ensuring the ease of access to public debt markets is a potential motivation for policymaker interventions. In Table 8, we investigate the contemporaneous relationship between primary market outcomes and CMDI components. Contemporaneously, only the PM-CMDI is related to measures of primary market activity, including metrics not included in the construction of the index (for example, issuance relative to total amount outstanding, columns (10)–(12)). That is, while secondary market conditions may affect future willingness of dealers to underwrite corporate debt as well as the willingness of firms to borrow at higher rates, secondary market conditions do not appear to have an immediate impact on primary market conditions. Table 8 shows that higher levels of PM-CMDI are associated with decreases in total issuance amounts — whether measured on a year-over-year growth rate, relative to refinancing needs, or relative to total amount outstanding basis — and a shift of issuance activity to higher-rated firms, as indicated by a lower primary-secondary market spread.

Such an explanation would be consistent with the “financial accelerator” channel postulated in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and subsequent literature.

26See, for example, FAQs: Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility.

27We measure the primary-secondary spread as the difference between the average primary market credit spread and the average secondary market credit spread. When the credit rating of the average issuer in the primary market is higher than the credit rating of the average bond traded in the secondary market, the primary-secondary spread becomes negative.
9 Conclusion

Indexes are well liked by market commentators and policy makers for many reasons. As early as 1884, Charles Dow sought to summarize stock market conditions averaging stock returns of a dozen companies for his newsletter. Indexes reduce dimensionality by combining multiple measures into single measures. Moreover, indexes of market distress are particularly valuable for policy makers as they can both summarize conditions and facilitate the implementation of interventions. The CMDI presents a unified measure of corporate bond market conditions broadening market distress measurement away from just identifying periods of high credit spreads or periods of increased illiquidity in secondary markets. Together with the real-time nature of the index, this makes the CMDI a valuable summary metric of market distress and functioning. Furthermore, we show that the CMDI predicts future realizations of commonly-used measures of corporate bond market distress, highlighting the timeliness of the information contained in the CMDI. The CMDI thus has clear value for times like March 2020, when corporate bond markets across the world experienced severe distress related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Federal Reserve reacted to these disruptions by introducing corporate debt purchase programs, aimed at stabilizing the flow of credit to the non-financial corporate sector, joining central banks in major advanced economies (including the U.K., Euro-area, and Japan) which were engaging in different types of corporate debt interventions.

Another benefit of indexes is that they can be more than the sum of their parts. The broad range of indicators that underlie the CMDI, spanning both primary and secondary market activity, in both price and quantity terms, reduce the risk that the index increases without a corresponding episode of market stress. The CMDI is also more than the sum of its parts – in predictive regressions, we find that the CMDI predicts real activity over the subsequent year. Moreover, the predictive power of the CMDI remains economically and statistically significant for a number of real activity metrics even after controlling for standard predictors, such as the term spread and credit spreads. This means that stress in
the corporate bond market appears to have meaningful consequences for economic outcomes more broadly. This suggests that corporate credit market conditions beyond just the credit spread may matter for real activity, providing additional stylized facts that can be targeted by structural macrofinance models.
References


Figure 1. Primary and secondary market conditions. This figure plots the time series of annualized quarterly growth rate of corporate bond liabilities for non-financial corporations together with the expected default premium (EBP) of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). Gray shaded areas indicate NBER recessions. Liabilities from Financial Accounts of the United States, Table L.103.
Figure 2. Time series of raw market conditions indicators. This figure plots the raw time series of measures of secondary and primary market functioning.

(a) Secondary market volume

(b) Secondary market liquidity

(c) Secondary market Z-spread

(d) Secondary market D-spread

(e) Quoted D-spread

(f) Primary market volume

(g) Offering D-spread
Figure 3. Category-level sub-indices. This figure plots the time series of category-level sub-indices of the corporate market dislocation index. Each sub-index is constructed as the equal-weighted average of the constituent individual measures.

(a) Secondary market volume
(b) Secondary market liquidity
(c) Quoted spread
(d) Secondary market Z-spread
(e) Secondary market D-spread
(f) Primary market volume
(g) Offering spread
Figure 4. Time-varying correlations between market indicators. This figure plots the time series of estimated time-varying pairwise correlations between the category-level sub-indices. Time-varying variance-covariance matrix estimated using an exponentially-weighted moving average with smoothing parameter $\lambda = 0.9$. 

(a) Secondary market volume

(b) Secondary market liquidity

(c) Traded-quoted spread

(d) Secondary market Z-spread

(e) Secondary market D-spread

(f) Primary market volume

(g) Primary-secondary market spread
Figure 5. Corporate bond market distress index. This figure plots the full time series of the corporate market dislocation index (Figure 5a), as well as zoomed-in to the 2020 history (Figure 5b). Gray shaded areas in Figure 5a correspond to NBER recessions; peach shaded areas correspond to the European debt crisis (Q2 2010 – Q4 2012) and the 2015 – 2016 manufacturing recession (Q3 2015 – Q3 2016). Event lines in Figure 5b at: March 22 (initial CCF announcement); April 9 (first term sheet update); May 12 (commencement of ETF purchases); June 16 (commencement of cash bond purchases); June 29 (PMCCF go-live date).

(a) Full sample

(b) 2020
Figure 6. Contributions to the CMDI. This figure plots the full time series of contributions to the corporate market dislocation index (squared) (Figure 6a), as well as zoomed-in to the 2020 history (Figure 6b).

(a) Full sample

(b) 2020
Figure 7. CMDI and common measures of financial distress. This figure plots the CMDI together with commonly used measures of distress. ETF-NAV basis computed as the assets under management weighted average across available bond ETFs at each date. “Noise” is the Hu et al. (2013) Treasury yield curve fitting error metric. NFCI is the Chicago Fed National Financial Index. CISS is the ECB’s Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress. Gray shaded areas correspond to NBER recessions; peach shaded areas correspond to the European debt crisis (Q2 2010 – Q4 2012) and the 2015 – 2016 manufacturing recession (Q3 2015 – Q3 2016).
Figure 8. Primary and secondary bond market distress index. This figure plots the full time series of the corporate market dislocation index (Figure 8a), as well as zoomed-in to the 2020 history (Figure 8b). Gray shaded areas in Figure 8a correspond to NBER recessions; peach shaded areas correspond to the European debt crisis (Q2 2010 – Q4 2012) and the 2015 – 2016 manufacturing recession (Q3 2015 – Q3 2016). Event lines in Figure 8b at: March 22 (initial CCF announcement); April 9 (first term sheet update); May 12 (commencement of ETF purchases); June 16 (commencement of cash bond purchases); June 29 (PMCCF go-live date).

(a) Full sample

(b) 2020
Table 1: Predictive relationship between secondary market conditions and primary market outcomes. This table reports the estimated coefficients from the contemporaneous regression of net corporate bond issuance and contemporaneous and predictive regressions of annualized corporate bond amount outstanding growth rate on a constant, lags of the dependent variable, the contemporaneous real effective federal funds rate, the contemporaneous 10 year - 1 year constant maturity Treasury slope, and corporate bond market conditions metrics. Corporate bond amount outstanding from Financial Accounts of the United States, Table L.103 (non-financial corporations) and Table L.110 (Depository Institutions). Corporate bond net issuance from Financial Accounts of the United States, Table F.103 (non-financial corporations) and Table F.110 (Depository Institutions). Lag-augmented (Olea and Plagborg-Møller, 2020) standard errors reported in parentheses below point estimates. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

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<td>Net issuance Current Q 1Q ahead 1Y ahead</td>
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<td>(9.02)</td>
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Table 2: Contributions to CMDI and dealer balance sheets. This table reports the estimated coefficients from the contemporaneous regression of contributions to the CMDI (squared) on a constant, one week lag of the dependent variable, and the average 5-year CDS spread on “G14” dealers. Lag-augmented (Olea and Plagborg-Møller, 2020) standard errors reported in parentheses below point estimates. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

(a) Volume metrics contribution

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<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
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(b) Liquidity metrics contribution

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<td>(0.33)**</td>
<td>(6.95)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.49)**</td>
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(c) Traded-quoted spread contribution

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(d) Duration-matched spread contribution

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<td>(0.36)**</td>
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(e) Default-adjusted spread contribution

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(f) Primary issuance contribution

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<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(4.23)</td>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
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<td>Adj. R-sqr.</td>
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(g) Primary-secondary spread contribution

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<td>(4.23)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
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Table 3: CMDI correlation with common measures of financial stress. This table reports correlation (in levels) of CMDI and common measures of financial stress. “Crisis” defined as the period from August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2009, inclusive. ETF-NAV basis computed as the assets under management weighted average across available bond ETFs at each date. NFCI is the Chicago Fed National Financial Index. CISS is the ECB’s Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress.

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<td>IG CDS-bond basis</td>
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<td>11%</td>
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<td>HY CDS-bond basis</td>
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<td>IG ETF-NAV basis</td>
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<td>HY ETF-NAV basis</td>
<td>71%</td>
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<td>C&amp;I loans credit standards</td>
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<td>CISS</td>
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<td>NFCI</td>
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<td>Unit VaR</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>33%</td>
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Table 4: Relationship between CMDI and contemporaneous market conditions. This table reports the estimated coefficients from the contemporaneous regression of VIX, nominal and real Treasury noise, NFCI, CISS, duration-matched spreads, bid-ask spreads, IG and HY absolute CDS bond-basis, IG and HY ETF-NAV basis, on a constant, one week lag of the dependent variable, and corporate bond market conditions metrics. “Noise” is the Hu et al. (2013) Treasury yield curve fitting error metric. NFCI is the Chicago Fed National Financial Index. CISS is the ECB’s Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress. VIX, nominal and real Treasury noise divided by 100 in the regressions. Lag-augmented (Olea and Plagborg-Møller, 2020) standard errors reported in parentheses below point estimates. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

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Table 5: CMDI and future market conditions. This table reports the estimated coefficients from the predictive regression of future duration-matched spreads, bid-ask spreads, IG and HY absolute CDS bond-basis, IG and HY ETF-NAV basis, on a constant, one week lag of the dependent variable, and corporate bond market conditions metrics. Lag-augmented (Olea and Plagborg-Møller, 2020) standard errors reported in parentheses below point estimates. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

(a) 6 months ahead

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(b) 12 months ahead

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<th></th>
<th>VIX</th>
<th>Bid-ask spread</th>
<th>Duration-matched spread</th>
<th>CDS-bond basis</th>
<th>IG CDS-bond basis</th>
<th>HY CDS-bond basis</th>
<th>ETF-NAV basis</th>
<th>IG ETF-NAV basis</th>
<th>HY ETF-NAV basis</th>
<th>CMDI</th>
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<td>0.81</td>
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(c) 18 months ahead

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VIX</th>
<th>Bid-ask spread</th>
<th>Duration-matched spread</th>
<th>CDS-bond basis</th>
<th>IG CDS-bond basis</th>
<th>HY CDS-bond basis</th>
<th>ETF-NAV basis</th>
<th>IG ETF-NAV basis</th>
<th>HY ETF-NAV basis</th>
<th>CMDI</th>
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Table 6: CMDI and real activity. This table reports the estimated coefficients from the predictive regression of one-year ahead industrial production, unemployment, real business fixed investment, real GDP, capital expenditures and sales growth on a constant, one year lag of the dependent variable, the contemporaneous real effective federal funds rate, the contemporaneous 10 year - 1 year constant maturity Treasury slope, and corporate bond market conditions metrics. Lag-augmented (Olea and Plagborg-Møller, 2020) standard errors reported in parentheses below point estimates. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
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<td>Real GDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market CMDI</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-1.64</td>
<td>8.25***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>G-Z spread</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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<td>-1.64</td>
<td>8.25***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj. R-sqr.</td>
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<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.70</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
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</table>
Table 7: Primary and Secondary market CMDI and real activity. This table reports the estimated coefficients from the predictive regression of one-year ahead industrial production, unemployment, real business fixed investment, real GDP, capital expenditures and sales growth on a constant, one year lag of the dependent variable, the contemporaneous real effective federal funds rate, the contemporaneous 10 year - 1 year constant maturity Treasury slope, and primary and secondary corporate bond market conditions metrics. Lag-augmented (Olea and Plagborg-Møller, 2020) standard errors reported in parentheses below point estimates. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ind. prod.</th>
<th>UR</th>
<th>Investment</th>
<th>Real GDP</th>
<th>CAPEX</th>
<th>Sales</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>PM CMDI</td>
<td>-7.09</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>-22.02</td>
<td>-3.45</td>
<td>-34.26</td>
<td>-11.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.70)*</td>
<td>(0.57)**</td>
<td>(8.36)**</td>
<td>(1.24)**</td>
<td>(15.94)**</td>
<td>(17.08)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>SM CMDI</td>
<td>-19.80</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>-18.45</td>
<td>-6.84</td>
<td>-32.85</td>
<td>-33.48</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.01)**</td>
<td>(1.06)**</td>
<td>(7.31)**</td>
<td>(1.14)**</td>
<td>(14.42)**</td>
<td>(15.19)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-sqr.</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<td>158</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
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</table>
Table 8: Primary and Secondary market CMDI and primary market activity. This table reports the estimated coefficients from the contemporaneous regression of primary market activity metrics on a constant, one week lag of the dependent variable, and corporate bond market conditions metrics. “Offering amt. gr.” is the year-over-year change in dollar amount issued in week $t$; “PM-SM spread” is the difference between the average primary market credit spread and the average secondary market credit spread; “Offering rel. to maturing” is the dollar offering amount relative to amount of outstanding debt maturing within the next 12 months; “Offering rel. to amt. out.” is the dollar offering amount relative to total amount outstanding as of the week prior. Lag-augmented (Olea and Plagborg-Møller, 2020) standard errors reported in parentheses below point estimates. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Offering amt. gr.</th>
<th>PM-SM spread</th>
<th>Offering rel. to maturing</th>
<th>Offering rel. to amt. out.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PM CMDI</strong></td>
<td>-358.89</td>
<td>-364.65</td>
<td>-584.52</td>
<td>-569.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61.80)***</td>
<td>(62.07)***</td>
<td>(48.72)***</td>
<td>(49.54)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SM CMDI</strong></td>
<td>82.74</td>
<td>97.73</td>
<td>49.68</td>
<td>70.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(108.93)</td>
<td>(109.70)</td>
<td>(81.65)</td>
<td>(71.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-sqr.</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>N. of obs</td>
<td>769</td>
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54
A Technical appendix

A.1 TRACE data cleaning

In our analysis, we use TRACE data provided by FINRA at the end of each business day. Starting in July 2002, each registered FINRA member that is a party to a reportable transaction in a TRACE-eligible security has a reporting obligation. The reporting is done in real-time. The set of TRACE-eligible securities has changed throughout the years. We start our sample in 2005, when all investment-grade and high-yield U.S. corporate bonds were included in the TRACE-eligible securities definition (except for 144A). A trade report includes the security identifier, date, time, size (par value), and price of the transaction. A report also identifies the member firm’s side of the transaction (buy or sell), their capacity as a principal or agent, and the other parties to the transaction. The required reporting time varies between categories of TRACE-eligible securities. Member firms must report a secondary corporate bond transaction as soon as practicable, no later than within 15 minutes of the time of execution. There are a few issues that need to be addressed:

1. Correction and Cancellations. A trade record that is corrected or cancelled at a later time because of misreporting remains on the tape, and additional records indicate its current status.

   **What do we do?** We keep the most recent status of each trade record based on the system control number and the record type.

2. Interdealer Trades. The reporting requirements require all registered broker-dealers (BDs) to report to TRACE. Hence, a trade between two BDs is reported twice, while a trade between a client and a BD is reported once.

   **What do we do?** To keep one record of each trade, we keep the sell side of an interdealer trade.

3. Non-Member Affiliates. While BDs are identified in trade records, clients’ identities are masked, and all clients are reported as “C”. Effective on November 2, 2015, firms are required to identify transactions with non-member affiliates, entering “A” instead of “C” if the affiliate is a non-FINRA member.

   The reporting rule amendment also requires firms to use an indicator to identify certain trades that typically are not economically distinct and, as such, would not provide investors useful information for pricing, valuation or risk evaluation purposes if disseminated publicly. Specifically, FINRA is requiring firms to identify trades with non-member affiliates that occur within the same day and at the same price as a trade between the firm and another contra-party in the same security. Thus, firms are required to use “non-member affiliate—principal transaction indicator” when reporting a transaction to TRACE in which both the member and its non-member affiliate act in a principal capacity, and where such trade occurs within the same day, at the same price and in the same security as a transaction between the member and another counter-party. A firm is not required to append the indicator if it does not reasonably expect
to engage in a same day, same price transaction in the same security with another
counterparty as with a non-member affiliate.

What do we do? We exclude records where the field SPCL_PRCSG_CD is non-
missing. In addition, for volume calculations, we break down dealer-to-client (DC) and
dealer-to-affiliate (DA) trading activity. We exclude non-member affiliate trades with
the same price and the same size that happen within 60 seconds of each other.

4. Trades on Electronic Platforms. With the growth of electronic trading platforms,
we see more transactions being executed through such platforms. Electronic platforms
may or may not have a reporting obligation. The reporting obligation of an electronic
platform is dependent on whether the platform is a party to the trade, and a registered
alternative trading system (ATS) with the SEC. An ATS platform is a party to all
transactions executed through its system, and therefore has a reporting obligation. An
electronic platform that is not an ATS is not necessarily a party to all trades executed
through its system so may not always have a reporting obligation.

Trades on an electronic platform which also has a reporting obligation increases the
number of observations in the TRACE data. For example, a trade between two member
firms on an electronic platform with a reporting obligation results in four observations
in the TRACE data: a sell by the first member firm to the platform, a purchase by
the platform from the first member firm, a sell by the platform to the second member
firm, and a purchase by the second member firm from the platform. This needs to
be addressed to avoid an upward-bias of trading activity, and a downward bias of
price-based liquidity measures.

What do we do? Depending on the analysis, one might want to flag such trades.
We use the counterparties identities and FINRA’s TRACE ATS identifiers list to flag
such trades. We also construct an additional trade size variable that reset to 0 if
the seller is an ATS platform. For trading volume calculations, for example, we use the
ATS-adjusted volume variable. If we do not account for multiple trade reports, then we
would include some trades more than once depending on whether the counterparties are
FINRA members and whether an electronic platform also had a reporting obligation.
This would result in an overestimation of the trading activity on electronic platforms
with a reporting obligation (e.g., non-6732 ATSs), and an inaccurate comparison of the
trading activity between platforms with different reporting obligations (e.g., 6732 ATSs
and non-6732 ATSs). Overall, the filter that we apply to the TRACE data ensures that
we include each trade only once in our sample.

A.2 Secondary market metrics definitions

Metrics of volume

- *Intermediated volume*: is defined as the ratio between the total volume across all trades
  between dealers and either customers or affiliates (“D2CA”) and the total volume across
  all trades in-between dealers (“D2D”). When intermediated volume is low, a lot of
  interdealer trades are necessary to reallocate bonds across end holders, and the market
is more likely to be stressed. We compute the intermediated volume at the week-cusip level, then aggregate to either the market or the credit-rating level by taking the median across corresponding bonds. As electronic trading became more prevalent, intermediated volume has trended down, as can be seen in the blue line in Figure A.1a. We thus only use the most recent 2 years of data in computing the empirical CDF standardization for intermediated volume.

- **Customer buy-sell pressure ratio**: is defined as the ratio between the buy flow of customers and the sell flow of customers. When the ratio is low, there is more one-sided selling of customer and the market is more likely to be stressed. We compute customer buy-sell pressure ratio at the day-cusip level, and then we take the weekly average to get to the week-cusip level. We aggregate to either the market or the credit rating level by taking the mean across all bonds.

- **Average trade size**: is the average D2CA trade size across all bonds traded within the week. When average trade size is smaller, customers have to split their trades to make the transaction more palatable to dealers, indicating less willingness to intermediate. As with the intermediated volume, average trade size (blue line in Figure A.1b) has traded down since the advent of electronic trading. We thus only use the most recent 2 years of data in computing the empirical CDF standardization for average trade size.

- **Turnover**: is the total volume as a fraction of the remaining amount outstanding in the bond as of the trade date. When turnover is high, a large fraction of amount outstanding is re-allocated across end holders, and the market is more likely to be stressed. We compute turnover at the week-cusip level, then aggregate to either the market or the credit-rating level by taking the median across corresponding bonds. We only use the most recent 2 years of data in computing the empirical CDF standardization for average trade size.

Figure A.1c shows that turnover is particularly low the last week of each month and the first week of every quarter, as the market prepares itself for monthly rebalancing by fund managers at the start of each month. We correct for this seasonality by replacing the turnover in those weeks with the four-week moving average (red line in Figure A.1c).

**Metrics of secondary market liquidity**

- **Effective bid-ask spread**: the (effective) bid-ask spread is the difference between the trade-size-weighted average price of the trades where customers buy from dealers and the trade-size-weighted average price of the trades where customers sell to dealers. Negative observations are set to zero to maintain the intuition of the measure as a transaction cost:

  \[
  \text{bas}_{b,t} = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{N_{b,t}} P_{n,b} V_{n,b}}{\sum_{n=1}^{N_{b,t}} P_{n,b} V_{n,b}} - \frac{\sum_{m=1}^{M_{b,t}} P_{m,b} V_{m,b}}{\sum_{m=1}^{M_{b,t}} P_{m,b} V_{m,b}},
  \]

  where \(N_{b,t}\) is the number of customer buy trades in bond \(b\) in date \(t\), \(M_{b,t}\) is the number of customer sell trades, \(P_{.,b}\) is the traded price and \(V_{.,b}\) the traded volume.
in each trade. We compute the effective bid-ask spread at the week-bond level, and compute the volume-weighted average to aggregate the bid-ask spread to either the market or the credit rating level.

- **TW spread**: the Thompson and Waller (1987) bid-ask spread estimator is the average of non-zero price changes throughout the day. This estimator works well in settings where trades but no quotes are available, and is computed as

\[
t_{\text{w}_{b,t}} = \frac{1}{N_{b,t}} \sum_{n=1}^{N_{b,t}} |\Delta P_{n,b}|,
\]

where \(N_{b,t}\) is the number of non-zero price changes on bond \(b\) in date \(t\). We compute the TW bid-ask spread at the week-bond level, and compute the volume-weighted average to compute the TW spread at either the market or the credit rating level.

- **Price impact**: the Amihud (2002) price impact is defined as the absolute return of consecutive transactions per million of trade volume, averaged across all the D2C trades in a day:

\[
\text{Price impact}_{b,t} = \frac{1}{N_{b,t}} \sum_{n=1}^{N_{b,t}} \frac{|r_{n,b}|}{V_{n,b}} \times 10^6.
\]

We compute the price impact at the week-bond level, and compute the volume-weighted average to construct the price impact at either the market or the credit rating level.

- **Imputed round trip cost**: to compute the Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) imputed round trip cost, we identify transactions in a given bond with the same trade size occurring on the same day. For each set of imputed round-trip trades, the imputed round-trip cost is:

\[
IRC_{b,t} = 100 \times \frac{P_{\text{max},b} - P_{\text{min},b}}{P_{\text{min},b}},
\]

where \(P_{\text{max},b}\) is the highest price within an imputed round-trip trade set, and \(P_{\text{min},b}\) is the lowest price within an imputed round-trip trade set. We aggregate to the weekly-credit rating level by taking the median across bonds within a week.

**Secondary market credit spread metrics** We begin by computing duration-matched spreads at the bond-trade level. As in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), define the Treasury-implied yield \(y_{b,t}^f\) on bond \(b\) on trade date \(t\) as

\[
\sum_{s=1}^{2T} \frac{C_b}{2} Z_t \left( \frac{s}{2} \right) + 100Z_t(T) = \sum_{s=1}^{2T} \frac{C_b}{2} \left( 1 + \frac{y_{b,t}^f}{2} \right)^s + \frac{100}{1 + \frac{y_{b,t}^f}{2}}^{2T},
\]
where $T$ is the time-to-maturity of the bond, $C_b$ is the coupon on the bond, and $Z_t(s)$ is the Treasury zero-coupon bond price for time-to-maturity $s$. The trade-level duration-matched spread on bond $b$ on trade date $t$ is then

$$z_{b,k,t} = y_{b,k,t} - y_{b,t}^f,$$

where $y_{b,k,t}$ is the yield on bond $b$ priced in trade $k$ on trade date $t$. We aggregate to the bond-trade day level by averaging using trading volume weights:

$$z_{b,t} = \frac{\sum_{k \in K_{b,t}} z_{b,k,t} V_{b,k,t}}{\sum_{k \in K_{b,t}} V_{b,k,t}},$$

where $K_{b,t}$ is the set of all trades in bond $b$ in on trading day $t$ and $V_{b,k,t}$ is the volume of the $k^{th}$ trade in bond $b$ on trade date $t$.

Duration-matched spreads measure the spread differential between corporate bonds and Treasuries with similar duration, capturing risk premia for both the differential credit and liquidity risk between Treasuries and corporate bonds. To separate these two components, similar to Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), we estimate the duration-matched spread that would be predicted based on bond and issuer characteristics using the following regression

$$\log z_{b,t} = \alpha + \beta \text{EDF}_{b,t} + \gamma \text{F}_{b,t} + \epsilon_{b,t},$$

where $\text{EDF}_{b,t}$ is the one year expected default probability for bond $b$ on day $t$ estimated by Moody’s KMV,\(^{28}\) and $\text{F}_{b,t}$ is a vector of bond and issuer characteristics: log duration, log amount outstanding, log age of the bond, log coupon rate, a dummy for call provision, and a 3-digit NAICS industry fixed effect.\(^{29}\) When bond-level EDFs are not available, we use the issuer-level EDF instead and include a dummy variable for whether bond- or issuer-level EDF is used in the specification. EDFs measure the probability of a firm’s bond experiencing a credit event (failure to make a scheduled principal or interest payment) over the following year, constructed from a Merton (1974)-style model. EDFs thus provide a timely measure of the credit worthiness of both the firm as a whole and the firm’s individual bonds, for both private and public firms.

We estimate this regression on an expanding-window basis, using the first 2 years of the sample (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2006) to initialize, separately for each credit rating category, allowing different credit ratings to have a different relationship between expected duration-matched spreads and bond characteristics.\(^{30}\) The default-adjusted spread for bond $b$ on date $t$ is then calculated as the difference between the priced and the predicted duration-matched spread on bond $b$ on date $t$

$$d_{b,t} = z_{b,t} - \exp \left\{ \alpha + \beta \text{EDF}_{b,t} + \gamma \text{F}_{b,t} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \right\},$$


\(^{29}\)The full-sample version of the regression also includes rating fixed effects.

\(^{30}\)Table A.1 reports the estimated coefficients for the above regression for the full sample January 1, 2005 – November 28, 2020.
where $\sigma^2$ is the estimated variance of the idiosyncratic error $\epsilon_{b,t}$. Figure A.2a plots the time series of the expanding-window and the full-sample estimate of the market-level default-adjusted spread. With the benefit of hindsight, the full-sample estimates the default-adjusted spread to have been negative in the run-up to the financial crisis, but the real-time estimate of the spread during that period is positive.

For both the duration-matched and default-adjusted spread measures, we calculate the following.

- **Spread mean and volatility**: for average and volatility of spreads, we average the bond-level daily metric to market/credit rating × week level using volume weights. We then estimate an “ARCH-in-mean” model (see e.g. Engle et al., 1987) for the weekly time series at the market/credit rating level, and use the predicted mean and volatility from that model as our measure of weekly average spread and volatility:

$$\text{Spread}_{r,t} = \alpha_r + \varphi_r \text{Spread}_{r,t-1} + \theta_r h_{r,t} + \epsilon_{r,t}$$

$$h_{r,t} = \delta_r + \beta_r \epsilon_{r,t-1}^2 + \theta_r h_{r,t-1}.$$  

We estimate the ARCH-in-mean model on an expanding window basis, using the first 2 years of the sample (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2006) to initialize. Figures A.2c–A.2f plot the real-time and expanding sample estimated mean and volatility of the duration-matched and default-adjusted market spreads. As a longer history becomes available, the ARCH-in-mean model has sufficient observations to estimate the time-varying volatility component of the model, and fits a constant volatility otherwise.

- **Interquartile range**: we compute the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile of bond-week level spreads for trading week.

Conditions for non-traded bonds

- **Quoted default-adjusted spread**: we compute equal-weighted average default-adjusted spreads for bonds with quotes in the ICE-BAML database, at either the market or credit rating category level, as well the interquartile range. For the market (credit rating category) level spread, we estimate an “ARCH-in-mean” model (see e.g. Engle et al., 1987) for the weekly time series at the market/credit rating level, and use the predicted mean and volatility from that model as our measure of weekly average spread and volatility.

A.3 Primary market metrics definitions

**Primary market volumes** We construct two metrics of primary market issuance: dollar amount issued relative to the average issuance in the same week of the year over the previous five years and dollar amount issued relative to the amount outstanding maturing in the next year. Considering issuance relative to historical issuance allows us to account for both the overall positive time trend in bond issuance as well as seasonality in the timing of corporate bond issuance, while issuance relative to maturing within the next year captures the ability
of companies to satisfy their re-financing needs. Figure A.1d shows that, at a weekly level, these primary market volume metrics are quite volatile, reflecting the relatively long time-to-market of corporate bond issuance. We smooth these series by first averaging offering amounts across weeks until we observe issuance from at least 20 individual issuers, and then estimating an exponential “ARCH-in-mean” model for the ratio of the smoothed offering amount relative to 5 year average and for the ratio of the smoothed offering amount relative to maturing amount outstanding. The corresponding predicted means are plotted in red in Figures A.1d and A.1f.

**Primary market pricing** As with the secondary market, we construct two measures of primary market credit spreads: duration-matched offering spread and default-adjusted offering spread. We use offering-amount-weighted averaging to construct the time series of market-level primary default-adjusted spreads, averaging across all fixed coupon bonds that satisfy the sample inclusion criteria outlined in Section 1. As with primary market volumes, we average across weeks until we observe issuance from at least 20 individual issuers. We estimate an “ARCH-in-mean” model (see e.g. Engle et al., 1987) for the weekly time series at the market/credit rating level, and use the predicted mean and volatility from that model as our measure of weekly average spread and volatility, as plotted in Figure A.1i.

**A.4 Common measures of financial stress**

**Treasury curve fitting errors** We use nominal and real Treasury curve fitting errors provided by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Treasury curve fitting errors are constructed as the average absolute fitting errors (in basis points) from the Nelson–Siegel–Svensson fit of the Treasury (Gurkaynak et al., 2007) and TIPS curves (Gurkaynak et al., 2010).

**ETF-NAV basis** We collect daily price per share, net asset value (NAV), and assets under management (AUM) data on the largest 48 investment-grade and the largest 68 high-yield bond exchange traded funds (ETFs) from Bloomberg. A bond ETF is considered to be “investment grade” if it specializes in investing in investment-grade-rated corporate securities, and “high yield” if it specializes in investing in high-yield-rated corporate securities. For each day-ETF observation, we compute the ETF-NAV basis as the basis point relative difference between the price per share and the fund’s NAV:

\[
\text{ETF-NAV basis}_{f,t} = 100 \times 100 \times \frac{P_{f,t} - \text{NAV}_{f,t}}{\text{NAV}_{f,t}}.
\]

When the ETF-NAV basis is positive, a share in the ETF costs more than the replicating basket of individual bonds. Given the panel of fund-level ETF-NAV basis, we construct the

---

31 See e.g. Almeida et al. (2012).

32 As with the secondary market, we estimate the explanatory regression for duration-matched spreads on expanding-window basis, using the first 2 years of the sample (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2006) to initialize, separately for each credit rating category, allowing different credit ratings to have a different relationship between expected duration-matched spreads and bond characteristics. Table A.2 reports the estimated coefficients for the primary market duration-matched spreads regression for the full sample January 1, 2005 – November 28, 2020.
time series of the credit rating category level absolute ETF-NAV basis as the AUM-weighted average of fund-level ETF-NAV bases across funds in each rating category at each date:

$$\text{ETF-NAV basis}_{IG,t} = \frac{\sum_{f \in IG} AUM_{f,t} |\text{ETF-NAV basis}_{f,t}|}{\sum_{f \in IG} AUM_{f,t}}$$

$$\text{ETF-NAV basis}_{HY,t} = \frac{\sum_{f \in HY} AUM_{f,t} |\text{ETF-NAV basis}_{f,t}|}{\sum_{f \in HY} AUM_{f,t}}.$$  

We then average each basis time series within the week to obtain a week-credit rating category ETF-NAV basis.

**Dealer Value-at-Risk** We follow Adrian and Shin (2013) to construct the average 99% unit dealer Value-at-Risk (VaR) as follows. We start with the total VaR disclosed by 11 major commercial and investment banks,$^{33}$ obtained from Bloomberg.$^{34}$ For those firms that report VaRs at the 95% confidence level, we scale the VaR to the 99% using the Gaussian assumption. We then compute the dealer-level unit VaR as the ratio between the (potentially imputed) 99% VaR and total assets of the dealer. Finally, we average across dealers using lagged assets as weights.

**A.5 Credit rating categories**

To construct credit-rating-level indices, we first coalesce bond-level ratings by multiple rating agencies into a single number based on the plurality rule: if a bond is rated by more than one agency, we use the rating agreed upon by at least two rating agencies and use the lowest available rating otherwise. For secondary market measures, we use the bond-level ratings contemporaneous with the trade date. For primary market measures, we use ratings closest to the bond’s offering date, restricting that each rating is issued no less than 7 days prior to the offering date and no more than 30 days after the offering date. Bonds rated BBB- or above are considered to be “investment grade”. Bonds rated below BBB- but above DDD are considered to be “high yield”.

**A.6 Real outcomes for publicly-listed firms**

We use balance sheet data from COMPUSTAT. From the universe of firms that have observations in the quarterly dataset, we remove financial firms (SIC code between 6000 and 6999, inclusive), “miscellaneous” firms (SIC codes 9900 and above), unclassified firms (missing SIC code), and observations with missing total assets or negative total assets. We compute four-quarter-ahead log growth rates of quarterly capital expenditures and sales at the firm-quarter level, and average to the aggregate level using lagged assets as weights. Figure A.4 plots the resulting aggregate time series, together with the market-level CMDI realizations.

$^{33}$Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse, Deutschebank, and UBS.

$^{34}$The Bloomberg code is ARDR_TOTAL_VALUE_AT_RISK.
Table A.1: Estimated relationship between secondary market duration-matched spreads and characteristics. This table reports the estimated coefficients from the regression of secondary market log duration-matched spreads on bond-level 1 year expected default frequency (EDF) and bond issuer characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the issuer-quarter level reported in parentheses below the point estimates. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

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<td>-5.17***</td>
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<td>-4.03***</td>
<td>-3.82***</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
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<td>-0.06***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.14***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
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<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
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<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
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<td>0.20</td>
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Table A.2: Estimated relationship between primary market duration-matched spreads and characteristics. This table reports the estimated coefficients from the regression of primary market log duration-matched spreads on bond-level 1 year expected default frequency (EDF) and bond issuer characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the issuer-quarter level reported in parentheses below the point estimates. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

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<td>(0.09)</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log coupon</td>
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<td>0.43***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.69***</td>
<td>0.79***</td>
<td>0.88***</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log offering amount</td>
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<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Callable</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
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<td>EDF_{1y}× Bond EDF dummy</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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Figure A.1. Raw and smoothed time series. This figure plots the raw and smoothed time series of measures of secondary and primary market functioning. Turnover smoothed to remove end-of-month and beginning-of-quarter seasonality. Intermediated volume and average trade size detrended relative to a lagged one year (52 week) moving average. Primary market metrics (offering amount growth, number of issues growth, amount outstanding issued relative to maturing amount, number of bonds issued relative to maturing bonds) smoothed by applying a four week moving average to both the numerator and denominator. Primary-secondary spreads smoothed by applying a four week moving average.

(a) Intermediated volume

(b) Average trade size

(c) Secondary market turnover

(d) YoY offering amount growth

(e) YoY number of issues growth

(f) Offering amount relative to maturing

(g) Offering bonds relative to maturing

(h) PM-SM duration-matched spread

(i) PM-SM default-adjusted spread
Figure A.2. Full-sample and expanding sample spread estimates. This figure plots full-sample and the expanding-sample default-adjusted spread, as well as the full-sample and the expanding-sample GARCH model estimates. The expanding sample initialized with the first two years of data (January 2, 2005 – December 30, 2006).

(a) Default-adjusted spread level
(b) Default-adjusted spread dispersion
(c) Duration-matched, mean
(d) Duration-matched, volatility
(e) Default-adjusted, mean
(f) Default-adjusted, volatility
Figure A.3. Full-sample and expanding sample ECDF estimates. This figure plots full-sample and the expanding-sample empirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDFs) of measures of secondary and primary market functioning. The expanding sample ECDF initialized with the first two years of data (January 2, 2005 – December 30, 2006).

(a) Intermediated volume
(b) Avg. trade size
(c) Turnover
(d) Customer buy-sell pressure

(e) Bid-ask spread
(f) T/W spread
(g) Price impact
(h) Round-trip cost

(i) Avg. Z-spread
(j) Vol. Z-spread
(k) Disp. Z-spread
(l) Avg. D-spread

(m) Vol. D-spread
(n) Disp. D-spread
(o) Trd-quoted Z-spread
(p) Trd-quoted D-spread

(q) PM-SM Z spread
(r) PM-SM D spread

(s) Offering amount growth
(t) Offering number growth

(u) Iss. rel. to maturing amount
(v) Iss. rel. to maturing number
Figure A.4. COMPUSTAT growth series. This figure plots the time series of aggregate cumulative four-quarter-ahead log CAPEX and sales growth, computed as the lagged-assets-weighted average of firm-level growth rates. Sample includes non-financial firms only.