Staff Reports
Central Bank Transparency under Model Uncertainty
January 2005 Number 199
JEL classification: E52, E31, E63

Author: Stefano Eusepi

This paper explores the effects of central bank transparency on the performance of optimal inflation targeting rules. I assume that both the central bank and the private sector face uncertainty about the "correct" model of the economy and have to learn. A transparent central bank can reduce one source of uncertainty for private agents by communicating its policy rule to the public.

The paper shows that central bank transparency plays a crucial role in stabilizing the agents’ learning process and expectations. By contrast, lack of transparency can lead to expectations-driven fluctuations that have destabilizing effects on the economy, even when the central bank has adopted optimal policies.

Available only in PDFPDF36 pages / 485 kb
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