Mortgage Contract Design: Implications for Households, Monetary Policy, and Financial Stability
|May 20-21, 2015|
The design of mortgage contracts varies strikingly across countries and through time, in terms of interest rate sensitivity, callability, maturity and other dimensions. For example, long‐term prepayable fixed‐rate mortgages predominate in the US and Denmark, while variable‐rate contracts tied to short‐term interest rates are popular in the UK, Canada, Australia and a number of other countries. These differences reflect a variety of factors ranging from household preferences to housing finance regulation, and have important implications for monetary policy transmission, financial stability, household finance and portfolio choice.
The conference is sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in association with the NYU Stern School of Business Center for Real Estate Finance Research and the Journal of Financial Economics.
The conference aims at bringing together financial economists, macroeconomists, practitioners and policy makers. The conference is by invitation only.
|Agenda: Day 1>> / Day 2>>|
This event is open to the media. Chatham House Rule will be in effect for all but the welcoming and keynote remarks; media may report on comments made during the event, but may not attribute remarks to individuals or organizations. To register, please contact Andrea Priest at the New York Fed, firstname.lastname@example.org or (212) 720-6139.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
John Campbell, Harvard University
|Academic Program Committee|
Arvind Krishnamurthy, Northwestern University
Please address any questions to: email@example.com.