Staff Reports
When Does a Central Bank’s Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support?
November 2014   Number 701
Revised: March 2015
JEL classification: E58, E59

Authors: Marco Del Negro and  Christopher A. Sims

Using a simple general equilibrium model, we argue that it would be appropriate for a central bank with a large balance sheet composed of long-duration nominal assets to have access to, and be willing to ask for, support for its balance sheet by the fiscal authority. Otherwise, its ability to control inflation may be at risk. This need for balance sheet support—a within-government transaction—is distinct from the need for fiscal backing of inflation policy that arises even in models where the central bank’s balance sheet is merged with that of the rest of the government.

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Author disclosure statement(s)
For a published version of this report, see Marco Del Negro and Christopher A. Sims, "When Does a Central Bank’s Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support?" Journal of Monetary Economics 73 (July 2015): 1-19.
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