Staff Reports
Buy Big or Buy Small? Procurement Policies, Firms' Financing, and the Macroeconomy
Previous title: “Government Procurement and Access to Credit: Firm Dynamics and Aggregate Implications”
Number 1006
February 2022 Revised June 2023

JEL classification: E22, E23, E62, G32

Authors: Julian di Giovanni, Manuel García-Santana, Priit Jeenas, Enrique Moral-Benito, and Josep Pijoan-Mas

This paper provides a framework to study how different allocation systems of public procurement contracts affect firm dynamics and long-run macroeconomic outcomes. We build a novel panel data set for Spain that merges public procurement data, credit register loan data, and quasi-census firm-level data. We provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that procurement contracts act as collateral for firms and help them grow out of their financial constraints. We then build a model of firm dynamics with asset and earnings-based borrowing constraints and a government that buys goods and services from private sector firms and use it to quantify the long-run macroeconomic consequences of alternative procurement allocation systems. We find that policies that promote the participation of small firms have sizeable macroeconomic effects, but the net impact on aggregate output is ambiguous. While these policies help small firms grow and overcome financial constraints, which increases output in the long run, these policies also increase the cost of government purchases and reduce saving incentives for large firms, decreasing the effective provision of public goods and output in the private sector, respectively. The relative importance of these forces depends on how the policy is implemented and the type and strength of financial frictions.

Available only in PDF
Author Disclosure Statement(s)
Julian di Giovanni
I declare that I have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Prior to circulation, this paper was reviewed in accordance with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s review policy, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/index.html.

Manuel García-Santana
I declare that I have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Prior to circulation, this paper was reviewed in accordance with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s review policy, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/index.html.

Priit Jeenas
I declare that I have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Prior to circulation, this paper was reviewed in accordance with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s review policy, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/index.html.

Enrique Moral-Benito
I declare that I have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Prior to circulation, this paper was reviewed in accordance with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s review policy, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/index.html.

Josep Pijoan-Mas
I declare that I have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Prior to circulation, this paper was reviewed in accordance with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s review policy, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/index.html.
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